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This thesis engages in a comparative analysis of two key ethnopolitical case studies 
drawn from Bolivia and Mexico. The intention is to critically evaluate the politically 
diverse ways in which Indigenous groups respond to the challenge of coloniality as 
they seek to restore their ethnic rights. The 2011 TIPNIS conflict between President 
Evo Morales (2006-2019) and lowland Indigenous communities reveals the difficulties 
faced by Bolivia’s former Indigenous president who struggled to find equilibrium 
between ethnic rights and national economic development. While Morales himself 
claimed to represent the interests of all Bolivian ethnic groups, the TIPNIS conflict 
showed that a policy of neoextractivism in combination with territorial development 
intersected with the struggle for ethnoterritoriality to reproduce scenes of chaos, 
conflict and socio-territorial change which sometimes distorted, at other times, 
enhanced his image as an Andean-decoloniser. Comparatively, in 2003, the Zapatista 
social justice movement bypassed Mexican state relations in order to satisfy their 
search for ethnoterritoriality. While the Zapatistas struggled in the midst of this 
pursuit against a global capitalist framework, which they claim, masquerades as 
international free-trade alliances and foreign corporatism, the rebels have become an 
important ethnopolitical model of resistance in the context of a neoliberal Mexico. 
Conceptually framed around notions of place and space, this interdisciplinary study 
uses a broad range of theoretical approaches (decolonial theory, discourse theory, 
utopia studies) which facilitates an innovative reading of key speeches, declarations, 
government policy documents, communiqués and locally-sourced journalistic material 
and relies on a range of scholarship drawn from cultural studies, political science, 
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anthropology and philosophy. Through its comparative design, this thesis not only 
generates fresh and original perspectives on contemporary ethnopolitical activity 
between Mexico and Bolivia but also reveals the challenges, opportunities, similarities 
and differences which shape diverse forms of ethnopolitcal resistance across the 
























In Latin American Studies, ethnopolitics, or the study of Indigenous political activism, 
has evolved across a range of scholarship, enhanced by an understanding of how 
Indigenous social movements resist the politics of the international neoliberal order 
from their specific places and spaces of ethnopolitical thought and action. From the 
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (hereafter EZLN) in Mexico, which advances 
a model of ethnopolitical autonomy outside the legal and conceptual limits of the 
neoliberal state, to the politics of Evo Morales (2006-2019) and the Movimiento Al 
Socialismo – Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (hereafter MAS-
IPSP), which formally shaped and reworked the foundations of Bolivian state matter in 
a more ethnically inclusive way, it is clear that ethnopolitics is practiced in diverse 
ways, across multiple geographies, producing a host of often opposing outcomes. 
While scholarship tends to endorse alterity in the analysis of ethnopolitical social 
movements in Latin America (López Caballero and Acevedo-Rodrigo 2018), frequently 
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locating the study of Indigenous political activism within specific local and national 
contexts, this thesis offers the reader an alternative view whereby I explore the 
implications of ethnopolitical research from a "hemispheric frame of reference" 
(Castellanos et al. 2012: 1). What happens to our understanding of ethnopolitics in 
Latin America when framed within a comparative context? Does a comparative 
methodology allow for a more critical reading of different Indigenous struggles and 
social movements in Latin America? By drawing together two separate case studies 
from Mexico and Bolivia, this thesis develops an innovative comparative approach to 
ethnopolitical research that generates a series of interesting perspectives in relation to 
the challenges, opportunities, similarities and differences which shape ethnopolitical 
resistance across the region. 
 From the outset, however, I must address the recent changes to occur in Bolivia 
and how these events impact this study. 2019 was an election year in Bolivia with 
elections being held across the country on 20th October. Several candidates contested 
the elections including Evo Morales (MAS-IPSP) and his main opposition, former 
president Carlos Mesa (2003-2005; Alianza Comunidad Ciudadana). While early 
election figures placed Morales ahead, with a firm lead, a delay in the release of official 
polling figures sparked rumour and suspicion that fraud had been perpetrated by the 
MAS-IPSP. Both protests for and against Morales quickly became visible on the streets 
of major cities. Moreover, the Organisation of American States (OAS) intervened to 
question the integrity of the results. Mesa and the Alianza Comunidad Ciudadana 
subsequently called for fresh elections as demonstrations on the streets against 
Morales rapidly escalated. By 9th November members of the police and the military 
had renounced support for Morales and violent, racist attacks against MASistas (MAS-
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IPSP loyalists) had resulted in some deaths (Hylton 2019).1 To restore some semblance 
of order and prevent further attacks on his core support base (cocaleros or coca leaf 
farmers) Morales, pressured by the military, resigned his post (10th November) and 
went into exile first to Mexico before seeking asylum in Argentina. By 12th November, 
Janeine Áñez, senator and party-member of the right-wing Unidad Nacional alliance 
was sworn in as interim president.  
The breakneck speed with which events unfolded in Bolivia caused obvious 
tension and confusion among scholars, intellectuals and observers. There is, however, 
a broad divide between those who view this as nothing less than a coup d'état 
(Mosquera 2020) and those who consider it more the ousting of a president who 
showed blatant disregard for democratic processes and who had, in their view, become 
increasingly authoritarian.  
Yet, with the departure of Bolivia's first Indigenous president, it remains to be 
seen how the country's Indigenous majority will respond in the long-term. What is 
certain is that racism towards Indigenous people has increased (Mosquera 2020). 
What is also true is that support for Morales had fallen in recent years. A series of 
controversies and corruption scandals, too many to mention here, contributed to his 
decline. One such conflict, the 2011 TIPNIS controversy, a primary case study in this 
thesis, symbolised many of the difficulties faced by Morales and the MAS-IPSP in their 
pursuit of a plurinational society. These recent tumultuous events mean that the 
temporal thrust of the thesis has been changed quite dramatically in that, from the 
outset of the study, the focus was on Morales as the President-in-situ, a situation that 
                                                          
1
 According to Hylton (2019) two massacres in Cochabmaba (Sacaba) and El Alto have taken place since 
the resignation of Morales on November 10
th 
which, collectively, have left 19 people dead, mostly 
unarmed indigenous people. 
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radically altered in the final weeks before submission. As a result, the thesis has 
adjusted and adapted to the new situation, referring to the Morales regime in the past 
tense and addressing the implications of recent events where necessary, most 
particularly in Chapter Four.  
Mexico and Bolivia have long drawn the attention of scholars for the influential 
role Indigenous people have played in resisting the politics of the international 
neoliberal order and how they have transformed the social dynamics of each country 
as a result. A decade after the Zapatista Uprising in January 1994 (Weinberg 2000; 
Womack Jr. 1999; Harvey 1998), which interrupted and destabilised Mexico's 
otherwise smooth transition into the world of free market capitalism (Wise el al. 
2003), Bolivia's first Indigenous president, Evo Morales Ayma, was elected in 
December 2005 with a resounding mandate to bring an end to the policies of the 
neoliberal past and to rework the foundations of the Bolivian state around the struggle 
for Indigenous rights and culture (Postero 2017; Farthing and Kohl 2013; Webber 2011; 
Harten 2011). Since then, both ethnopolitical models have been widely studied by 
scholars for their innovative approaches to ethnopolitical resistance and for the many 
challenges these ethnopolitical models have faced in attempting to overcome the 
contemporary conditions attributed to the neoliberal “lifeworld”.2 While many 
scholars celebrate the achievements of Zapatista autonomy and their prolonged effort 
in peacefully resisting the Mexican state through alternative forms of local 
government (Mora 2017; Harvey 2016; Dinerstein 2016; 2013), Morales has been more 
harshly criticised as Bolivian president for his struggle to establish a more effective 
                                                          
2
 I frequently deploy the use of the term lifeworld throughout the thesis both in relation to Indigenous 
people as well as in reference to neoliberalism. With roots in philosophy, phenomenology and the social 
sciences, lifeworld is a useful and relevant phrase which effectively captures the experiences, activities, 
and contacts that constitute the worlds of Indigenous and non-Indigenous people alike.  
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equilibrium between national economic growth, Indigenous rights and environmental 
sustainability (Rivera Cusicanqui 2015). As scholarship in this area continues to grow, 
drawing closer attention to the evolving dynamics of ethnopolitical struggle in Mexico 
and Bolivia, this presents us with new opportunities to develop a comparative 
approach to the study of ethnopolitics in contemporary Latin American Studies. 
To date, there are virtually no studies in the literature which exclusively and 
comprehensively engage the treatment of Indigenous political activism between 
Mexico and Bolivia on a comparative basis. While some comparative research does 
exist in the field of Indigenous studies (Pitman 2018), it is a generally underutilised 
framework in the study of Indigenous political activism and has broadly concerned the 
study of Zapatismo in relation to the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (MST) 
in Brazil (Starr et al. 2011; Vergara-Camus 2009). Despite our growing interest as 
researchers in the search for alternatives to neoliberal orthodoxy, scholarship has 
remained heavily confined by its attention to both local and national perspectives 
which continue to strongly shape our collective understanding of ethnopolitics in 
contemporary Latin America. From the Mexican milpa (Nigh and Diemont 2013) to the 
Andean ayllu (Yampara Huarachi 2017; Alderman 2016; de la Cadena 2015), from the 
Zapatista Caracoles (González Casanova 2010; Ross 2005) to the 2011 TIPNIS 
controversy in Bolivia (Delgado 2017; Laing 2015; Rivera Cusicanqui 2015; McNeish 
2013), Latin American indigeneities are frequently debated, discussed and analysed 
from the "small spaces of everyday life" (Canessa 2012: 32). And yet, while all this 
establishes a very rich, detailed and dynamic picture of the ethnopolitical landscape in 
Latin America today, scholarship still neglects to look beyond the small places and 
spaces of ethnopolitical thought and action and towards the new possibilities that 
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arise in engaging a comparative approach to ethnopolitical research. How does the 
Zapatista model of ethnopolitical resistance on the margins of nation-state recognition 
(Mora 2017) compare to Morales and the MAS-IPSP who pushed to transform nation-
state frameworks from within, adopting national policies and discourses which 
reflected ancient Andean cosmologies? What similarities and differences can be drawn 
from a comparative study of this nature and how might that enrich our understanding 
of ethnopolitical activism between Mexico and Bolivia in the contemporary Latin 
American lifeworld? The opportunities, then, to generate fresh and original 
perspectives in the epistemological space between Mexico and Bolivia are a central 
motivation behind this thesis. 
 Of course, let me be clear: it is not my intention here to competitively assess 
the merits of one ethnopolitical model over the other nor will I conclusively find in 
favour of one ethnopolitical approach and not the other. To engage in a comparative 
study of this nature on that basis would be completely misguided and runs counter to 
my main objective: to develop a fresh and original comparative approach to 
ethnopolitical research between Mexico and Bolivia (Castellanos et al. 2012). Respect 
for the radically different dimensions of these two ethnopolitical models in Mexico 
and Bolivia is central to the very foundations of this thesis and thus informs my 
analytical approach. 
 Throughout the thesis, my intention is to focus specifically on two separate 
case studies, drawn from Mexico and Bolivia, which highlight the opportunities, 
challenges, similarities and differences in the practice of ethnopolitical activism in 
Latin America. Not only will my focus on case studies provide the thesis with the 
range and scope necessary to develop an effective and worthwhile comparative 
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ethnopolitical analysis but it will avoid the added pitfalls of engaging in direct 
comparisons between nation-states (Bolivia) and social movements (Mexico), 
something which would inevitably result in methodological, theoretical and 
conceptual challenges to say the least. 
In Mexico, the EZLN, or the Zapatista social justice movement, highlights the 
challenges and opportunities that confront an ethnopolitical social movement which 
operates a project of autonomy outside the legal and conceptual limits of the Mexican 
state. After years (1994-2001) of protracted negotiations with the government over the 
issue of Indigenous rights and culture (Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Higgins 2001; Womack 
Jr. 1999; Harvey 1998), the Zapatista revolutionaries transitioned to the margins of 
nation-state recognition (Mora 2017), where they developed new political architecture 
(Caracoles) that not only continues to challenge the authority and legitimacy of the 
international neoliberal order, but secures access to land and Indigenous rights in 
their attempt to resolve the legacies of Mexico’s (neo)colonial past (Ross 2005; 
González Casanova 2010).  
Meanwhile, the 2011 TIPNIS (Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro-
Securé) controversy between former Bolivian president Evo Morales Ayma and 
lowland Indigenous communities (Chimané, Yuracaré, Moxeño) serves as the second 
ethnopolitical case study in this thesis. It highlights the challenges faced by Bolivia’s 
former Indigenous president who struggled to mediate between a national economic 
agenda based on neoextractivism while preserving the integrity of local 
ethnoterritorial rights. While Morales claimed to represent the universal interests of 
Bolivia’s Indigenous majority, promising to rupture with the neoliberal past, his 
pursuit of a highway development directly through the heart of the TIPNIS reserve 
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and Indigenous territory reproduced scenes of conflict and chaos that forced lowland 
Indigenous communities to confront the hegemonic tendencies of his government 
(Delgado 2017; Springrtová 2016; Wickstrom 2013; Hirsch and McNeish 2011; Calla 
2011).  
In terms of structure and approach, these two ethnopolitical case studies will 
be comparatively analysed around two key tropes: place and space (Tuan 1977; Relph 
1976). Broadly divided into two parts, chapter one and chapter two explore the politics 
of Indigenous place-making in Mexico and Bolivia respectively, examining how the 
Zapatista struggle for land and ethnoterritorial rights in Mexico compares to the 
complex reality of Indigenous place-making in Morales’s Bolivia, symbolized by the 
challenges of the TIPNIS case study and the opportunities which surround 
construction of la nueva arquitectura andina (Runnels 2019).  
Meanwhile, chapter three and chapter four address the politics of space and, in 
particular, explore what these different case studies reveal to us about how 
ethnopolitical actors in Mexico and Bolivia “endow” national spatial imaginaries with 
“value” and meaning in accordance with their own precise ways of knowing and being 
(Tuan 1977: 6). Focusing exclusively on textual analysis, these chapters foreground key 
declarations and speeches, authored by Indigenous people themselves, and which 
have not yet featured as part of any independent study to date. Chapter three analyses 
the Zapatista Declaraciones de la Selva Lacandona (1994-2005), revealing how they 
challenge and destablise traditional power dynamics during the height of neoliberal 
reforms in Mexico. This is followed by chapter four which studies two 2006 inaugural 
speeches delivered by former president Morales who combined performance, memory 
and discourse in the pursuit of Andean utopias in Bolivia (Flores Galindo 1994 [1986]) 
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that were enhanced and destabilised by the complexities surrounding the 
development of the TIPNIS highway. As such, this study reveals the opportunities, 
challenges, similarities and differences which characterize contemporary 
ethnopolitical resistance in Latin America, especially in relation to the struggle for 
place and space which, as Tuan (1977: 3) notes, serve as “basic components of the lived 
world”.  
With the basic objectives of this thesis now firmly established, attention turns 
to section two of this introduction. Here I will define the term ethnopolitics as it 
relates to the Mexican and Bolivian contexts. In particular I will draw attention to the 
evolutionary nature of the concept ethnopolitics and how it is best understood in 
relation to place and space (Tuan 1977; Relph 1976). Following this, section two will 
develop the methodological approach for this comparative research before I finally 



















The Politics of Place and Space: Defining Ethnopolitics through the Centuries 
 
Place and space are key organising tropes in this thesis. This section will address the 
concepts of place and space, locating them within their respective theoretical 
frameworks and in relation to the particularities of this study. It is useful to 
contemplate ethnopolitics in relation to place and space for several critical reasons 
which I will outline here in this section. And, in doing so, I propose to draw upon the 
work of Tuan (1977) whose phenomenological approach to the conceptualisation of 
place and space is relevant to the framing of this contemporary ethnopolitical analysis.  
Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience by geographer Yi-Fu Tuan was 
was originally published in 1977 and is considered to be one of the first texts to explore 
acts of place-making from a phenomenological perspective. In justifying his approach, 
Tuan (1977) argues for a more coherent statement in relation to human environmental 
experience and narrows his focus to the closely related concepts of place and space 
which, he adds, form the basic components of the lived world. In his unique, 
exploratory style of writing, Tuan (1977) sets out to understand how people think, feel 
and react to space and how they form attachments to home however that may be lived 
or experienced. By defining his work as an essay, Tuan (1977) unburdens himself of the 
need to seek answers to the questions he proposes and instead aims to suggest rather 
than conclude which actively encourages his readership to consider the relationship 
between space and place in light of their own experiences and subjectivities. These 
stylistic elements combined with his refusal to contextualise his sixteen different 
chapters on architecture, the body, the homeland and mystic space owe to the 
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relevancy of Tuan’s (1977) narrative today and why it is the perfect point of departure 
for a contemporary analysis of ethnopolitics in Latin America.  
Crucial to this study is how Tuan (1977) draws close attention to the co-
dependent and interrelated nature of place and space and how the freedom and 
insecurity of space becomes the familiarity of place the more individuals and groups 
inhabit it and get to know it. This phenomoneological approach to the concept of 
place-making strongly mirrors the historic and contemporary ways in which 
Indigenous people struggle for land and meaning in a world defined by disorder and 
chaos, where their cosmologies, cultures and traditions are submerged beneath the 
weight of dominant capitalist ideologies. Indigenous activism or what I term 
ethnopolitics in this thesis can be considered a way in which Indigenous people seek 
to establish their own sense of "security" and "freedom" in the world (Tuan 1977: 3). As 
"basic components of the lived world", place and space belong to a set of key values 
and human desires and a struggle for them in the contemporary world is akin to a 
struggle to exist, to survive (Tuan 1977: 3; Relph 1976). Place, and the struggle to “make 
place”, concerns the need to establish meaning in reality and is a "basic element in the 
ordering of our experiences of the world", according to Relph (1976: 43). For Tuan 
(1977: 6) place and space are bounded together in an intimate relationship of mutual 
dependency, where the world of "undifferenciated space becomes place" the more "we 
get to know it better and endow it with value". "From the security and stability of 
place", he writes, "we are aware of the openness, freedom, and threat of space" (Tuan 
1977: 6).  
It is clear, then, that arranging this thesis around place and space develops an 
effective framework in which to explore ethnopolitics from a comparative perspective. 
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It becomes useful in helping to illuminate how the Andean ayllu (chapter two) and 
Mexican milpa (chapter one) construct the realities of those Indigenous groups who 
conform to these specific ways of knowing and being in the world. The struggle for the 
ayllu and for the milpa in the contemporary lifeworld is, as I have suggested, a struggle 
to exist, and to survive. Beyond notions of survival, place and space help us 
understand the different ways Indigenous groups architecturally construct places and 
spaces of significance (Tuan 1977). While the Zapatista Caracoles (chapter one) create 
distinction between notions of the interior and the exterior, helping the 
revolutionaries establish meaning separate to the neoliberal world, la nueva 
arquitectura andina (chapter two) redefines the struggle for place in contemporary 
Bolivia and reveals how some urban Indigenous people negotiate the ethnic self. 
Emphasis on textual analyses in chapters three and four illuminates how Indigenous 
people define space through discourse, ascribing their own structure and meaning to 
the contested world of national imaginaries.  
 From here, I focus on the historical evolution of ethnopolitics in Mexico and 
Bolivia focusing on how the interrelation between place and space has changed 
through time. Beginning with a discussion of the ayllu and milpa and the intimate 
relationship between place and space, I then turn to the period of twentieth century 
revolutionary nationalism. Here, I point out how the nation-state interfered with 
Indigenous place and space informing reality on their behalf. Finally, attention turns 
to neoliberalism and how place and space became a set of radicalised demands against 
the excesses of the neoliberal world order. I will also facilitate discussion here of 
decoloniality and how this maps onto an important theoretical framework which helps 
to frame the realities of ethnopolitical activism.    
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Ethnopolitical Origins in Bolivia:  
The Andean Ayllu 
 
The ayllu is the oldest form of socio-political and territorial management in the 
Bolivian Andes (Yampara Huarachi 2017; Platt 2016; de la Cadena 2015; Canessa 2012; 
Abercrombie 1998). While an exact date of orgin remains unclear, the literature agrees 
that the ayllu pre-dates the Inca civilisation which ruled over the Andes between the 
years 1438-1533 (Yampara Huarachi 2017; Abercrombie 1998). Considering its longevity, 
discussion of the ayllu provides an important basis from where we can begin to 
understand not only how Indigenous people in Andean Bolivia engage the land 
physically and “make place” but how they also organise and rationalize time and space 
in the mental and material universe guided by philosophies and cosmologies that 
shape their understanding of reality in the present (de la Cadena 2015; Huanacuni 
Mamani 2010). The ayllu is evidence for how place and space are intimately bound 
together in the Andes forming a complex picture of social life (Tuan 1977). Any effort 
to intercept this, radically alters, distorts and destabilises the very foundation of 
Andean reality. 
 Local and international scholarship provides a rich and varied understanding of 
how the Andean ayllu not only sustains life but informs a sense of reality that is 
unknowable to European epistemologies. I emphasis Andean ayllu in order to draw 
attention to the fact that the ayllu, "a political, geographical and ethnic unit that 
encompasses Indigenous communities occupying different ecological levels" in the 
lifeworld, traditionally and historically transcends the conditions of modernity and the 
nation-state borders of Bolivia and Peru which demarcate the Andes today (Yampara 
Huarachi 2017; de la Cadena 2015). While one can certainly find differences in the way 
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Aymara and Quechua peoples engage the land and organise space within and between 
ayllus in Bolivia and Peru respectively, there are a series of common traits that shape 
our general understanding of how the ayllu operates in time and space (Yampara 
Huarachi 2017; Platt 2016; de la Cadena). 
 A "ubiquitous" phrase in Andean ethnography, Peruvian anthropologist de la 
Cadena (2015) offers her rather interesting take on ayllu relationality. De la Cadena 
(2015) describes the ayllu as a unique system of "kinship ties" between "human and 
other-than-human persons" that collectively inhabit a single geographic region or 
territory. Akin to notions of "weaving", de la Cadena (2015: 44) draws attention to the 
way "all beings in the world" including plants, animals, and mountains are like 
separate, individual threads woven together to reveal a complex yet delicate picture of 
reality that is suspended in space between partially connected worlds.  
Alderman (2016) observes how the Andean community of Kallawaya performs 
ritual offerings of alcohol, coca leaves and llama foetuses to nearby mountains which 
they believe contain the spirits of dead ancestors or mulchulas (Abercrombie 1998). 
This close and intimate association between the living and the dead, between the past 
and present speaks to a sense of time and of history that exists in other wordly forms 
and is relived through kinship ties (Canessa 2008; Abercrombie 1998). Through 
feeding these spirits, the Kallawaya incorporate the mountains into local political 
structures, expanding Western understandings of the political to include all non-
human entities or what de la Cadena (2015: 25) refers to as "earth-beings" (Alderman 
2016). Rituals and performances (re)generate reciprocity and complimentarity among 
community members and the spirit world, transforming this unfamiliar natural space 
into a familiar communal place of belonging (Yampara Huarachi 2017; Canessa 2012). 
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Regular engagment with the spiritual world through ritual and communal 
performance allows community members to negotiate the ethnic self. According to 
Canessa (2012), being human (Indigenous) or jaqi is a constant cycle or process of 
becoming and is renewed through ritual and laboring the land. A sense of self is 
intimately tied to notions of place, where the further one is from the ayllu the less jaqi 
and more q’ara (white) they become. This creates distinction between interior and 
exterior places and spaces which reinforces belief in the Andean ayllu as a place-




































Ethnopolitical Beginnings in Mexico:  
The Milpa  
 
In Mexico, the milpa is a system of territorial management historically associated with 
the Maya civilization (Grube 2000). The Maya ruled over regions of Latin America we 
now refer to today as Guatemala and southern Mexico, including Chiapas and the 
Yucatán peninsula (Grube 2000). Like the Andean ayllu, the Mexican milpa embodies 
particular ways of knowing and being in the world that require specialist knowledge to 
operate. The milpa is farmed by a milpero who learns to “make milpa” through the 
knowledge and wisdom that is passed down from grandfather to father to son (Nigh 
and Diemont 2013; De Frece and Poole 2008). Maíz or corn is the principle crop 
produced by the milpa (Nigh and Diemont 2013; De Frece and Poole 2008). It has 
special significance in Maya culture and forms an important staple in the diet of Maya 
descendents (Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Chol, Tojolabal, Mam, Zoque in Chiapas) and the 
Mexican peoples more generally (Rovira 2000; Barry 1995).  
 According to the Popul Vuh, or book of life, the first peoples to walk the planet 
were los hijos de maíz, or children of corn who were fashioned by the Maya gods from 
maíz (Tedlock 1996; Recinos 1986). As such, maíz has important historical and 
spiritual significance in Maya culture (Tedlock 1996; Recinos 1986). The milpa, central 
to the agricultural production of maíz, is not only a robust and adaptable way to 
provide for communities but is central to the spiritual world of the milpero and is a 
way for him to negotiate the ethnic self. Male and female Indigenous Maya have 
specific gendered roles in the production of maíz. While milperos (male) apply their 
knowledge and skills to make milpa and harvest corn, women domesticate maíz and 
prepare it for consumption. The gendered nature of corn production speaks to the 
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more traditional elements of Maya culture, where duality and complimentarity 
routinely define relations within this cosmic space (Agredo et al. 2013). As Marcos (in 
Agredo et al. 2013: 197) writes, “the feminine-masculine dual unity was fundamental to 
the creation of the cosmos, its (re)generation, and its sustenence”. Yet, among the 
rural communities of Chiapas, Rovira (2000) draws attention to the slippery nature of 
gendered traditions in Maya culture. In particular, she notes how an established 
hierarchy between male and female figures (re)produces unbearable conditions of 
exploitation for women and girls such that “the exploitation men suffer, women suffer 
more (Rovira 2000: 34). The liberation of women and girls from the narrow confines of 
certain traditions and practices is a central tenet of the Zapatista social justice 
movement, pioneered by Comandante Ramona (1959-2006) and symbolized by their 
1993 Ley Revolucionaria de Mujeres (Klein 2015; Eber and Antonia 2012; Roriva 2000)  
In preparing the milpa, the milpero engages a technique that is widely known as 
slash-and-burn (Nigh and Diemont 2013; De Frece and Poole 2008). However, Nigh 
and Diemont (2013: 45) prefer use of the term “swidden” which, in their view, more 
accurately captures the skill, knowledge and prowess involved in the clearing and 
burning of vegetation. As they write, the “burning of newly felled vegetation in tall 
forest areas is often necessary to clear the land for planting. Fire can make an 
important contribution to long-term soil fertility through the addition of biochar that 
has been produced by low-temperature burning” (Nigh and Diemont 2013: 45) 
Swidden requires profound knowledge of land, nature and the seasons. If the 
environment is damp or wet then vegetation will only smolder thus producing limited 
fertilizer that will not sufficiently replenish the landscape with minerals (Nigh and 
Diemont 2013; De Frece and Poole 2008). Meanwhile, if the climate is arid then the 
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milpero risks losing control over the fire thus endangering himself, his companeros 
and the surrounding communities and ecologies.  
 Knowledge, then, is central to the milpa. The intimate knowledge required of 
the territorial and spatial dimensions of the milpa inform a unique sense of place in 
the mind and body of the milpero and locate the act of making milpa at the heart of 
place-making practices in Maya communities. Moreover, the sharing of knowledge 
between generations of milperos reveals the collective act of place-making. A 
successful harvest of maíz reinforces this skill and knowledge enhancing an even 

































Ethnopolitics in Twentieth Century Latin America:  
Indigeneity and Post-colonial Revolution in Mexico and Bolivia 
 
Thus far, I have shown that ethnopolitics originates within the Andean ayllu and the 
Mexican milpa. It traditionally and historically concerns the close interrelation 
between place and space and how this universal whole informs reality. I discussed how 
the Andean ayllu and the Mexican milpa function as mental and material universes 
that not only provide the territorial basis for place-making but they perform as 
complex ecological units, where space is organised around cosmologies which inform 
Indigenous realities.  
In twentieth century Mexico and Bolivia, the spatial and territorial dimensions 
of ethnopolitics were considerably different. The nation-state played a profound role 
in the place-making capabilities of Indigenous people, informing their sense of reality 
through the institutional parameters of federal reforms, national unions, agencies and 
the promotion of official culture. Indigeneity was understood and articulated in 
relation to a post-colonial context of national revolution and reform which aimed to 
address the socio-territorial injustices of the colonial past without due consideration 
for the evasive ways modern logics continued to perpetuate throughout the social 
order. Twentieth century Mexican and Bolivian nationalisms may be considered post-
colonial for the way they “attributed agency and history to the subjected nation [yet] 
staked a claim to the order of Reason and Progress instituted by colonialism” 
(Bhambra 2014; Guha 1997). In other words, the problem for some with post-
colonialism is the almost implicit suggestion “that colonialism is now a matter of the 
past” without much regard or consideration for the way hegemony “persists in forms 
other than overt colonial rule” (Xie 1997: 8).  
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Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico 
 The 1910 Mexican Revolution was long and protracted. Beginning as an armed conflict 
which lasted several years (1910-1921), the Revolution later entered a phase of 
constructive development (1920-1940) which established the foundations for a 
modern, constitutional republic (Krauze 1997; Fuentes 1996 [1971]). Part of this process 
of renewal and social transformation included the foundation of the Partido Nacional 
Revolucionaro (PNR) in 1929 by president of the Republic Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-
1928) (Krauze 1997; Fuentes 1996 [1971]; Corneluis and Craig 1991). As “the great 
institutional project”, Krauze (1997: 428) notes that the formation of this new national 
political entity had three key priorities: unite its forces, identify itself with the nation 
and elaborate an open, classless ideology which included radical action, centralized 
organization and moderate, steady evolution. The PNR, later the PRM (Partido de la 
Revolución Mexicana) and finally the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) 
positioned itself at the heart of a new Mexico and defined the spatial, territorial, 
economic, social and cultural limits of this new post-revolutionary national condition.  
 Revolutionary nationalism was strongly imbued with themes of social justice. It 
was aspirational, culturally romantic and created pathways for the upward social 
mobility of citizens (Gutiérrez 1999). As Lomnitz (2001: 53) writes, Mexican 
nationalism was imagined in the figure of the mestizo/a, “the product of a Spanish 
father and an Indigenous mother”. The logic behind the construction of a national 
mestizaje concerned the mestizo/a as a “fortified version of the Indigenous race”, 
where a mixture of the Spanish and the Indigenous “would create a population […] 
finally […] capable of holding its own against the United States” (Lomnitz 2001: 53). 
Similar to the characteristics of place-making identified earlier, Mexican nationalism 
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drew a distinction between the interior and the exterior, developing new racial 
characteristics that would both define Mexico’s place in the world as a modern nation 
without simultaneously losing its relationship to the ethnic past (Tuan 1977). 
Combining what were perceived to be the positive attributes of both races, Lomnitz 
(2001: 54) writes that, “like his European father the [mestizo/a] had a propensity for 
action” yet, like his Indigenous mother was motivated by a desire to “protect his 
maternal legacy from exploitation by Europeans”. This move towards a universal 
nationhood, centred on the official figure of the mestizo/a, defines the considerably 
utopian dimensions of José Vasconcelos’s La raza cosmica (Vasconcelos 2003 [1925]). 
According to O’Brien et al. (2013: 403) this essay by Vasconcelos, a Mexican 
philosopher and former secretary of education, celebrated mestizaje as the “moral and 
material basis for the union of all men into a fifth race” and identified it as precursor 
to a world, in the distant future, which transcends race in a new universal civilization. 
Yet, despite the intellectual and aesthetic appeal of a national mestizaje, the 
project concealed a sinister reality. For Gutiérrez (1999: 1), official nationalism, which 
she defines as a “long-term project aimed at constructing a culturally and linguistically 
uniform nation by means of integrationist policies and institutions”, had an “intrinsic 
ambivalence”. While Mexican nationalism acquired legitimacy through cultural motifs 
and myths about the country’s pre-colonial origins, it channeled a process of “social 
engineering” (Gutiérrez 1999: 3) designed to “assimilate the living Indigenous people 
into the mainstream nation” through a policy known as indigenismo (Gutiérrez 1999: 
1). As Jung (2008: 95) writes, this policy approach “conflated Indigenous with poor, 
rural, and marginalized”, and provided impetus for the state and its agencies to entre 
communities and rework the parameters of ethnicity. In stark contrast to the Mexican 
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milpa, where place-making relied on the knowledge and skill of the milpero himself to 
negotiate and mediate complex social and ecological relations, the twentieth century 
revolutionary state now appeared to redefine the limits of social operation on behalf of 
all Indigenous people (Lomnitz 2001; Gutiérrez 1999).  
 Central to a policy of indigenismo was the implementation of land reform 
under the new 1917 revolutionary constitution (Krauze 1997; Kelly 1994; Foland 1969; 
Gruening 1960). Article 27 combined both modern and pre-mondern forms of 
territoriality in, what Foland (1969) suggests, was a highly innovative structure of 
state-led territorial redistribution. Kelly (1994) reminds us that the implementation of 
Article 27 is largely the result of Emiliano Zapata's contribution to the constitutional 
reform process. Nowadays a cultural icon in the Mexican imaginary (Conant 2010; 
Holloway and Peláez 1998), Zapata drafted his Plan de Ayala in 1911 which denounced 
revolutionary president Francisco I Madero and outlined his vision for an elaborate 
land reform that restored all rights to land and natural resources to the Mexican 
pueblo (Karuze 1997; Fuentes 1996 [1971]). In 1917, his ambitions for land reform and 
territorial justice were symbolized by the federal redistribution of the ejido (Krauze 
1997; Kelly 1994). An innovative form of communal land tenure, where property rights 
were collectively held by the village, ejidos were not permitted to be bought, sold or 
mortagaged by their recipients (Kelly 1994; Gruening 1960). Predicated on a belief in 
the social function doctrine, the ejido symbolized Mexico’s commitment to ensuring 
that land served a practical, social function, that it embodied the principles of social 
justice and supported the greater good of society. The ejido directly challenged the 
logic behind the hacienda, a popular form of land tenure under Porfirio Díaz which 
symbolized a legacy of colonial wealth and inequality between creole elites and 
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Indigenous people who were bound to the land by the conditions of debt servitude 
(Ankersen and Ruppert 2006; Weinberg 2000; Foland 1969; Gruening 1960). Through 
the act of federal redistribution, where the Mexican president personally approved the 
allocation of all ejidal properties, the ejido positioned the nation-state as a national 
‘savior’ freeing the Indigenous people from the excesses of colonialism. This firmly 
located it at the heart of Indigenous place-making, legitimising its presence among 
Indigenous communities (Jung 2008; Kelly 1994; Gruening 1960).  
In addition to legitimising the place of Indigenous people under the new 
revolutionary state, the executive encouraged membership of federal unions, principly 
the Conferderación Nacional Campesina (CNC). If the ejido formed the territorial basis 
of place-making acts in revolutionary Mexico, then the unionization of Indigenous 
agricultural workers reinforced their role as state-endorsed campesinos. The CNC 
performed two major roles in relation to the organization and distribution of labour in 
Mexico’s agricultural sector. First, it provided basic infrastructure which allowed 
campesinos to engage the land in ways suitable to a modern economy. Second, the 
CNC provided training and other financial and material resources to help facilitate the 
development of a homogenous campesino class that focused exclusively on 
agricultural productivity and output (Jung 2008). Yet, above all else, through this 
paternalistic approach, the CNC strategically designed a loyal political support base, 
with direct links to the state, mobilized by the PRI in times of political instability or 
crisis. It is clear, then, that the revolutionary state reset the institutional parameters of 
possibility, encouraging Indigenous people to renounce ties to ethnicity and to 
embrace the mestizo/a self as a positive and progressive step towards prosperity. For 
Jung (2008) the Instituto Nacional Indigenista (INI), founded in 1948, was a key agency 
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established by the state for that very purpose. It employed some of Mexico’s most 
influential writers and creative artists, placing them in contact with communities and 
environments with high-density Indigenous populations. Rosario Castellanos (Oficio 
de tinieblas [1962]) and Juan Rulfo (Pedro Páramo [1955]) were two of the most 
influential participants of the INI and the writers addressed the plight of ethnicity and 
rural Mexico through their works. The INI translated a national policy of indigenismo 
into reality, proposing vaccination and hygiene programmes in communities as well as 
delivering education services that focused explicitly on interrupting “the informal 
transmission of culture from parents to children” (Jung 1998: 96). It is clear, then, that 
the revolutionary state institutionally framed Indigenous life. It enforced a particular 
view of the world which radically departed from knowledges and traditions associated 















Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia 
In contrast to Mexico’s Revolution which unfolded over two stages, lasting a total 
thrity-years (1910-1940), Bolivia's 1952 Revolution lasted only a matter of months with 
Dr Víctor Paz Estensorro, leader of the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), 
assuming the presidency on 9th April 1952 (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; Dunkerley 1997). 
Central to the revolutionary agenda was a focus on domesticating capital and 
reclaiming the country from the liberal grip of twentieth century globalism. Bolivian 
intellectual Carlos Montenegro (2016 [1943]: 227) was a leading figure behind the 
revolution of 1952 and played a key role in the formation of the MNR. His text, 
Nacionalismo y Coloniaje (2016 [1943]), formed an important ideological basis for the 
revolution. It draws fresh attention to Bolivian history and justifies the struggle for 
Bolivianidad. Central to his work is an emphasis on the dicotomy between concepts 
like la nación and la anti-nación which Montenegro uses to distinguish between the 
Bolivian majority dominated by global capitalism and the minority industrial 
capitalists or oligarchy. As Montenegro (2016 [1943]: 227) writes, "el capitalismo 
privado convirtiera en medios de negación de la bolivianidad". And, adds that,”el 
dinero internacional reguló así desde Europa […] el manar de nuestras vetas 
metalíferas, descargando en ellas los contragolpes de los vuelcos económicos que 
promovía en el Viejo Mundo”. Therefore, central to Montenegro’s (2016 [1943]) thesis 
is the idea that, by displacing international capitalism and recreating an internal 
domestic economic framework, Bolivia would achieve national unity and prosperity 
for all.   
Two reforms central to the restoration of the state and the development of a 
new revolutionary era in Bolivian politics included the nationalization of Bolivia’s tin 
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industry and agrarian reform (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016). In line with revolutionary 
aspirations, Salman et al. (2014: 295) writes that the 1952 Revolutionary programme 
included “welfare ideals” and a focus on the “economic liberation and sovereignty of 
the Bolivian people”. Through the nationalization of Bolivian tin mining industries the 
MNR government established COMIBOL (Corporación Minera de Bolivia). Within a 
matter of just two decades (1950s-1970s) COMIBOL’s workforce increased from 40,000 
to 170,000, the largest employer in the state. Moreover, out of loyalty to the rural 
population, who supported the MNR’s pursuit of power, the government introduced 
land reform in 1953 (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016). However, while land reform was 
considered the pinnacle of social justice in Mexico, it appeared to be more of an 
afterthought in Bolivia and was administered in a rather disorderly and chaotic 
fashion (Salman et al. 2014; Foland 1969). Within the first twelve months of the 
revolution, militias had already seized hacienda estates across the Bolivian altiplano or 
highlands and state-led land reform prodecures appeared to be a way to impose order 
on a disorderly, even lawless, rural society (Foland 1969). The minifundio, an 
individual land parcel, formed the centerpiece of Bolivian land reform. Like the ejido, 
the minifundio prioritized the social function of land, symbolising the redistribution of 
land for the greater social good (Ankersen and Ruppert 2006). Yet, unlike Mexico, 
Bolivian agraian reform did not prioritize the collective tenure of land and focused 
instead on a policy of colonization between the highlands and the lowlands, the arid 
altiplano and the fertile Oriente, by campesinos (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; Salman et al. 
2014; Antezana Ergueta 1982).  
  The origin of the campesino/a in Bolivia arguably forms part of a broader public 
debate on the racial constitution of Bolivian society that long pre-dates the 1952 
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Bolivian Revolution. Authors such as Alcides Arguedas (1879-1946) and Franz Tamayo 
(1879-1956) presented their opposing views on indigenismo and a national mestizaje in 
a string of published novels and essays that strongly influenced a public debate on 
Bolivianidad in the early twentieth century. In the influential yet highly controversial 
essay Pueblo enfermo (Arguedas 1979 [1909]) Arguedas draws attention to European 
discourses around desgeneration which he readily applies to explain Bolivia’s 
seemingly backward condition. “Disease”, writes Trigo (2000: 1), was a popular 
“metaphor”, used by writers like Arguedas, to account for the “general state of crisis 
that [they] found not only in their respective regions, but also throughout Latin 
America”. While several factors contribute to this “enfermedad nacional” (Paz-Soldán 
1999: 62), Arguedas adopts a strongly pessimistic view of Bolivia’s racial heterogeneity 
and, in particular, “el Otro indigena” who is “instintivo, irracional, rencoroso, 
supersticioso y atado a sus tradiciones” and thus an inherent impediment to 
modernity and progress (Paz-Soldán 1999: 65). Such a pessimistic diagnosis of the 
Bolivian condition provoked Tamayo to reflect inward and to construct his own 
mestizo/a ideal from the inside-out (Eiss and Rapport 2018). For Tamayo, a mestizo 
himself, Indigenous people represented energy, vitality, and morality and should not 
be so eagerly dismissed as part of the national question (Eiss and Rapport 2018). In 
negotiating his own subjectivity in Creación de la pedagogía nacional, Tamayo engages 
in the construction of bodily metaphor to imagine the figure of the mestizo/a in 
Bolivia. He imagines a national mestizaje or the mestizo/a ideal as the physical 
embodiment of Indigenous strength and stature coupled with the intelligence of the 
mestizo/a (Eiss and Rapport 2018). Twentieth century debates on a national mestizaje 
naturally continued and coalesced around the formation of state-endorsed 
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campesino/a identities during the 1952 Revolution. Like Mexico, the MNR embraced 
pre-colonial heritage as a source of legitimation for the new revolutionary state while 
coopting Indigenous people into formal union structures in the areas of mining and 
agriculture symbolized by the institutional power of the Central Obrera Boliviana 
(COB) (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; Canessa 2000; Antezana Ergueta 1982).    
However, Canessa (2000: 123) writes that, by the mid-twentieth century, the 
Bolivian Revolution “opened up political space” for indianismo or Indigenous 
nationalism to grow in popularity. Indigenous urbanisation coupled with a weakening 
of the revolutionary state structure, encouraged intellectuals and city workers to 
explore alternative methods of organizing outside the limits of the nation-state which 
obliged Indigenous people to renounce their ethnicity in order to make citizenship 
claims on the state (Canessa 2000). Indianismo had always been a strand of radical 
thought which pearmeated the Andes, propelled forward in the mid-twentieth by 
various influences in the area of scholarship and literature. Literary works by Peruvian 
José María Arguedas (Los ríos profundos [1958]), on one hand, and scholarship by 
Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui, on the other, contributed towards a rethinking of 
attitudes in relation to socialism and Andeanness in the twentieth century. Humberto 
Flores M (2006) notes that Mariátegui challenged the universal implementation of 
Marxist-socialist thought in Latin America and argues that European socialism did not 
account for subjective experience in the Andes. Instead, he encouraged a critical 
rethinking of pre-colonial Andean histories. In particular, he pointed to the Incas as a 
model for Andean socialism which, under the right circumstances, would naturally 
flourish across the Andes (Humberto Flores M 2006).  
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Aymara intellectual Fausto Reinaga (2001 [1970]: 46) proposed a model of 
indianismo for Bolivia that located the struggle for Indigenous autonomy and dignity 
in the recreation of “un sistema social colectivista de propiedad socialista”, a 
communitarian model originally practiced by the Incas in pre-colonial times. 
Reinaga’s ideas, his texts, including La Revolucion India (1970) and his indianismo 
movement Partido Indio de Bolivia (PIB) struggled to compete against the ideology of 
the revolutionary nation-state and the many economic benefits offered by the MNR to 
Indigenous people in exchange for their loyalties and support (Canessa 2000). 
However, his ideas did eventually gain ground in urban Aymara strongholds, namely 
El Alto, where radical intellectuals including Felipe Quispe developed further the 
principles of contemporary Aymara nationalism. Central to Quispe’s political vision 
for Bolivia is the restoration of the ayllu “[como] un modelo en el que ya vivieron 
nuestros antepasados desde tiwanaku hasta los incas es un sistema comunitarista, 
donde se vive en condiciones igualitarias […] buscamos autogobernarnos en un 





















Ethnopolitics and the Neoliberal-Turn:  
Place and Space as Sites of Resistance in Mexico and Bolivia  
 
Thus far, I have not only established the close interrelation between place and space in 
the Andean ayllu and the Mexican milpa but I noted how notions of place and space in 
the ethnopolitical lifeworld were radically altered and distorted by the twentieth 
century nation-state. In exchange for vital services and access to citizenship, 
Indigenous people were encouraged to embrace a national mestizaje which often 
celebrated the pre-colonial origins of their respective nations in culturally aesthetic 
ways without due concern for the way living Indigenous people were forced to 
renounce their personal ties to ethnicity.  
In this section I would like to define ethnopolitics in relation to the neoliberal 
turn in Latin America which began in 1973 and which accelerated across the continent 
from Mexico (1982) right through to Bolivia (1983). Here I will discuss how place and 
space became important sites of resistance between Indigenous people and the 
neoliberal nation-state as first the EZLN seized land in Chiapas during their 1994 
revolution against the privatization of the ejido followed by Bolivia’s Indigenous and 
campesino majority who elected Evo Morales as the country’s first Indigenous 
president in December 2005 as a means through which they could reclaim sovereignty, 
dignity and control over national patrimony.  
Since its early inception in Chile in 1973, neoliberalism has been a widely 
debated phase in the historic development of Latin America with scholarship in 
frequent discussion over the impact this “theory of political economic practices” 
continues to have across local political, economic, social, cultural, racial and gendered 
structures and spaces (Harvey 2005: 2). Developed by US economists as early as the 
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late-1950s, neoliberalsim builds upon existing theories, frameworks and philosophies 
that, broadly speaking, originated among European theorists in the eighteenth century 
(Kletsky 2010; Dardot and Laval 2009; Harvey 2005). In his historic treatment of global 
capitalism, Kaletsky (2010) identifies the four stages of global capital development as a 
way to reinforce the robust nature of capitalism as a fluid system of exchange that has 
acquired a unique ability to adapt to cycles of revolution, crisis and global change. In 
reference to the latest controversy to afflict global capitalism (2007-2008), he refutes 
any optimism that capitalism might crumble or collapse under the weight of crisis 
pointing instead to the highly flexible and versatile nature of this system of social 
exchange. In his view, “the cental argument is that capitalism has never been a static 
system that follows a fixed set of rules, characteristed by a permanent division of 
responsibilities between private enterprise and governments” (Kaletsky 2010: 2). 
Instead, as Kaletsky (2010: 2) writes, capitalism is an “adaptive social system that 
mutates and evolves in response to a changing environment” that, when threatened by 
a systemic crisis, will reinvent itself in more successful and productive ways, 
developing new versions that replace the previous dominant order (Kaletsky 2010).  
By Kaletsky’s (2010) summation, then, neoliberalism was part of a natural cycle 
of capitalist development that adpted, changed and fortified itself in response to 
global crises. From the Great Depression (1929-1933) which “destroyed the classical 
laissez-faire capitalism of the nineteenth century”, to revolutionary nationalism and 
the wefare economies of the twentieth century which, in turn, suffered from a rise in 
global inflation that sparked moves towards a neoliberal reconstruction of the world, 
capitalism embodies a unique ability to change, adapt and transform when everything 
else around it appears to disintegrate and collapse (Kaletsky 2010: 3).  
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In his text, Harvey (2005) casts a critical eye over this latest phase in capitalist 
development, dedicating his time to dispelling several key misunderstandings which 
appear to characterize the application of neoliberalism internationally. He defines 
neoliberalism as a “theory of political economic practices that proposes that human 
well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and 
skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property 
rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey 2005: 2; Goodale and Postero 2013). His 
historical treatment of neoliberalism is far less extensive than Kaletsky (2010). Instead, 
Harvey (2005) locates the origins of this latest wave of capitalist development in the 
economic interventionism of US economists in Chile in 1973 (Harvey 2005). What 
began as an experiment on the global periphery, transformed into a highly popular 
model of global development throughout the US and Europe in the 1980s, combining 
international loans with industry privatization and market deregulation that restricted 
the functions of the nation-state to those “necessary […] to guarantee the proper 
functioning of the markets” (Goodale and Postero 2013: 27). Central to Harvey’s (2005) 
critique is that neoliberalism, through its institutions and political proponents, 
advances the idea of freedom and liberation as powerful and appealing markers of this 
global model which, he adds, would be an attractive proposition for anyone who 
values the ability to make decisions for themselves. Yet, freedom itself is neither 
inherently good nor bad but is as “contradictory and as fraught as its incitements to 
action are compelling” (Harvey 2005: 36). A proponent of Marxism, Harvey (2005) 
concludes that the logic of neoliberalism only reinforces the wealth, power and 
prestige of a dominant capitalist class whose rights, freedoms, income, leisure and 
security never needed any enhancing in the first place. Instead, he adds, the unequal 
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distribution of wealth and freedom over the global body leaves nothing more but a 
pittance for the rest of us” (Harvey 2005: 38).  
However, authors Dardot and Laval (2009) and Beasley-Murray (2010) 
challenge the widely held misconception that the nation-state somehow withdraws 
under a neoliberal model of deregulation and privatization (Harvey 2005). Instead, 
Dardot and Laval (2009: 215) argue against two broad misunderstandings: one, the 
nation-state lacks efficiency and productivity to participate in globalization and two, 
the withdrawl of the nation-state from market economics somehow allows for the 
“immaculate conception of the spontaneous, autonomous market” as a “natural system 
prior to political society”. In their view, the concept of “governance” is an important 
axis around which several key changes have taken place in relation to the state and the 
market under neoliberalism. In constrast to a twentieth century model of governance 
which emphasized “sovereignty and government” as key elements in “nation-state 
formation” (Dardot and Laval 2009: 218), neoliberalism emphasizes “enterprise”, where 
the nation-state delegates certain powers and responsibilities to the marketplace in a 
public-private partnership arrangement (Dardot and Laval 2009; 220). In other words, 
the state does not retreat so as to allow for the wider expansion of the market but 
redevelops and reconfigures to become a more marginal presence that operates a 
bureaucratic and managerial style of governance which exercises “its power more 
indirectly by incorporating codes, standards and norms defined by private interest 
agents” (Dardot and Laval 2009: 221). This technocratic perspective aligns considerably 
with Beasley-Murray (2010) who argues that, under neoliberalism, “civil society and 
the state merge”, where the neoliberal state slips the bounds of dedifferenciation and 
infuses with civil society to form a hegemonic social whole.  
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In view of this Hardt and Negri (2000: xii) have long argued for the presence of 
Empire which, they note, is a “decentred and deterritorialis[ed] apparatus of rule that 
progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanded frontiers”. 
Unlike imperial projects of the past, which had a clear geographic centre and 
periphery, the decline in sovereignty of the nation-state from the mid-twentieth 
century onwards paved the way for a “smooth world free of the ridgid striation of state 
boundaries” (Hardt and Negri 2000: 142). Mediated by the flow and exchange of 
capital which is regulated by a series of corporate, financial and humanitarian 
institutions based in the United States, “Empire posits a regime that effectively 
encompasses the spatial totality […] that rules over the entire civilized world” (Hardt 
and Negri 2000: xiv).  
Considering the small places and spaces that traditionally constitute 
ethnopolitics - the Andean ayllu and the Mexican milpa - Indigenous people are now 
confronting a regime of capital development which has progressively grown and 
expanded to fill the global space (Hardt and Negri 2000). Decolonial theorist Quijano 
has termed this perpetual dominance of capitalism as the “coloniality of power” and 
develops his explanation around the racial consequences of captialism. Unlike a 
number of earlier authors (Kletsky 2010; Dardot and Laval 2009) who develop a 
Westernized historicity of capitalism, Quijano argues that the Latin American colonial 
encounter generated a divide in time which created space for the development of a 
new social clasification of the world’s population around the idea of race, a mental 
construct that expresses the basic experience of colonial domination (Moraña et al. 
2008). Indigenous languages, cultures, places and spaces were erased and replaced by 
European epistemes which advanced what Quijano refers to as the “social geography 
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of capitalism” which serves as the “axis around which all remaining forms of labour 
control, resources and products are articulated” (Quijano in Moraña et al. 2008: 187). 
This concept of modernity shapes global development along industrial, scientific and 
geopolitical lines generating wealth and fortune for European and Western powers 
while casting a long dark colonial shadow across current and former colonies 
obscuring violent histories of chaos, death and destruction which continue to 
permeate the social fabric of the continent today (Mignolo 2010; Moraña et al. 2008).  
Therefore, ethnopolitics may be considered decolonial by the way it not only 
shines light on the long history of coloniality but how it engages a radical 
“reconstruction of knowledge, power, being and life itself” (Walsh 2012: 11). In Mexico, 
the Zapatista social justice movement continues to struggle for land and place while 
defining their anticapitalist resistance through declarations and communiqués. In 
Bolivia, former president Evo Morales developed a nation-state model which rejected 
the neoliberal past while using performance, discourse and memory to construct an 
alternative decolonial future which, as recent events reveal, has not yet materialized 
for Indigenous people. Collectively, all these acts of territorial and spatial recovery 
may be viewed as decolonial, de-linking from the coloniality of power which 
articulates hegemonic forms of neoliberal power. As established ethnopolitical 
models, my thesis proposes to comparatively explore the similarities and differences 
which characterize the struggle for place and space in Mexico and Bolivia. In what 







A growing subdiscipline within the wider academic field of Latin American Studies, 
the study of ethnopolitics is open to a variety of different perspectives from across the 
academy. While ethnopolitics was at one time almost exclusively dominated by North 
American anthropological investigations carried out during the early-to-mid twentieth 
century (Gallenkamp 1960), it has now diversified in recent decades to include 
scholarship from a variety of different sources and disciplines. Among the disciplinary 
frameworks that will support this thesis include scholarship - monographs and journal 
articles - drawn from history (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; Rabasa 2010; Weinberg 2000; 
Womack Jr. 1999; Harvey 1998; Karuze 1997), anthropology (Mora 2017; Alderman 
2016; Postero 2017; de la Cadena 2015; Canessa 2012; Abercrombie 1998), political 
science (Webber 2011; Semo and Pardo 2006; Castañeda 2000), philosophy (Foster and 
Bonilla 2011 Ankersen and Ruppert 2006; Foland 1969), social geography (Lazar 2008), 
cultural studies (Conant 2010), sociology (Gutíerrez Aguilar 2014), performance studies 
(Taylor 2003), decolonial studies (Singh 2018; Gómez-Barris 2017; Cusicanqui 2015 
Mignolo 2010; Moraña et al. 2008; Dussel 1985), discourse analysis (Foucault 1970), 
utopian studies (Dinerstein 2016; Flores Galindo 1994 [1986]), and the visual arts 
(Cárdenas 2010). Furthermore, this thesis relies on a combination of both international 
and locally-sourced scholarship.  
This strong emphasis on a multidisciplinary framework not only highlights the 
nuances which characterise contemporary forms of Indigenous resistance but also 
reveals how the concept of indigeneity itself in Mexico, Bolivia and Latin America as a 
whole can no longer be adequately contained within any one particular perspective or 
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dominant theoretical approach. Instead, by fusing together this multidisciplinary 
methodology, this thesis promotes and enhances greater ethnopolitical dialogue 
between the different strands of scholarship, revealing the similarities and differences 
which transcend the practice of ethnopolitics across the region. Additionally, this 
thesis relies on a blend of primary and secondary sources. Not only does this thesis 
include discussion and commentary from an array of multidisciplinary scholarship 
that originates in Europe, North America and Latin America but it also foregrounds a 
series of primary texts. Key among them are the Zapatista Declaraciones de la Selva 
Lacandona (chapter three) as well as two 2006 inaugural speeches and policy 
documents prepared by Morales and his MAS-IPSP government (chapter four).  
To begin with, chapter one and chapter two deal exclusively with the 
intersection between territorial and political philosophy (Yampara Huarachi 2017; 
Foster and Bonilla 2011; Huanacuni Mamani 2010; Ankersen and Ruppert 2006; Vargas 
Vega 2004) and how this shapes unique responses to ethnoterritorial resistance in 
both Mexico (Ross 2005; Gonález Casanova 2010) and Bolivia (Laing 2015; McNeish 
2013; Cárdenas 2010). Meanwhile, chapter three and chapter four develop distinct 
utopian frameworks - exploring utopian concepts like hope (Dinerstein 2016) and la 
utopía andina (Flores Galindo 1994 [1986] - which address the various different ways in 
which these two ethnopolitical case studies frame the struggle for social justice in both 
Mexico and Bolivia respectively.   
The application of these various theoretical frameworks across each of the four 
chapters in this thesis facilitates innovative rereadings of key speeches, government 
policy documents, communiqués, declarations and locally-sourced print media, all of 
which form the material basis of this methodological approach to comparative 
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indigeneities research. This thesis not only adopts a methodological framework that is 
rooted in textual analysis but also regards this kind of methodological approach as 
crucial to facilitating a comparative overview of ethnopolitics in contemporary Mexico 
and Bolivia. By relying on a variety of different historical and contemporary narrative 
forms which have been published across multiple platforms, disciplines, and 
geographies, this study not only exclusively identifies the types of texts which lie at the 
heart of this comparative study but reveals how this particular methodological 
framework enables fresh and original ethnopolitical perspectives to emerge between 
Mexico and Bolivia, located at the heart of Latin American Studies as conceptualised 
in the academy. In other words, by situating these different ethnopolitical case studies 
from Mexico and Bolivia within a comparative methodological setting, this thesis 
naturally draws fresh attention to the similarities, differences, opportunities and 
challenges which characterise the practice of ethnopolitics across contemporary Latin 
America. 
While academic literature frames the theoretical parameters within which this 
comparative study is situated, the array of primary texts, documents and articles 
provides an important basis from which to examine the realities of Indigenous 
injustices and to reflect upon the similarities and differences that emerge across these 
two ethnopolitical case studies in Mexico (Zapatista social justice movement) and 
Bolivia (2011 TIPNIS controversy). While scholarship is an effective position from 
which to observe the underlying processes, practices and trends which have broadly 
shaped Indigenous activism throughout Latin American history into the political 
present, this thesis is also acutely aware of how non-scholarly Indigenous actors 
themselves author many important contemporary narratives which strongly influence 
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and disrupt traditional dynamics both within and between the Mexican and Bolivian 
political lifeworlds: they do so by proposing alternative imaginaries that directly 
challenge and rival the dominance of neoliberal orthodoxy. Moreover, my approach 
also seeks to acknowledge the variegated participation of different actors including 
Evo Morales and the Zapatista revolutionaries but also Indigenous 
scholars/intellectuals too (Yampara Huarachi 2017; Rivera Cusicanqui 2015; Huanacuni 
Mamani 2010; Reinaga 2001 [1970]).  
Using Foucault's (1970) discourse analysis, chapter three examines the Zapatista 
Declaraciones de la Selva Lacandona (1994-2005) to reveal how their discourse 
challenges and destabilises the traditional dynamics of power within the neoliberal 
Mexican state. By mapping a theory of hope (Dinerstein 2016) onto the concept of civil 
society (Beasley-Murray 2010; Cohen and Arato 1992), the Zapatista social justice 
movement use the Declaraciones to paint an alternative utopian futurescape in 
Mexico, one which foregrounds social justice for the country's Indigenous and other 
subaltern communities who continue to suffer beneath the homogenising tendencies 
of the neoliberal state. By inserting themselves within an anti-globalisation discourse, 
the Zapatista movement invite the use of these methodological approaches in order to 
help illuminate the political ideas behind their discourse. Chapter four examines 
president Evo Morales's two 2006 inaugural speeches from within an Andean utopian 
perspective (López Baralt 2016; Flores Galindo 1994 [1986]. Not only does this reveal 
how Morales combined the use of Andean histories and memories with performance 
and discourse (Taylor 2003) to orientate his presidency in the political present but it 
revealed how development controversies like the TIPNIS (Laing 2015; McNeish 2013) 
both enhanced and destabilised his image as Andean decoloniser. 
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Furthermore, the addition of print media to my comparative methodology 
offers this study key insight into how controversies like the 2011 TIPNIS dispute in 
Bolivia and el Tren Maya in Mexico both play out across the landscape. In addressing 
the wider struggle for ethnoterritoriality in Mexico (chapter one) and Bolivia (chapter 
two), my treatment of print media sheds light on what these controversial 
developments reveal about the tensions between neoliberalism (or the legacies of 
former neoliberal policies) and ethnopolitical struggle. For example, despite the fact 
that Andrés Manuel López Obrador positions his presidency as a defining moment of 
change in the neoliberal lifecycle in Mexico (la cuarta transformación), el Tren Maya 
appears to reflect an uncomfortable legacy of ethnocultural and ethnoterritorial 
appropriations in Chiapas. Meanwhile, careful analysis of Bolivian print media in 
chapter two not only reinforces the widely held opinion that the TIPNIS reserve and 
Indigenous territority is a deeply contested site between Indigenous people and the 
Morales state but that it may also be considered a discursive battleground, where 
indigeneity and decolonisation are highly contested categories. Additionally, further 
analysis of print media is useful in the study of la architectura nueva andina in El Alto 
(Cárdenas 2010), providing insight into how alteños (citizens of El Alto) engage and 
respond to this development. 
In addition to this, I spent three months (2017) in Bolivia conducting fieldwork 
as part of my doctoral research. While there I conducted a series of interviews with 
several Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists from the Bolivian altiplano and las 
tierras bajas. Moreover I consulted sources in a series of archives. In Sucre I visited the 
Archivo Biblioteca Nacionales de Bolivia where I acquired a combination of primary 
and secondary sources on Bolivian revolutionary history of the twentieth century. In 
48 
 
Cochabamba, I attended the Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia (CEDIB) 
which provided me with contemporary sources on the 2011 TIPNIS controversy, 
including an array of print media. Furthermore, all photos printed in subsequent 
pages were taken by me during time spent in Bolivia (chapter two; chapter four).  
My experience in Bolivia was a highly formative one and encouraged me to 
reflect more deeply on my position as a white, male European PhD researcher carrying 
out indigeneities research from afar. It forced me to develop an acute sensitivity 
towards my use of language and description in the thesis and of the need to honour 
and include Indigenous scholarship and other primary sources. At every stage of the 
thesis I try to respect and honour the profound differences between my cultural, 
social, and gendered privilege and the realities of Indigenous struggle against political 
and cultural injustice. I attempt to reflect this in my refusal to translate certain 
phrases and key concepts which do not naturally have a counterpart in the English 
language (campesina/o) and in my complete avoidance of words like Indian which 
frequently reappear in anthropological studies produced in the Global North but 
which, in my view, continue to carry the weight of a deeply negative and traumatic 
colonial history. As much as this thesis has been about my personal educational 
attainment within a profoundly neoliberalist educational setting – I have always been 
deeply conscious of that fact – the opportunities to learn and expand my 
understanding of indigeneities through the various approaches and frameworks laid 
out in this thesis have genuinely challenged me to think and rethink the world in 
which I live and the prevailing shadow of colonial injustice that continues to obscure 
important realities.  
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 I must add that, while I received opportunity to visit Bolivia for an extended 
period, the same opportunities to travel to Mexico were less forthcoming due to 
funding scarcities. Needless to say, my research background and experience from the 
past decade (2009-2020) provides an important counterbalance to that lack of first-
hand experience of Mexico and Chiapas. During previous degree programmes I 
studied, published, presented and taught on Mexico and the Zapatistas (Warfield 2015) 
and I have also been highly active in my pursuit of courses/modules in territorial and 
political philosophy, available as part of the PhD structured programme, which have 
duly helped to facilitate the development of my theoretical approaches to the various 
chapters which follow. With an established background in indigeneities research, 
accompanied by a passion for the material itself, I hope that I am suitably positioned 
to lead in the development of this comparative research topic.  
Overall, by engaging in a methodological framework which prioritises textual 
analysis over other qualitative, quantitative and other social scientific methods, this 
thesis not only observes the historical and contemporary processes and practices 
which underpin ethnopolitics in Latin America today but acknowledges the agency of 
Indigenous people themselves who author influential narratives that have real effect 
and meaning within the social spaces they are produced and articulated. This 
methodology facilitates a smooth, comparative transition between the Mexican and 
Bolivian contexts, promoting fresh, original perspectives within the growing field of 








Before I begin this comparative analysis, it is first necessary to outline the structure of 
this thesis as well as to provide an overview of each of the four chapters. All four 
chapters are arranged in relation to the key organising tropes of place and space, 
where chapters one and two deal exclusively with land and Indigenous place-making 
in Mexico and Bolivia while chapters three and four concern the politics of space and 
ethnopolitical representation. The case studies which I have identified for discussion 
in this thesis will each be introduced in chronological order beginning with the 
Zapatista social justice movement in Mexico followed by the 2011 TIPNIS controversy 
in Bolivia. By regularly shifting back and forth between these two ethnopolitical 
contexts this thesis draws greater attention to the similarities and differences which 
characterise ethnopolitical activity across contemporary Latin America.  
 Chapter one begins by examining the evolving nature of Indigenous place-
making in Mexico with particular emphasis on the key role played by the Zapatista 
social justice movement in the struggle for land and place in Chiapas. By focusing on a 
variety of different Indigenous place-making acts including the milpa, and the 
twentieth century ejido, chapter one considers the way in which the Zapatista 
Caracoles evolve the struggle for land and place in contemporary Mexico. In 
particular, chapter one identifies how the Zapatista Caracoles may be considered a 
form of place-making in Mexico by arguing how they architecturally and 
epistemologically delineate between internal and external spaces, allowing the 
Zapatista communities to develop an internal project of autonomy that is separate 
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from yet connected to the neoliberal world outside (Tuan 1977). However, the chapter 
goes on to further elaborate that, despite the security offered by the Caracoles to the 
Zapatista communities, Chiapas still remains a key location under threat from several 
neo-territorial challenges linked to the neoliberal world order, among them eco-
tourism and government-endorsed plans to develop el Tren Maya. While construction 
of this vast railway project does not directly impact Zapatista territory, this chapter 
reveals how el Tren Maya represents the contested nature of development in Chiapas. 
Even before construction of this railway project has begun, tensions are already 
emerging between the Zapatistas and the Mexican state, led by Andrés Manuel López 
Obredor, as well as among local Indigenous populations themselves in southern 
Mexico.  
 The contested nature of development in Chiapas establishes the groundwork 
for chapter two which addresses the challenges faced by former Indigenous president 
of Bolivia, Evo Morales Ayma, who struggled to mediate between a national policy of 
neoextractivism, on one hand, while maintaining the integrity of Indigenous collective 
territorial rights on the other. As my analysis of the 2011 TIPNIS controversy will show, 
lowland Indigenous communities, who legally occupy this reserve and Indigenous 
territory, were forced to confront the hegemonic tendencies of the Morales-led state, 
where Morales used discourse to marginalise communities who resisted the proposed 
highway, framing them as citizens deliberately acting against the interests of the 
plurinational state. Yet, in tracing ethnoterritoriality along rural-urban lines, chapter 
two also reveals how wealthy Aymara alteños (residents of El Alto) benefited from 
economic policies under the Morales regime, commissioning a bold new architectural 
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aesthetic that not only promotes ethnic pride and visibility in urban Bolivia but 
redefines the relationship between indigeneity and territoriality.  
 Transitioning from place to space, chapter three applies Foucault's theory of 
discourse to analyse the Zapatista Declaraciones de la Selva Lacandona to reveal how 
they challenge and destabilise the nature of power in neoliberal Mexico. From 
declaring war against the federal executive to proposing alternative futurescapes that 
foreground the subaltern in a globalisation of resistance, the Zapatista Declaraciones 
de la Selva Lacandona point to the power of discourse in undermining state hegemony 
whereby they articulate a message of hope. As a utopian framework, the Zapatista 
Declaraciones map hope onto the concept of civil society and encourage Mexicans to 
transcend the limits of modernity and organise outside the locus of the nation-state. 
While the Zapatista social justice movement acknowledges its difficulties in mobilising 
political change outside the narrow confines of Mexican electoral democracy, analysis 
of the declarations reveals how Zapatista discourse evolves to advance a globalisation 
of resistance which challenges the global neoliberal right by forming a global 
resistance of solidarity from below and to the left.  
 From looking beyond the nation-state, chapter four observes the way former 
Bolivian president Evo Morales Ayma used discourse to shape and rework the 
foundations of the nation-state in pursuit of social justice for the country's Indigenous 
majority. Through an Andean utopian perspective, chapter four analyses Morales's two 
2006 inaugural speeches to reveal the ways in which Bolivia's first Indigenous 
president combined discourse, performance and memory to convey a new sense of the 
political which ruptures with the neoliberal past and foregrounds Indigenous rights 
and culture in a new and inclusive national imaginary. However, analysis of the 2011 
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TIPNIS controversy reveals how Morales's pursuit of highway development both 
enhances and destabilise his image as an Indigenous president who expressed personal 
commitment to decolonise the country. Not only do I argue that the TIPNIS highway 
development symbolises Morales's endeavour to elevate Bolivia out of a chronic state 
of underdevelopment, positioning it at a strategic crossroads in a pan Andean 
futurescape, chapter four also points to the ways in which the Morales state used force 
towards lowland Indigenous protesters, policing their demands and encouraging them 
to conform to his national Andean project. Chapter four concludes that the use of 
such force eroded Morales's broad coalition of support which contributed, in part, to 
his political demise years later. 
 By analysing these two very different ethnopolitical case studies through a 
comparative methodology, this thesis will draw attention to key similarities and 
differences in contemporary ethnopolitics across Mexico and Bolivia, generating fresh 














Tierra y libertad: The Zapatista Movement and the Struggle 







The aim of this first chapter is to explore the evolving nature of Indigenous place-
making in Mexico with particular emphasis on the key role the Zapatista social justice 
movement has played in the struggle for land and place in Chiapas. Developing this 
argument over several stages, this chapter draws attention to examples of Indigenous 
place-making and how this practice has evolved either as a result of external 
influences or direct state intervention. Beginning with the Mexican milpa, this chapter 
establishes the basic principles of ethnoterritorial philosophy in this predominantly 
Maya region and how the relationship between the human and the non-human Other 
is symbolised by a special regard for maíz and for the knowledges and practices of the 
milpero who grows and nurtures maíz on the milpa. The chapter then considers the 
twentieth century ejido, and how this federally-endorsed system of communal land 
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tenure not only represented a post-colonial form of justice for Indigenous people but 
was vulnerable to state intervention, privatised by the Partido Revolucionario Nacional 
(PRI) in 1992, leaving Indigenous people exposed to market forces without legal 
guarantees or territorial protections.  
 In the context of this neoliberal turn, the Zapatista social justice movement 
emerged, symbolising the innovative role played by this predominantly Indigenous 
social movement in the struggle for land and place in Mexico. Following protracted 
negotiations with the neoliberal Mexican state, accompanied by political violence in 
the deeply militarised zone of Chiapas, the Zapatistas turn to construct the Caracoles 
which aim to redefine relations both among the communities themselves and between 
the Zapatistas and the rest of the world. Representing an epistemic reversal of power, 
the Caracoles distinguish between what Tuan (1977) refers to as the interior and the 
exterior, allowing the Zapatistas to develop a model of autonomy that is both separate 
from yet connected to the external lifeworld. This distinction between inside and 
outside spaces reinforces the role of the Caracoles as a place-making act whereby they 
generate a sense of security and stability for Zapatista communities inside amid the 
threat of the neoliberal world outside (Tuan 1977). 
 Yet, despite the reassurance of the Caracoles, Chiapas remains the site of 
several ongoing neo-territorial challenges among them the growth in eco-tourism and 
the invasive infrastructural development which supports this industry. Here, I apply 
Gómez-Barris's (2017) model of the "extractive zone" to illuminate how the 
ethnoterritorial and ethnocultural appropriations carried out by president Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador and his Tren Maya development project reveals the invasive 
presence of neoliberalism in twenty-first century Chiapas. Despite López Obrador and 
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his cuarta transformación, which proposes a radical reorientation of Mexico's political 
system away from the policies and practices of the neoliberal past, the Zapatista 
resistance to el Tren Maya symbolises the challenges that continue to confront 
Indigenous people who deliberately choose to make place outside and in opposition to 
the neoliberal world.  
 To achieve these aims, this chapter is divided into four sections. Section one 
addresses territorial philosophy and cosmology in the Maya region, focusing on the 
significance of maíz and the milpa among Maya communities. This section then turns 
to discuss the role of the ejido as a form of place-making in twentieth century 
revolutionary Mexico and its relationship to the nation-state.  
 Section two discusses Mexico's neoliberal turn and the impact this economic 
change had on the politics of place-making in Chiapas. In particular, I focus on the 
privatisation of the ejido in 1992 and how this sparked a predominantly Indigenous 
revolution in Chiapas.  
 In Section three, I explore the period of negotiations between the Zapatistas 
and the Mexican state which culminated in the San Andrés Accords in 1996. However, 
the government's refusal to implement the Accords in law provided impetus for the 
Zapatistas to begin the development of the Caracoles. Here, I focus on the Caracoles as 
a form of contemporary place-making in Chiapas.  
 Finally, Section four addresses one among a number of neo-territorial 
challenges to confront twenty-first century Chiapas. By drawing attention to the 
contested nature of the Tren Maya development, I argue how Chiapas is an "extractive 





A History of Land and Land Reform in Chiapas and the Emergence of the EZLN 
 
While the overarching aim of this chapter is to map out the evolution of ethnopolitical 
place-making in Chiapas and the role the Zapatista movement has played in that 
effort, I begin this discussion by reflecting a little further on the historical significance 
of land and how it came to form the centrepiece of the EZLN’s politics of resistance 
against the nation-state. The aim of this opening section is to describe that history of 
struggle for land and ethnoterritorial rights in Chiapas dating back to the time of the 
Mexican Revolution (1910-1921) and to discuss how limitations in the federal 
redistribution of land to local communities in this Indigenous region of Mexico 
eventually gave way to the formation of a new kind of twenty-first century Zapatismo. 
However, I must add here that Mexican political history is a highly complex matter 
that is regularly rehearsed in the literature from a variety of differing perspectives 
(Katz 2014; Rabasa 2010; Higgins 2004; Bonfil Batalla 2002; Weinberg 2000; Womack 
Jr. 1999; Harvey 1998; Krauze 1997; Cornelius and Craig 1991; Bramford Parkes 1962; 
Gruening 1928). Therefore, the reader should be mindful from the outset that the 
ethnoterritorial analysis I am offering up in this section is a rather focused view of 
historical-territorial developments in Chiapas.  
Chiapas is Mexico’s most southern state and comprises several distinctive 
geographic regions and strategic sites of importance. The state capital, Tuxtla 
Gutiérrez, is located towards the west in an area known as the tierra caliente, a low 
lying region which stretches along the Pacific coast. By contrast, the eastern half of the 
state largely comprises the mountaineous terrain of the Sierra Madre where many 
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important historical centres are located, including the colonial town of San Cristóbal 
de las Casas which was made famous during the Zapatista insurrection of 1994. 
Moreover, further east and south lies the Selva Lacandona, a rich, bio-diverse 
rainforest. Originally the focus of significant human population growth during the 
industrial boom of the twentieth century, this vast rainforest now serves as an 
important tourist attraction, the consequences of which I will address later in this 
chapter.  
Historically, Chiapas was annexed by Mexico in the year 1825 having originally 
formed part of the northern territories of Guatemala (Khasnabish 2010; Weinberg 
2000). With this move not only did Mexico inherit an extremely biodiverse landscape, 
rich in flora, fauna, wildlife as well as renewable and non-renewable energy resources, 
an array of Indigenous communities, the majority of whom claim Maya ancestry, also 
joined the state. In short, the main ethnic groups in Chiapas are as follows: Zoque, 
Tzotzil, Ch’ol, Tojolabal, Mam and Tzeltal (Rovira 2000; Weinberg 2000). While others 
do exist, I have listed these communities largely because they now reside within the 
Selva Lacandona, which will be the focus of our discussions in this opening section, 
having migrated from the highlands during the twentieth century. Additionally, as will 
be determined later, these six Maya ethnic groups also form the basis of the civilian 
branch of the contemporary Zapatista social justice movement and therefore play an 
instrumental role in the daily functioning of this organisation.  
In order to begin to understand ethnoterritoriality in Chiapas, it is important to 
think beyond the nation-state and to acknowledge that Chiapas shares a distinctive 
spatial relationship with the Maya past (Phillips 2014; Grube 2000). While the presence 
of the Maya civilisation has been traced to the northern rainforests of what we now 
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call Guatemala, their legacy extends across large swaths of southern Mexico including 
Chiapas, as I mentioned, as well as the Yucatán (Phillips 2014; Frece and Poole 2008; 
Grube 2000). While ongoing discoveries of ancient sites and artefacts continue to 
draw attention to the region, highlighting links between past and present – I will 
reflect later on how the López Obrador government aims to capitalise on the ancient 
sites of Chiapas in section four - the legacy of the Maya is also arguably a lived one by 
the way in which communities here continue to broadly favour engagement with the 
land through a form of ethnoterritoriality known as the milpa (Phillips 2014; Frece and 
Poole 2008; Grube 2000). While I am not in any way suggesting here that there is an 
authentic and, therefore, static relationship between the ways in which the milpa was 
farmed then as it is now - I will shortly acknowledge how agricultural practices have 
been shaped by state intervention in Chiapas - I do, however, aim to highlight here the 
historical and, therefore, conceptual importance of land and territoriality to ethnic 
groups in this region, where the milpa is considered more than just a form of 
subsistence agriculture but is, in fact, a way of life (Philips 2014; Nigh and Diemont 
2013; De Frece and Poole 2008; Grube 2000).  
 The milpa serves as an important component of the daily infrastructure of 
Indigenous lifeworlds and is a medium through which communities in this region 
conceptualise their place in the natural world of things. The processes and practices 
behind “making milpa” (De Frece and Poole 2008) inform and mediate important ties 
between place, space, community and the ethnic self. According to most scholars, the 
milpa is a versatile and ecologically sustainable system of rotational agriculture that is 
most commonly associated with the cultivation of maíz or corn but also includes other 
important crops such as squash and beans (Philips 2014; Nigh and Diemont 2013; Frece 
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and Poole 2008; Grube 2000). The significance of the milpa, as a sustainable and 
adaptable form of agriculture, lies in the approach that milperos take in carrying out 
their farming duties. While agricultural practices vary from region to region, there is 
broad consensus on what makes the milpa successful.  
To begin with, milperos generally clear a portion of land among the dense 
overgrowth, removing trees and vegetation from the area which is then burned in a 
method known as swidden (Nigh and Diemont 2013). As Nigh and Diemont (2013) 
recount, while the burning of vegetation may appear like an excessive act, it does 
embody some practical functions. According to the authors, it aims to “reduce weeds” 
and “releases soil nutrients, replenishes nitrogen and adds phosphorous, potassium, 
magnesium and manganese contained in the ash of the burned woody vegetation to 
the soil” (Nigh and Diemont 2013: 49). While the lowland regions of Chiapas are 
generally naturally rich in nutrients before any human interaction takes place, this 
‘slash-and-burn’ technique is what makes the milpa both a sustainable and highly 
adaptable form of agriculture in highland areas where the quality of the soil may be 
greatly reduced. To this end, the milpa generates its own fertiliser from the unwanted 
trees and vegetation that are cleared to make way for it. Once ready, the milpa is 
intensively farmed by the milpero for a period of between two to three years before it 
is then left fallow for up to ten years, allowing the soil and vegetation to naturally re-
grow and replenish (Nigh and Diemont 2013).  
In Chiapas, the milpa has been at the heart of economic and agricultural life for 
centuries (Philips 2014; Grube 2000). Not only has maíz been cultivated for 
distribution at local markets or bartered in exchange for labour and other supplies, 
maíz has also been consumed in the form of tortillas which have been a staple in the 
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diet of many remote ethnic communities in the region, sustaining them through 
intense periods of poverty (Nigh and Diemont 2013; Frece and Poole 2008; Rovira 
2000). Additionally, maíz, when left to ferment, transforms into an alcoholic drink 
known locally as pozol which has been traditionally served up during fiestas, 
endowing the milpa with strong cultural associations too. However, the idea of the 
milpa as the “stuff of life” (De Frece and Poole 2008: 341) takes on strong cosmological 
significance when we consider how maíz is conceptualised in the historical imaginary 
of communities in this region.  
According to the Popol Vuh, an ancient Maya scripture which tells the story of 
how the world came into being, the first Maya deities created the earth, crafting the 
first humans from maíz,  
 
A continuacón entraron en pláticas acerca de la creación y la formación de nuestra 
primera madre y padre. De maíz amarillo y de maíz blanco se hizo su carne; de 
masa de maíz se hiceron los brazos y las piernas del hombre. Unicamente masa de 
maíz entró en la carne de nuestros padres, los cuatro hombres que fueron creados. 
 
(Recinos 1986: 104)3 
 
The idea that maíz constitutes the essence of being human in Maya epistemology, 
intimately ties the self to the land and natural world. This endows the process of 
                                                          
3
 There are numerous translations available of the Popul Vuh or Book of the People which was originally 
orally transmitted across generations of Maya descendents before it was transcribed by an anonymous 
figure to preserve this history following the colonial encounter around 1521. Originally transcribed in 
Maya (Quiché) it has since been translated into Spanish (Recinos 1986) and also English (Goetz and 
Griswold Morley 2003; Tedlock 1996). A lengthy narrative, the Popul Vuh unfolds across five sections or 
books telling the story of how the world came into being through a long and complex struggle between 
the world below and the world above, between good and evil, light and darkness, deities and humans 
until an imperfect existence was finally created, a reality that must be harmoniously mediated in a 
constant cycle of construction, deconstruction and rebirth. This chapter relies on Recinos’s (1986) 
Spanish language translation.   
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making milpa with a whole new, personalised meaning. No longer does milpa 
agriculture simply constitute the sustainability of livelihoods from a one-dimensional 
economic perspective, but it clearly informs a deeply entrenched part of who Maya 
people are, how they experience identity and construct a sense of self. The act of 
making milpa is a way of forming and maintaining spiritual connections with deities 
and ancestors, according to De Frece and Poole (2008) who have explored milpa 
farming in the Yucatán peninsula. By regularly tending to the milpa, making offerings 
to the gods and performing rituals of appreciation for the deities, milperos successfully 
navigate the challenges of seasonal harvests, generating food for themselves, their 
families and the community. Not only does this demonstrate the milperos’ great sense 
of care and duty towards the land from which they originally came, according to the 
Popol Vuh (Recinos 1986), but, through this, they also demonstrate for others a sense 
of Mayaness which is something widely respected in communities (Frece and Poole 
2008).  
 Like the Andean ayllu, which I will explore in chapter two, the types of 
agricultural practices and knowledges associated with making milpa generate vivir 
bien, what Hunacuni Mamani (2010: 43) refers to as “los valores de respecto, buscar la 
unidad y la armonía, con los ancestros, con los astros, y con los demás seres humanos 
de diferentes culturas, pueblos, naciones”. While the concept of vivir bien shares 
certain similarities and characteristics that arguably make it a universal way in which 
to know and be in the world – something which will become apparent following my 
analysis of ayllu relationality in chapter two – Huanacuni Mamani (2010: 43) draws 
attention to the fact that local processes and practices such as making milpa connect 
individuals and entire communities “con la divinidad, deidades, ancestros, con los 
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astros y demás seres de la naturaleza para agradecer, pedir y equilibrarse 
personalmente y colectivamente”. Specifically regarding the Mexican milpa, Cano-
Conteras and Valenzuela Guadalupe (2014) note that the milpa is not just a prehistoric 
form of agriculture but that it is linked to local myth and to Mesoamerican 
cosmovision and that the processes and practices behind making milpa demonstrate a 
clear respect for and unity with the world. As the authors write, the vast majority of 
milperos “asocian las fases lunares, y también la intensidad de las lluvias, con las 
distintas respuestas de las plantas, de acuerdo con el momento de la siembra” (Cano-
Conteras and Valenzuela Guadalupe 2014: 19). Moreover, the authors add that every 
milpero “tiene conocimiento al respecto, aprendido de sus mayors, de su propia 
experiencia y sus obervaciones y reflexiones” (Cano-Conteras and Valenzuela 
Guadalupe 2014: 19). In other words, the art of successfully making milpa does not 
constitute the simple idea that man has somehow mastered the natural world around 
him but rather that he is just another “elemento más del universo” (Huanacuni 
Mamani 2010: 42).  
There is also a strong gendered component to making milpa which must also be 
considered here. Men and women have traditionally performed separate yet 
complementary roles in local agricultural processes, mirroring the importance of 
duality and complementarity in the Maya universe. “Duality” writes Marcos (2013: 198) 
is “the essential ordering force of the cosmos”. Peppered throughout the Popol Vuh are 
important references to the priniciple of duality in terms of how the gods themselves 
created the earth and universe (Recinos 1986). In banishing earthly darkness, the gods 
created light, in forming the sun they also created the moon, where there is heaven, 
there is an earthly reality, life and death and so on (Recinos 1986). And, in forming the 
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first humans, they created a masculine and a feminine which, in relation to 
ethnoterritoriality and the Mayan milpa, perform complementary roles in the 
cultivation of corn (De Frece and Poole 2008). While men have traditionally engaged 
in the more laborious task of creating and tending to the milpa, women are often 
responsible for domesticating corn and transforming it into edible forms such as 
tortillas (De Frece and Poole 2008).  
However, in keeping with the gendered nature of making milpa, it is quite 
obvious that the milpa as an agricultural unit is firmly under the authority of male 
figures in the community, where grandfathers, fathers, brothers and sons inherit the 
land from each other, excluding and isolating women from participating directly in the 
local economy (Rovira 2000). If a husband or father dies unexpectedly within the 
family unit, it is usually the eldest son who takes over the milpa in a move that 
instantly overlooks the agency of wives, mothers and daughters in the economic and 
agricultural processes and practices of the community (Rovira 2000). This tradition of 
inheritance very obviously imposes a visible hierarchy between male and female 
figures in Maya communities, where economic and agricultural authority remains 
firmly in the hands of the male (Agredo et al. 2013; De Frece and Poole 2008). 4 
Thus far, I have shown how the milpa is not only an important form of self-
sufficient agriculture in terms of how it has traditionally sustained the lives and 
                                                          
4
 Challenges to these internal forms of community patriarchy were first established by a set of 
revolutionary laws proposed by the EZLN command in advance of their insurrection in 1994. Key among 
them was the Ley Revolucionario de Mujeres published in the newspaper El Despertador Mexicano in 
December 1993. This law exclusively promotes female agency by not only acknowledging the right of 
women to participate in the Zapatista-led struggle and to occupy leading positions of political authority 
and influence within communities but it also foregrounds their right to live economically independent 
lives from the men and to pursue their own line of work. While the struggle for gender equality over the 
last twenty-five years has been a slow up hill climb for many Zapatista women, it has resulted in a 
steady increase in female-led activity with women forming important economic and agricultural 
cooperatives which contribute to the local economy (Eber 2011; Klein 2015).     
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livelihoods of Maya communities in Chiapas but also how it is the cornerstone of 
Indigenous lifeworlds in the region, where tending the milpa endows individuals with 
a sense of self and place in the wider cosmological world. In what follows, I will 
discuss the ways in which twentieth century land reform in Mexico inserted itself into 
this agricultural space, disrupting, distorting and transforming ethnopolitical 
associations with land and place.  
It is not a particularly useful exercise to try and ascertain whether land reform 
was a positive or negative experience for Indigenous communities in Chiapas. To do so 
may risk ironing over the complexities of territorial reform in Chiapas which, I should 
add, are many. Perhaps it is more suitable to frame this discussion in relation to the 
short-term and long-term consequences of nation-state intervention in the 
agricultural sector in Chiapas. This delivers a more thorough explanation as to why 
contemporary Zapatismo came into being towards the latter stages of the twentieth 
century.  
In the short term, land reform was a welcome initiative because it aimed to 
address the long-term legacies of territorial injustice and inequality most acutely 
suffered by Indigenous groups in Mexico under the more than thirty years that 
Porfirio Díaz (1877-1880; 1876-1911) had single-handedly ruled the country (Higgins 
2004; Krauze 1997; Bramford Parkes 1960). Under his liberal regime, Díaz encouraged 
foreign elites, mainly from European and North American markets, to invest heavily in 
Mexican agriculture, mining and industrial development including the construction of 
a vast rail network (Hardy 1934). To this end, Díaz deployed the military to 
appropriate Indigenous lands and to resell these territories to foreign buyers (Krause 
1997). As Bramford Parkes (1960: 262) writes, “under Díaz the hacienda system had 
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spread throughout the entire country and the misery of its victims had been 
intensified”. According to Barry’s (1995: 1) assessment, Díaz had “presided over […] the 
most extensive land redistribution in Mexico’s history, leaving the Indian deprived of 
90 percent of [his/her] land”.  
In Chiapas, American, German, French and British families had extensive 
control over land resources in the region and were engaged in lucrative commercial 
enterprises which included coffee plantations, cattle ranching and the trading of 
expensive woods such as mahogany to markets in Europe and North America 
(Womack Jr. 1999; Harvey 1998). As a consequence of this extensive control over land 
and natural resources, which was facilitated largely by the Díaz regime, many 
Indigenous communities were left completely landless, forced to sell their labour 
cheaply to the foreign patrón under conditions of debt servitude either to settle 
mounting debts which they themselves had accumulated in the local company store or 
to simply earn a small wage that might eventually allow them acquire some land of 
their own into the future (Weinberg 2000; Harvey 1998).  
Similar to Bolivia, the liberal regime of Porfirio Díaz touted its belief in the 
“sancitity of private property and the efficiency of larger [agricultural] units”, looking 
to the United States and its successful agricultural economy as an appropriate model 
to imitate (Foland 1969). Yet, according to Ankersen and Ruppert (2006: 85), the 
hacienda economy was merely a perpetuation of the colonial past, resembling 
encomiendas and latifundios which were former colonial systems of land management. 
While Mexico’s Revolution (1910-1920) set about rupturing with the legacies of the 
country’s colonial past, not only were the material benefits of this revolutionary event 
slow to emerge in Chiapas but land reform was neither motivated, nor fully inspired, 
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by the country’s ethnoterritorial past, favouring, instead, a fresh new approach to the 
agricultural economy going forward.  
Following the initial first stages of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), which 
saw architect of the revolution, Francisco I Madero (1911-1913), assume the role of 
president of Mexico in 1910, there was profound disagreement as to exactly what type 
of state should emerge out of the wreckage of the ensuing social chaos (Fuentes 1996). 
Revolutionaries including Emiliano Zapata in the state of Morelos and Francisco 
‘Pancho’ Villa in Chihuahua strongly denounced the presidency of Madero, criticising 
him for maintaining continuity with capitalist regimes of the past, foregoing 
opportunities to implement revolutionary reform throughout Mexico (Fuentes 1996; 
Cornelius and Craig 1991). Zapata, in particular, favoured a decentralised state model 
where the hacienda economy would be entirely dismantled and the lands redistributed 
to the popular masses in order to allow Indigenous groups to practice 
ethnoterritoriality, empowering communities to reclaim control over local lands and 
natural resources (Krauze 1997; Fuentes 1996). Needless to say, this did not materialise 
nationally as the Mexican constitutionalists seized power and began consolidating the 
revolution around a single party system of governance which would preside over a 
new model of state capitalism (Krauze 1997; Cornelius and Craig 1991). While Zapata 
was famed for leading his Zapatista army of Indigenous and peasant rebels in arms 
against local landowners in Morelos, both he and Pancho Villa in the north were 
quickly defeated and the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) formed in 1929 
(Krauze 1997). The revolutionary constitution of 1917 incorporated Zapata’s principle 
of national territorial expropriation and redistribution, previously outlined in his Plan 
de Ayala (1911). However, Article 27, as it was termed in the legal framework, was not a 
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key priority for the consolidating and institutionalising revolutionary state in the 
immediate aftermath of the revolution. Instead, successive governments focused on 
rebuilding the foundations of a strong capitalist state which included establishing the 
Central Bank in 1921 (Krauze 1997). It was not until the popular presidency of Lázaro 
Cárdenas (1934-1940) in 1934 that Indigenous communities in Chiapas began to 
experience the longer-term benefits of the Mexican Revolution. Under Cárdenas, the 
PNR began the widespread redistribution of the ejido (Jung 2008). 
Article 27 of the revolutionary constitution declared all “land, water and 
mineral rights to be the property of the people of Mexico” and that the state should 
“expropriate land from large landowners and to give it to eligible agrarian 
communities” (Kelly 1994: 542-543; Article 27: 20). Under President Cárdenas, this 
amounted to the redistribution of the ejido which, at the time, was an innovative form 
of communal land tenure that could not be leased, mortgaged or sold by its 
Indigenous recipients (Gruening 1928: 146-147). The concept of the ejido was premised 
on belief in the social function doctrine which broadly implies that land should not 
only serve as an important source of liberation for the Indigenous people but that it 
should also be put to good use by improving society and forming the basis of a strong 
and stable agricultural economy (Ankersen and Ruppert 2006; Foland 1969). In other 
words, land reform was not simply a gesture of goodwill towards Indigenous 
communities but functioned as something more broadly entwined with the politics of 
revolutionary nationalism and as a constitutive element of the ongoing process of 
revolutionary state building in Mexico. To complement the formal restructuring of 
Mexican agriculture, president Cárdenas founded the Conferderación Nacional 
Campesina (CNC), a newly constituted state-endorsed union that would consolidate 
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the Indigenous participants of this new agricultural economy around a single, 
homogenous class referred to by the state as campesinos (Jung 2008). This represented 
the formal integration of Indigenous people into the folds of the Mexican state as 
Spanish-speaking and agriculturally proficient campesinos (Jung 2008). This process of 
assimilation continued and expanded with the establishment of the Instituto Nacional 
Indígena (hereafter INI) in 1948 (Jung 2008). The aim of the INI, when it was originally 
founded, was to “integrar a los indígenas a la cultura nacional [y] promover el 
desarrollo e integración en las regiones interculturales a la vida económica, social y 
política de la nación” (INI 2012: 7). This policy of acculturation or indigenismo, as it 
was widely referred to then by the Mexican state, involved establishing a range of 
bilingual education and sanitation programmes designed to encourage Indigenous 
people to overcome poverty and isolation which were believed to be inherently linked 
to the condition of being Indigenous rather than something that was just simply 
circumstantial or the result of historical neglect.  
It was no surprise, then, that the INI opened its first regional branch in the 
state of Chiapas in 1951 (Jung 2008). While the population of Chiapas is estimated to 
be around four million people, at least thirty-percent of them claim an Indigenous 
identity (Warfield 2015; Cuevas 2007). Collier and Lowery Quaratiello (2005) note that, 
in order to more deeply embed the institutional presence of the Mexican state among 
ethnic communities in Chiapas, the INI appointed community leaders to facilitate 
education and sanitation programmes within and between communities, entrusting 
these often male protagonists with the capacity to decide which communities should 
receive state development and funding and which communities should not. The 
Mexican state was now effectively reaching inside communities, taking advantage of 
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the types of traditional hierarchies I discussed earlier in relation to the milpa and 
awarding land and development funding to those who expressed loyalty to the 
national government (Washbrook 2005; Stahler Sholk 2004).  
Throughout the twentieth century, agricultural practices in Chiapas evolved at 
a considerable rate. While the milpa still remained the cornerstone of agricultural 
activity, under the influence of state-led land reform, campesino groups began to 
intensively farm their milpa plots with technological and educative supports provided 
by the CNC and the INI (Jung 2008). By the year 1970, the Mexican government had 
redistributed more than 200,000 legal land titles to communities who were mainly 
resident in the central highlands of Chiapas (Jung 2008). However, as population 
numbers continued to expand in this region, overcrowding suddenly became a 
pressing issue forcing predominantly Tzeltal, Tzotzil and Ch’ol communities to 
relocate to Chiapas’s lowland region. The Selva Lacandona remained an under 
populated region of Chiapas right up until the mid-twentieth century. It was still 
home to commercial landowners up to that point in history. However, due to the 
progressive colonisation of this ecologically sensitive region of Chiapas, the lowlands 
went largely unsupported by the state, particularly in terms of the provision of 
institutional and infrastructural supports (Washbrook 2005; Stahler Sholk 2004; Trejo 
2002). In other words, while presidents such as Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970-1976) 
encouraged the ongoing colonisation of the Chiapanecan lowlands, the state did not 
properly reinforce land titles creating confusion within and among communities 
themselves and between communities and landowners which, in turn, contributed 
towards further tension and conflict between the various different social actors in the 
state (Van Der Haar 2004; Trejo 2002). Added to this was the increasing pressure of 
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environmental concerns over the intensification of agricultural practices in this 
sensitive ecological area. Around this time, the Montes Azul Biosphere reserve in the 
Selva Lacandona was established to try and prevent the total destruction of this region 
and to preserve important species of flora, fauna and other wildlife from extinction 
through increasingly aggressive agricultural practices which included intensive milpa 
farming and logging (Washbrook 2005). 
This lack of state institutional presence generated a political vacuum that was 
duly occupied by religious groups seeking to win over the support of ethnic 
communities in the region. Following the secularisation of the Mexican state in the 
aftermath of the Mexican Revolution, the Catholic Church was eager to find new ways 
in which to rebuild its support base. It found the impoverished and disenfranchised 
communities of rural Chiapas receptive to their presence. In 1960, the newly appointed 
Bishop of Chiapas, Samuel Ruíz, proposed liberation theology as a method used by the 
clergy to communicate the Word of God, combining religious teachings with local 
Indigenous practices and customs (Womack Jr. 1999; Harvey 1998; Dussel 1978). 
Speaking at the second general council of the Conference of Latin American Bishops, 
Samuel Ruíz delivered an address, in which he spelled out his reasoning for adopting 
such an approach in Chiapas,  
 
 
The poor cannot be evangelized if we [Catholic Church] own vast estates. The 
weak and the oppressed withdraw from Christ if we appear as allies of the 
powerful. The illiterate cannot be evangelized if our religious institutions continue 
looking for paradise in the big cities, and not on the poor edges of town and out in 
the disinherited hamlets. 
 
 
(Womack Jr. 1999: 30)  
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As a philosophy, liberation theology offers “a new framework to rethink the 
articulation of religion and politics, culture and community” (Moraña et al. 2008). As 
Moraña et al. (2008: 15) writes, liberation theology is an “epistemological and 
theoretical criticism of colonialism”. It trancends “traditional Marxist notions of 
alienation” and resignifies “religious narratives as discourses of liberation and popular 
resistance”. It creates “a new rhetoric and a new concept of social change” which is 
“connected with popular beliefs and emancipatory political agendas”. In Chiapas, 
Womack Jr. (1999: 30) notes that Bishop Ruíz began to learn native Indigenous 
languages “to understand villagers in their own tongue” followed by further efforts to 
translate the Bible into Tzeltal to ensure the widespread dissemination of the Word of 
God throughout remote communities in the Selva Lacandona.  
Through small meetings and gatherings in Chol, Tzotzil, Tzeltal, and Tojolabal 
strongholds, Indigenous people in the central highlands of Chiapas and beyond 
“demonstrated their new conscious and conscientious capacity to organize on a 
regional scale (Womack Jr. 1999: 31). The Congreso Nacional Indígena (hereafter CNI), 
held in San Cristóbal de las Casas on 13th October 1974, was an important catalyst in 
this formidable new era of autonomous thinking in Chiapas (Khasnabish 2010; 
Womack Jr. 1999). Around 1,250 Indigenous people across more than 300 villages, 
settlements and communities gathered to recount the “misery and indignity of their 
lives”, to denounce “injustices in vivid detail”, to analyse “the causes of their poverty, 
torments and frustration” and to finally discuss “strategies for action including a union 
of canyon communities” (Womack Jr. 1999 31-32). As Khasnabish (2010) notes, the CNI 
inspired the development of a well organised Indigenous movement in Chiapas that 
led to the formation of several unions across the state including the Central 
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Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos (CIOAC) as well as the Union de 
Ejidos Emiliano Zapata (OCEZ) (Womack Jr. 1999). It was apparent that liberation 
theology had quite an impact across the political landscape of Chiapas, providing 
communities with an alternative to the revolutionary PRI which had lost significant 
influence among communities. Liberation theology actively appropriated Indigenous 
language, customs and cultures in a hegemonic exercise designed to organise 
Indigenous people around the religious teachings of the Church. Despite this, it 
nevertheless created sufficient political space to allow emerging ethnopolitical actors 
to begin the independent struggle for land outside the nation-state. This naturally 
resulted in fierce conflict with a nation-state that was reluctant to permit alternative 
forms of ethnopolitical expression that exceeded the limits of what it was willing to 
afford communities by way of land titles and other basic rights (Trejo 2002). Within 
this politically independent and mobile setting the Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional 
(FZL) entered Chiapas and combined with local Indigenous communities to form the 
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), a predominently Indigenous-led 
revolutionary movement that prioritised the struggle for land and place in Chiapas. A 
relatively unkown force between 1983-1993, the EZLN, which combined elements of 
Marxist thought with Maya cosmology, dominated public discourse in Chiapas and 
across Mexico when the revolutionaries finally declared war against the neoliberal 
Mexican state on 1st January 1994 (Khasnabish 2010; Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Mentinis 
2006; Higgins 2004; Hayden 2002; Womack Jr. 1999; Harvey 1998; EZLN 1st January 
1994). In section two, I elaborate why the EZLN declared war on the Mexican state, 






Ethnoterritoriality and Neoliberalism in Mexico 
 
While there has been a significant focus by a whole range of scholars in recent decades 
on the politics and practices of the Zapatista social justice movement both in terms of 
how their initial revolution unfolded against the state (Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Womack 
Jr. 1999; Harvey 1998) and the subsequent developments that have taken place since 
then (Mora 2017; 2015; Khasnabish 2010), I remind the reader that my discussion here 
must be viewed in relation to the wider comparative framework within which it is 
broadly situated. I am particularly keen to demonstrate the way in which this 
Zapatista model of ethnopolitics evolved within the context of a neoliberal Mexico 
and, in particular, to situate this struggle for land and Indigenous territoriality within 
a comparative framework that also addresses the question of ethnoterritoriality in a 
Bolivia characterised by radical state-led ethnopolitical reforms under Evo Morales 
and the MAS-IPSP. To more accurately frame the Zapatista struggle for 
ethnoterritoriality in Mexico, it is important to first define the impact the Tratado de 
Libre Comercio de América del Norte (hereafter TLCAN) had on ethnoterritoriality in 





the anglophone title North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), represented 
the peak of Mexico’s formal integration into the global free market system (Cannon 
2016; Wise et al. 2003; Levy and Bruhn 2001).5  
 Two key events unfolded in Mexico on 1st January 1994. Leader of the ruling PRI 
and then-president of Mexico Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) celebrated the 
signing of TLCAN in Mexico City to much fanfare. TLCAN was a hallmark bilateral 
free trade deal which ushered in a new era of free market capitalism intended to open 
up Mexico to the benefits of the first world alongside its new North American trading 
partners the United States and Canada (Wise et al. 2003). As part of this process of 
“economic integration”, TCLAN not only reduced tariffs and customs duties along the 
northern border with the US, but it established the rules to allow “transnational 
corporations to locate production in Mexico” and “to market their goods and services” 
to the Mexican people, “taking advantage of the country’s comparative advantages” 
which included “low salaries, abundant natural resources, weak or uninforced 
environmental laws, favourable tax structures, and infrastructure” (Wise et al. 2003: 2). 
While Mexico already formed part of other international trading arrangements, 
including the General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT) which concerns all 
                                                          
5
 It is important to note that the Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN) is being 
replaced by a new trade deal, the Acuerdo Estados Unidos, México, Canadá otherwise known as the US-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) (La jornada 3
rd
 October 2018). This new trade deal to replace 
NAFTA was signed by representatives of the three participating countries in December 2019 after 
negotiations reopened on this 25 year multilateral agreement at the behest of US president Donald 
Trump (The Guardian 10
th
 December 2019). During his controversial 2016 presidential campaign, 
President Trump blamed NAFTA for the loss of US manufacturing jobs and vowed to renegotiate it with 
the help of Mexico and Canada to secure a more competitive advantage for the US. While slight tweeks 
appear to characterise much of this new trade deal, important changes have taken place in key areas 
including intellectual property, agriculture and automobile manufacturing. To restore the US 
competitive advantage, 75% (up from 60%) of vehicles must be manufactured in any of the three 
participating countries to qualify as tariff-free. Moreover, at least 40% must be manufactured by a 
worker earning $16 or more, a wage only available in the US (Countryman 2018). As USMCA has not yet 
been fully approved by all parliaments and senates, it is impossible to assess its impact. On that basis I 
will remain focused on TLCAN which still remains relevant for my analysis of ethnoterritoriality and 
neoliberalism in Chiapas.  
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World Trade Organisation (WTO) members, TLCAN was significant in terms of its 
scope, scale and impact on the country (Wise et al. 2003; Levy and Bruhn 2001). As 
Levy and Bruhn (2001) note, the problem with TCLAN did not directly lie with the 
impact it had on extremely high tariffs (some as high as 100%) which characterised 
Mexico’s protectionist period (1940-1970) earlier that century; many of these tariffs 
had, in fact, already been radically reduced under GATT in 1986. Instead, as the 
authors write, “to secure fast-track agreement, Mexico had to make several 
unwelcomed concessions to an increasingly restive US Congress” including in the 
areas of labour and migration (where free trade did not constitute the free movement 
of people) and territorial and environmental law (Levy and Bruhn 2001: 205). While 
some still praise the wealth benefits brought about by TLCAN in Mexico, Indigenous 
revolutionaries who took up arms in the Selva Lacandona felt victimised by a series of 
“economic policies that seemed to leave no room for their survival” (Barry 1995: 157).  
On that same morning, thousands of mostly Indigenous Zapatista 
revolutionaries, some armed with little more than sticks, seized private landed estates 
and deliberately occupied the streets, squares and town halls of some of Chiapas’s 
most strategic cities including San Cristóbal de las Casas (Muñoz Ramírez 2008; 
Womack Jr. 1999; Harvey 1998). The aim of this armed insurrection was to showcase 
their anger at the threat neoliberalism posed to their ongoing – and still unresolved – 
struggle for land and Indigenous territoriality. The events of that morning were 
symbolically profound not just because a band of Indigenous revolutionaries launched 
a rebellion against the nation-state at a crucial stage of transition in the country’s 
development, but it also marked the beginning of a new phase in the struggle for 
ethnoterritorial rights in Chiapas, one which centred on the question of compatability 
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between the struggle for ethnoterritoriality, on one hand, and the transition towards a 
neoliberal Mexico, on the other (Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Barry 1995).  
During the first twelve days of the revolution both the Zapatista revolutionaries 
and the Mexican military were embroiled in a fierce battle which played out on the 
streets of San Cristóbal de las Casas in full view of national and international media 
(Muñoz Ramírez 2008). Surprised – perhaps even overwhelmed – by the extent of this 
Indigenous uprising, the state ordered an estimated 70,000 military troops be 
deployed to Chiapas in order to rapidly contain the spread of this insurrection 
(Higgins 2004). Justifying the revolution in their own words, through the publication 
of the Primera Declaración de la Selva Lacandona, the Zapatista revolutionary 




Somos producto de 500 años de luchas: primero contra la esclavitud, en la guerra 
de Independencia contra España encabezada por los insurgentes, después por 
evitar ser absorbidos por el expansionismo norteamericano, luego por promulgar 
nuestra Constitución y expulsar al Imperio Francés de nuestro suelo, después la 
dictadura porfirista nos negó la aplicación justa de leyes de Reforma y el pueblo se 
rebeló formando sus propios líderes, surgieron Villa y Zapata, hombres pobres 
como nosotros a los que se nos ha negado la preparación más elemental para así 
poder utilizarnos como carne de cañón y saquear las riquezas de nuestra patria sin 
importarles que estemos muriendo de hambre y enfermedades curables, sin 
inmortales que no tengamos nada, absolutamente nada, ni un techo digno, ni 
tierra, ni trabajo, ni salud, ni alimentación, ni educación, sin tener derecho a elegir 
libre y democráticamente a nuestras autoridades, sin independencia de los 
extranjeros, sin paz ni justicia para nosotros y nuestros hijos. 
 
 
(EZLN 1st January 1994) 
 
 
I include this long paragraph from the declaration to draw attention to the fact 
that the Zapatista revolutionaries do not explicitly reference neoliberalism or TLCAN 
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as direct causes of their revolutionary campaign in Chiapas. Instead, as the passage 
highlights, the revolutionaries situate their current struggle for land and other basic 
rights within a long and complex historical trajectory which has persistently 
marginalised Indigenous people for more than five hundred years, leaving them with 
“absolutemente nada”, as the passage suggests (EZLN 1st January 1994). In the context 
of current economic adjustments, the declaration simply points to the fact that the 
long, dark shadow of coloniality only looks set to darken further under this neoliberal 
turn, prompting Indigenous people in Chiapas to challenge convention and take up 
arms against the nation-state and in defence of la tierra and other basic rights 
(Mignolo 2010; 2000; Moraña et al. 2008; Muñoz Ramírez 2008; EZLN 1st January 1994).  
A key factor in Mexico’s economic transition under TLCAN directly concerned 
Article 27 of the country’s 1917 revolutionary constitution and the federal 
redistribution of land in Chiapas and across Mexico. In order to ensure that Mexico’s 
agricultural sector was more compatible with the international marketplace, president 
Salinas de Gortari ordered amendments to Article 27 which “terminated the 
government’s historic commitment to provide land to petitioning campesinos”, thus 
opening the doors to the “privatisation of the country’s social sector” altogether (Barry 
1995: 117). The ejido, a hallmark of Mexico’s twentieth century land reform programme, 
was now no longer legally guaranteed by the federal state and rules and regulations 
which previously restricted the buying, selling and leasing of ejidal properties were 
now non-binding under current legal and economic frameworks (Barry 1995 Bramford 
Parkes 1960; Gruening 1928). In other words, Mexico returned to embrace a national 
regime of private property rights (as it did under the liberal regime of Porfiro Díaz), 
where demand for land and natural resources was no longer regulated by the 
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institutional presence and influence of the nation-state but was, instead, exclusively 
controlled by the economic currents of global market forces (Kaletsky 2010; Dardot 
and Laval 2009). The devastating consequences of agricultural deregulation under 
TCLAN can be accurately traced along the contours of Mexico’s once thriving 
domestic maíz industry (Barry 1995).  
As I discussed earlier, maíz was once the centrepiece of agricultural activity on 
the milpa. However, as Barry (1995: 70) notes, US-produced corn suddenly flooded the 
Mexican marketplace, where upwards of “2.5 million metric tons of duty-free corn was 
allowed to enter Mexico in the first year of NAFTA”. Under TCLAN, more than two 
million campesinos were “hard hit by the agricultural restructuring policies” 
(Browning 2013: 87), with many more struggling to compete against the imposition of 
“industrial growers” who were buying large swathes of rural lands to expand their 
transnational enterprises (Browning 2013: 90). In short, it was quite clear that, from an 
ethnopolitical perspective at least, TCLAN not only represented the imposition of a 
radically disruptive economic regime which unfairly favoured corporatism over 
campesino and Indigenous livelihoods but, by deregulating and commoditising maíz 
in this way, it was a direct attack on ethnopolitical ways of knowing and being in the 
world. As the reader will remember, maíz is not just an economically important crop 
among Indigenous communities in Chiapas but it constitutes the very essence of life 
and being in the cosmological universe of the Maya. Therefore, this ethnopolitical 
resistance was not just a defence of economic lifestyles in Chiapas, it was a personal 
endeavour, an act of survival against a prevailing worldview which prioritised the 
economic agency of transnational businesses over the lifestyles of many remote 
Indigenous communities in Chiapas (EZLN 1st January 1994).  
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New international norms, however, dictated that national governments were 
now responsible for recognising the rights of Indigenous people within their 
jusrisdictions. Central to this global rights-based agenda was a series of international 
agencies such as the International Labor Organisation (ILO) and the United Nations 
(UN) which no longer deemed it acceptable or appropriate for national governments 
to either ignore and/or assimilate entire Indigenous populations into dominant 
cultures or ways of life. Instead, the ILO (1991) and, later the UN (2007), drafted a 
series of charters which encouraged nation-states to recognise and value the 
contribution of ethnopolitical, cultural and economic rights in their legal and 
constitutional frameworks, what Sieder (2002: 1) terms a recognition of a “politics of 
difference”.  
In 1991, the ILO published Convention 169 which explicitly required all member 
states to acknowledge “the aspirations of these peoples to exercise control over their 
own institutions, ways of life and economic development and to maintain and develop 
their identities, languages and religions within the framework of the States in which 
they live” (ILO 169 1991). While the politics of globalisation rolled back the influence of 
the twentieth century nation-state, thus generating fresh space in which to articulate 
an ethnopolitical rights-based agenda, these demands were still predicated on a 
certain set of beliefs and assumptions which reinforced the presence and influence of 
the colonial “matrix of power” (Mignolo 2010; Moraña et al. 2008).  
First, this multicultural turn addressed the question of Indigenous rights as 
human rights. This is an example of the universal recognition and inclusion of 
difference explicitly articulated from within a Eurocentric perspective or worldview 
(Mignolo 2014; 2010). By incorporating the local rights of ethnic communities into a 
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universal rights-based agenda, European and North American powers position 
themselves as “saviours” of the global lifeworld. These agencies and institutions speak 
on behalf of all those it deems to be “victims”, bestowing upon them a set of rights 
which conceal past violations that were formally perpetuated by these very same 
powers at different stages throughout history, resulting in ethnic invisibility (Mignolo 
2014; 2010; Hopgood 2013).  
Second, this multicultural agenda tended to reinforce the centrality of the 
nation-state in the political lifeworld of Indigenous people, empowering states to 
decide on whether, or to what extent, they would acknowledge ethnic rights within 
national legal frameworks. In other words, the state, a product of the modern colonial 
condition, was entrusted to legitimise the place of Indigenous people in contemporary 
societies. However, complete multicultural recognition almost never outweighted the 
nation-state’s propensity to foreground economic development in this new neoliberal 
lifeworld. At the same time at which Mexican president Salinas de Gortari approved 
reforms to Article 27 in 1992, suspending all hope that Indigenous people would 
maintain access to lands and territories approved by the state, he also introduced a 
series of limited multicultural reforms which redefined the national character of 
Mexico to acknowledge the presence of ethnic cultures and to recognise their 
contribution to Mexican history and national heritage (Article 2; Mexican 
Constitution).  
As Hale (2005) notes, this shift towards multicultural recognition allowed the 
nation-state to manage between permissible or inappropriate expressions of 
ethnopolitics. The nation-state viewed Indigenous people as either one of two 
categories: el indio permitido who does not pose a threat to the implementation of 
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neoliberal policies and can, therefore, be suitably managed by the nation-state 
through a range of modest reforms or, by contrast, the uncontainable indio tajante 
who makes radical claims on the nation-state by articulating a series of deep-seated 
ethnic demands which disrupt the continuity of the neoliberal project. By conducting 
land grabs and making territorial claims that far exceeded what was acceptable under 
Mexico’s newly imposed neoliberal framework, the 1994 EZLN Revolution deliberately 
ruptured the multicultural seal of ethnopolitical containment, allowing Zapatista 
revolutionaries to engage a new kind of agency which had not been played out within 
neoliberal Mexico before. 
In what follows, section three elaborates how the Zapatista revolutionaries 
engaged the struggle for ethnoterritorial rights in neoliberal Mexico. It is important to 
consider that this process of place-making unfolded over two separate phases in the 
evolution of Zapatismo between the years 1994-2005. First, section three will address 
the intense period of negotiations in the late-twentieth century which highlighted the 
failure of the federal executive to accommodate the demands of the EZLN. Committed 
to the struggle for land and place in Mexico, section three also considers how 
Zapatista revolutionaries were forced to occupy a place on the margins of nation-state 
recognition, where they developed the Caracoles as a material and symbolic response 
to their position outside the epistemological and institutional parameters of the 










The Struggle for Ethnoterritoriality in Chiapas 
 
Having established the impact that neoliberalism - specifically the TCLAN trade deal - 
had on land and ethnoterritorial rights in Mexico, discussion now turns to 
acknowledging the various ways in which the Zapatista social justice movement 
engaged the struggle for territorial rights in Chiapas from this point onwards. As I 
mentioned, this struggle for land and ethnoterritorial recognition is best understood 
as a process of place-making which unfolded over two separate phases of 
development, with the Zapatista revolutionaries first participating in a series of deeply 
contentious negotiations before finally occypying a place outside the legal and 













Negotiating Place in Neoliberal Mexico 
Within the brief two month period since the 1994 Chiapas Revolution first unfolded 
on January 1st, both the Zapatista revolutionaries and Mexican negotiators, led by PRI 
confidant Manuel Camacho, gathered at the Cathedral in San Cristóbal de las Casas to 
begin a process of dialogue mediated by the trusted Bishop of Chiapas, Samuel Ruíz 
(Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Higgins 2001). The Dialogues in the Cathedral took place over 
a two-week period between February and March 1994 (Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Higgins 
2001; Womack Jr. 1999; Harvey 1998). In hindsight, the dialogues were both successful 
and unsuccessful in equal measure. On one hand, after an intense period of bloody 
conflict between the revolutionaries and the Mexican state, where more than five 
hundred Zapatista soilders are believed to have lost their lives (although official 
figures claim that it was closer to two hundred), the dialogues proved, in the short-
term at least, that both sides could indeed sit down to negotiate a potential solution to 
the crisis (Hayden 2002). However, any possibility of an actual solution materializing 
at this early stage was very quickly diminished, on the other hand. While both sides 
emerged from the talks having agreed that the federal government would implement a 
series of 34 commitments which closely resembled the eleven original demands laid 
down by the Zapatistas in their Primera Declaración de la Selva Lacandona, Mexico 
simunltaneously entered a period of national political crisis which threw into question 
the government’s commitment to peace in Chiapas altogether (Castañeda 2000; 
Womack Jr. 1999).  
The Chiapas Revolution broke out during an important election cycle in 
Mexico. The PRI was intent on securing the presidency for another six year term 
(1994-2000). President Salinas de Gortari had, as per tradition within the institutional 
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ranks of the PRI, nominated his successor to the presidency, the youthful and 
exuberant Luis Donaldo Colosio (Castañeda 2000). Touted as a political reformer, 
Colosio's appointment stirred up tensions among some within the traditional ranks of 
the PRI to the point where certain members of the party faithful feared that his 
nomination might risk the Mexican presidency altogether (Castañeda 2000). A 
political party that once epitomized the very essence of Mexicanidad now struggled to 
find relevance among a competing electoral framework - the right-wing Partido Acción 
Nacional (hereafter PAN) and the centre-left Partido Revolucionario Democrático 
(hereafter PRD) - and within an economy that had weakened to the point of collapse 
in 1982 (Levy and Bruhn 2001). Broadly speaking, it is within this contested political 
environment in which Luis Donaldo Colosio was assassinated on 23rd March 1994 in 
the state of Tijuana while out on the campaign trail (Castañeda 2000). While Colosio 
was almost immediately replaced by the less charismatic Ernesto Zedillo, who 
eventually won the election that same year, this victory did little to restore confidence, 
faith or credibility in the PRI. In response to this ensuing crisis of legitimacy, Zapatista 
authorities firmly rejected the government’s 34 commitments following a thorough 
consultation with communities in Chiapas (Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Manaut et al. 2006; 
Higgins 2001; Womack Jr. 1999; Harvey 1998). For now, it appeared as though all 
formal channels between the revolutionaries in Chiapas and the government in 
Mexico City remained suspended. Yet, with rising levels of violence reported 
throughout Chiapas, the EZLN command was left with little choice but to seek out 
ways in which it could bring to an end the conflict in Chiapas.  
Within a year of the Dialogues taking place in the Cathedral at San Cristóbal de 
las Casas, the Zapatistas and the Mexican state agreed to re-join the peace effort and 
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find a solution to the crisis in Chiapas (Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Manaut et al. 2006; 
Higgins 2001). To showcase their commitment to peace in the region - a metaphorical 
olive-branch if you will - Mexico’s Congress passed a new law entitled Ley para el 
Diálogo, la Conciliación y la Paz Digna en Chiapas (Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Manaut et al. 
2006; Higgins 2001). Not only did this law establish a new legal precedent which 
guaranteed Chiapas and its citizens the right to peace, but it formally proposed the 
development of a new mediating body designed to help achieve that goal (Muñoz 
Ramírez 2008; Manaut et al. 2006; Higgins 2001). Known as La Comisión de Concordia 
y Pacificación (hereafter COCOPA), this new legislative body constituted an array of 
cross-party congressional leaders whose task it was to help facilitate and achieve a new 
peace deal in Chiapas.  
Of course, while the government appeared to set the stage for peace talks to 
take place, preparing all the necessary legal and political groundwork for the 
demanding task that lay ahead, the Zapatista revolutionaries could be forgiven for 
thinking that the Zedillo administration was less than serious about dialogue and 
peace in Chiapas. In the roughly tweleve month period since the Dialogues at the 
Cathedral in San Cristóbal de las Casas concluded in March 1994, political violence in 
the region had intensified on a number of levels. Following military intervention in the 
conflict in January 1994, a large number of federal security forces remained in the 
region forming checkpoints which controlled the flow of individuals and communities 
in and out of the rebel-held territory (Muñoz Ramírez 2008). However, reports quickly 
surfaced which indicated that many of these military checkpoints staged multiple 
incidences of intimidatory violence towards communities as well as the rape of female 
victims by military personnel in an attempt to destablise and undermine the support 
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base of the Zapatistas in Chiapas (Klein 2015; Eber and Antonia 2011; Muñoz Ramírez 
2008; Rovira 2000).  
Meanwhile, in 1995, state intelligence officials claimed that they had finally 
identified the individual behind the highly popular yet enigmatic figure of 
Subcomandante Marcos whose identity had remained anonymous up to this point 
(Hayden 2002; Womack Jr. 1999). This discovery prompted president Zedillo to deliver 
an address to the nation in which he publically un-masked Marcos in an attempt to 
humiliate him and the Zapatistas (Womack Jr. 1999). By revealing to the nation that 
this iconic and respected Zapatista figure was, in fact, a mestizo university professor by 
the name of Rafael Sebastián Guillén, Zedillo hoped to inspire a sea-change in public 
opinion that would drive many to question the integrity of this ethnopolitical social 
movement. His efforts, however, failed, having the exact opposite effect. This public 
de-masking encouraged many supporters to join demonstrations in the Zócalo, Mexico 
City, where they donned the famous pasamontañas in solidarity with the 
revolutionaries, chanting Todos Somos Marcos (Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Manaut et al. 
2006; Higgins 2001). With this level of public support firmly behind the rebels in 
Chiapas, the Zapatista revolutionary command could confidently approach peace talks 
with government negotiatiors in the small township of San Andés Larrainzar in March 
1995 (Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Manaut et al. 2006; Higgins 2001).  
Formal peace talks were set to begin on 20th March 1995. However, almost 
immediately, the government unexpectedly canceled proceedings (Muñoz Ramirez 
2008). According Muñoz Ramirez (2008: 128), many thousands of Indigenous 
supporters of the EZLN had appeared at San Andés Larrainzar “to accompany their 
delegates” to the talks. Overwhelmed by this response, the government “orchestrated 
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a media campaign to argue that the dialogues could not begin because the Indigenous 
supporters were armed” (Muñoz Ramirez 2008: 128). While this was untrue, EZLN 
delegates requested that their supporters return to base in order to allow negotiations 
proceed without further delay or interruption.  
From the outset, negotiations appeared slow and protracted and revealed the 
obvious epistemological divides that existed between the revolutionaries, on one 
hand, and the neoliberal state, on the other. For more than five months, both sides 
struggled to agree on the issue of the military in Chiapas. While Zapatista delegates 
sought an immediate relaxation of the federal security presence in the region, the 
government was unwillinging to relinquish such levels of military control over 
Chiapas, a clear sign that state negotiators still considered the revolutionaries a threat 
to Mexican national security (Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Manaut et al. 2006; Higgins 2001).  
It was clear, then, that negotiations at San Andrés were a hardened battle 
between the local and the national. While the Mexican state maintained the position 
that this was a local, predominantly Indigenous dispute, the Zapatistas appeared eager 
to stress the national significance of their revolutionary campaign, claiming these 
negotiations embodied the hopes of “los pueblos indios de todo el país” (EZLN 17th July 
1998). As negotiations progressed, both sides eventually agreed upon six roundtables 
that would become the focus of discussions between the revolutionaries and the state 






Indigenous Rights and Culture 
Democracy and Justice 
Well-being and development 
Conciliation in Chiapas 
Women's Rights in Chiapas 
 End to Hostilities 
(Graph 1.1 provides a full list of the six roundtables agreed for discussion between the EZLN and the 
Mexican state during peace talks at San Andrés Larrainzar. (See Muñoz Ramírez 2008) 
 
 
After nine months, the Zapatistas and state negotiators emerged from San 
Andrés Larrainzar on 16th February 1996 with a formal agreement on the first 
roundtable, Indigenous Rights and Culture (Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Manaut et al. 2006; 
Higgins 2001). While the Zapatistas approached all negotiations with the state as 
representatives of a national struggle for land and Indigenous rights, it was very clear 
that they had to concede this stance in order to reach agreement. The San Andrés 
Accords discussed the terms of Indigenous autonomy in relation to Chiapas, failing to 
address the “nationwide problem of agrarian reform” or “the reform of Article 27” 
(Muñoz Ramírez 2008; 137). By signing the San Andés Accords, the government agreed 
to “uphold the right to autonomy of the [Indigenous] peoples in the Constitution, to 
broaden their political representation, to guarantee full access to the justice system 
and to build a new legal framework that guaranteed political rights, legal rights and 
cultural rights” (Muñoz Ramírez 2008; 138).  
The government, however, has since refused to legalize and permit the 
implementation of Zapatista autonomy in Chiapas. In the aftermath of what was a 
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relatively successful negotiation process, which resulted in collective agreement by 
both sides on the issue of Indigenous rights and culture, this flat refusal by the nation-
state to adhere to the constitutional demands for political and territorial autonomy in 
Chiapas dealt a massive blow to the wider Zapatista campaign (Muñoz Ramírez 2008; 
Manaut et al. 2006; Higgins 2001). More worrying was the fact that this period of 
uncertainty positioned Chiapas and the Zapatistas in quite an unstable and precarious 
political situation as the revolutionaries, along with their community supporters, were 
left with little choice but to patiently wait for the Mexican government to implement 
the accords (Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Manaut et al. 2006; Higgins 2001). This renedered 
the Zapatistas powerless against the state which was by now itself uniquely positioned 
to decide on whether to permit or deny the legal practice of Indigenous autonomy in 
Chiapas. Despite success in securing a legal agreement, it was clear that the San 
Andrés Accords reconfirmed the centrality of the neoliberal state in recognizing and 
legitimising the place of Indigenous people in Chiapas. The San Andés Accords 
revealed the challenges and obstacles that still faced this ethnopolitical social 
movement which struggled to negotiate their claim to place in a neoliberal lifeworld 
that continually failed to acknowledge a politics of difference in Mexico (Sieder 2002).  
For the remainder of the twentieth century, the relationship between the 
Zapatista revolutionaries and the nation-state was charcterised by increased levels of 
mistrust followed by even greater instances of political violence and bloodshed which, 
it appeared, explicitly focused on community displacement. During this time, 
paramilitary groups began clandestine operations in the remote Selva Lacandona, 
terrorizing local communities and forcing their displacement. Amid this deeply 
unsettling and chaotic social landscape, the Acteal Massacre unfolded, where forty-
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five Indigenous men, women and children were killed, at point-blank range, in broad 
daylight by a number of paramilitary elements (Rabasa 2010; Muñoz Ramírez 2008). As 
members of the Catholic pacifist community, La Abejas, these Tzotil men, women and 
children were seeking refuge in the hamlet of Acteal when it came under attack on the 
morning of the 22nd December 1997 by a paramilitary organization with links to the 
ruling PRI (Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Lacey The New York Times 23rd December 2007; 
Ramírez The Irish Times 24th December 1997). While Las Abejas did not directly 
support the Zapatistas and their use of armed conflict, they did share support for their 
political aims and were sympathetic to the wider campaign for land, liberty and justice 
being pursued by the revolutionaries in Chiapas. Yet, after years of hard-fought 
negotiations, where the promise of political agreement always remained within distant 
reach, the Acteal Massacre was a clear reminder of the profound epistemological and 
political divides that still stood in the way of peace and securing place in Chiapas. 
Neither the democratic election of Vicente Fox and the PAN in the year 2000 nor 
Comandante Ramona’s impassioned plea to Mexican Congress to elevate the San 
Andés Accords to constitutional law shortly thereafter could restore the momentum 
which had been seemingly lost over the previous years. In the end, it was clear that the 
neoliberal state failed to recognize and legitimize the presence of the Zapatistas in 
Chiapas forcing the revolutionaries to secure their claim to ethnoterritoriality 
themselves (Mora 2017; 2015).  
In what follows, I address phase two of the Zapatista struggle for land and 
ethnoterritorial justice in neoliberal Mexico, focusing on the symbolic and material 
significance of the Zapatista Caracoles as a form of Indigenous place-making in 
twenty-first century Chiapas. 
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Securing Ethnoterritorial Rights in Chiapas:  
The Material and Symbolic Significance of the Zapatista Caracoles 
 
Following almost a decade of political uncertainty, defined by protracted negotiations 
and a sustained campaign of military violence throughout Chiapas, the Zapatista 
revolutionaries entered into a period of silence, where they quietly and patiently 
enacted the San Andrés Accords themselves (Muñoz Ramírez 2008). In their Sexta 
Declaración de la Selva Lacandona, the final declaration to be published by the 
Zapatista command, the revolutionaries declared that they were no longer willing to 
engage with the neoliberal Mexican state on the issue of Indigenous rights and culture 
in Chiapas. As the Zapatistas made clear,  
 
 
pues ahí lo vimos claro que de balde fueron el diálogo y la negociación con los 
malos gobiernos de México. O sea que no tiene caso que estamos hablando con los 
políticos porque ni su corazón si su palabra están derechos, sino que están chuecos 
y echan mentiras de que sí cumplen, pero no. O sea que ese día que los políticos 
del PRI, PAN y PRD aprobaron una ley que no sirve, pues lo mataron de una vez al 




(EZLN 30th June 2005) 
 
 
 With this decisive statement, the Zapatista revolutionaries unveiled a new and 
elaborate socio-territorial system of ethnopolitical governance in Chiapas symbolised 
by the development of the Caracoles. The “birth of the Caracoles”, writes Khasnabish 
(2010: 115), included the “formation of the Juntas de Buen Gobierno, marking the 
fulfilment of community autonomy” right across the Zapatista territory. The five 
Caracoles instantly became both materially and symbolically significant political 
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devices for the Zapatista revolutionaries in their struggle for ethnoterritoriality and 
Indigenous autonomy in Chiapas. As I will show, similar to Tuan's (1977) definition of 
place and space, the Caracoles endow the abstract and volatile nature of space in 
Chiapas with a new meaning and sense of purpose, redefining relations within and 
between Zapatista communities and between the Zapatistas and the political outside. 
As I will illustrate, the Caracoles not only symbolised the very act of place-making but 
they also reveal how processes of ethnopolitical place-making have evolved within 
Chiapas, allowing Indigenous people to finally take control of their own political 
destinies without direct interference from the nation-state as was the case with 
twentieth century land reform and the universal distribution of the ejido. By 
disrupting the flow of the neoliberal order over Chiapas, the Caracoles created new 
opportunities for Indigenous communities to advance autonomy and to specifically 
develop healthcare and other systems which are fully attune to the needs of the 
individual communities they aim to serve. In other words, I argue that the Caracoles 
transformed the previously "undifferentiated" nature of space in Chiapas into a place 
of "security and stability" for Indigenous people (Tuan 1977: 6), ensuring "that 
autonomy and the motto “mandar obedeciendo” do not remain in the sphere of 
abstract concepts" but find their place in Chiapas (González Casanova 2010: 79).  
 The Caracol is not an entirely new concept in Chiapas but has, in fact, evolved 
from earlier initiatives designed and developed by the Zapatista revolutionaries 
themselves within the autonomous territory since 1994. In this way, the Caracol does 
not represent or symbolise a complete rupture with the political past but, instead, 
speaks to the evolving nature of Zapatismo as the revolutionaries continually reshape 
and rework the narratives of their struggle in contemporary Mexico. Following the 
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revolution in 1994, the Zapatista revolutionaries developed what they referred to as the 
Aguascalientes, which they defined as "lugares de encuentro entre la sociedad civil y el 
zapatismo" (EZLN 10th January 1996). Borrowing their name from the Mexican city of 
Aguascalientes, where leaders of the 1910 Revolution gathered to agree the terms of 
the country's new 1917 revolutionary constitution, the five Zapatista Aguascalientes 
became important and strategic spaces of encounter between the Zapatistas and 
members of civil society who collectively gathered for days at a time to discuss "los 
principales problemas nacionales" (EZLN 10th January 1994; Krauze 1997). While the 
Aguascalientes represented the basic principle of horizontal information flow and 
exchange between the Zapatista revolutionaries and the world outside, the 
development of the Caracoles formulated an alternative approach to intellectual and 
social organising within Chiapas which starts with the local and the particular and 
slowly builds to include a whole new universal relationship with the world (González 
Casanova 2010).  
 Much of the symbolic weight of the Caracoles is tied up in the very meaning of 
the term itself and how it is applied throughout Zapatista political discourse in 
Chiapas. For example, as Ross (2005) notes, at a very basic level, the term Caracol in 
Spanish means snail or conch shell, the latter being a device traditionally deployed by 
the Indigenous Maya of the Selva Lacandona to summon individuals and entire 
communities together for political meetings. Collectively, the image of the snail and 
the shell speaks to the slow and gradual nature of Zapatista development in Chiapas 
and illustrates how the revolutionaries not only see the internal relationship among 
communities inside the territory but how they plan to develop their relationship with 
the world outside (González Casanova 2010; Conant 2010; Ross 2005). Similar to the 
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inward and outward motion or flow of the spirals on a snail shell, the Caracoles "serán 
como puertas para entrarse a las comunidades y para que las comunidades salgan; 
como ventanas para vernos dentro y para que veamos fuera; como bocinas para sacar 
lejos nuestra palabra y para escuchar la del que lejos está. Pero, sobre todo, para 
recordarnos que debemos velar y estar pendientes de la cabalidad de los mundos que 
pueblan el mundo" (desInformémonos 10th August 2017). In this way, the Caracoles 
create a clear and visible distinction between the interior and the exterior, helping the 
Zapatistas to forge a sense of place that is both separate from yet connected to the rest 
of the outside world (Tuan 1977).  
Central to the internal dynamics of the Caracoles are the Juntas de Buen 
Gobierno (hereafter JBGs). As I mentioned above, each of the five Aguascalientes were 
erased and replaced by five Caracoles and their five corresponding JBGs which are as 
follows: Oventic, Roberto Barrios, La Realidad, La Garrucha and Morelia (Dinerstein 
2013; Conant 2010; González Casanova 2010). Unlike the previous internal structure of 
the Zapatistas, where the EZLN-CCRI functioned as the political-military wing of the 
organisation, leading the development of all internal strategy, each of the five 
Caracoles now independently functions as a separate governing body that responds to 
and reflects the administrative needs of the grassroots communities under its 
jurisdictional remit. 
Unlike the more familiar top-down approach to political organising we see 
reflected across many institutional structures, where policies are traditionally 
developed from above and then dispensed to the public below, the Caracoles emphasis 
an altogether entirely different approach that positions all 1,111 Zapatista communities 
to the fore of the internal decision-making process (Warfield 2015; Khasnabish 2011; 
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Conant 2010; González Casanova 2010). Operating on a two year rotational system, 
each community elects at least two representatives to serve across 29 municipal 
councils which then elects a further two representatives to serve as members of the 
JBG (Dinerstein 2013; Conant 2010). With all political positions at every level of 
government conducted on a voluntary basis, the political becomes a deeply personal 
act, whereby all members are expected to uphold their duty as representatives of this 
ethnopolitical model and either participate themselves directly in this bottom-up 
system of community government or alternatively support their fellow serving 
representatives by tending their land, harvesting their crops and sharing excess food 
and other supplies with their families (Neils 2003). This rotational system of 
government within each of the five Caracoles solidifies the abstract concept of mandar 
obedeciendo, locating it within a political architecture that allows the Zapatistas to 
spiral "away from some of the colossal mistakes of capitalism's savage alienation [...] 
and toward old ways and small things" (Dinerstein 2013: 5).  
It is clear, then, that the Caracoles function as "territorial spaces" (Dinerstein 
2013: 4) that draw attention to a distinction between the "inside" and the "outside", 
allowing the Zapatista revolutionaries to transform the abstractness of space inside 
Chiapas into a familiar environment that is constructed around their basic needs and 
desires (Tuan 1977: 107). The abstract, unfamiliar and violent nature of the neoliberal 
space is transformed in Chiapas by the way in which the Zapatista communities 
embrace the political and social institutions of the Caracoles. Central to this act of 
place-making in neoliberal Mexico is, for example, the development of the 
autonomous healthcare system which empowers communities right across the self-
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declared autonomous territory to take control of their destinies and to negotiate their 
own futures.  
Structured in a similar fashion to what I just described above, the autonomous 
healthcare system is located, first and foremost, inside the communities. Through a 
process of consensus-building, members of the community gather to nominate and 
elect health promoters who, once trained by NGOs, work within the community to 
diagnose and treat basic aliments, educate families around basic hygiene and to 
generally support the overall health and well-being of the communities they serve 
(Kozart 2007; Cuevas 2007). As per the internal structure of Zapatismo, larger clinics 
and health centres, designed and developed by the Zapatistas themselves, with the 
support of national and foreign NGOs, operate at municipal and Caracol levels and are 
often equipped with expert staff and more advanced technologies (Kozart 2007; 
Cuevas 2007). Yet, in the interest of maintaining a decentralised approach to 
healthcare services, which locates power and autonomy within the communities 
themselves, these clinics prefer only to offer additional supports to health promoters 
who do not have the material or financial resources or the knowledge necessary out in 
the field to adequately tend to patients in the community with more serious or 
complex medical needs.  
It is clear, then, that the Caracoles carve out space which allows the Zapatista 
revolutionaries to give new meaning to their environment, transforming this once 
marginalised, neglected and state-dependent region of Chiapas into a highly 
productive and self-sufficient ethnopolitical site which now fully and completely 
satisfies that long-established struggle for autonomy conducted over previous 
centuries. In the words of Relph (1976: 67), even though "places acquire meaning 
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simply because we live in them [...] human life [still] requires a system of [...] structure 
and form and meaning" for us to thrive, to make sense of the world and to really 
achieve place.  
In this discussion thus far, I have mentioned a lot about this distinction 
between the inside and the outside, where I put forward the view that the Caracoles 
achieve place in Chiapas by the way in which they help structure the internal political 
and social worlds of the Zapatista communities. Through initiatives such as 
autonomous healthcare, for example, the Caracoles symbolise the act of place-making, 
becoming "centres of felt value where biological needs [...] are satisfied" (Tuan 1977: 4). 
Yet, place is not just achieved by what we manage to create or organise ourselves in 
the abstract world of space. Rather, the act of place-making can equally be achieved 
through the distinctions we make between worlds and by our ability as “place makers” 
to mark or ward off and defend ourselves against that which we perceive to be the 
intruder (Tuan 1977). Place-making is as much a creative expression as it is a mark of 
defence and a desire to achieve a sense of stability and security in the unstableness of a 
neoliberal world which, for the Zapatistas, continues to threaten them (Tuan 1977).  
In addition to fulfilling the needs of communities inside the autonomous 
territory, which Dinerstein (2013) argues covered an estimated 30,000 km2 by the year 
2007, the Caracoles are also designed to carefully mediate the flow and exchange of 
financial, material and other supplies between Zapatista communities and what 
Olesen (2004: 259) refers to here as "global solidarity". It is widely agreed that, in the 
aftermath of the 1994 Chiapas Revolution, the Zapatista revolutionaries became 
international beacons of resistance against the smooth expanse of the neoliberal 
lifeworld (Hardt and Negri 2000). From 1994 onwards, Zapatista revolutionaries did 
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not just engage in frequent dialogue with global activists and sympathisers through 
the various encountros held across their five Aguascalientes, but they began to receive 
material supplies, financial assistance and other labour supports from an international 
community that was willing and eager to help with the resistance (Ryan 2011).  
Olsen (2007) reminds us that, at this early stage in the conflict, global solidarity 
was mutually beneficial. Not only did the Zapatista communities receive financial and 
material supplies from overseas but the very presence of foreign volunteers, among 
Indigenous communities in Chiapas, drew widespread international attention to the 
plight of poverty in the region and forced the Mexican government to reconsider its 
use of violence towards the revolutionaries. Moreover, at a time when the 
international Left was in crisis, trying to redefine itself in the wake of the end of the 
Cold War, the Zapatistas provided many activists with inspiration and motivation, a 
guiding light towards a new anti-neoliberal horizon (Olesen 2007). Yet, at a time when 
the Zapatistas were considering the role of the nation-state in their struggle for land 
and place in Chiapas (ie. the San Andrés Accords), Subcomandante Marcos was also 
reflecting on this global solidarity relationship which no longer appeared to be based 
around the principles of mutual respect and understanding. Instead, as the quote 
below suggests, this relationship became a global manifestation of pity and charity or 
what Marcos calls "el síndrome de la Cenicienta" (La Jornada 25th July 2003). In a 
communiqué that has since been widely circulated in scholarship and the media, 












Del baúl de los recuerdos saco ahora extractos de una carta que escribí hace más de 
nueve años: "No les reprochamos nada (a los de la sociedad civil que llegan a las 
comunidades), sabemos que arriesgan mucho al venir a vernos y traer ayuda a los 
civiles de este lado. No es nuestra carencia la que nos duele, es el ver en otros lo que 
otros no ven, la misma orfandad de libertad y democracia, la misma falta de justicia. 
(...) De lo que nuestra gente sacó de beneficio en esta guerra, guardo un ejemplo de 
"ayuda humanitaria" para los indígenas chiapanecos, llegado hace unas semanas: 
una zapatilla de tacón de aguja, color rosa, de importación, del número 6 1/2... sin su 
par. La llevo siempre en mi mochila para recordarme a mí mismo, entre entrevista, 
foto-reportajes y supuestos atractivos sexuales, lo que somos para el país después del 
primero de enero: una Cenicienta (...) A esta buena gente que, sinceramente, nos 
manda una zapatilla rosa, de tacón de aguja, del 6 1/2, de importación, sin supar... 
pensando que, pobres como estamos, aceptamos cualquier cosa, caridad y limosna, 
¿cómo decirle a toda esta gente buena que no, que ya no queremos seguir viviendo en 
la vergüenza de México? En esa parte que hay que maquillar para que no afee el 




(La Jornada 25th July 2003) 
  
 
Olesen (2007) argues that Marcos deployed the use of humour in his 
discourse here to tackle what is a very difficult and challenging truth. While 
Marcos is clear that the Zapatistas welcome the support and solidarity that is 
offered by members of the international community, he recognises that this 
relationship has been a very destabilising one for the Zapatistas all the same. In a 
similar vein to Hardt and Negri (2000: 36), who argue that NGOs and other 
humanitarian organisations are "some of the most powerful pacific weapons of 
the new world order", the Zapatistas develop an acute awareness of the dangers 
of international solidarity and how it is intimately tied to this neoliberal 
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lifeworld.6 The light hearted image of the pink stiletto heel in the Selva 
Lacandona speaks to a more uncomfortable truth and points out the 
disempowerment which arises from a global solidarity relationship which denies 
the agency of the so called Other it aims to help. What can a Zapatista do with a 
stiletto in the rainforest?  
Through this statement, Marcos implicitly questions a solidarity 
relationship that has been traditionally led by international NGOs and charities 
that act on the basis of their own ethical and moral assumptions without due 
regard for the particularities of other, local geographies which operate according 
to their own alternative epistemologies and ways of doing (Hardt and Negri 
2000). All this echoes the twentieth century policy of indigenismo that 
accompanied the universal distribution of the ejido and how the revolutionary 
nation-state institutionally treated Indigenous communities through a series of 
unions and agencies that developed paternalistic education and sanitation 
programmes designed to manipulate communities and to encourage them to 
leave behind their ethnocultural ways. In both instances, it becomes clear that 
                                                          
6
  Zapatismo played a leading role in the configuration of the alter-globalisation movement which began 
to gather momentum in places like the United States and Europe during the 1990s. The Zapatistas 
became heroes of the radical left not just because they resisted NAFTA and the onset of neoliberalism in 
Mexico but because these rebels offered an original perspective on the nature of global capitalist 
relations. As De Angelis (2005: 179) writes, Zapatismo offered the world of radical resistance a fresh 
perspective and insightful coordinates that provided a general framework for empowering individuals 
and communities “to invent their own politics and construct alternative social relations”. The formation 
of the Caracoles not only symbolises this inventive approach to grassroots democracy and political 
organising among Indigenous communities inside Chiapas but reveals the wider implications of 
transnational resistance on acts of place-making. By redefining the nature and purpose of global 
solidarity, the Zapatistas encourage activists and followers to avoid investing all their hopes of 
widespread social and political renewal in this local Indigenous project of autonomy and instead to 
invent their own unique style of resistance to neoliberalism elsewhere. In their book, which explores the 
best way to build bridges between various traditions of the radical left (anarchism, Marxism, militancy, 
unionism), Lynd and Grubačić (2008) settle on the view that accompaniment and organising alongside 
marginalised communities might be the best way forward for radical left politics. I return to the themes 
of transnationalism and global solidarity in chapter three where the Zapatistas encourage a 
globalisation of resistance from below and to the left in their Sexta Declaración de la Selva Lacandona. 
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their agency is denied and the power to define the frontiers of their resistance is 
hindered. However, like the inward-outward motion of the spirals on the snail 
shell, the Caracoles redefined this relationship with the outside world, defending 
the Zapatistas from the excesses of neoliberalism, disrupting the uni-directional 
flow of solidarity from the West to the rest (Dunford 2017; Olesen 2007; 2004). 
The installation of the Caracoles in 2003, alongside the corresponding 
JBGs, represents an epistemic reversal of power, where the world outside is forced 
to conform to the standards set by the internal universes of the Zapatista 
communities inside. Activists and international humanitarian organisations are 
no longer permitted unrestricted access to communities across the autonomous 
territory (Mora 2017). Instead, each of the five Caracoles functions like a filter, 
distributing this international aid to the communities which they deem need it 
the most (Ryan 2011; Conant 2010). And, since the communities themselves are 
the ones who elect representatives to serve on the JBGs in the first place, they, in 
turn, remain at the fore of the decision-making process. In a decolonial sense, the 
Caracoles appear to rework the long-established narrative of power that has 
historically manipulated the small places and spaces of ethnopolitical thought 
and action. Agencies, governments and humanitarian groups that exist in the 
neoliberal world outside no longer have direct control over the space inhabited 
by the communities inside the Caracoles. This distinctive move to shift and 
displace traditional forms of top-down power and authority both inside and 
outside the Caracoles generates, what Harvey (2016: 13) refers to as “decolonial 
liberation”, where the ability of the state and other transnational agencies and 
institutions to control the region has been deflected. It is in this way that the 
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Caracoles establish a clear distinction or barrier between the inside and the 
outside, between the interior and the exterior, allowing Indigenous communities 
to finally develop a sense of security or place away from the "openness [and] 
threat of space" (Tuan 1977: 6). 
In the final section of this chapter, I explore the imposition of neo-
territorial challenges, where the Zapatistas find themselves forced to confront the 
development of new infrastructural projects that appropriate space in Chiapas 




















Neo-Territorial Challenges in Contemporary Chiapas:  
Eco-Tourism and El Tren Maya 
 
Without doubt, the model of development that has been pursued in Chiapas over the 
previous one hundred years has evolved considerably. From a focus on agriculture and 
cash crops in the twentieth century, where cattle-ranching and coffee plantations in 
particular dominated the landscape, Chiapas has certainly become the locus of new 
twenty-first century development strategies designed to better connect the region 
together with Mexico through roadways, railways and other infrastructural projects 
(Weinberg 2000; Womack Jr. 1999; Harvey 1998). Among other things, one of the main 
intentions behind such development plans is to enhance the image of Chiapas as a 
modern, attractive and suitable location for the twenty-first century global traveller 
(Gómez-Barris 2017).  
In this final section, I will reflect on some of these neo-territorial challenges, 
and the consequences they have for Indigenous people in Chiapas. This complex 
intersection between the local and the global produces what Gómez-Barris (2017: xvii) 
terms the “extractive zone”, where “extractive capitalism […] engages in thefts, 
borrowings, and forced removals, violently reorganising social life as well as the land 
by thieving resources from Indigenous territories”. While this reminds us that 
Indigenous agency remains threatened beneath the expansive weight of global 
capitalism, it also draws attention to the many ways in which Indigenous people 
choose to facilitate and/or engage processes of development too. Despite the fact that 
the Zapatista social justice movement strongly resists the state-endorsed Tren Maya 
project in southern Mexico, where a new rail network will connect together all six 
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major states in southern Mexico including Chiapas, a recent referendum on the 
railway development by the Andrés Manuel López Obrador government in December 
2019 found that there remained unanimous support for this latest project across the 
region.  
Rocheleau (2015) reminds us that Chiapas is no stranger to global development 
strategies having been first identified as a prime location for the implementation of el 
Plan Puebla-Panamá (hereafter PPP) under the presidential administration of Vicente 
Fox and the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) back in 2001 (Torres Torres and Gasca 
Zamora 2009; Ornelas Delgado 2002; Álvarez Béjar 2002). When it was originally 
proposed almost two decades ago, the main aims and objectives of the PPP were to 
enhance and deepen Mexico’s integration “[a] una comunidad económica de 
Norteamérica con mayors alcances que los del tratado de Libre Comercio de América 
del Norte y más semejante a la integración europea” (Ornelas Delgado 2002: 146). 
Following on from the implementation of TLCAN in 1994, it was apparent that 
Mexico, particularly regions in the far south, lacked sufficient infrastructure to extend 
the universal reach of this new trade deal across the country (Álvarez Béjar 2002). 
Moreover, this ambitious plan to develop transnational highways along the Atlantic 
and pacific coasts and, to build bridges, airports, railways and pipline infrastructure 
across southern Mexico, provided ample opportunity and scope to expand the 
influence of TLCAN further south along the border into neighbouring Central 
American countries too, so that, one day, there might be “grandes corredores 
carreteros y ferroviarios desde Alaska hasta Panamá, lo mismo que gasductos y líneas 
troncales de electricidad” (Ornelas Delgado 2002: 146; Álvarez Béjar 2002). It was clear, 
then, that the PPP symbolised the material advance of US hegemony and the 
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deepening of “el proceso de modernización [y] la lógica del capital y el mercado” 
across Mexico (Ornelas Delgado 2002: 138). And, despite the fact that the PPP was 
erased and replaced by the more recently proposed MesoAmerica Project (MP) did 
little to hide the fact that, as Rocheleau (2015) reminds us, regardless of these titular 
changes, the underlying logic behind these two development plans is identical.  
In describing this newer plan, Rocheleau (2015: 701) draws attention to the 
continuity that exists between these two plans, revealing the ongoing nature of 
regional integration that is taking place across Mexico, Central America and Colombia, 
where a series of joint ventures by state and private capital are being led with major 
US participation. She adds that this newer MesoAmerica initiative maintains key focus 
on “transportation and energy infrastructure, with much of the power destined for 
mining and manufacturing industries, as well as energy consumers in the US” 
(Rocheleau 2015: 701).  
In terms of Chiapas, however, a key project to emerge out of this cross-
continental development plan is the Centro Integral Planeado Palenque (hereafter 
CIPP). This development plan aims to promote Chiapas as a destination for a “world-
class inland tourism archipelago of archaeological sites, pristine forest stands and 
scenic waterfalls and lakes in a green sea of biodiversity conservation, carbon storage 
and environmental services” (Rocheleau 2015: 701-702; Bellinghausen 2008). The plan 
centres on the development of several key “hotspots” across Chiapas where eco-
tourism initiatives will take place followed by an emerging corridor of ecological sites 
that are preserved and protected from all forms of human habitation and development 
(Rocheleau 2015: 702). As Rochleleau (2015: 702) notes, the intention behind the CIPP 
is to take advantage of “cultural tourism” and to diversify Mexico’s tourist market. By 
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promoting cultural and ecological destinations or sites of interest outside some of the 
more traditional tourist hotspots in southern Mexico (Cancún), local and federal 
governments hope to take advantage of the “Indigenous people as spectacle” which 
they now view as an important “engine of economic development” in the region 
(Rocheleau 2015: 702).  
As a result of this interest in developing Chiapas as a site for eco-tourism and 
ecological conservation, this regional landscape radically transformed to reflect 
conditions in the extractive zone where the scars of modern territorial development 
are revealed to us in new and different ways (Gómez-Barris 2017). In Chiapas, new eco-
narratives were deployed to frame the sinister practices of development coloniality 
which continued to plague the region. As Rocheleau (2015: 698) notes, the act of 
“green grabbing” increased across Chiapas and, much like Gómez-Barris’s (2017) 
extractive zone, involved the illegal appropriation of Indigenous lands and territories 
“by conservation and tourism interests”. To this end, many NGOs were implicated in 
the darker side of western modernity, as they sought to help support local efforts to 
preserve land and territories as ecosystems in the wider conservation efforts of public 
and private interests (Rocheleau 2015; Mignolo 2010). This eco-development narrative 
emerged out of western concern over environmental damage and changes to the 
climate’s behaviour, as many environmental activists arrived in Chiapas in an attempt 
to protect and preserve the biodiversity of eco-systems for future generations. Yet, 
these well-intentioned acts only appeared to (re)apply a familiar logic of control over 
Chiapas shaping and reworking the spatial dimensions of this region around the 
moral, ethnical and economic considerations of the West (Gómez-Barris 2017; 
Rocheleau 2015).  
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Conflicts around land and “green grabbing” frequently involved the Mexican 
state performing the role as enforcer, acting on behalf of private interest groups who 
seek to develop roadways and commercial centres as part of the CIPP and the wider 
MesoAmerica Project. Frayba, or the Fray Bartolomé de la Casas human rights centre 
in San Critóbal de las Casas, published reports documenting violent encounters that 
have taken place between police, the military and local Indigenous community 
activists who frequently come out in defense of their lands and territories. In 2012, the 
Frayba centre revealed the direct use of military tactics designed to intimidate and 
stoke fear among communities in the San Sebastián Bachajón ejido in Chiapas. The 
lands and territories around this area had been earmarked by the state and other 
private interest groups for vast infrastructural development including the construction 
of a highway between the San Cristóbal de las Casas and the Maya temples at Palenque 
(Frayba 2012). As Frayba (2012: 2) note, the Mexican state tried, on many occasions, to 
“apropiarse del territorio del Ejido de San Sebastian Bachajón a través de distintas 
estrategias como desalojos forzados, la cooptación para la firma de convenios y 
proyectos de desarollo, la ocupación político y militar de la zona, la criminalización de 
defensores y la judicialización de acciones de defensa de derechos”.  
As Rocheleau (2015: 702) notes, the violent displacement of Indigenous 
communities from their territories paves the way for local government and other 
commercial interests to step in and recreate parts of the mystic jungle, transforming 
sites like Palenque into a Cancún of the Rainforest. The appropriation of heritage sites, 
Indigenous architecture, ancestral lands and sacred temples by outside neoliberal 
forces deeply impacts how local Indigenous communities experience their culture in 
contemporary Chiapas. Not only are they physically erased from public view, violently 
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displaced from their territories to accommodate the construction of luxuary tourism 
infrastructure, but their histories, cultures and heritages are appropriated and 
refashioned to satisfy foreign commercial consumption. As Bellinghausen (La Jornada 
29th Septembre 2008) notes “la cultura maya y sus riquezas naturales son un atractivo 
indiscutible en el mundo”. This wholesale commercialism of place and space reflects 
what Gómez-Barris (2017: 43) refers to as the “projection of romantic spatial 
imaginaries”, where Chiapas has been “reductively constructed” to conform to the 
fantasies of the global tourist who seeks “an idyllic escape from the toxicities of the 
overdeveloped United States and Europe”. This example of “new age settler 
colonialism”, as she calls it, is justified by the desire of many in the northern 
hemispheres who claim the need to escape “the stress, consumption, eco-depression 
and generalised dissatisfactions of late capitalism […] exonerating the foreigner in 
everyway from the local injustices” which they help to perpetuate (Gómez-Barris 2017: 
43).  
The unstable nature of space in Chiapas, destabilised here further by the 
(neo)colonial processes and practices I just mentioned, which shape and rework these 
spatial imaginaries around ethnocutural consumption, reinforces the place-making 
capabilities of the Caracoles which, as González Casanova (2010: 87) reiterates, signify 
a “consciousness of what is internal and what is external”. From here, however, the 
Zapatista revolutionaries criticise the accelerated nature of neoliberal development in 
Chiapas which has recently coalesced around the proposed construction of el Tren 
Maya, a large-scale railway development that will connect together “las principales 
ciudades y circuitos turísticos [en el sur de México] para integrar territorios de gran 
riqueza natural y cultural al desarollo turístico, ambiental y social en la región” (Tren 
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Maya n.d). The strongly cultural and eco-touristic dimensions of this latest 
development project speaks to the ongoing appropriation of space by public and 
private interests and how the international neoliberal order continues to normalise 
“an extractive planetary view” that “facilitate[s] capitalist expansion” across 
ethnoterritorial and ethnocultural resource-rich regions (Gómez-Barris 2017: 6).  
An initiative of the Andrés Manuel López Obrador government (2018-present), 
construction of this vast new rail nework is set to begin in the year 2020 (Tren Maya 
n.d). Once completed by 2024, this rail network, constructed using a combination of 
new and existing rail lines, will cover an estimated total distance of 1,460km (Tren 
Maya n.d). Originating in the popular tourist resort of Cancún, two rail lines – a 
northern route and a southern route – will traverse several key states along the 
Yucatán peninsula eventually converging at the ancient Maya archeological site at 
Palenque, Chiapas (Pskowski 2019; El Financiero 12th December 2018; Muñoz Ramírez 
Desinformémonos). Costing an estimated $6.5 billion to complete, with finance for the 
project being made available through a series of public-private partnerships, the two 
rail lines will pass through the following five states which have been identified for 
development: Quintana Roo, Campeche, Chiapas, Tabasco, Yucatán (Pskowski 2019; El 
Financiero 12th December 2018; Muñoz Ramírez Desinformémonos).  
Since López Obrador and his party Morena (Movimiento Regeneración 
Nacional) were elected in July 2018, the Tren Maya development has been a heavily 
contested idea, supported by some, vehemently opposed by others. Strongly endorsed 
by the president himself, López Obrador has participated in ritual ceremonies led by 
various different Indigenous communities from Chiapas and elsewhere that 
collectively converged at the Ritual de los Pueblos Originarios a la Madre Tierra para 
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Anuencia del Tren Maya on 16th December 2018 to, at the title suggests, seek 
permission from la Madre Tierra to begin construction of the project (El Financiero 12th 
December 2018). A central aim of the Tren Maya development has been to ensure “el 
bienestar de las communidades y pueblos originarios con el objectivo de crear 
condiciones que generan crecimiento económico en beneficio de la sociedad” (El 
Financiero 12th December 2018). Moreover, the Morena government has held several 
referendums and consultas across Mexico and among communities in the Yucatán 
peninsula with results from each one almost always showing in favour of the project. 
Yet, despite this perception of support for the project by Indigenous and non-
Indigenous communities alike, the Zapatista revolutionaries have remained highly 
critical of president López Obrador and the Morena government and have come out 
strongly against, what they call, “su porquería Tren Maya” (EZLN 1st January 2019).   
A leading figure of the socialist left in Mexico for over two decades, López 
Obrador first served as a member of the PRD before later splitting from the party and 
eventually founding Morena (Semo and Pardo 2006). After serving as mayor of Mexico 
City (2000-2005), followed by two attempts at contesting the Mexican presidency 
(2006; 2012), López Obrador and Morena eventually swept to power in 2018 on the 
back of an anti-neoliberal campaign, where he promised to initiate, what he calls, la 
cuarta transformación (Ackerman 2019; Semo and Pardo 2006). Positioning his 
presidency in line with other key moments of profound historic revolutionary change 
and social transformation, López Obrador promised to bring about an end to the 
excesses of neoliberalism in Mexico and to the corrupt ties between the political and 
commercial spheres which regularly results in fraudulent privatisation practices 
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(Ackerman 2019).7 After winning the election but before taking office – a six month 
timeline - López Obrador and Morena consulted the Mexican public on several key 
outstanding development issues in an unofficial referendum which asked whether the 
construction of a controversial new airport for Mexico City and el Tren Maya should 
continue under the new administration. Around one million citizens from across 
Mexico participated in the poll unanimously rejecting the new airport (70% against), 
on one hand, while endorsing the railway development in Chiapas (90% in favour), on 
the other. And since 2018, el Tren Maya has been a leading priority for the López 
Obrador government, “un plan integral de ordenamiento territorial, infraestructura, 
crecimiento socieconómico y turismo sostenible … [que] … tiene como principal 
objectivo el bienestar social de los habitantes de la zona maya”, according to the 
president himself (Muñoz Ramírez Desinformémonos).  
For the Zapatistas, however, el Tren Maya represents nothing more than a clear 
expression of continuity between the neoliberal past and the neoliberal present. In a 
communiqué released by the revolutionaries to celebrate twenty-five years since the 
1994 Chiapas Revolution (1st January 2019), the Zapatistas launch a scathing critique of 
the current Mexican political system “[y] a los chiquitos líderes […] especialmente el 
que está en el poder y el partido que está en el poder”(EZLN 1st January 2019). Despite 
earlier promises made by López Obrador to radically transform the neoliberal 
condition in Mexico through his cuarta transformación, the Zapatista revolutionaries 
reject these claims, drawing attention instead to how little things have changed for 
them in Chiapas in the twenty-five years since their revolution: “no es fácil enfrentar 
                                                          
7
 The moments of historic change and transformation which the la cuarta transformación refers to here 
are as follows: the War of Independence (1821), the period of secular reforms (1850s-1860s) and the 1910 
Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) (Ackerman 2019; Krauze 1997).  
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los veinticinco años aquí a miles de soldados protectores del capitalismo, y aquí están, 
aquí donde estamos, pasamos en sus narices estos días” (EZLN 1st January 2019). As the 
communiqué develops, their criciticism of López Obrador intensifies where they reject 
the superficial way in which the president presents himself as one of us. For the 
Zapatistas, president López Obrador’s active participation in Indigenous rituals and 
ceremonies attempts to envelop the Tren Maya development project in a series of 
behaviours, gestures and practices that rework the narrative of capitalist development 




Aquel que está en el poder, es mañoso, ¿y cuál es la maña que hace? Que 
hace de que está con el pueblo de México y engañando a los pueblos originarios y 
demostrando que se hinca en la tierra pidiéndole permiso como creyendo de que 
todos los pueblos originarios lo creen y aquí nosotros le decimos, no lo creemos 
eso, al contrario.¿Cómo es eso que al contrario? Eso de que disimula que agarra 
nuestros modos, nuestras costumbres, que pide permiso a nuestra madre tierra; 
nos está diciendo, dame permiso madre tierra para destruir a los pueblos 
originarios, eso es lo que dice eso, le hace falta entender a esos otros hermanos 
pueblos originarios. Eso es lo que está haciendo ese señor, nosotros no lo creemos. 
Sólo porque la madre tierra no habla, si no se lo dijera ¡Chinga tu madre! Porque la 
tierra no habla, si fuera, ¡No, vete a la chingada! 
 
(EZLN 1st January 2019) 
 
 
Yet, while the Zapatistas reject all cultural appropriations of Mayaness as 
branding for the project, they are equally critical of other Indigenous groups too who 
appear to be convinced by López Obrador and his cultural and cosmological 
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appropriations.8 It is clear, then, that not only is el Tren Maya a highly contested idea 
between the Zapatistas and the Morena-led state but this development project divides 
opinion on-the-ground, among Indigenous communities in Chiapas and elsewhere. 
Here the issue of alterity and agency are called into question. Is an individual any 
more or less Indigenous if they express desire for development to take place? Is alterity 
to capitalism and development automatically a pre-condition for ethnicity in the 
contemporary lifeworld? Should the Zapatistas themselves be so critical of other 
Indigenous groups who participate in development processes given their own political 
emphasis on notions of plurality, difference and the creation of un mundo donde 
quepan muchos mundos? 
These questions will not be addressed here in this chapter, but do provide an 
important basis for the comparison which follows in chapter two. This analysis of the 
the evolution of ethnopolitical place-making in Chiapas and, in particular the 
contributions made by the Zapatistas in this area through the development of the 
Caracoles, has strongly emphasised alterity in the struggle for ethnoterritoriality in 
neoliberal Mexico. The Caracoles symbolise this desire for alterity by defining an 
inside and an outside which helps the Zapatista revolutionaries to mediate between 
the uncertainty of an accelerating neoliberal world order in Mexico and the familiarity 
of the internal places and spaces of Indigenous autonomy in Chiapas. However, 
tracing the contours of ethnopolitical place-making in Bolivia reveals an outcome that 
                                                          
8
 An obvious example of López Obredor’s ethnocultural and cosmological appropriations included his 
inaugural ceremony on the 1
st
 December 2018 where the newly appointed president of Mexico received a 
traditional cleansing by indigenous leaders before being handed the bastón de mando, a wooden staff 
which symbolises indigenous trust in the country’s new leader and represents their approval for him to 
govern on their behalf (Carlsen 2018). In an online article published around the time of AMLO’s 
inauguration, the bastón de mando is described as “una posesión muy importante que debe tratarse con 
respecto”(México desconocido 1
st
 December 2018). By accepting the staff, AMLO “aceptó el cargo de 
gobernante de las communidades originarias y sostener con firmeza y respecto el bastón de mando” 
(México desconocido; 1
st
 December 2018).  
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is both similar to and different from the Zapatista case study explored here. While 
Indigenous communities in rural Bolivia strongly resisted the imposition of a highway 
through their territories (2011 TIPNIS controversy), Indigenous communities in the 
Andean city of El Alto appear to rework notions of ethnoterritoriality in contemporary 
Bolivia. As I will show, la nueva arquitectura andina reveals how some wealthy Aymara 
people embrace development as a symbol of ethnic pride and a journey towards the 
















From the milpa to the ejido to the Caracoles to neo-territorial challenges of the 
twenty-first century, this chapter has examined the evolutionary process of place-
making in Mexico, reconfirming the importance of place to Indigenous people in 
Chiapas. In particular, this chapter drew attention to several key attributes of the 
Zapatista Caracoles and how they inform a politics of place-making in Chiapas. By 
distinguishing between the interior and the exterior, the Caracoles assist Zapatista 
communities in making sense of reality, providing them with the physical and 
epistemological space to define a model of autonomy that is both separate from yet 
connected to the world outside. Symbolising an epistemological reversal of power, the 
Caracoles force the neoliberal world outside to conform to the politics and practices of 
Zapatista communities inside, shifting the balance of power and placing Indigenous 
communities to the fore of decision-making processes. Within this space, the 
Zapatistas construct and develop a world adapted to their needs and ways of being 
that transforms Chiapas into a more stable and secure environment for them, thus 
achieving place according to Tuan (1977). However, eco-tourism and el Tren Maya are 
some of the neo-territorial challenges that confront the Zapatistas in twenty-first 
Chiapas. The global tourist industry together with el Tren Maya perpetuate the acts of 
ethnoterritorial and ethnocultural appropriation that, despite the reassurances offered 
by president Andrés Manuel López Obrador and his cuarta transformación, reflect 
neoliberal continuity in the region. The contested nature of el Tren Maya between 
López Obrador and the Zapatistas reveals that place-making is never a fully 
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guaranteed thing for Indigenous people, especially those who deliberately choose to 
situate themselves outside and in direct opposition to the neoliberal world.  
 However, does an ethnopolitical movement which recaptured the nation-state 
offer us an alternative perspective on the struggle for ethnoterritoriality and place in 
contemporary Mexico? To address this question and more, my attention now turns to 
trace the contours of rural and urban forms of place-making evident in Bolivia under 

















The Struggle for Rural and Urban Ethnoterritoriality in Evo 








Having established the evolving nature of Indigenous place-making in Mexico and the 
role the Zapatista social justice movement plays in the struggle for land and place, 
attention turns to the politics of place-making in Morales’s Bolivia, where the nation-
state becomes the vehicle through which Indigenous people secure their rights to 
ethnoterritoriality. From his initial election victory in 2005, to his formal resignation 
in 2019, president Morales vowed to resolve the legacies of Bolivia’s (neo)colonial past 
by developing an ethnopolitical model of nation-state governance that combined a 
policy of neoextractivism with a national legal framework which spearheaded the 
ethnoterritorial rights of Indigenous people in Plurinational Bolivia.  
However, analysis of the 2011 TIPNIS controversy draws attention to the 
challenges that confronted an Indigenous president who struggled to mediate between 
the need for national economic growth, on one hand, while preserving the integrity of 
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Indigenous collective territorial rights, on the other. In his pursuit of a highway 
development, directly through the heart of the TIPNIS reserve and Indigenous 
territory, Morales ignited a conflict between lowland Indigenous communities and the 
Movimiento Al Socialismo – Instrumento Político por la Soberanía del Pueblo (hereafter 
MAS-IPSP) state which reveals the contested nature of land and Indigenous 
territoriality in plurinational Bolivia. While Morales and the MAS-IPSP touted the 
economic benefits of this highway development, lowland Indigenous communities 
continued to resist the project claiming it would destroy local ecologies.   
This chapter will outline how a policy of neoextractivism (re)produces scenes of 
conflict and chaos in Bolivia, where lowland Indigenous communities are forced to 
confront the hegemonic tendencies of the Morales state. In particular, this chapter will 
not just simply reinforce the widely held view that the TIPNIS reserve is a 
geographically contested site of production, what Gómez-Barris (2017: 2) has termed 
the “extractive zone”, but that the TIPNIS may also be considered here as a discursive 
battleground, where concepts including indigeneity are highly contested categories, 
creating the conditions for ethnopolitical marginality and exclusion reminiscent of the 
colonial past.  
This chapter also draws attention to the politics of place-making in urban 
Bolivia which has become an important site of ethnopolitical production in recent 
decades (Lazar 2008). Here, I argue that la nueva arquitectura andina in the city of El 
Alto not only represents an “Indianizing” of the urban landscape as Runnels (2019) 
suggests, but that this architecture transforms the interrelation between ethnicity and 
place in contemporary Bolivia, where wealthy Aymara people commission the 
construction of bold new modern aesthetics that celebrate ethnicity while helping its 
120 
 
owner renegotiate the ethnic self. Studying this architecture in El Alto in combination 
with complexities surrounding the TIPNIS controversy helps us to understand the 
shifting parameters of ethnoterritoriality and place-making in contemporary Bolivia, 
allowing us to draw better, more informed connections between rural and urban 
responses to ethnicity and place in contemporary Latin America.  
To achieve these aims, this chapter is divided into three sections. Section one 
explores a history of ethnoterritoriality in Bolivia defining the territorial philosophies 
and cosmologies applicable to this study before then discussing how the 1953 Agrarian 
Reform Law and the 1996 ley INRA separately shaped the interrelation between 
ethnicity and place over two distinct phases in Bolivian history. Section two moves on 
to argue how the TIPNIS reserve may be considered a discursive battleground, where 
indigeneity has become a highly contested category maginalising lowland Indigenous 
people from the plurinational state. In this section I also take the time to define 
neoextractivism as it relates to the Bolivian context. Finally section three discusses the 
advent of la nueva arquitectura andina in El Alto, where I argue how it evolves notions 
of ethnoterritorial place-making in contemporary Bolivia. For now I begin this 











A History of Ethnoterritoriality in Bolivia 
 
Like a number of its Andean counterparts, Bolivia is defined by a dramatic landscape. 
To the west and south beyond the city of La Paz lies the altiplano (Crabtree and 
Chaplin 2013). This vast highland region sits at an impressive altitude of around 4,000 
meters. The majority of Bolivia's cities are located at various points along this mostly 
flat, dessert-like terrain. While many Bolivians now claim to live more urban lifestyles, 
the arid conditions of the highlands continue to challenge those who persist in eeking 
out a meagre living as agriculturalists in the more remote townships and villages 
located deep within this vast territorial plain. The Bolivian Salar, the country's most 
unique landscape setting, is also located here, near the border with Argentina, and 
attracts many tourists annually who come to experience this dramatic salt landscape 
(Noriyoshi 2018).  
To the north and east of the country, the Amazonian lowlands offer a dramatic 
contrast. This tropical, jungle terrain contains fewer towns and cities than the south 
and they are generally scattered further apart making them more difficult to access by 
road. Towards the east of the lowlands is an area known as the Oriente which has 
become an important locus for agro-industry in recent decades. In particular, 
industrial agriculture, which is centered on the production of rubber and the Brazil 
nut among other produce, has transformed the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra into an 




Finally, between the highlands and the lowlands lies the Cordillera valley, a 
series of dramatic mountain ranges which mark the transition between these two 
opposing terrains. Along this valley lies the strategic city of Cochabamba as well as an 
area known as the yungas, a fertile landscape famed for the production of the sacred 
coca leaf (Crabtree and Chaplin 2013). However, despite this immense topographical 
diversity, one thing about Bolivian territoriality remains abundantly clear: it has been 
an enduring source of political conflict for centuries. 
Vargas Vega (2004) captures the nature of territorial conflict in Bolivia with the 




El problema de la tierra y del territorio en Bolivia se inició con la conquista y la 
occupación colonial de los territorios indígenas por la corona Española que implicó 
la usurpación de las tierra de cultivo de las poblaciones indígenas, así empezó la 
disputa por la propriedad de la tierra y el domino del territrio entre el Estado 
colonial y los pueblos indígenas pleito que se mantuvo irresolute en al substrato de 
los últimos quinientos años.  
 
 
(Vargas Vega 2004: 13) 
 
In this passage, Vargas Vega (2004) identifies how the foreign occupation of 
Indigenous lands by Spanish invaders more than five hundred years ago became a 
catalyst for the array of territorial problems which continue to afflict Bolivia today. 
The violent appropriation of Indigenous lands and territories by white European elites 
transformed the nature of territorial relations within this newly conquered geographic 
space. Under Spanish rule, Andean colonial society was organised around racial 
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hierarchies which elevated white European landowners or encomenderos to positions 
of authority while simultaneously subordinating the role of native Indigenous 
populations, collectively categorised as indios, “que fueron desposeídos de su tierra y 
condenados a pagar con trabajo a cultivar la tierra para obtener sus alimentos y vivir 
en su territorio” (Vargas Vega 2004: 13 de la Cadena 2015; Canessa 2012; Mignolo 2011; 
2000; Moraña et al. 2008).  
While it is widely agreed that the formal colonial encounter between the 
European and Andean worlds produced scenes of conflict, disorder and chaos, it was 
by no means the only era in which territorial conquest and appropriation was 
deployed as a method of social and geographic control. In the period before the 
Spanish Empire, Inca kings ruled over a “vast empire” that was itself pieced together 
through war, conquest and territorial appropriation (Liss and Liss 1972: 27). This 
resulted in “so many diverse nations” existing beneath the authority of a “single 
commonwealth, ruled by the same laws, statutes and customs” (Keen 1986: 19). As 
Ankersen and Ruppert (2006) note, the Inca Empire developed a highly sophisticated 
strategy of territorial appropriation which maintained the structures of pre-existing 
forms of land tenure, such as the ayllu which I discuss below, shaping these structures 
to meet the needs of an expanding empire. While appropriated lands were individually 
controlled by local leaders, they were now property of the Incas and subject to their 
rules, regulations and processes (Ankersen and Ruppert 2006). Therefore, if territorial 
appropriation was central to the dominance and centrality of the Incas over the Andes 
in the period before the Spanish conquest of 1532, then why is it that the Spanish 
invasion is frequently singled out as the starting point for Bolivia’s five hundred year 
land problem? (Vargas Vega 2004). What exactly lay at the heart of this particular 
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encounter that produced a territorial conflict which continues to reverberate into the 
present day? The answer to this question lies in a further discussion of territorial 
philosophies where I uncover how differing approaches to landownership and use 
























La tierra y el territorio in Bolivia 
When we discuss the nature of land and territoriality in the Bolivian context, it is 
vitally important to draw a clear distinction between two rather distinctive territorial 
concepts. On one hand, there is the territorial concept known as territorio which 
considers the natural world as a collective totality and, on the other, la tierra which 
adopts a more fragmented worldview of things where everything that constitutes the 
natural world exists separately in an unrelated and unconnected way (CEDIB 2008). 
While both territorial concepts are highly popular in the Bolivian Andes today – each 
territorial concept features exclusively in Bolivia’s 2009 Plurinational Constitution – 
they each shape how individuals and groups engage in agricultural practice and, as 
such, have been popularised at various different stages throughout pre- and post-
colonial Andean-Amazonian society. 
According to the Centro de Documentación e Información de Bolivia (CEDIB; 
2008) there are several key elements that distinguish the concepts el territorio and la 
tierra. In their definition of el territorio, CEDIB (2008: 10) writes, “[que] implica una 
ocupación concreta del espacio, implícitamente tomando en cuenta la transformación 
del espacio “natural” en un espacio “ocupado” y por ello transformado por las 
estructuras sociales y culturales”. In the period before the colonial encounter, the ayllu 
was a highly popular form of territorio practiced by Aymara and Quechua 
communities in the Andes (Yampara Huarachi 2017; Alderman 2016; de la Cadena 2015; 
Canessa 2012; Abercrombie 1998). As a complex yet highly dynamic system of socio-
political and economic organising, the ayllu is broadly considered to be a political, 
geographic and ethnic unit that encompasses Indigenous communities occupying 
different ecological zones (Yampara Huarachi 2017). Specifically, ayllu relationality 
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considers how both human and non-human entities in the lifeworld relate and 
interconnect as a result of special kinship ties that must be carefully mediated through 
regular ritual practice and embodied performance (Alderman 2016; de la Cadena 2015; 
Canessa 2012). This universal social relationship between human and "other-than-
human" actors in the lifeworld is broadly referred to as vivir bien or suma-qamaña 
which loosely describes how everything exists and interrelates in a complex system of 
balance and harmony that must always be maintained as a matter of priority (Yampara 
Huarachi 2017; Huanacuni Mamani 2010). While various Indigenous groups across the 
Andes including Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador develop their own precise meanings and 
practices of vivir bien, Huanacuni Mamani (2010: 37) offers the following by way of 
general overview: "Desde la cosmovisión aymara y quechua, toda forma de existencia 
tiene la categoría de igual, todos existimos en una relación complementaria, todo vive 
y todo es importante". 
The idea goes that while farming and other agriculture-based development 
practices are permitted to take place within and between ayllus, community members 
must readily communicate and negotiate with the surrounding Andean spirits which 
they believe inhabit the mountains, rivers and lakes of any given ayllu ecology 
(Alderman 2016; de la Cadena; Canessa 2012). Alderman (2016) observes the 
importance of this dynamic relationship between human and non-human forms as he 
explores the various ways in which humans and mountain beings interact politically in 
the Andean community of Kallawaya. Through his observations, Alderman (2016) 
reveals how members of the Kallawaya regularly maintain a ritual relationship with 
the nearby mountain spirits or muchulas, feeding these local deities with alcohol, coca 
leaves and llama foetuses. By regularly engaging in these practices and behaviours, the 
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author highlights that not only do the Kallawayas incorporate these mountain spirits 
into local community structures, thus expanding a Westernised concept of the 
political to include all non-human entities, these relationships are also key to 
maintaining a sense of belonging within the ayllu and are an important way for 
members to regularly negotiate the ethnic self (Alderman 2016). According to Canessa 
(2012: 163), being a person or "jaqi" within the ayllu involves a "continuous process of 
becoming", where one must consistently engage with the community and the earth 
spirits to achieve a legitimate sense of the ethnic self. An individual's sense of ethnic 
identity is defined by their relationship to the community and the lifeworld and is 
something which must be regularly rehearsed either through labouring the land or by 
engaging in the types of ritual behaviours noted above (Canessa 2012).  
While the ayllu is unique to the Andean region, it is clear that the processes 
and practices which define this socio-territorial space are not all that dissimilar to the 
way in which the Indigenous Maya conceptualise and operate within the milpa. In the 
same way that ethnicity is achieved through careful mediations between the self, 
community and wider lifeworld of the ayllu, the milpero achieves status in his 
community by successfully negotiating the milpa, producing a harvest of maíz and/or 
beans for consumption and distribution. While the ayllu defined the personal, political 
and economic lifestyles of pre-colonial Andean societies, where, for example, "los 
ayllus del norpotosinos eran el eje de un vasto circuto de comercio regional e 
interregional de granos y harinas" according to Platt (2016: 13), this concept of 
territorio was submerged beneath the weight of a new territorial logic which 
emphasised, above all else, the economic value of land and territory.  
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In contrast to el territorio, CEDIB (2008: 9) defines la tierra “[como un] sistema 
bioproductivo terrestre que comprende el suelo, la vegetación, otros componentes de 
la biota y los procesos ecológicos e hidrológicos que se desarrollan dentro del sistema, 
de la misma manera que los minerales metálicos y no metálicos que se encuentran en 
su interior o en su superficie además de los hidrocarburos”. La tierra is key to 
understanding how the European conquest of the Andes permanently altered 
landownership in this region. While the Incas appropriated ayllus and other territories 
as their own, providing varying degrees of autonomy to communities under this 
imperial regime, the Spanish Crown introduced a more tightly controlled system of 
feudal land tenure which generally dismissed local practices in favour of a worldview 
that considered the Andean landscape as the sum total of separate, individual parts 
that could be divided up and exploited to achieve maximum capital gain. Territories 
that were once divided by ayllus now formed part of a much wider encomendero 
system where Spanish landlords distributed lands to Indigenous people in exchange 
for tribute payments (Ankersen and Ruppert 2006; Liss and Liss 1972). While the 
landlord was supposed to "protect and Christianize the Indigenous people as well as 
ensure that they were permitted to use their lands for their own subsistence", 
encomenderos became increasingly more authoritarian which led to even greater levels 
of abuse and exploitation (Ankersen and Ruppert 2006; 80). Nothing exemplifies the 
exploitative behaviour by the Spanish Empire in the Bolivian Andes more than the 
silver mining which took place at the Cerro Rico outside Potosí (Mesa Gisbert et al. 
2016). For more than two centuries, the Spanish Crown mined this mountain using 
Indigenous and African slaves transforming this small urban settlement into one of 
the richest cities in the world (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016). The consequences of such a 
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modern and individualist logic were profound, however, transforming nature into 
"exploitable matter, destructible without limit, a cache of profits, a source of capital 
gains" (Dussel 1985: 114). 
This logic of modernity continued to permeate the post-independence era of 
Bolivian development, where creoles advanced a liberal system of private property 
rights which allowed for the concentration of land and other resources in the hands of 
the few (Ankersen and Ruppert 2006; Foland 1969). According to Foland (1969: 98) the 
basic tenets of this liberal logic include the "inviolability of private property [which] is 
based on the theory that the right is God-given, resting on natural law and preceding 
the state itself; therefore the state had no jurisdiction in the matter". In other words, 
there was no obligation on landowners to distribute land nor was there any need to 
ensure that land served a wider economic purpose. Instead, the act of landownership 
was about the expression of power and prestige, reflected by the way in which 
Indigenous people were forced to serve on hacienda estates in their capacity as 
agricultural labourers under conditions of debt servitude or pongueaje (Mesa Gisbert 
et al. 2016; Vargas Vega 2004; Foland 1969).  
By the turn of the twentieth century, life in rural Bolivia was defined by severe 
territorial inequalities (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; Webber 2011). Bolivia claimed the 
"highest inequality of land concentration in all Latin America, with 82% of land in the 
possession of just 4% of landowners” (Webber 2011: 27). Furthermore, three of the 
country's largest mining executives, collectively referred to as the Tin Barons, 
controlled this lucrative industry, generating huge profits for themselves through 
private tin exports to European and North American markets while many Aymara and 
Quechua miners languished in near-deadly working conditions (Mesa Gisbert et al. 
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2016; Dunkerley 2007). With such vast resources and wealth virtually out of reach of 
both citizens and the state, Bolivia was forced to import foodstuffs from abroad to 
meet the needs of a population of just four million citizens (La Nación 28th June 1953).9 
Such profound levels of inequalities set the stage for Bolivia's most transformative 
period yet as the revolutionary Movimiento Nacional Rrevolucionario (hereafter MNR) 














                                                          
9
 Nothing exemplifies the power of the Bolivian oligarghy more than its influence over the Chaco War 
(1932-1935) (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; Dunkerley 2007). This war between Bolivia and neighbouring 
Paraguay sought to claim ownership over the disputed resource-rich Chaco region. Following a 
ceasefire, it emerged that more than 50,000 of the total 250,000 men Bolivia conscripted to fight had 
died in battle while a further 21,000 were caputred by opposing forces (Dunkerley 2007). The highly 
unsuccessful nature of this international war effort coupled with the fact that it unfolded in the wake of 
the devastating 1929 Wall Street Crash raised eyebrows among the Chaco generation as they returned 
from the trenches. It transpired that the Bolivian state had received £2.1 million in loans from Simón 
Patiño, a tin baron, to fund state-of-the-art military equipment purchased from Europe and the US 
(Dunkerley 2007). Funded by private interests, the Chaco War fuelled anger and frustration among the 
popular masses over social inequality and the failure of the nation-state to protect public interests. 
Backlash from the Chaco War, in turn, encouraged changes to Bolivian labour law and is identified by 
Dunkerley (2007) and others as a motivating factor behind the revolutionary momentum of 1952.  
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1953 Agrarian Reform Law 
The overall aim of the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 was to “crear el concepto de un 
estado nacional poderoso” (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016: 557). In particular, it aimed to 
reverse the effects of foreign, transnational capitalism in Bolivia’s economy which had 
effectively weakened the state by diverting capital away from the national economy 
and into the hands of business elites, otherwise referred to as the oligarchy, while 
poverty levels continued to escalate among the majority Indigenous population 
(Montenegro 2016 [1943]; Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016). Carlos Montenegro, a revolutionary 
intellectual and member of the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) writes 
that “el capital extranjero constituye poco menos que el mayor enemigo de los 
pueblos, de su independencia y de su progresso” (Montenegro 2016 [1943]: 22). To 
achieve this reversal of fortune, the MNR, led by revolutionary intellectual and 
president of Bolivia Dr Víctor Paz Estenssoro, developed a model of state capitalism 
which aimed to insert the nation-state into Bolivian national life by institutionalising 
the role of government in the social, economic, cultural and political spheres (Bernard 
et al. 1973). Similar to the Mexican PRI, which broadly served as inspiration, this was 
achieved, in large part, through the formation of state-led unions as well as the 
implementation of mandated reforms (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; Antezana Ergueta 
1982). The revolution was based around strengthening Bolivia’s domestic economy by 
nationalising the country’s two key industries – the mines and agriculture – and 
developing a strong workforce in service of these two new pillars of the national 
revolutionary state (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; Crabtree and Chaplin 2013).  
The nationalisation of Bolivia’s mines took place in October 1952 and resulted 
in the foundation of a new state enterprise known as la Corporación Minera de Bolivia 
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or COMIBOL (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; Salman et al. 2014; Bernard et al. 1973). While 
COMIBOL did encounter a series of problems from the moment it initiated 
operations, namely experiencing issues around aging equipment as well as a 
precipitous decline in the global price of tin, this new state enterprise did, in fact, 
provide more stable employment for the 28,900 employees who now received social 
benefits from the nation-state (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; Salman et al. 2014). However, 
the 1953 agrarian reform law, which followed one year after the 1952 Revolution, is still 
considered to be “la piedra de toque de toda la economía política nacional” (La Nación 
26th July 1953). 
The 1953 Ley de la Reforma Agraria was hailed by the new revolutionary elite 
(the MNR) as the “solución del problema de la tierra” (Cooperativa 25th January 1953). 
It was signed into law by president Paz Estenssoro on 2nd August in Cochabamba, a 
city located in the mountainous valley known as the Cordillera Oriental which, as I 
mentioned earlier, separates the Andean highlands to the south of Bolivia and the 
Amazonian lowlands to the north (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; Crabtree and Chaplin 
2013). This geographical distinction is important to reiterate here because, as I will 
show, the 1953 agrarian reform was implemented differently across the various 
different geographical regions of Bolivia to correspond with the MNR’s domestic 
economic policy. The main aim behind land reform was twofold. First, as described 
earlier, land reform set out to address the so-called land problem by returning land “[a 
los] verdaderos dueños”, thus helping to liberate Indigenous people from the 
latifundios (La Nación 2nd August 1953: 4). Second, and perhaps more importantly for 
the MNR, land reform intended to modernise and mechanise Bolivia’s agricultural 
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economy after a long history of underdevelopment and stagnant growth (Mesa Gisbert 
et al. 2016; Webber 2011; Assies. 2006).  
 In the Bolivian highlands or altiplano, including in the Cordillera valley, the 
MNR government concentrated on expropriating latifundios and redistributing this 
land to families and individuals in the form of small, individually-sized parcels of land 
that became known as minifundios (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; Salman et al. 2014; Assies 
2006). In contrast to the Mexican ejido, with its emphasis on collective ownership, the 
minifundio was strictly individual and represented the MNR’s efforts at introducing 
new, modern scientific based standards of agricultural production which aimed to 
achieve what Assies (2006) describes here as an “adequate organisation of agrarian 
economy in order to obtain maximum output” (Assies 2006: 579). The MNR pressed 
the importance of moving beyond all associations with Bolivia’s unsuccessful 
agricultural past by inscribing new methods of territorial production which focused 
exclusively on the economic viability and productivity of land or la tierra. As Mesa 
Gisbert et al. (2016: 563) notes, the 1953 agrarian reform law did not intend to reflect 
“la realidad de las tierras de comunidad, ni las experiences productivas y el sistema de 
trabajo colectivo de tradición quechua-aimara”. In other words, the everyday place of 
los indígenas and their traditional ways of being with the land, such as the ayllu, were 
denied any kind of formal or prominent role in the recovery of Bolivian society in this 
post-1952 revolutionary period. In other words, the MNR state sought to confine 
traditional ways of knowing and being with the land to the ancient past in favour of 
developing and encouraging a new kind of economic agency among Indigenous people 
who were now collectively refered to by government as modern, mobile, and state-
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dependent campesinos (Postero 2017; Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; Crabtree and Chaplin 
2013; Assies 2006).  
 Meanwhile, in the Bolivian lowlands, also referred to as the Oriente, the 1953 
land reform took on an entirely different character and approach to that discussed 
above. While in the highlands the focus was on dismantling haciendas in favour of 
small land parcels to be farmed by Bolivia’s emerging campesino class, in the lowlands 
the MNR focused on building a strong agroindustrial sector that would employ 
campesino workers who were encouraged by the state, through the Ministerio de 
Asuntos Campesinos, to colonise this region, working to support the commercial 
production of cash crops including rubber and the Brazil nut (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; 
Crabtree and Chaplin 2013; Antezana Ergueta 1982). Similar to the Confedración 
Nacional Campesina in Mexico, the principle aim of the Ministerio de Asuntos 
Campesinos was to “organizar la economía rural en función de la economía nacional” 
(Antezana Ergueta 1982: 76). Moreover, this emphasis on class rather than ethnicity 
was also reflected in the founding of the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), a large-sale 
umbrella union established in April 1952 which formalised a network of sindicalismo 
or local unionism to provide an official channel between the state and small 
agricultural and other workers’ unions across Bolivia (Antezana Ergueta 1982).  
To achieve colonisation of the lowlands, the MNR invested heavily in 
infrastructure to better connect what was a particularly rural and isolated region of 
Bolivia. According to Capobianco Ribera (1996), in the ten years following the 
Revolution of 1952, the state invested in the construction of several different roadway 
and railway projects, including an asphalt highway between Santa Cruz de la Sierra 
and Cochabamba, with a view to supporting agricultural production and trade within 
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the country. However, this commercial approach to territoriality was exclusively one-
diminsional and failed to consider the many different lowland Indigenous 
communities who occupied unrecognised territories in departments like Cochabamba 
and Beni. Lowland communities including the Chimané or Yuracaré, were neither 
included in the legal framework of the 1953 agrarian reform law nor were they even 
considered as active participants in the overall process of revolutionary state building 
of the mid-twentieth century. Their marginalisation and isolation from historical 
processes would later fuel a series of protest marches in the decades to come. 
Meanwhile, as the predicted gains of the MNR revolutionary economy failed to fully 
materialise in the years following 1952, these weaknesses developed into political 
struggles between members of the revolutionary class which, in turn, resulted in many 
more decades of instability and uncertainty as Bolivia struggled with a cycle of 
dictatorships, military rule and coups well into the late-twentieth century (Mesa 



















Bolivia’s Neoliberal-Turn: Ley del Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria (Ley 
INRA 1996) 
 
The clearest way to approach discussion of neoliberalism and its impact on 
territorialisation in Bolivia is to view its implementation in two separate yet 
interrelated stages of development over a period of twenty years between 1985 and 
2005. The first phase concerns the initial wave or first-generation structural 
adjustments which took effect during the late-1980s whereby a politics of privatisation 
had immediate and profound consequences on land and society in Bolivia. The second 
stage relates to the so-called “multicultural turn”, which emerged during the 1990s, 
where neoliberal reforms were paired with a discourse rooted in democracy and civil 
empowerment in an attempt to better facilitate a policy of decentralisation.  
As was seen in the introduction, Harvey (2005: 2) broadly defines neoliberalism 
as a theory of “political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can 
best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within 
an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free 
markets and free trade”. Goodale and Postero (2013: 27) add that “the state should be 
restricted to those functions necessary […] to guarantee the proper functioning of 
markets". In Bolivia, this early phase of neoliberal reform was heavily marked by 
sweeping economic and structural adjustments which aimed to redefine the role of the 
nation-state within Bolivian society and to reduce its public spending. This, in turn, 
unravelled the national-revolutionary model of governance which had been 
constructed over time since the 1952 Revolution, whereby the state performed its role 
as both large-scale employer and provider of goods and services to the Bolivian nation 
(Salman et al 2014).  
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This model of economic protectionism or import substitution industrialisation 
(ISI) led to the accumulation of high-levels of state debt and soaring inflation rates 
which were exacerbated by a dramatic fall in global commodity prices which 
negatively affected tin minerals. Quite simply, while state expenditure had either 
remained the same or increased, its main revenue stream had all but effectively 
collapsed. It was no surprise, then, that a joint loan offered by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) together with the World Bank (WB) was released to Bolivia on 
condition that the country unload or restructure loss-making industries. This, of 
course, included the largest state enterprise in the country, COMIBOL, which 
employed an estimated 23,000 miners at the time of collapse (Salman et al. 2014).  
This closure of Bolivia’s tin mining industry marked the formal end of the 
country’s national revolutionary-cycle by releasing thousands of now unemployed ex-
miners into an already saturated jobs market. Many of Bolivia’s ex-miners either 
migrated to the cities (namely El Alto) or returned to the agriculture sector as 
cocaleros or coca-farmers. Dunkerley (2007: 40) describes this return to agriculture as 
a form of “deindustrialisation”, whereby modern and partially industrialised wage 
labourers were abruptly thrown back into social circuits traditionally associated with 
other historical epochs. Dunkerley (2007: 40) argues that the collapse of Bolivia’s tin 
mining industry, a direct consequence of international neoliberal reforms, resulted in 
a “reversal” of the “normal” processes of historical revolutionary development which 
sees so-called developing societies like Bolivia transition away from a reliance on 
agriculture towards a more industrialised society and economy. Under the watchful 
eye of international agencies and institutions based in the Global North, Bolivia 
continued to extend and deepen this cycle of neoliberal reform right across the 
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country, fully embracing a process of market liberalisation that combined the 
privatisation of land and natural resources with an even greater decentralised role for 
the nation-state in economic and social matters (Goodale and Postero 2004).  
 By 1990, the consequences of neoliberalism and deindustrialisation could be 
clearly felt along ethnoterritorial lines, as tensions between cocaleros and lowland 
Indigenous communities, namely the Chimané, Yuracaré and Mexeño communities, 
began to surface. As discussed earlier, during the agricultural reforms of 1953, the 
MNR state avoided the legal designation of territories to lowland ethnic groups in 
favour of promoting an agricultural economy that was supported, in large part, by 
agroindustrialists in the Bolivian Oriente. While logging and industrial agriculture 
intensified in the Bolivian lowlands, additional population growth among cocaleros in 
the Chapare valleys increased pressures for land in this particular region of Bolivia. At 
a fundamental level, this brought into conflict two very different forms of 
landownership.  
While many cocaleros claim Aymara and Quechua ancestry, they traditionally 
engage in an aggressive form of agriculture which is intimately tied to market-based 
practices whereby they individually farm land for profit (Crabtree and Chaplin 2013). 
However, lowland communities felt threatened by this domestic form of agriculture 
taking place at such close proximity to their collective territories inside the TIPNIS 
(Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro-Securé). In 1989, lowland communities 
established the Conferderación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB), designed to 
represent the interests of communities in this region. One of the first public acts of 
defiance undertaken by this newly constituted lowland Indigenous umbrella 
organisation was la Marcha por el territorio y la dignidad which began on 15th August 
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1990 from the lowland township of Trinidad to the Bolivian capital La Paz. Around 300 
people participated in this march which called on the state to officially recognise and 
legally designate Indigenous collective titles to communities in the Bolivian lowlands. 
According to CIDOB, “[lo] más importante se refiere a la necesidad de que [las 
indígenas] tengan un territorio propio con títulos a nivel communitario para que 
sientan seguros que puedan ejercer sus derechos sobre esta región” (Presencia, 30th 
March 1990). 
 The outcome of this and the several other marches for dignity that took place 
between Trinidad and La Paz over subsequent years resulted in the formal designation 
of the TIPNIS reserve as a Tierra Communitaria de Origen (TCO). Following 
subsequent protest marches from the lowlands to La Paz by CIDOB, the government 
drafted and implemented ley INRA and the Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria in 
1996 (Ley INRA 1996). While this gave the appearance that progress was being made in 
relation to Indigenous ethnoterritorial rights, there are a number of considerations to 
take into account which reveal the harsh limitations of this new phase of land reform 
in Bolivia.  
One of these limitations concerns the precise way in which this new 
multicultural law defines territoriality and geographic space. According to Article one 
of ley INRA, “la presente Ley tiene por objecto establecer la estructura orgánica y 
atribuciones del Servico Nacional de Reforma Agraria y el régimen de distribución de 
tierras; garantizar el derecho propietario sobre la tierra” (Article 1 ley INRA 1996: 3). As 
the quote suggests, the neoliberal Bolivian state continued to define land and 
territoriality in terms of its “función económico-social” (Article 2.II ley INRA 1996: 3), 
negating all cultural and historical value which Indigenous communities often ascribe 
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to land. Under the conditions of this new reform agenda, the state permitted 
Indigenous groups the right to access renewable resources on their newly designated 
lands, leaving the Bolivian state to claim exclusive ownership over the non-renewable 
resources below the surface of the earth (ley INRA 1996). 
 In her critique of this multicultural reform agenda, Rivera Cusicanqui (2015) 
argues that Indigenous nations were confined to territorial reserves by the 
government, politically constrained by their minority status as static and, therefore, 
unchanging cultural objects of the state or, to use Hale’s (2005) phrase, el indio 
permitido. Bolivian intellectual and former vice-president of Bolivia, Álvaro García 
Linera, (2012: 11) shares in this same criticism of ley INRA, arguing that it left many 
Indigenous communities vulnerable to the “mechanisms of seigneurial and hereditary 
domination by the businessmen-hacendados who use the [community] leaders as 
intermediaries for the depredation and economic dependency of their communities”. 
In other words, he criticises the fact that the business landowning class “integrated the 
management of the Indigenous TCOs into the supplying of raw materials for their 
industrial activities”, thus denying them exclusive right to the land and co-opting 
these ethnoterritorial spaces for commercial action (García Linera 2012: 11).  
It is clear, then, that there is unanimous agreement across both ethnopolitical 
case studies that this era of multicultural reform in Latin America denied Indigenous 
people their agency, restricting their access to land in different ways. While Mexico 
halted distribution of the ejido in preparation for a new trade deal with the US and 
Canada, Bolivia experienced a much more complex fallout as a result of widespread 
neoliberal reforms. Not only were many Bolivian Aymara and Quechua miners forced 
to return to the agricultural sector following the collapse of the tin industry in the 
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1980s, lowland Indigenous communities from the country’s Amazonian north 
petitioned the Bolivian state to develop a land reform programme that was specifically 
tailored to their collective ethnoterritorial needs. However, their rights to el territorio 
were heavily restricted within designated TCOs, where the government prioritised the 
commercial interests of agroindustrialists over local Indigenous communities (García 
Linera 2012).  
By the turn of the millennium, frustrations with the neoliberal project had 
reached new heights in Bolivia with the issue of natural resource sovereignty, under a 
model of privatisation, becoming a growing cause of concern for many Bolivians who 
questioned the logic of exporting minerals and resources without experiencing the 
financial or material benefits for themselves. While the Zapatista social justice 
movement led their ethnopolitical revolutionary campaign from the remote corners of 
southern Mexico, Bolivia responded with a series of separate, individual protests and 
mobilisations across this national political space, between the years 2000-2005, that 
brought about a cycle of revolutionary change which transformed the entire country 
(Webber 2011; Dunkerley 2007). It paved the way for Evo Morales and the MAS-IPSP to 
lead a new ethnopolitical model of nation-state governance which promised to break 











Evo Morales, Neoextractivism and the 2011 TIPNIS controversy  
 
 
This section examines the 2011 TIPNIS (Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro-
Securé) controversy and how this territorial dispute embodies the social and economic 
complexities which have long overshadowed Evo Morales's fourteen-year tenure as 
Bolivian president (2006-2019). Following a successful and highly popular anti-
neoliberal campaign, Morales and the MAS-IPSP pledged to resolve the legacies of the 
colonial past by building an alternative decolonial futurescape which prioritised the 
needs of Bolivia's large Indigenous population. In an inaugural address delivered to 
the Bolivian nation one month following his election, where he and the MAS-IPSP 
won a 54% majority share of the national vote, Morales vowed to “recuperar el 
territorio” and return Bolivian patrimony into the hands of el pueblo boliviano 
(Morales 2006b; Webber 2011). A significant part of this transition included the widely 
anticipated nationalisation of the country's lucrative oil and gas reserves. While a 
strong sense of anticipation surrounded Morales's first presidential term (2006-2010), 
it was unclear whether he would be able to successfully mediate between the various 
demands of this office, including achieving equilibrium between national economic 
growth, on one hand, and preserving the integrity of Indigenous collective territorial 
rights, on the other. An analysis of the 2011 TIPNIS controversy quickly reveals how 
Morales's struggled to negotiate between this dichotomy.  
In this section, I outline how this new national economic framework which 
centred on a policy of neoextractivism (re)produced scenes of conflict and chaos, 
where lowland Indigenous communities were forced to confront the hegemonic 
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tendencies of Morales’s Bolivia which unilaterally pursued the development of 
highway infrastructure directly through the heart of the TIPNIS, a sensitive ecological 
zone and Indigenous territory (Delgado 2017; Postero 2017; Laing 2015; McNeish 2013; 
Wickstrom 2013; Hirsch and McNeish 2011; Calla 2011). While Morales and his cocalero 
supporters touted the economic and social merits of this roadway development, the 
contested nature of this highway has simultaneously transformed the TINPIS into 
what Gómez-Barris (2017: 2) terms the “extractive zone”, a concept I also deployed in 
chapter one. Like the Zapatistas, who continue to defend Chiapas from further 
exploitative development, the concept of the extractive zone similarly applies to the 
TIPNIS where "local geographies" have been "traversed by colonialism and extractive 
capitalism [revealing] the ongoing force of the colonial encounter" (Gómez-Barris 
2017: 2). By analysing locally-sourced print media, this chapter does not just simply 
reinforce the widely held opinion that the TIPNIS is a geographically contested site 
where territorial conflict continues to play out. Instead, this chapter advances this 
view by arguing that the TIPNIS can also be understood as a discursive battleground, 
where discourse is weaponised transforming once inclusive concepts such as 
indigeneity and decolonisation into deeply polarising and unstable categories. Before I 
can address the discursive characteristics of the 2011 TIPNIS controversy, it is first 
necessary to define neoextractivism as it relates to Morales’s Bolivia and where 









The Origins of Neoextractivism in Morales’s Bolivia:  
Popular Indigenous Uprisings in the Twenty-first Century  
 
To understand how a policy of natural resource sovereignty and neoextractivism 
became the cornerstone of Morales’s Bolivia, I am required to take a brief detour of the 
preceding five years which are long remembered as a difficult and uncertain time in 
the country's national development (Postero 2017; Arce Catacora 2015; Gutiérrez 
Aguilar 2014; Paz Arauco 2011; Webber 2011). While the country's Indigenous and 
campesino majority staged a series of separate, individual protests across different 
cities and localities throughout Bolivia, between the years 2000-2005, they all 
collectively expressed common concern over one key issue: the integrity of national 
resource sovereignty under the neoliberal Bolivian state. By focusing on three defining 
protest movements in the city of Cochabamba, the Chapare and the Andean city of El 
Alto, this section will reveal how a policy of neoextractivism became a leading prioirty 
for Morales's 2006 administration, transforming the philosophical underpinnings of 
the entire Bolivian economy (Arce Catacora 2015; MAS-IPSP 2014; Webber 2011).  
Acknowledged as the starting point of this five year period of instability and 
revolutionary social change, la Guerra del Agua intensified across the city of 
Cochabamba in the early part of the year 2000 (Arce Catacora 2015; Gutiérrez Aguilar 
2014; Penarando U. et al. 2012; Webber 2011; Dunkerley 2007). While popular protests 
and mobilisations against the policies and practices of the neoliberal state had already 
taken place elsewhere, led by other disenfranchised sectors of Bolivian society, 
including the several Marchas por el Territorio y la Dignidad by lowland Indigenous 
communities between Trinidad and La Paz in the 1990s, the 2000 Guerra del Agua is 
broadly considered to be "la primera victoria popular en Bolivia contra las políticas 
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neoliberales" (Arce Catacora 2015: 115). Following a decision by president Hugo Banzar 
(1971-1979, 1997-2001) and his government to legally approve the privatisation of 
Cochabamba's fresh water supply and sewage system, the city collectively mobilised in 
defence of their right to water and to retain their power and agency as Bolivian 
citizens to decide "sobre la explotación y aprovechamiento de sus recursos naturales" 
(Arce Catacora 2015: 115; Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014; Penarando U. et al. 2012).  
On 12th November 1999, la Coordinadora de la Defensa del Agua y la Vida was 
established by regantes, or farmers with irrigation rights, to provide a social 
architecture that would help facilitate and coordinate the diverse array of 
Cochabambinos (citizens of Cochabamba) who turned out to protest the state's 
"scandalous" water policy (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014: 3; Arce Catacora 2015). While 
president Banzar and his government proceeded with ley 2029, transferring the right 
of ownership over Cochabamba's water and sewage systems from the public into the 
hands of US multinational Bechtel via their local subsidiary Aguas del Tunari, protests 
led by the newly established La Coordinadora quickly escalated which included the 
participation of campesinos, local Indigenous people, students and the urban middle-
class (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014; Arce Catacora 2015).10  
At different stages between January and April 2000, protesters mobilised 
around several disruptive bloqueos or roadblocks (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014). These 
protests gradually escalated to include the occupation of local water company offices 
                                                          
10
 Bechtel is a US multinational engineering firm that was originally founded in 1898. In over one-
hundred years this transnational has led the development of more than 25,000 infrastructural projects 
worldwide, across 160 countries. The company specialises in a variety of different engineering markets 
from nuclear right through to transport infrastructure and continues to conduct operations in South 





in an angry display of public frustration that made it increasingly more difficult for the 
likes of Bechtel to commit to the commercial distribution of water under ley 2029 
(Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014; Penarando U. et al. 2012). While La Coordinadora quickly 
disbanded following the successful ousting of Bechtel from the Cochabamba area, the 
question of resource sovereignty under the neoliberal state was far from resolved. 
Instead, as neoliberal policies intensified, concern over natural resource sovereignty 
lingered on in the public consciousness, igniting fresh protests in other key parts of 
the country (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014). 
As protests in Cochabamba drew to a close, this unsettled period of 
revolutionary change and social unrest continued in El Alto and the Chapare, two 
important Indigenous and campesino strongholds located elsewhere in Bolivia. While 
this continuation in social unrest marked a growing dissatisfaction with the policies 
and practices of the neoliberal state on a nationwide scale, it did not yet signal the 
beginning of a new national front against the state. Instead, as Gutiérrez Aguilar (2014) 
reminds us, while Indigenous and campesino protesters continued to challenge the 
state on the issue of natural resource sovereignty in Bolivia, they did so by rooting 
their resistances in local experiences, knowledges, identities and geographies. 
In El Alto, Aymara activists staged a series of bloqueos across this Andean city 
between the years 2000-2002 calling on the Banzar government to amend Bolivian 
water policy under ley 2029. Similar to Cochabamba, many alteños expressed a great 
deal of anger over the transfer of public water rights into the private hands of another 
European conglomerate Suez via its local subsidiary Aguas del Illimani (Arce Catacora 
2015; Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014). However, unlike recent events in Cochabamba, these 
demonstrations in El Alto quickly escalated to include a host of other demands from 
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territorial autonomy to the preservation of the sacred coca leaf which was, by now, the 
target of a new national campaign of eradication led by the central government 
(Postero 2017; Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014; Webber 2011).  
Orchestrated over a two year period by Aymara activist Felipe Quispe, who 
served as then-executive president of the Confederacion Sindical Única de Trabajadores 
Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTC), this uprising in El Alto was heavily infused with a 
radical form of Aymara nationalism which foregrounds the central figure of the 
Indigenous subject in political thought and action (Canessa 2009; Reinaga 2001 
[1970]). Building on this revolutionary consciousness originally proposed by Fausto 
Reinaga in the 1960s, whose Indianismo vehemently rejected all occidental ways of 
knowing and being in favour of promoting ethnic subjectivities, this contemporary 
expression of Aymara nationhood in El Alto created a shared space of collective 
thought and action, where disenfranchised subjects of this predominantly poor 
Indigenous cityscape could mobilise around a single identity form to challenge and 
contest the neoliberal state on issues relating to resource sovereignty and privatisation 
(Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014; Reinaga 2001 [1970]. Not only did embracing this form of 
nationhood facilitate a radical form of politics which empowered the local citizenry to 
confront the state on Indigenous rights, it also meant that by reclaiming these rights 
to natural resources, alteños were reclaiming a sense of self that had been eroded and 
erased through the long and violent history of marginalisation and neoliberal 
coloniality which brought them to this point of revolutionary confrontation in the first 
place (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014). 
While these protests continued to play out across El Alto for a further two 
years, mobilising around four key bloqueos in April 2000, September 2000, June 2001 
148 
 
and February 2001, additional social unrest gathered pace in the Bolivian Chapare 
(Catacora 2015; Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014). Here, the country's large population of 
cocaleros or coca farmers were forced to confront an aggressive military campaign 
which focused explicitly on the eradication of coca in the region (Gutiérrez Aguilar 
2014). While this policy was orchestrated and led at ground-level by the Banzar 
government, it received a range of financial and material supports from the US to help 
steer this elaborate campaign of eradication in the Bolivian valleys (Dunkerley 2007).  
This military exercise by Bolivian and US governments adopted a very one-
dimensional view of the role coca plays both nationally and internationally. Motivated 
by their international war on drugs, US authorities expressed a great deal of concern 
over the central role they believed Bolivia's cocalero population played in fuelling the 
international narcotics trade (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014; Webber 2011; Harten 2011; 
Dunkerley 2007). The coca leaf is widely acknowledged to be a central ingredient in 
the manufacture of cocaine. A highly popular drug, demand for cocaine product 
spiralled in the US during the 1980s and 1990s, fuelling a dangerous, deadly and 
destabilising cartel economy across North, Central and southern parts of Latin 
America (Martínez 2016; Chepesiuk 2013; Grillo 2012; Vulliamy 2010). While Bolivia did 
not directly participate in the manufacture and distribution of cocaine product to the 
lucrative US market - its distance on the peripheral edge of the US economy meant 
that it was not in a strategic position for cartels to operate effectively - the cocaleros 
were victims of an eradication campaign which aimed to address the international 




What this eradication campaign failed to consider was that Bolivia's cocaleros 
also supplied a lucrative domestic coca market in which the sacred coca leaf serves a 
number of important cultural, historical, social and practical functions (Crabtree and 
Chaplin 2013). Regularly consumed by Bolivians, coca is believed to have naturally 
occurring properties which support the regulation of certain innate functions in the 
human body. Whether chewed raw, infused with water or blended with other snacks 
such as chocolate, coca helps to stave off hunger, thirst, fatigue and the negative side 
effects that often accompany the struggle to adjust to the higher climes of the Bolivian 
altiplano. Besides the practical, everyday use of coca in the lifestyles of Bolivia's 
Aymara and Quechua communities, coca is also a sacred symbol used as part of ritual 
performances in and among ayllus, where Indigenous communities aim to feed and, 
therefore, communicate with the other-than lifeworld of the Andean earth spirits I 
discussed earlier (Gómez-Barris 2017; Alderman 2016; de la Cadena 2015; Canessa 
2012).11  
It is clear, then, that internationally-backed attempts at the total and complete 
eradication of coca farming in the Bolivian Chapare did not just represent an assault 
on the lives and livelihoods of cocaleros who were forced into this agricultural practice 
following the collapse of Bolivia's mining industry in the 1980s, but signalled a 
vehement attack on certain ways of knowing and being in the world which were 
                                                          
11
 The ayllu remains a politically and socially relevant model of community organisation in 
contemporary Bolivia. It forms the basis for Felipe Quispe’s alternative political vision for Bolivia where 
the Aymara actvist proposes a national return to the decentralised forms of communitarianism and self-
government which previously defined the politics of the ayllu in the period before the colonial 
encounter (Ecotopía 2007). As Quispe describes himself, “tenemos el modelo del ayllu […] donde se vive 
en condiciones igualitarias, sin opresión del hombre al hombre” (Ecotopía 2007: 73). Quispe was a 
staunch critic of the Morales administration and strongly disapproved of the president’s centralised 
form of government. Furthermore, the ayllu continues to play a significant role in urban spaces like the 
city of El Alto. Entire neighbourhoods are organised based on the principles of the ayllu where it is 
associated with a very strong sense of community solidarity (Lazar 2008).  
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completely unknowable to the aggressive and one-dimensional worldview of the 
neocolonial world order. With this, cocalero unions, led by key activists including Evo 
Morales, staged bloqueos and the Marcha por la Coca, la Vida y la Dignidad in defence 
of coca and the economic and social lifestyles that this natural resource represented 
(Arce Catacora 2015; Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014). These mobilisations drew widespread 
attention to the militarisation of the Chapare, as four thousand cocaleros marched the 
600 kilometers from Cochabamba to La Paz (Arce Catacora 2015). Within this 
increasingly contested national space, the coca leaf became a leading symbol of anti-
imperialist struggle and resistance (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014; Webber 2011; Harten 2011).   
Thus far, it is clear to see that the question of resource sovereignty formed the 
centrepiece of Indigenous and campesino resistance to the neoliberal state between 
the years 2000-2005. Not only did the privatisation of water or eradication of coca 
resources threaten and destabilise the lives and livelihoods of Indigenous and 
campesino peoples across the country, but it also represented an attack on local 
epistemologies which are intimately tied to ways some individuals and communities 
engage the use of certain resources in culturally and historically specific ways.  
By 2003, the anger and discontent that had largely been expressed at the local 
and regional levels now coalesced around the Guerra del Gas in El Alto (Postero 2017; 
Arce Catacora 2015; Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014; Paz Arauco 2011; Webber 2011). A national 
demonstration which unfolded across the city between September and October 2003, 
these marches and bloqueos destabilised and undermined the long-established 
neoliberal order in Bolivia. What initially began as a series of local protests against the 
imposition of additional federal taxes in El Alto, this uprising by Indigenous and 
campesino protesters quickly escalated to include large-scale demonstrations against 
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the government over its latest decision to permit the private sale of Bolivian gas 
abroad to Chile (Postero 2017; Arce Catacora 2015; Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014; Paz Arauco 
2011; Webber 2011; Dunkerley 2007). While national elections had taken place the 
previous year, which Morales and the MAS-IPSP successfully contested, the ruling 
MNR still managed to maintain a firm electoral lead, winning a significant share that 
allowed party leaders form the next government under president Gonzalo "Goni" 
Sánchez de Lozada (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016). Despite Morales and the MAS-IPSP 
winning a 20% share of the national vote, this did little to alter Bolivia's current 
economic trajectory which continued down the path towards further austerity and 
privatisation (Pearce et al. 2011; Webber 2011; Harten 2011). The 2002 election cycle 
only reaffirmed the country's wholesale commitment to neoliberal orothdoxy, 
whereby newly appointed president of Bolivia Sánchez de Lozada prepared to siphon 
off Bolivian gas fields to European and North American transnationals under a new 
and enticing corporate tax rate of just five percent (Arce Catacora 2015; Gutiérrez 
Aguilar 2014; Paz Arauco 2011).  
Similar to earlier crises over public water services in Cochabamba and El Alto, a 
low corporate tax rate coupled with the foreign distribution of Bolivian gas to Chile for 
sale to markets in Mexico and the US, erased any right the domestic citizen in Bolivia 
had to the collective use of natural resources. With that, tensions escalated further 
and bloqueos were positioned at several strategic sites across El Alto. In particular, a 
number of bloqueos were located along the only highway to provide access to La Paz, 
starving the city – which contains many government departments, financial 
institutions and the presidential palace – of key supplies like fuel. In response, 
Sánchez de Lozada passed a national emergency plan which permitted the Bolivian 
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military to guarantee the safe passage of oil trucks through El Alto and into La Paz 
(Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014). However, as Gutiérrez Aguilar (2014) adds, this emergency 
plan was effectively a "license to kill" by a president who showed little regard for 
protesters’ demands. On 12th October 2003, tensions between protesters and the 
military came to head when security personnel opened fire on a number Aymara 
protesters culminating in one of the worst atrocities to afflict Bolivia in contemporary 
living memory.12 During the attack, 63 people were killed and a further 247 were 
injured including men, women and children (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014). This violent 
encounter between the neoliberal state and Bolivian society became a catalyst for 
change, leading first to the swift resignation of Sánchez de Lozada before the eventual 
collapse of the neoliberal regime altogether less than two years later. Amid the 
destruction and decay left behind by the neoliberal project in Bolivia, Morales and the 
MAS-IPSP secured an impressive victory in December 2005, propelling the country 







                                                          
12
 In a similar vein to the Acteal Massacre in Chiapas, Mexico, the fight for justice over this state-led 
attack in El Alto has been a hard fought campaign. Immediately following his resignation from office, 
Sánchez de Lozada fled to the US leaving it almost impossible for Bolivian courts to try him for his 
crimes. According to Trial International, after years of protracted talks, Sánchez de Lozada was 
eventually tried in a US courtroom on charges of extrajudicial killings and was found guilty on 3
rd
 April 
2018. While the defendant has lodged an appeal against the conviction, an award totalling the amount 
of $10 million has been made available to the victims (see https://trialinternational.org/latest-
post/gonzalo-sanchez-de-lozada/ [accessed 18
th
 December 2019]).  
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The Policies and Practices of the 2006 Morales State 
In contrast to chapter one, where the Zapatista movement struggled to have their 
rights to territorial autonomy enshrined in Mexican constitutional law despite several 
years of protracted negotiations with the neoliberal state, Bolivia's MAS-IPSP 
proposed a series of popular policies and reforms which attempted to ambitiously 
shape and rework Bolivian state matter around Indigenous subjectivities, including a 
radical re-territorialisation of the country that would ultimately transform the very 
basis of society and the economy (Smith 2019; Maria Ranta 2016; García Linera 2014; 
MAS-IPSP 2014; Goodale and Postero 2013; Paz Arauco 2011; Webber 2011; Tapia 2010). 
Central to this radical process of state renewal and transformation were two key policy 
frameworks which addressed the long-standing issue of Bolivian resource sovereignty 
from both a constitutional (Pearce et al. 2011) and economic perspective (Postero 2017; 
Kohl 2010). Responding to the demands of recent protests, Morales and the MAS-IPSP 
not only proposed the formation of a constituent assembly and the redrafting of a new 
Bolivian constitution but he and the MAS-IPSP insisted on the nationalisation of the 
country's oil and gas reserves, reconfiguring the very basis of Bolivia's economy 
(Morales 2006b). By discussing the significance of these constitutional and economic 
changes, I outline here how Morales and the MAS-IPSP attempted to address the 
legacies of Bolivia's (neo)colonial territorial past. 
Unlike the neoliberal Mexican state which refused to reform or even amend 
part of the constitution to accommodate the Zapatistas’ San Andrés Accords, Morales 
and the MAS-IPSP presided over the redrafting of an entirely new constitutional 
framework for Bolivia, one which not only recognises the plurinational composition of 
Bolivian nationhood, but which affords equal rights to the individual and collective 
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ownership of land and ethnoterritoriality in the country (Eisenstadt et al. 2013; Pearce 
et al. 2011). While Bolivia's 2009 constitution was drafted by a democratically elected 
constituent assembly which was majority-controlled by MAS-IPSP delegates, it is not 
my intention here to elaborate on the details of this particular process nor do I 
propose to describe at any length the hostilities and tensions which characterised the 
political climate in which the final constitutional draft document was passed and 
signed into law on 14th December 2007; I will reserve discussion of these points for 
chapter four when I reflect further on how the constituent assembly supports 
Morales's Andean utopian vision. Meanwhile, it is important to recognise in this 
chapter that the 2009 Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional set a new legal 
precedent in the country, obligating the Bolivian state to not just preserve and protect 
the integrity of Indigenous collective territorial rights but to acknowledge the 
economic role played by campesinos who require land for commercial agricultural 
purposes, as I have established elsewhere in this chapter.  
Divided into five parts, Bolivia's 2009 constitution contains 411 articles which 
concerns everything from the basic structure of the plurinational state itself, including 
national economic and judicial systems, as well as new provisions which accommodate 
the right to intercultural education, Indigenous customary law and the practice of 
traditional medicines. Therefore, an obvious yet defining characteristic of this 
constitutional framework is the role Indigenous people played in shaping this legal 
instrument. In particular, part two of the constitution, entitled Estructura y 
organización territorial del estado, directly concerns provisions for the re-
territorialisation of Bolivia and how the plurinational state proposed to protect and 
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defend the integrity of Indigenous collective territorial rights without alienating the 
economic rights of other agriculturalists.  
For example, Article 56 of the constitution acknowledges both the right to 
private and collective property stipulating that all land must serve a social function: 
“Toda persona tiene derecho a la propiedad privada individual o colectiva, siempre 
que ésta cumpla una función social” (Article 56; 2009 Constitución Política del Estado 
Plurinacional). Not only does this acknowledge the right of campesinos, cocaleros, 
agri-industrialists and others to engage la tierra in economically and socially 
responsible ways, but it also considers how the definition of social function has itself 
evolved under this new constitutional framework since earlier encounters with the 
concept in twentieth century Bolivia and Mexico. 
An embedded feature of land reform programmes almost everywhere 
throughout Latin America in the twentieth century, the social function doctrine often 
stipulated that territorial properties, redistributed by the nation-state, should serve a 
practical, economic purpose in the restoration and modernisation of post-colonial 
agricultural societies (Foster and Bonilla 2011; Mirow 2010; Ankersen and Ruppert 
2006; Foland 1969). Territorial value and productivity was often measured in terms of 
capital output, transforming the historic relationship Indigenous people once had with 
the land, as entire societies transitioned further away from traditional ways of knowing 
and being in and with the land towards strong national commercial agricultural 
sectors. Besides guaranteeing the right to individual and commercial properties, the 
2009 Plurinational Constitution also develops further protections for la territorialidad, 
acknowledging the whole range of cultural, historical and social rights that accompany 
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the collective ownership and use of ethnoterritoriality in Bolivia (Article 30 2009 
Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional).  
Article 30 of the Plurinational Constitution is dedicated to the rights of 
Indigenous people, defining las naciones y pueblos indígenas originarios campesinos as 
those “que comparta identidad cultural, idioma, tradición histórica, instituciones, 
territorialidad y cosmovisión, cuya existencia es anterior a la invasión colonial 
Española” (Article 30.1 2009 Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional). While the 
Plurinational Constitution guarantees Indigenous people their rights to Indigenous 
identities and Bolivian citizenship (Article 30.3), to intercultural education (Article 
30.12), traditional medicines (Article 30.9), and their political and judicial institutions 
that operate in accordance with their cosmovisions (Article 30.14), it also stipulates 
their right “a la titulación colectiva de tierras y territorios” (Article 30.6 2009 
Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional). In addition to this full range of 
ethnopolitical and ethnoterritorial rights, the Plurinational Constitution is also careful 
to acknowledge Indigenous agency in relation to their right to decide regarding the 
often controversial interrelation between land, natural resources and development. 
For example, Article 30.15 guarantees Indigenous communities “el derecho a la 
consulta previa obigatoria, realizada por el Estado, de buena fe y concertada, respecto 
a la explotación de los recursos naturales no renovables en el territorio que habitan” 
Article 30.15 2009 Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional). 
There are a few considerations tied up in this statement which deserve our 
attention here for a moment. It is certainly quite clear from the constitution that the 
Morales state vowed to respect the agency of Indigenous communities in relation to 
their right to decide on development projects proposed for their land and territories. 
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Based on this, we can safely say that Morales did not conflate indigeneity with the pre-
modern nor did he consider ethnicity to be something that is static and unchanging. 
Instead, the constitution acknowledges ethopolitical agency and certainly considers 
Indigenous people to be active thinking and speaking subjects who may or may not 
wish to engage in planned development of their lands and territories. Defining 
ethnicity in this way speaks to the repeated shifts and changes which have taken place 
to national-political definitions and understandings of this complex identity form and 
how it relates to, and operates within, notions of place and place-making (Rivera 
Cusicanqui 2015).  
Morales clearly broke with the mould of the political past, particularly in 
relation to earlier multicultural reforms which, as Rivera Cusicanqui (2015: 83) 
reminds us, reworked definitions of the “Indigenous emphasising its minority status 
and static, unchanging nature, expressed in a series of external forms: dress, dance, 
ritual, always associated with the rural and anchored in a space of production”. While 
Morales moved beyond those particular constraints with the neoliberal past, Article 
30.15 does also invite some cause for concern, especially in relation to the role the 
nation-state plays in the provision of consultations within Indigenous communities.  
Article 30.15 explicitly states that the Bolivian government is responsible for 
delivering consultations to communities in a move which appears to elevate the role of 
the state in local community decision-making. In other words, Indigenous agency is 
contingent on the presence of the nation-state hosting consultations inside 
communities and their voices, either for or against processes of development, will only 
be legitimately heard through state imposed mechanisms and procedures. While the 
Zapatistas may have struggled to secure legal recognition in Mexican constitutional 
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frameworks, their place on the margins ensured that they were largely free of state 
institutional interference at least in terms of their autonomy from 2005 onwards (see 
Mora 2017; Harvey 2016). Meanwhile, it is clear that the Plurinational Constitution of 
Bolivia continues to maintain a close proximity to Indigenous communities, 
recognising ethnicity as some kind of extension of the state that may or may not be 
manipulated by the state in the interest of state-led development.  
On the issue of development, to accompany the redrafting of the Plurinational 
Constitution, Morales also proposed the nationalisation of Bolivia’s oil and gas 
reserves on the 1st May 2006 in accordance with the demands laid down by protesters 
in the city of El Alto in 2003. The nationalisation of Bolivian patrimony formed the 
centrepiece of the MAS-IPSP government’s newly constituted Modelo Económico 
Social Comunitario Productivo (MAS-IPSP 2014; Webber 2011). Proposed by the MAS-
IPSP as an economic model of transition, the goal was to establish what has been 
termed in MAS-IPSP literature as el Socialismo Comunitario para el Vivir Bien (MAS-
IPSP 2014). In their programme for government, the MAS-IPSP defines this model as 
“una síntesis de las aspiraciones políticas de la clase obrera hacia la construcción del 
socialismo, y las naciones y pueblos indígenas orginarios campesinos hacia una 
potenciamiento de las forma comunitarias de producción y reproducción de la vida” 
(MAS-IPSP 2014: 21). In other words, this proposed political and economic model 
works towards the ultimate, long-distant goal of displacing the centrality of the state 
and traditional modes of capital production in favour of a society “que se basa en la 
producción y redistribución de riqueza sin la enajenación del trabajo, preservando los 
bienes colectivos y asegurando el patrimonio común de las funciones ambientales para 
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el pueblo boliviano, a traves de la no mercantilización de la naturaleza” (MAS-IPSP 
2015: 22).  
This future plan, rooted in notions of communitarianism and social harmony 
between humanity and the natural world, began with an immediate focus on the 
nationalisation of oil and gas reserves during Morales’s first-term. Yet, unlike the 
process of nationalisation which occurred in the aftermath of the 1952 Bolivian 
Revolution, where the mining industry was brought under the direct control of the 
revolutionary state, the Morales government simply increased taxes on the profits 
made by private hydrocarbon companies and their commercial operations in Bolivia 
(Postero 2017; Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; Webber 2011; Kohl 2010). According to Webber 
(2011), this new corporate tax regime generated significant revenue streams for the 
MAS-IPSP government, with initial tax rates set at over eighty percent for the first 
three months of his tenure. Under this new centralised model of state-led economic 
development, the Morales government planned for the redistribution of state revenues 
back into the hands of the Bolivian people in the form of social welfare programmes 
(MAS-IPSP 2014; Paz Arauco 2011; Webber 2011; Harten 2011). This cycle of financial 
exchange, whereby state revenues generated from natural resources are then returned 
to the Bolivian pueblo through social programmes, develops a different, more 
nuanced, and inclusive approach to national economics (MAS-IPSP 2014). Under this 
framework, Morales and the MAS-IPSP depart from neoliberal orthodoxy by sharing 
state revenues with society, investing in Indigenous citizens to support low-income 
children to attend school through the Juancito Pinto programme, for example. This 
generates a new and different kind of social relationship between state, society and el 
territorio, one which bears a remarkable similarity to the inclusiveness and 
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harmonious-ness of ayllu relationality, plurinationality and vivir bien discussed earlier 
(Yampara Huarchi 2017; Alderman 2016; de la Cadena 2015; MAS-IPSP 2014; Canessa 
2012; Huanacuni Mamani 2010; Mignolo 2010; Tapia 2010).  
Yet, the following analysis of the TIPNIS controversy (Territorio Indígena y 
Parque Nacional Isiboro-Securé) calls into question the inclusive and democratic 
nature of the plurinational state, where categories such as indigeneity became key 
epistemological battlegrounds between the Morales state and lowland Indigenous 
communities, specifically those resident inside the TIPNIS reserve itself. By focusing 
my analysis on locally-sourced print media, first-hand interviews with activists in 
Bolivia as well as local and international scholarship, this discussion not only 
reconfirms the widely held view that the TIPNIS is a contested site of production, 
what Gómez-Barris (2017: 2) terms the “extractive zone”, but that discourse was 
weaponised, effectively creating conditions of exclusion and marginalisation which 









form of “reconstituted neoliberalism” (Webber 2011: 178) but he presided over 




















                                                          
13
 Thus far, I have largely defined neoliberalism in relation to its economic principles and impact on 
regions like Mexico and Bolivia and I am acknowledging here that this rather focused view generates 
certain limitations regarding how we might come to fully understand this global approach to state 
management and governance. While it has been crucial for me to hone in on neoliberal economics here 
in order to assess the implications of these policies on land and territoriality in Mexico and Bolivia, 
Brown (2015; 17) encourages us to consider neoliberalism as a “form of reason that configures all aspects 
of existence in economic terms” and as such quietly unravels the basic elements of democracy. In 
addition to viewing neoliberalism as an ensemble of economic policies and packages designed to open 
up countries to the benefits of free trade, Brown (2015) invites us to consider how neoliberal rationality 
economises all noneconomic spheres of social life to the point where everything and everyone including 
people, politics, democracy and its institutions are remade in the image of homo oeconomicus. 
According to this rational, all domains of social life are markets, the figure of the human is an ensemble 
of entrepenurial and investment capital who competes rather than exchanges with her/his fellow man, 
and this logic gradually erodes away at public life where politics is reduced to concerns over “power, 
hegemonic values, resources and future trajectories” (Brown 2015: 39). And the criticism of Morales by 
Rivera Cusicanqui and others is rooted in what they perceive to be his failure as Bolivia’s first 
indigenous president to radically depart from the norms and attributes of a neoliberal model of nation-
state governance.  This chapter is not an attempt to resolve the debate over whether Morales facilitated 
or interrupted neoliberalism in Bolivia. Instead, the strength of this research lies in its ability to 
transcend binaries and reveal the complex influences of Morales’s presidency on the way different 
Indigenous groups in rural and urban Bolivia struggle for land. For further discussion on the theory of 
neoliberalism I point to Feher (2009) and Brown (2015) who lead the conversation in this area.   
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The 2011 TIPNIS Controversy as Discursive Battleground in Morales’s Bolivia 
 
Considering the recent political upheaval in Bolivia, I have been unable to ascertain 
the current status of the TIPNIS controversy amid this national crisis. Still an 
incomplete project by the time Morales resigned his position, it remains unclear 
whether the highway will be completed. While Morales approved construction in 2017, 
after years of stand-offs and protests, current intrim president Áñez has actually been 
an opponent of the development since she first entered office (2009) (Rodriguez 
Martíenez 14th November 2019). I will address the TIPNIS controversy in the present 
tense as there has been nothing to indicate yet that the project is cancelled. Any 
references to Morales will of course remain in the past tense. 14 
The TIPNIS (Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro-Securé) reserve is 
located in the central lowlands of Bolivia and lies in the direct path of the third and 
final phase of what is a large-scale interdepartmental roadway development which has 
been in construction since 2008 and which aims to connect together the departments 
of Cochabamba and Beni by directly linking the town of Villa Tunari in the south with 
San Ignacio de Moxos in the north. The road is expected to cover a total distance of 
                                                          
14
  It is important to acknowledge from the outset that Evo Morales’s voice features more prominently in 
this analysis of the TIPNIS compared to the indigenous communities who live inside the reserve. I 
propose several brief explanations for this imbalance here. First this speaks to my difficulty as a 
researcher in gaining access to the TIPNIS reserve while conducting fieldwork in Bolivia for this thesis. 
This prompted me to consider an alternative approach to this analysis which included focusing on local 
journalism, something which had not been done before. Not only did this approach contribute 
something original to the debate on the TIPNIS, revealing the discursive nature of the conflict, it 
unintentionally highlighted the under represention of indigenous voice in Bolivian media (newspapers), 
especially those communities and groups of activists who deliberately rallied against the Morales-led 
state. The question of indigenous representation in Bolivian media lies beyond the scope of this thesis 
but the concerns raised here certainly do provide scope for further research both specifically in relation 
to the TIPNIS conflict and the media more generally during the presidency of Evo Morales. It is 
important to add here too that Indigenous people are active agents in the pursuit and creation of their 
own media outlets (radio, TV, film) and Zamorano Villarreal (2017) offers an assessment of that, 
acknowledging the role Indigenous-led media production has played in reimagining the national 
political landscape.  
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approximately six-hundred kilometres (MAS-IPIS 2014; La Prensa 12th August 2011). In 
the early stages of this highway development, before signs of conflict emerged, the 
Brazilian transnational OAS was awarded the contract by Bolivia to carry out 
construction of the highway at a total cost of $415 million, $332 million of which would 
be put forward by the Brazilian state (El Deber 1st August 2011).15 President Morales and 
the MAS-IPSP government justified both the cost of construction and the roadway 
itself by stressing the need to better integrate Bolivia. A clear intention behind 
upgrading and enhancing Bolivia’s road network, according to the MAS-IPSP is to 
move beyond “una Bolivia desarticulada” by interconnecting cities and economic 
zones. This, in turn, will help the country move towards vivir bien (MAS-IPSP 2014: 
60).  
For president Evo Morales and the MAS-IPSP government, this controversial 
roadway project was a way in which to properly and formally "integrate the country's 
Amazonian and Andean regions" together, something which had been "a dream since 
Bolivian independence" (Achtenberg 13th August 2016). As Morales remarked, “esa vía 
llevará desarrollo a todo la región y cumplirá uno de los anhelos de pueblo desde 1826 
para que exista una carretera que una directamente a los departmentos de Beni y de 
Cochabamba” (El Deber 1st August 2011). Morales argued that the TIPNIS highway “será 
concluida en año 2014 para ser puesta al servicio del desarrollo e integración nacional” 
(El Deber 1st August 2011). Not only was the highway designed to benefit Bolivia, but 
                                                          
15
 The Brazilian firm OAS is a transnational corporation originally formed in 1976 with business interests 
in over 20 countries worldwide. Primarily an engineering and construction firm, the company’s 
operations have since been broadly divided into two main subsidiaries: OAS Engenharia and OAS 
Investimentos. While the former is more concerned with heavy-duty construction projects in the area of 
hydroelectric dams, coastal ports and, airports, the latter is the investment wing of the firm, fronting 
the money for roadway and other large-scale investment projects throughout Latin America and 
worldwide (http://www.oas.com/oas-com-1/oas-s-a/). The firm currently has business interests in 




Brazil’s significant financial contribution in the earlier stages of the project revealed 
that country’s ambition to lead the way forward in strengthening its own national 
economic outlook through a better integrated Andean region (Earth Rights 
International 30th July 2014). The Iniciativa para la Infraestructura Regional 
Suramericana (hereafter IIRSA), originally signed in Brasilia in the year 2000, is an 
example of this (CCI 2011). While the TIPNIS highway is not directly connected to this 
cross-regional scheme which aims to “avanzar en la modernización de la 
infraestructura regional y en la adopción de acciones específicas para promover su 
integración y desarrollo económico y social”, Brazil has relied upon these multilateral 
agreements to aid in “un processo de crecimiento de tipo capitalista, llegando a 
constituirse en una de las diez economías más importantes del mundo” (CCI 2011: 35-
36). In other words, the TIPNIS highway would play a small, perhaps even indirect, 
role in helping Brazil forge better distribution channels throughout the Andean 
region. However, while Morales was clear that “la gran mayoría de los bolivianos […] 
apoyan la obra” (El Deber 1st August 2011), there was a growing ground-swell of anger 
in the Bolivian lowlands that would change the course of this development project.  
On 15th August 2011, 34 Indigenous communities from the lowlands of Bolivia 
instigated a protest march to the city of La Paz in direct response to the proposed 
development of the TIPNIS highway. The aim of la Marcha por el territorio y la 
dignidad was to pressure the government into overturning its decision to allow 
construction of the highway take place. The march was led by the lowland umbrella 
organisation, Confederación de los Pueblos Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano, which, as I 
mentioned earlier, was founded in 1989 to defend lowland communities against the 
colonisation of their collectively-held lands by highland campesinos and cocaleros 
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(coca leaf farmers), many of whom now settle in an area of the TIPNIS known as 
Polígono 7 to the north of the park. However, the presence of these commercial 
activities alongside the intention of those inside the TIPNIS to preserve and protect 
collective ethnoterritorial rights raised tensions between these separate groups. As I 
mentioned earlier, campesinos and cocaleros share a similar view of the land or tierra 
which is a broadly individualist, mercantile approach to agricultural activity while 
large swathes of the TIPNIS reserve are held under collective titles by predominantly 
Chimáne, Yuracaré and Moxeños ethnic groups. Unsurprisingly, the former supported 
Morales and the TIPNIS roadway because, in their view, a highway would help them 
better market their produce domestically (Crabtree and Chaplin 2013).  
During the three month march, protesters argued against the proposed 
roadway development, declaring the construction to be a violation of their rights and a 
threat to the biodiversity of the reserve (Delgado 2017; Rivera Cusicanqui 2015; 
McNeish 2013; Wickstrom 2013; Calla 2011; Hirsch and McNeish 2011). The latter was a 
discourse that resonated. In newspaper articles which followed the progress of the 
march, the resistance was often framed as an Indigenous display of defence against the 
potentiality of state-imposed development and a clear effort on the part of lowland 
communities to protect the parkland’s unique biodiversity. One article in La Razón 
stated that, 
 
la carretera impactará de forma negativaen el medio ambiente y en el hábitat del 
lugar […] en un período de 18 años la intervención en el lugar provocará una 
deforestación del 64% del territorio. 
 
 
(La Razón 1st August 2011) 
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In a similar vein, another article referred to the TIPNIS park “[como] un 
importante pulmón del país, que resguarda una de las mayors riquezas, la 
biodiversidad” (La Razón 29th September 2010). As Callejas (2011) notes, protests that 
took place in support of the TIPNIS communities organised in La Paz in the days 
following the launch of the protest march also shared in this rhetorical defence of the 
reserve, stressing the need to halt construction of the road in order to protect the 
ecological diversity of the park. As Laing (2015) observers, leaders and intellectuals of 
the resistance deployed the environmental question as an important and necessary 
discursive tactic to make recognisable the protest movement to an audience of 
international environmental sympathisers. This was emphasised to me in an interview 
I conducted with a Madidi park guide in Rurrenabaque. In our interview, Rodrigo 
Mariacz stressed that an environmental defence of the TIPNIS is important 
considering the negative consequences which can emerge from such development 
projects. (personal interview 5th December 2017). But, he added that divisions also lie 
within and between Indigenous communities, some of whom identify with 
development and the overall proceso de cambio being led by Morales and others who 
do not (personal interview 5th December 2017).  
This links with remarks by McNeish (2013) who argues that the environmental 
attributes of the TIPNIS controversy must not be overplayed or even fetishized. He 
argues that essentialist claims should be avoided as well as a tendency to oversimplify 
Indigenous identity to such a point where they become so intrinsically ‘close’ to nature 
that they, therefore, perform this one-dimensional role as ‘grand defenders’ of the 
natural world (Laing 2015; McNeish 2013). In one newspaper article, lowland 
Indigenous communities were simply described as “especialistas y entidades 
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ambientalistas [que] han pedido que no se construya el tramo II atravesando el 
parque” (Página Siete 6th August 2011). Indigenous identities are profoundly complex 
forms and are much more nuanced than our assumptions often allow us to see. By 
tracing political developments along the constantly shifting parameters of territorial 
politics, we reveal how the boundaries of difference between land, indigeneity and 
development often become blurred, even overlapping and intersecting to (re)create 
complex social scenarios. It is clear that protection of Indigenous landscape is an 
important concern for ethnic groups themselves, however, their environmental 
concerns are often grounded in the everyday threats these mega-developments pose to 
their daily sense of being with el territorio. It is important to remain aware that this 
being with the land includes engaging in forms of development necessary to promote 
and sustain their livelihoods. As I discussed earlier, this right is embedded in the 
Plurinational constitution which lowland groups helped to draft. To reiterate the 
point, Article 30 encourages Indigenous groups to benefit from the exploitation of 




se respectará y garantizará el derecho a la consulta previa obligatoria, realizada por 
el Estado, de buena fe y concertada, respecto a la explotación de los recursos 
naturales no renovables en el territorio que habitan.  
 
 
(Article 30.15 2009 Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional)  
 
From this we can see that the real concern here for lowland Indigenous 
protesters was the fact that the government abandoned its constitutional duty to 
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engage in a consultation process with lowland communities not only when Morales 
signed the original construction deal with Brazil but also when the president 
introduced ley 180 (Rivera Cusicanqui 2015; Laing 2015; McNeish 2013). Responding, as 
the government saw it, to the demands of the marchers, Morales defended ley 180 
which defined the TIPNIS parkland como zona intangible. The law not only stopped 
construction of the roadway from taking place, but it also ensured that all other forms 
of developmental activity important to the livelihoods of TIPNIS communities were 
also banned from taking place inside the reserve, including cacao farming (McNeish 
2013).  
In their view, CIDOB saw this as an achievement – a limited one no less - 
because the government did concede to its demands and halted construction of the 
third and final phase of the roadway development (personal interview 5th December 
2017). However, it must be said that, according to McNeish (2013), this law allowed the 
government to secure revenge against the protesters, as he puts it. This executive 
decree legally preserved the park in what can only be described as an unrealistic state 
of preservation or untouchability which Rivera Cusicanqui argues was nothing more 
than a “strategic weapon in the hands of the state” (Rivera Cusicanqui 2015: 104; 
McNeish 2013). It was an extreme response to what was a plethora of lowland 
Indigenous demands, above all else, respect for their rights as independent, 
autonomous agents legally occupying this territorio. This new law effectively 
characterised the TIPNIS park as an ecological ‘museum’ piece and the communities 
within it as those seeking to remain ‘close’ to nature – environmental warriors if you 
will. This law appeared to reflect a multicultural politics rather than one based on the 
principles of plurinationality. In many ways, this speaks to what Nancy Postero (2017) 
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suggests was the racialisation of the conflict where ethnic identity and decolonisation 
became discursive battlegrounds. Evo Morales (re)framed lowland Indigenous 
communities as obstacles to ‘decolonisation’ by engaging in discursive tactics which 
undermined their position as autonomous agents in plurnational society. Morales was 




Si yo tuviera tiempo, iría a enamorar a las compañeras yuracarés y convencerlas de 
que no se opongan [la carretera]; así que, jóvenes, tienen instrucciones del 
Presidente de conquistar a las compañeras yuracarés trinitarias para que no se 
opongan a la construcción del camino.  
 
 
(La Razón 1st August 2011) 
 
These remarks which were made along racial and sexist lines rearticulated the 
logic of assimilation which had long been an inherent and damaging feature of 
Bolivia’s former colonial past. This discursive behaviour revealed a replaying of former 
colonial narratives, where lowland Indigenous communities were forced to confront 
the hegemonic tendencies of the Morales-led state. Through these remarks it is clear 
to see that Morales sought to deny lowland communities’ agency by single-handedly 
categorising them, women in particular, as simple Indigenous people who could easily 
be appropriated by the romanticism of modernisation and progressive development. 
While the government did initiate a consultation process – ley 222 – its delayed 
implementation brought into question the government’s commitment to both 
listening to and respecting the views of lowland communities as autonomous agents. 
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Reflecting on the dispute, Fernando Vargas, president of the TIPNIS Subcentral 
committee, an organisation which defends the interests of communities inside the 
reserve, sums up this sentiment while participating at a protest in La Paz: “Evo 
Morales ha creado indígenas de primera y de segunda” (El Deber 23rd April 2012). 
Thus far, this chapter has addressed the concept of place and Indigenous place-
making in Bolivia and, in particular, where Morales situated himself within this 
evolving debate. From his proposal to break with the legacies of the (neo)colonial past 
by combining individual and collective territorial rights under a new constitutional 
framework, the TIPNIS controversy reveals the ongoing contested nature of land and 
ethnoterritoriality in plurinational Bolivia and how this complex site of ethnopolitical 
thought and action is not just geographically contested but is also a discursive 
battleground where categories like race and gender were weaponised to recreate the 
conditions of marginalisation and exclusion. 
However, the final section of this chapter draws attention to the struggle for 
ethnoterritoriality in urban Bolivia and how certain Indigenous groups (namely 
Aymara people) “make place” in El Alto. While these two ethnopolitical case studies 
(Zapatistas and TIPNIS) generally concern the struggle for ethnoterritoriality in 
contemporary rural Latin America, it is important to consider acts of place-making in 
the less conventional places and spaces of ethnopolitical thought and action or at least 
what were once considered non-traditional sites of Indigenous production. In what 
follows, I argue that la nueva arquitectura andina is a form of ethnoterritoriality in 
urban Bolivia that combines fresh and original Indigenous modernities, what Runnels 
(2009: 140) refers to as an “Indianizing of the urban landscape”, with the struggle for 
the ethnic self. This results in the presence of new territorial and spatial imaginaries 
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which endow the undifferenciated nature of urban space with meaning transforming 



























Redefining Place and Ethnoterritoriality in Urban Bolivia:  
La nueva arquitectura andina in El Alto 
 
In the years that Morales served as Bolivian president (2006-2019) many Bolivians took 
great pride in being Indigenous, embracing their identities through language, fashion 
or by simply occupying the public places and spaces once formally the preserve of the 
creole and mestizo elite.16 However, with new levels of wealth being generated as a 
result of the former president’s economic reforms, some can afford to take this pride 
further, creatively expressing this sense of the ethnic self through ostentatious 
architectural creations. Against the backdrop of what has been a long and deeply 
unsettling history of colonisation, assimilation, marginalisation and migration, where 
Indigenous people have consistently struggled to maintain visibility throughout all 
stages of history since the colonial encounter, the advent of la nueva arquitectura 
andina throughout the city of El Alto reveals how some urban Indigenous groups are 
now choosing to perform their identity and negotiate the relationship between place, 
space and the ethnic self. By prioritising elements of the aesthetic in this analysis here, 
I will describe how this lavish and flamboyant architectural style reveals the 
alternative ways in which indigeneity is being explored in urban Bolivia. However, 
given that ethnic identity remains a contested and deeply personal category, it is 
prudent to ask to what extent these buildings represent the sweeping social changes 
that have taken place in ‘ethnic’ Bolivia under former president Morales since 2006 or 
                                                          
16
 Creole generally refers to those of European descendent (Spanish) who were born in the colonies and 
is a term which dates back to the time of the colonial occupation of the Americas by white Europeans, 
mainly the Spanish. Meanwhile, mestizo describes those of mixed European-Indigenous heritage and 
has been popularied by its usage in scholarship and by governments during the twentieth century (Liss 
and Liss 1972; Abercrombie 1998; Canessa 2012).  
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is it that these buildings simply (re)confirm the widely held belief that Aymara now 
dominates the new social order of things in the country?  
La nueva arquitectura andina or neo-Andean architecture is an example of 
contemporary place-making in a city which owes much of its development to the 
rather unsettling history of rural-to-urban migration which accelerated during 
revolutionary changes in the mid-twentieth century and which has steadily continued 
since then. This pattern of migration has generated what Lazar (2008) has coined an 
“in-betweenness” both in terms of how Indigenous people experience and perform 
identity in the urban landscape of El Alto. As I have outlined before, indigeneity is a 
place-related concept, where a sense of the ethnic self has been intimately tied to the 
types of relationships forged and mediated between the human and other-than-
human lifeworld (de la Cadena 2015). As I discussed earlier, the ayllu, which is an 
example of collective socio-territorial and political organising commonly found along 
the Bolivian Andes, has been a central component in the way Aymara and Quechua 
groups have traditionally achieved a sense of selfhood or jaqi (Canessa 2012) Through 
methods of embodied practice and ritual performance, which include communal 
dance and the offering up of alcohol, coca leaves and llama foetuses to Pachamama or 
Mother Earth, a sense of the self and the collective achieve a state of coexistence or 
harmony we might otherwise describe here as vivir bien (Alderman 2016; Canessa 
2012). However, the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 interrupted such traditional acts of 
place-making by attempting to submerge ethnic difference beneath a newly 
reconstituted social logic based around national inclusion, class relations and liberal 
notions of citizenship. This newly reconstituted social relationship between the 
revolutionary state and society was personified, in part, by the creation of the new 
174 
 
national campesino identity which was mediated and institutionalised by the state-
controlled union Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) I mentioned earlier. However, by 
tracing the historical development of the migrant city of El Alto, we can in fact observe 
the hybrid ways in which the liberal and the ethnic self appear to coexist and overlap, 
revealing the non-static and transformative ways in which indigeneity responds and 
adapts to urban landscapes and lifestyles (Lazar 2008). 
El Alto developed as a consequence of numerous state-led changes which took 
place in Bolivia beginning in the 1950s and which have actively reworked and reshaped 
the social fabric of the country in the more than five decades since then. During the 
late-twentieth century, the city of El Alto experienced accelerated growth as rural and 
industrial migrants, the majority of whom claim Aymara ancestry, joined this 
emerging ‘ethnic’ city in response to a decline in productivity levels across some of 
Bolivia’s more traditional agricultural and mining sectors. While the 1953 land reform 
successfully disrupted the hacendado economy by dismantling landed estates and 
redistributing this land to communities along the altiplano, issues of overcrowding on 
land parcels quickly emerged, forcing families to send younger members of the 
community to the city in search of work and to supplement agricultural incomes 
(Clarke 1968). Meanwhile, by 1985, state-led neoliberal reforms had forced the closure 
of Bolivian mines right across the country with the loss of thousands of jobs in the 
sector and a spike in national unemployment rates. For those ex-miners who did not 
return to agriculture in the Bolivian valleys and lowlands, they were left with little 
choice but to migrate to the city. However, being the destination of choice for many of 
Bolivia’s migrants, the city of La Paz struggled to cope with this rise in population 
numbers due entirely to the fact that it is geographically situated deep within the 
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mountainous confines of the Cordillera valley. With that, migrants were therefore 
forced to inhabit the then-rapidly emerging city of El Alto which began to sprawl out 
along the geographically unrestricted altiplano plateau which overlooks colonial La 
Paz below (Arbona and Kohl 2004).  
Statistics highlight the true extent of this growth in El Alto’s population 
compared with its neighbouring city La Paz during the same period. While, between 
the years 1950-2010, the population of La Paz increased by a total of 128% from 321,063 
to 730,000, in that same fifty-year period, the population of El Alto spiralled upwards 
from a meagre 11,000 residents in 1950 to nearly one-million by the year 2010, a total 
growth rate of around 8646% (Crabtree and Chaplin 2013; Arbona and Kohl 2004). 
While this pattern of migration swiftly transformed El Alto into one of the fastest 
growing cities in Bolivia and Latin America, this level of inward migration also had a 
profound impact on how the city developed and organised. In line with the idea that 
hybrid liberal-ethnic subjectivities characterise being alteño, Lazar (2008) confirms 
that citizenship in the city combines both liberal and ethnic elements to reproduce 
what she describes as an “inclusive Indigenous and popular identity, which can be the 
source of considerable political strength” (259). Lazar (2008) of course refers to the 
influence of the more traditional forms of political and social organising in Bolivia 
which have now penetrated the social fabric of the city and informed the day-to-day 
development of society and economy. These broadly fall under syndicalism, trade 
unionism and the traditional Andean-Bolivian ayllu, for example. The politics and 
practices of syndicalism and trade unionism, for example, arose out of the spread of 
the Marxist labour movement in the twentieth century and featured prominently as 
methods of organising in Bolivia’s agricultural and mining industries respectively pre- 
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and post-1952 Revolution. In addition to that, ayllu governance, which pre-dates the 
colonial encounter as a system of community organising, experienced a resurgence in 
the 1970s as a method of social practice in response to decades of submergence 
beneath Eurocentricism. Lazar (2008) was writing based on the fact that, as a result of 
this considerable inward flow of migration from Bolivia’s agricultural and industrial 
sectors, syndicalism, trade unionism and even the ayllu have all played a role in 
shaping the development of El Alto’s society and economy.  
The residents of El Alto have had to effectively build this city themselves from 
the ground up, developing and participating in neighbourhood and school councils to 
provide local infrastructure and services. While participation in these local 
organisations is ‘voluntary’, there is a strong sense of obligation to attend monthly 
neighbourhood assemblies for fear of fines and being shamed by the community 
(Lazar 2008; Zibichi 2005). In his article, Zibichi (2005) argues that these 
neighbourhood councils operate in a similar fashion to the more traditional forms of 
rural Andean community organising such as the ayllu. He considers these similarities 
in terms of the way in which these neighbourhood councils are structured, organised 
and how they relate to territoriality. In the same way the ayllu combines both 
individual and collective elements in relation to the ownership and use of land and 
resources, families must also mediate between the public and the private of 
neighbourhood councils (Zibichi 2005). In other words, “even though each family 
owns their own place of residence, there are communal spaces such as plazas, soccer 
fields, and schools. In order to buy or sell a lot or house, the family must appear before 
the neighbourhood council to determine whether there are pending debts or some 
other factor that would prevent the transaction.” (Zibichi 2005). 
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The rather mundane monochromatic cityscape of El Alto, defined by low-rise, 
redbrick buildings made from inexpensive construction materials, represents the long 
history of poverty in the city. While Bolivia’s economy has only recently formally 
evolved into one which is now largely based on a policy of neoextractivism which aims 
to redistribute wealth through social programmes and welfare benefits for many of 
Bolivia’s poor (it remains to be seen how long this will last), El Alto’s economy has 
remained rooted in a state of informality. This state of informality means that alteños 
mainly work as entrepreneurs trading cheaply imported products from abroad or 
producing furniture, textiles and other handicrafts themselves for distribution and sale 
at local markets. The concept of economic informality was originally coined by Hart 
(1973) and has since been applied to identify the exclusion of often undereducated or 
under-skilled participants from formal economic circuits. As Wilson (2010) writes, 
“those who populated this economy […] were considered marginal and excluded from 
the modern, capitalist, formal economy whether because of human capital deficits or 
because of the underemployment of the national economy” (341). However this broad 
understanding of the informal economy as an exclusionary site or outside space does 
little to fully encapsulate the true meaning of El Alto’s economic potentiality and the 
role that this site of production has played in the overall economic evolution of Bolivia 
since the 1950s.  
As Lazar (2012) points out, we must avoid painting a deliberate picture of 
Bolivian economics in terms of formal and informal economic worlds that never meet 
or interact. Instead, she argues it might be more fruitful to consider the formal and 
informal economic sectors as mutually dependent and coexisting social realities that 
interrelate and even overlap. This she adds would best be measured in terms of 
178 
 
“degrees of (in)formality” rather than to consider them as economic categories which 
can be placed along a continuum suggesting that more developed economies have 
undergone a transition from informal to formal or that even the participants within 
so-called informal economies seek to formalize this space of work (Lazar 2012: 16). This 
is reflected in the fact that El Alto’s so-called informal economy has played a key role 
in the historical evolution of Bolivia’s more formal economic sector acting, as I 
describe here, as a space of last resort for many former miners and campesino workers 
who either lost jobs through the sluggish development of the revolutionary state in the 
1950s or as a consequence of the dismantling of state institutions and agencies during 
neoliberal reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. Bringing with them, as I mentioned earlier, 
their tradition of unionism to the city, alteños have constructed an economic network 
governed by unions such as the Federation of Street Vendors of the city of El Alto 
which grants permits and negotiates with state authorities on behalf of 
representatives. This, I add, speaks in part to a degree of formalisation within this 
generally informal sector. And, while this state of informality is perceived negatively 
given that many alteños live day-to-day without receiving state benefits including 
pension contributions or holiday pay, there are also clear positives too with this 
approach to informal economic organisation: they have limited contact with the 
federal state and manage to avoid paying taxes to the government. This therefore 
generates a degree of personal and commercial freedom as alteños, through their 
participation in union governance and activities, control and mediate this economic 
environment themselves. Over time, the Feria 16 de Julio has become the beating heart 
of this informal economic network in El Alto. This market takes place twice a week in 




Todo tipo de productos desde alimentos, pasando por ferreterías, venta de 
vehículos, materials de construcción, carpintería, mecánica, electricidad, hasta 
ganado, ropa, lanas, productos agrícolas, objectos a medio uso, y otros objectos, 
concentra alrededor de 60 mil personas entre compradores y vendedores.  
 
 
(Paz Arauco 2011: 231) 
 
According to estimates by the Gobierno Municipal de El Alto,  
 
 
en la feria se mueven dos millones de dólares, cuenta con más de 10.000 puestos 
de venta que muevan una impresionante candidad de productos locales y 
nacionales importados y de contrabando, lo que refleja la diversidad y complejidad 
de la propia realidad alteña.  
 
 
(Paz Arauco 2011: 231)  
 
This wealth has generated new opportunity for some alteños to rethink the use of 
space and place in the city and to renegotiate that relationship between the liberal and 
the ethnic self. This is why a Neo-Andean style of architecture, originally created by 
Aymara engineer and architect Freddy Mamani Silvestre, has appealed to over 300 
wealthy alteños who have opted to commission this elaborate design (López Cruzado 
20th June 2015). These buildings can cost anywhere between 690,000bs (est. €90,000) 
up to 3,400,000bs (est. €500,000) to construct, firmly rooting their origins in economic 
processes and capitalist relations. Not only does this architectural style recreate an 
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association with the ethnic past through the use of vibrant colours and Andean 
iconography, but these large buildings are also viable businesses operating as salones 
de eventos or ‘party-halls’ for hire. For the remainder of this section I am going to 
spend time reflecting on how these buildings combine commercial and ethnic 
elements together through an analysis of their aesthetic and social contribution. This 
will also allow us to observe the ways in which the parameters of what constitutes 
indigeneity is constantly shifting and being rearticulated in relation to place, revealing 
the evolving and non-static nature of ethnic subjectivities in urban, contemporary 
Bolivia.  
Below is an example of the exterior and interior aesthetic of this bold 
architectural design. With a strong emphasis on colour and elaborate stylistic 
elements both inside and outside the property, Neo-Andean architecture is a 
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In designing this architectural style, Mamani was responding to the limitations 
of Western-European architectural epistemology, taught throughout universities in 
Bolivia, which have, in his view, failed to incorporate traditional Indigenous design. In 
response, Neo-Andean architecture combines a number of aesthetic elements which 
directly associate these buildings with the wider Andean universe. As images one to 
three above show, the one striking aspect of these buildings is the vibrant choice of 
colours used to adorn the façades. As the images reveal, these elaborate colours define 
both the exterior and interior aesthetics of the buildings. As Cárdenas (2010) notes, 
these colours feature on Aymara textiles, the most noteworthy example here being the 
aguayo, a textile traditionally worn by Aymara women in Andean Bolivia. It is a 
rectangular cloth tied around the upper torso, just below the neckline, which is used 
to transport infants (Bertelli and Lill 13th February 2016; Cárdenas 2010). But we also 
see these vibrant Andean colours feature on the wiphala, a multicoloured flag which 
has been made famous through its close association with Indigenous protest and 
social mobilisation in the Andes, particularly since the 1970s. While the wiphala is now 
a constitutionally recognised emblem of the plurinational state, displayed alongside 
the tricolour on all municipal and state buildings throughout Bolivia, it continues to 
draw close historical association with the pan-Andean Empire and Inca civilisation. 
The colours and geometric shapes used in the design of the wiphala correspond with 
celestial and cosmological relationality in the Andean universe. According to 
Hernández A. (online publication), each of the seven colours displayed on the flag – 
yellow, white, orange, red, blue, violet and green – carry important meaning in 
relation to Andean cosmology, representing time-space, duality, earth, culture and 
society, and the cosmos to name but a few. The way in which these colours are 
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geometrically and diagonally aligned across the flag in 49 quadrants also speaks to the 
importance of unity, reciprocity and complementarity between these different 
elements of Andean cosmology.  
This interrelation between Neo-Andean architecture and Andean cosmology 
continues through to the iconography displayed both inside and outside of these 
buildings. As I mentioned before, Mamani has incorporated into the design of this 
contemporary Andean architecture specific shapes and symbols which resemble the 
semiotics found at the pre-Columbian site of Tiwanaku. However, the origins of 
Tiwanaku itself remain largely unknown. Holton (n.d) argues that, as a direct 
consequence of this site’s ambiguous relationship to the past, the predominantly white 
governments of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries appropriated the 
archaeological site of Tiwanaku by way of identifying the ancient site as an important 
source of cultural imagination and nationalism. This form of cultural appropriation 
contributed towards the designation of Tiwanaku as a cultural artefact which 
displaced alternative, Indigenous-based claims to the site, thus undermining their 
place in the history of Bolivia and the Andean world (Holton n.d). However, Holton 
(n.d) further writes that, even though the origins of Tiwanaku are not necessarily 
rooted in a specific history of the Aymara peoples, the appropriation of Tiwanaku by 
Morales and the MAS-IPSP has allowed the Aymara community in Bolivia to regain a 
sense of their past by restoring Tiwanaku to its ‘rightful’ owners (Holton n.d: 9). In 
each of the three presidential elections which Evo Morales contested and won, he has 
thrice opted to be inaugurated at Tiwanaku, cementing the importance of this 
particular site in the historical and political imaginary of the Aymara people (I will 
reflect further on the significance of Tiwanaku as place in chapter four). Furthermore, 
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Mamani’s incorporation of specific geometric shapes and designs reveals the 
significance of this ancient place to the everyday performance of Aymara identity in 
Bolivia today, channelled through this architectural style. The circular and square 
shapes found on the façade as well as inside the buildings represent the duality 
between the masculine and the feminine in Tiwanaku culture (Truman 2016). There 
are also strong angular and geometric shapes which aim to resemble the chakana or 
Andean cross. According to Truman (2016), the Andean cross has special significance 
in Andean cosmovision and was used across the pan-Andean region as a celestial 
calendar to predict seasonal change and maximise agricultural output.  
It is also pertinent to explore the significance of the communal space located 
inside Neo-Andean buildings with a view to identifying the ways in which these 
salones de eventos have become an-other space which alteños use to perform identity. 
As ‘party halls’, these communal spaces host fiestas (Andreoli 13 July 2015). According 
to Lazar (2008), the fiesta has and continues to be an important way in which alteños 
negotiate their citizenship and develop and maintain a sense of unity between the self 
and the collective. As Lazar (2008) writes, the fiesta is “central to how people 
experience their membership in local and national communities in Bolivia” (118). To 
this end, both dance and the consumption of alcohol are important, basic elements in 
the performative repertoire of the fiesta. In other words, when these elements 
combine - the collective execution of rhythmic movement lubricated by the 
consumption of alcohol – a sense of communal belonging, not unlike that experienced 
in the ayllu, is reproduced, strengthening and enhancing group cohesion between the 
ethnic self and the collective, while also ensuring the mediation of social relations 
between the human and supernatural worlds. Alcohol is often poured on the earthen 
187 
 
ground as an offering to Pachamama and, according to Cárdenas (2010), this often 
takes place before the foundations of these contemporary Andean buildings are even 
constructed. This once again bears similarities to the way in which ayllu relationality is 
executed where offerings are frequently made to Pachamama. Canessa (2012) reminds 
us that Aymara migrants brought with them the tradition of the fiesta upon their 
arrival into the city as an important way in which to maintain a sense of their ethnic 
self despite the fact that they had physically removed themselves far outside the limits 
of the ayllu, beyond the spirits, streams, fields, and mountains without which “one’s 
sense of person must inevitably be different” (164). But, Indigenous identity is 
experienced and performed differently in the urban landscape of El Alto and this is 
something that Neo-Andean architecture clearly captures. In the same way alteños 
have developed a broadly hybrid sense of self which moves between liberal notions of 
citizenship and ethnicity, Neo-Andean architecture is a product of that hybridity.  
As I have shown this architectural style is associated with a sense of 
Andeanness by the way in which it mimics key features of that past. By drawing on the 
vibrant Andean colours found in Bolivian textiles as well as the symbols and shapes 
sourced from the ancient site of Tiwanaku, architect Freddy Mamani Silvestre is 
creating an overall sense of belonging between architecture, its inhabitants and the 
wider Andean-Aymara cultural community. Furthermore, the hosting of fiestas inside 
these buildings also speaks to the ways in which Neo-Andean architecture plays host 
to the performance and mediation of relationships between the self and the collective. 
And, because these spaces must be hired out, there is a very strong sense of the 
commercialisation of ethnicity as Neo-Andean architecture becomes an-other 
place/space in which communal relations are expressed. In the end while Neo-Andean 
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architecture reflects recent upward trends in wealth creation and economic mobility 
in Bolivia, the distinctly Aymara quality of the aesthetic highlights the increased social 






















This chapter addressed the nature of place-making in Bolivia and, in particular, how 
the Morales state both facilitated the struggle for ethnoterritorial rights while also 
disrupting acts of place-making too. Transcending the rural-urban divide, this analysis 
explored the concept of ethnoterritoriality across different territorial and spatial 
imaginaries to reveal the dynamic ways in which Indigenous people struggle for land 
and identity in the contemporary Bolivian lifeworld. In his promise to rupture with the 
(neo)colonial past, Morales presided over the development of a new constitutional 
framework which foregrounds the right to commercial property while also 
maintaining the integrity of Indigenous collective territorial rights. However, analysis 
of the TIPNIS controversy points to the still contested nature of land and territory in 
Bolivia. While this discussion not only reconfirmed the widely held view that the 
TIPNIS is a deeply contested geographic site of production, this chapter also defines 
the TIPNIS as a discursive battleground, where categories such as indigeneity have 
become contested and weaponised, recreating the conditions of marginality and 
exclusion once formally associated with the politics of (neo)coloniality.  
Meanwhile, Neo-Anden architecture in the city of El Alto invites a fresh, 
original perspective on the struggle for ethnoterritoriality in contemporary Bolivia, as 
wealthy Aymara people reengage the use of place in urban settings to recover and 
renegotiate the ethnic self. By combining commercialism with symbolic 
representations of the ethnic past, Aymara peoples create bold new architectural 
aestectics that redefine the interrelation between ethnicity and territoriality in the 
modern Bolivian lifeworld. While the Zapatistas face ethnoterritorial opportunities 
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(Caracoles) and challenges (El Tren Maya) in their position outside and in opposition 
to the neoliberal state, it is clear that Morales encountered different opportunities (la 
arquitectura nueva andina) and challenges (TIPNIS) as a result of his decision to 
inhabit state architecture and transform it from within.  
With the complexities of ethnoterritoriality and Indigenous place-making now 
firmly established across these two ethnopolitical case studies, attention turns to the 
question of space in the ethnopolitical lifeworld. In particular, this thesis is most 
concerned with how ethnopolitics in Mexico and Bolivia addresses the issue of 
representation within wider politics, where the processes and practices of global 
coloniality continue to challenge and destabilise ethnic visibility. There is no one way 
to explore the politics of representation in contemporary Latin American contexts, 
where representation can find meaning across a host of artistic and other cultural 
practices (architecture; fiestas; textiles; muralism) as well as in the development of 
new political infrastructure (Caracoles) which rivals the state.  
For this comparative thesis, I have opted to foreground primary Indigenous 
sources, where I will engage in a textual analysis of the Zapatista Declaraciones de la 
Selva Lacandona in chapter three followed by analysis of Evo Morales's two 2006 
inaugural addresses in chapter four. Not only does this approach foreground 
Indigenous agency, examining how these various different ethnopolitical social 
movements author key texts and documents which challenge and destabilise power in 
the neoliberal lifeworld, but neither the Zapatista declarations nor Morales's speeches 
have themselves been isolated in a single study before, which makes for some 
interesting insights on the nature of power, discourse and ethnopolitical visibility in 
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contemporary Latin America. For now, attention turns to chapter three, where I begin 

















The Politics of Space in Chiapas: Analysis of the 






Having established the complex nature of ethnopolitical place-making in Mexico and 
Bolivia, attention now turns to the similarities and differences which characterise what 
our two primary case studies tell us about how Indigenous people carve out space for 
themselves within highly contested national and global imaginaries. In this chapter, I 
will analyse the Zapatista Declaraciones de la Selva Lacandona which function as 
destablising tools within the neoliberal world order. As an example of Zapatista 
discourse, the Declaraciones de la Selva Lacandona reveal how the Zapatistas engage 
alternative knowledges and ways of doing democracy in Mexico which aim to 
accelerate the struggle for social justice outside the limits of electoral democracy. 
Applying Foucault’s (1970) theory of discourse and power, this chapter will carefully 
analyse how Zapatista revolutionaries evolve textual space in the declarations, forging 
a new relationship with civil society which elaborates a more hopeful and utopian 
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ethnopolitical space of possibility, expectation and transformative action in Mexico. 
While Khasnabish (2010) has addressed the significance of the Declaraciones de la 
Selva Lacandona as political texts, he does so in relation to a more elaborate discussion 
of Zapatismo in Mexico, failing to acknowledge the power and agency of the 
Declaraciones themselves in undermining the legitimacy of the neoliberal state. By 
isolating and foregrounding the declarations in this analysis, this chapter seeks to 
elaborate Rabasa’s (2010) claim that "we ought to read the corpus of declarations, 
communiqués and political analyses as contributions to the dismantling of capitalist 
regimes". 
To achieve this, this chapter will first engage in a discussion of the origins of 
the Zapatista declarations before justifying them as a form of discourse using 
Foucault’s theory of discourse and power (Foucault 1970). Following this, chapter 
three will begin by scrutinising the first declaration which declared war on the 
neoliberal Mexican state in 1994. As Zapatista discourse evolves across this textual 
space, it becomes apparent that civil society forms an important trope which 
embodies the hopes and expectations of the Zapatista movement to create new 
possibilities and forms of social organising outside the limits of electoral democracy 
(Dinerstein 2017; 2016). In the final stages of the chapter, I draw attention to a 
noticeable discursive shift in the declarations whereby the Zapatistas no longer 
position their ethnopolitical struggle at the centre of an anti-neoliberal resistance 
campaign but, instead, develop an intersectional worldview (Crenshaw 1991; 1989) that 
facilitates a broader understanding, on their part, of the impact transnational 
capitalism has across multiples spaces in Mexico and the world and how the Zapatistas 
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aim to connect these spaces of resistance together through a globalisation of 






























The Origins of the Zapatista Declaraciones de la Selva Lacandona 
 
The table which follows provides a comprehensive overview of six separate 
publications which together are collectively referred to as the Declaraciones de la Selva 
Lacandona. As the graph shows, the declarations were published over a period of 
eleven years between 1994-2005. As such, the publication of the declarations frames 
one of the most tumultuous periods in Zapatista political history. From that initial 
intervention, when the Zapatista revolutionaries declared war against the Mexican 
state on 1st January 1994, the Declaraciones de la Selva Lacandona have been regularly 
published at key intervals throughout the course of this conflict, revealing the 
challenges and opportunities which lie at the heart of this ethnopolitical campaign for 











Declaration Date of Publication Content Context 
Primera Declaración de 
la Selva Lacandona 
1
st
 January 1994 Declaration of war 
against the Mexican 
state; Outlines 11 basic 
demands which must 




Mexico, the U.S and 
Canada.  
Segunda Declaración de 
la Selva Lacandona 
10
th
 June 1994 Proposed the 
Convención Nacional 
Democrática (CND) 
designed to mobilise 
civil society around a 
democratic transition. 
Dialogues in Cathedral 
at San Cristóbal had 
concluded; Internal 
crisis within PRI; 
Assassination of 
presidential candidate 
Luis Donaldo Colosio. 
Tercera Delcaración de 
la Selva Lacandona 
1
st
 January 1995 Founded the 
Movimiento de 
Liberación Nacional 
(MLN) which aimed to 
secure support from 
independent political 
parties across Mexico. 
EZLN-CCRI celebrate 
one-year anniversary of 
revolution by escalating 
calls for national 
solution to the crisis in 
Chiapas. 
Cuarta Delcaración de 
la Selva Lacandona 
1
st
 January 1996 Founded Frente de 
Liberación Nacional 
(FZLN), a national 
political force which 
emerged in response to 
public vote by EZLN-
CCRI. 
President Zedillo 







after government fails 
to implement San 
Andrés Accords. 
Quinta Delcaración de 
la Selva Lacandona 
17
th
 July 1998 Urgently calls for 
solution to the conflict. 
Acteal Massacre took 
place in December 
1997, where 45 
innocent Indigenous 
people killed by 
paramilitary troops 
aided by the state 
military. 




 June 2005 Introduces La Otra 
Campaña, an 
alternative form of 







emerged from two-year 
period of silence; 
Implemented San 
Andrés Accords 
including provision of 
autonomous 
healthcare, education 
and judicial systems. 
(Graph 3.1 provides a summary of all six Zapatista Declaraciones de la Selva Lacandona including the date 
in which each declaration was originally published, a brief insight into each of their content and an 




All six Declaraciones de la Selva Lacandona were drafted and published by the 
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional-Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena 
(hereafter EZLN-CCRI). This internal committee of Indigenous revolutionaries 
constituted the inner workings of the wider Zapatista movement. During the height of 
the conflict in the late-1990s, the CCRI led all political and military strategy including 
preparations for the revolution in 1994 as well as all formal encounters with the 
Mexican state and wider society thereafter. Both the centralised nature of this 
operation and, the fact that it was orchestrated and led by a committee of Indigenous 
Maya revolutionaries known as comandantes, speaks volumes in terms of how this 
social movement formatively developed and the kind of epistemologies which inform 
its discourse as a result.   
  The EZLN army was formally established in Chiapas, deep within the Selva 
Lacandona, on 17th November 1983 by three mestizos and three Indigenous Maya 
(Khasnabish 2010; Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Mentinis 2006; Weinberg 2000; Womack Jr. 
1999; Harvey 1998). The EZLN is the product of two broad epistemological traditions: 
one shaped by the legacy of twentieth century Marxism in Mexico and the other firmly 
rooted in Maya cosmology, shaped, in part, by the long anticolonial history of 
Indigenous struggle in the region. In 1969, the Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional 
(hereafter FLN), a traditionally Marxist guerrilla with clandestine cells located across 
many key cities throughout Mexico, including Mexico City and Monterrey, dispatched 
a number of operatives to the Chiapas highlands with a view to initiating "a new front 
of armed struggle" (Khasnabish 2010: 56; Womack Jr. 1999). The popularity of Marxist 
ideology in Mexico increased in response to the political and economic 
authoritarianism of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (hereafter PRI) alongside 
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the successes of other international revolutionary efforts in places like neighbouring 
Cuba (Khasnabish 2010; Mentinis 2006; Womack Jr. 1999). However, the FLN 
encountered difficulties in establishing any kind of revolutionary traction in urban 
Mexico, due in large part to the PRI's heavy surveillance of subversive elements 
(Womack Jr. 1999). Instead, it concentrated efforts on the southern state of Chiapas, a 
prime location in which to ferment revolutionary unrest, due, on one hand, to its 
difficult terrain and high topography and, on the other, the large and deeply 
impoverished Indigenous population (Rovira 2000). 
 While the FLN rightly assumed that poverty in Chiapas had indeed fuelled 
anger among Indigenous communities, it did not predict the already high levels of 
ethnopolitical activism and organising established across the region (Womack Jr. 1999; 
Harvey 1998). Rather unsurprisingly, Marxism, a Eurocentric ideological framework 
which addresses key issues relating to class oppression and liberation, failed to 
properly translate across an Indigenous region defined by identity politics and land-
based conflicts (Khasnabish 2010; Moraña et al. 2008). Indigeneity is not a universal 
category nor can it be understood solely within a class-based ideological framework. 
Therefore, Marxism’s blind spots were immediately apparent in Chiapas where six 
main Indigenous groups - all of which descend from the Maya – traditionally dominate 
the ethnopolitical landscape: Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Ch’ol, Tojolabal, Mam, Zoque (Stephen 
2002; Rovira 2000; Womack Jr. 1999; Harvey 1998). While Indigenous ethnopolitical 
activism and resistance has deep roots in their long history of exploitation dating back 
to the colonial encounter of the sixteenth century, it was influenced more recently by 
their interactions with the nation-state (Stephen 2002; Trejo 2002; Weinberg 2000; 
Womack Jr. 1999). As illustrated earlier, in chapter one, the failure of the state to 
199 
 
properly and adequately redistribute land and provide basic infrastructure and 
services across the remote regions of Chiapas, encouraged Indigenous people to self-
organise following encounters with Catholic and Protestant missionaries and activists 
(Stephen 2002). Liberation theology fuelled a radically new form of independent 
thinking among communities which then mobilised around the formation of 
autonomous unions that addressed unresolved issues relating to land titles, rural 
transportation and other basic services (Trejo 2002; Stephen 2002; Womack Jr. 1999). 
In short, the FLN did not encounter a docile and complicit Indigenous population 
which would be willing to gather in service of their national revolutionary ambitions. 
On the contrary, the evidence suggests that Chiapas contained a highly active and 
vibrant ethnopolitical environment which expressed the greatest concern for 
Indigenous rights.  
 It is clear, then, that the Declaraciones de la Selva Lacandona are a product of 
an epistemological and cultural encounter between worlds, where modern and non-
modern forms of thinking and doing insurrection in Mexico intersected and 
overlapped to produce a radical approach to resistance (Rabasa 2010). The 
amalgamation of these two histories produced a dynamic discourse which, as this 
chapter will show, shifted and evolved both in terms of style and form adapting and 
responding to the challenges posed by a system of power in Mexico based on the logic 
of coloniality. And, while the declarations achieve a destabilizing effect without ever 
articulating claims to that same form of negative power, this textual space refocuses 
the attention of the reader on alternative possibilities and hopeful solutions to this 
dystopian crisis which has been inflicted upon Mexico. But, before this chapter can 
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proceed any further, it is necessary to clarify two outstanding issues: first, what is 





























This chapter will use discourse analysis to frame this discussion of the Zapatista 
Declaraciones de la Selva Lacandona and how they might be seen to serve as a form of 
resistance against the neoliberal Mexican state. In order to undertake such an 
approach, it is first necessary to elaborate, on a more fundamental level, what I mean 
by the use of the term discourse. In his text L’Ordre du Discours (1970), the French 
philosopher Michel Foucault pioneered discourse analysis in what has become a 
"growth industry" in recent decades across major disciplines including the social 
sciences and the humanities (Hook 2001: 1; Diaz-Bone et al. 2008). The idea of 
discourse immediately brings to mind speech, including the grammatical structure of 
narratives as well as the order that is expressed over the level of the sentence (Diaz-
Bone et al. 2008; Foucault 1970). However, Foucault expanded the meaning of 
discourse beyond our own instinctive discursive habits - dialogue or philosophical 
monologue - to conceive it instead as "social structure and discursive practice" (Diaz-
Bone et al. 2008: 9; Foucault 1970). With this view in mind, the definition of discourse 
has shifted to include "group[s] of ideas or patterned way[s] of thinking which can be 
identified in textual and verbal communications, and can also be located in wider 
social structures" (Powers 2015: 18; Foucault 1970).  
But, not only did Foucault express a great deal of interest in establishing the 
meaning of discourse as practice, he was also concerned with the types of meaning 
produced by discourse in practice and how rules and procedures govern what is 
thinkable, sayable and knowable (Angel Martínez 2018; Powers 2015; Miller 1989; 
Foucault 1970). For Foucault, discourse produces a series of statements or formations 
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that generate knowledge and this knowledge constructs our realities in a process that 
Spivak refers to as "worlding" (Diaz-Bone et al. 2008: 12; Angel Martínez 2018; Miller 
1989; Foucault 1970). Knowledge is not understood as something objective or neutral 
but is instead the "perspective that is definitive of some society, group [or] institution" 
(Miller 1989: 117; Foucault 1970). Knowledge is put to work through certain strategies 
of application where it acquires authority or truth (Angel Martínez 2018; Miller 1989; 
Foucault 1970). Knowledges are held to be the function of power relationships which 
means that those who produce knowledge exercise power but conversely not all 
knowledge effectively becomes truth (Miller 1989). At different historical moments 
certain subjects embody particular kinds of truth, articulating hegemonic strategies 
that inform reality (Diaz-Bone et al. 2008; Foucault 1970). Hence, powerholders aim to 
use discourse to consolidate, reproduce and enact their power over and throughout 
the social body, transmitting forms of truthfulness that "ward off its powers and 
dangers", help it "gain mastery over its chance events [and] to evade its ponderous, 
formidable materiality" (Young 1981: 53).  
However, for Foucault, "discourse is not simply that which translates struggles 
or systems of domination but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle" 
(Young 1981: 52-53). There is no power without resistance and the potentiality to enact 
forms of domination lie as much which those who are oppressed as it does with those 
who currently dominate the lifeworld (Powers 2015; Foucault 1970). Foucault clearly 
left open the possibility for alternative groups or institutions to challenge strategies of 
domination by generating alternative discourses that would threaten and undermine 
the legitimacy of current powerholders. For Foucault, power is not the exclusive 
domain of certain individuals, groups or institutions. In other words, power is not an 
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object which the nation-state or any of its agencies or institutions can permanently 
acquire. Instead, power reverberates throughout the social body in a "shifting web or 
grid of individual positions of tension between power and resistance" (Powers 2015: 
29). Based on this understanding, everyone or everything has the potentiality to enact 
new forms of power through discursive practice, generating new ideas or new ways of 
thinking that challenge systems of domination that enact certain forms of negative 
power. Thus, power can be reclaimed through individual acts of resistance. And so, 
the potentiality to enact change over and throughout the lifeworld is embodied 
through other forms of discourse and discursive practice which produce alternative 
meanings and knowledges that can, in theory, enact alternative truths.  
Situating my discussion of the Zapatista Declaraciones de la Selva Lacandona 
firmly within this context of power and resistance, I address how, collectively, the 
declarations directly confront the negative and dystopian reality of electoral politics in 
Mexico. With that said, I must exercise caution here not to overstate or to conflate the 
relationship between Zapatista discourse and the six declarations as the only possible 
form of Zapatista discursive practice. If I am to take into full consideration here 
Foucault's meaning and use of the term discourse, then it is only fitting that I 
acknowledge, albeit briefly, the other forms of Zapatista discursive practice that exist 
outside the declarations themselves, what Foucault broadly identifies as non-
discursive practices. In other words, the declarations are not the only form of Zapatista 
discourse to generate meaning which challenges, undermines and destabilises the 
power and authority of the neoliberal state. Nevertheless, unlike symbols and gestures, 
the declarations serve as important ethnopolitical manifestos which elaborate 
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alternative meanings in relation to politics, democracy and society in neoliberal 
Mexico and, as such, they deserve our full attention in this chapter.  
 The Zapatista movement is a social movement of symbols and gestures (Conant 
2010; Holloway and Peláez 1998). Whether assessed individually or collectively, these 
symbols and gestures transmit certain meanings within and throughout the wider 
social body, challenging and destabilising the nature of state power in the Mexico. For 
example, Conant (2010: 120) argues how the pasamontañas or ski-mask "bloomed like 
a dark flower across the cultural landscape" of Mexico, transforming the mask into a 
leading symbol of this insurrectionary movement from 1994 onwards. He 
acknowledges, of course, how the pasamontañas serves a series of practical functions 
first and foremost. Donning the ski mask helps protect the face against the cold, harsh 
winters of Chiapas, “where it is common to see people wearing ski masks to protect 
against frostbite” (Conant 2010: 128). Moreover, like all masks everywhere, the 
Zapatista pasamontañas covers the face to conceal identity, protecting individual 
revolutionaries from being personally identified and, therefore, targeted by federal 
security forces (Conant 2010). However, the true nature of any mask does not lie in its 
ability to conceal and hide but in its power to transform and to make knowable and 
visible the presence of the Other.  
Conant (2010: 129) adds that there is a strong culture of masks among 
Indigenous communities in Chiapas and elsewhere, where the use of the mask in 
dance, ritual and warfare induces something of a metamorphosis, allowing individuals 
and groups embody an anti-imperialist spirit "just as they had hundreds of years 
before against the Spanish". Rather than be seen as individuals, the mask performs a 
unitary function revealing the presence of a new collective force (Conant 2010). In the 
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case of the Zapatistas, the ski mask transforms Indigenous people who were once 
without power or agency into ominous and threatening figures ready to challenge and 
destabilise traditional power dynamics in Mexico (Conant 2010). The nation-state itself 
emits a "pathological fear" of the ski mask which is commonly associated with terrorist 
acts, petty criminality, and bank robbery among other things (Conant 2010). By 
donning the ski mask, the Zapatistas do not just simply reclaim their place in Mexico 
but they also reveal their intention to slip beyond the confines of institutional and 
legal norms, where they challenge the very logic of power, how it is exercised over and 
throughout the Mexican social body, robbing it and returning it in a different form to 
the Indigenous communities of Chiapas (Conant 2010).  
Meanwhile, the image of Subcomandante Marcos, who performed his role as 
EZLN spokesperson between 1994 and 2014 when that nom de guerre was erased and 
replaced by another (Subcomandante Galeano), also transmitted certain meanings 
about the nature and trajectory of this revolutionary event in Mexico.17 Long before 
the Primera Declaración de la Selva Lacandona was read aloud by revolutionaries from 
San Cristóbal de las Casas on 1st January, the image of Subcomandante Marcos in the 
jungles of Chiapas smoking pipes, dressed in fatigues and even riding horseback 
through the Selva Lacandona revealed what Holloway and Peláez (1998: 20) have 
termed "living memory". These gestures and images enact remembering, encouraging 
                                                          
17
  In a communiqué released by the EZLN on 25
th
 May 2014, Subcomandante Marcos delivered his final 
address to Mexico. In this communiqué, entitled Entre la Luz y la Sombra, Marcos expressed resentment 
over the celebrity status attributed to his persona and how this distracted from the many other 
achievements of Zapatismo in recent decades including the implementation of autonomy in Chiapas. 
Speri (2014) argues that this was all part of a much wider strategy designed to dis-associate Marcos from 
the Zapatistas and to restore public focus on the achievements of the revolutionaries. The elevation of 
Marcos as spokesperson in 1994 created a “boomerang effect” where the movement became 
personalised in the persona of Marcos (Speri 2014). By signing off his last communiqué as 
Subcomandate Galeano, a revolutionary killed by paramilitaries, Marcos reinventes a new role for 
himself within the social movement (Speri 2014).  
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Mexico to re-engage with the political past when twentieth century revolutionary 
heroes, including Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa, rode horse-back through rural 
Mexico struggling for land and social justice. By drawing on these symbolic 
connections between the political past and the present, Zapatista revolutionaries paint 
a clear picture of historical continuity, acknowledging that the struggle for land and 
social justice remains as much an urgent task today as it did around one-hundred 
years ago. These gestures, images and symbols, promoted by the Zapatistas, challenge 
the PRI as legitimate heirs of that revolutionary history, drawing attention instead to 
the failure of twentieth century revolutionary state politics to address injustice which 
continues to permeate the lifestyles of Indigenous communities in Chiapas.  
 Despite the obvious power and agency that these symbols and gestures contain, 
it remains quite clear that there is a limit to the role non-discursive practice plays in 
defining strategies of resistance against dominant powerholders. In the immediate 
aftermath of the 1994 Chiapas revolution scholarship became distracted with the 
elusive figure of Marcos and the symbol of the balaclava, rapidly propelling these icons 
into the cultural stratosphere as universal symbols of resistance against globalism and 
imperialism in twentieth century Mexico.18 Yet, these symbols do not reveal much 
                                                          
18
 In his play Todos Somos Marcos, playwright Vicente Leñero deploys the use of the pasamontañas to 
illustrate the different political affliations of his three main protagonists, Laura, Raúl and Miguel. An 
engaging treatment of Mexico’s political Left, Leñero’s play skilfully examines how Zapatismo upset the 
country’s political landscape in 1994, destabilising the political loyalties among left supporters, 
personified by the breakdown in the romantic relationship between Laura and Raúl. In a key scene, 
midway through the play, Laura returns to the small apartment she shares with boyfriend Raúl having 
just participated in a large mobilisation in defence of Zapatismo in the Zócalo, Mexico City. With his 
girlfriend wearing the pasamontañas inside the apartment, Raúl “feels compelled to take a stand and 
turns to Mexico’s public transcript in order to combat Laura’s quest for a more democratic society” (Day 
2001: 112). Representing the static political left, Raúl fails to convince Laura to renounce her 
revolutionary ways, where she appears relucant to share his bed. In a desperate attempt to assert his 
power, he rapes Laura in a statement Leñero deploys to symbolise the violence and coercion of the 
Zedillo administration towards the EZLN in Chiapas (Day 2009; 2001). A deeply symbolic play that 
explores liberalism, apathy and machismo in Mexican politics, Leñero’s play was originally staged in 
1994 as part of Teatro Clandestino at the Casa de Teatro in Mexico City (Day 2009; 2001).   
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about the nature of Zapatista strategy going forward. For that, it is important to return 
to the more familiar and, therefore, conventional forms of Zapatista discourse which, I 
contend have often been overlooked by scholarship, where they have not featured as 
part of any independent study until now. By exclusively examining all six Zapatista 
Declaraciones de la Selva Lacandona this chapter will acknowledge the complex ways 
in which the Zapatista movement engages the struggle for social justice in Mexico in 
their attempt to carve out new ethnopolitical space that will make this possible. Using 
Foucault's discourse analysis, this chapter will reveal how the Zapatistas think and do 
outside the limits of electoral politics, reimagining democracy in Mexican society with 
the help and support of civil society. With that in mind, this chapter now turns to 
section two, where it will analyse the first of six declarations which openly and 

























Declaring an Alternative War:  
The Primera Declaración de la Selva Lacandona 
 
As the title suggests, the Primera Declaración de la Selva Lacandona is the first 
declaration published by the EZLN-CCRI. It was originally circulated by the Zapatistas 
throughout local media in Chiapas on 31st December 1993, a day before the Chiapas 
Revolution broke out. However, it only began to receive widespread notoriety when it 
was read aloud by a number of Zapatista Indigenous revolutionaries from the balcony 
of the Palacio Municipal in San Cristóbal de las Casas, a local state building which the 
EZLN army had seized earlier that same morning on the 1st January 1994 (Muñoz 
Ramírez 2008; Womack Jr. 1999; Harvey 1998). 
The Primera Declaración de la Selva Lacandona certainly brought a degree of 
clarity to the unfolding situation in Chiapas (Khasnabish 2010). While the EZLN had 
long been an established presence in the Selva Lacandona, recruiting and training 
anywhere between 3,000 and 6,000 Indigenous Maya in clandestine training camps 
scattered throughout the rainforst since 1983, few civilians were in fact aware that an 
insurrection was about to take place in the region (Weinberg 2000). Despite efforts by 
Guatemalan officials to alert Mexican authorities to the possible threat of armed 
insurrection - a threat which Mexico ignored - the entire country was taken by 
surprise when this group of armed Indigenous rebels descended down the 
mountainside of the Selva Lacandona to occupy prominent positions across several key 




At the heart of the Primera Declaración de la Selva Lacandona lies an 
unmistakable declaration of war. However, the Zapatistas are very specific about who 
they are declaring war against (Khasnabish 2010). In the declaration itself, the 
Zapatistas identify,  
 
[el] ejercito federal mexicano, pilar básico de la dictadura que padecemos, 
monopolizada por el partido en el poder y encabezada por el ejecutivo que hoy 
detenta su jefe máximo e ilegítimo Carlos Salinas de Gortari. 
 
(EZLN 1st January 1994)  
 
As the declaration makes clear, the EZLN command instructs their army to 
advance on Mexico City and to demobilise Mexican security forces which they view as 
guardians of the illegitimate one-party state. They hope this will generate space going 
forward where alternative national powers can step in and restore the legitimacy of 
the Mexican nation. In the document they write, "conforme a esta declaración de 
guerra pedimos a los otros Poderes de la Nación se aboquen a restaurar la legalidad y 
establilidad de la Nación deponiendo al dictator" (EZLN 1st January 1994).  
It is clear that the Primera Declaración de la Selva Lacandona does not in any way 
reflect a desire on the part of the EZLN to seize state power and install an alternative 
regime from above. Instead, behind this revolutionary language lies a much deeper, 
more meaningful call for a democratic opening in Mexico through which the most 
basic needs of all of Mexico’s citizens can be collectively met (Khasnabish 2010). This 
is reflected in the eleven key demands outlined by the Zapatistas in the declaration 
which, they argue, motivated this revolutionary activity in the first place. Alongside 
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the call for healthcare, education, food and housing, the Zapatistas outline their 
demand for greater democracy, freedom and justice in Mexico. In the declaration, the 
EZLN-CCRI write, “pedimos tu participación decidida apoyando este plan del pueblo 
mexicano que lucha por trabajo, tierra, techo, alimentación, salud, educación, 
independencia, libertad, democracia, justicia y paz” (EZLN 1st January 1994).  
As Womack Jr. (1999) notes, the Primera Declaración de la Selva Lacandona 
makes no racial or ethnic claims in a strategic move, I believe, resisted the 
regionalization of the conflict within Mexico. By identifying demands that are not 
specifically related to the Indigenous condition per se, the Zapatistas nationalise what 
is effectively a small and local revolutionary campaign centred on Indigenous 
communities in Chiapas. Highlighting a series of general demands in this way draws 
together the attention of a wider Mexican social body who almost certainly can relate 
to the realities of life without proper healthcare, housing, and a political system which 
appears to favor the PRI one-party state (certainly in the period before the 2000 
election cycle). In other words, the first declaration draws the attention of Mexicans 
back to some of the more fundamental issues of the day including a struggle for 
existence, born out of 500 years of coloniality, that seeks to embrace basic demands 
for education, healthcare, food, housing, democracy, liberty and justice. This is why 
the Zapatistas seek a national popular struggle in the first place and why they 






la soberanía nacional reside esencial y originalmente en el pueblo. Todo el poder 
público dimana del pueblo y se instituye para el beneficio de este. El pueblo tiene, 
en todo tiempo, el inalienable derecho de alterar o modificar la forma de su 
gobierno. 
 
(EZLN 1st January 1994)  
 
It is clear then that the Zapatistas are eager to forge a relationship of cooperation 
with elements of Mexican society with a view to overcoming the negative and 
exclusionary politics of the PRI. In a final passage of the declaration, the Zapatistas 
write,  
 
PUEBLO DE MÉXICO: Nosotros, hombres y mujeres íntegros y libres, estamos 
conscientes de que la guerra que declaramos es una medida última pero justa. Los 
dictadores están aplicando una guerra genocida no declarada contra nuestros 
pueblos desde hace años por lo que pedimos tu participación decidida apoyando 
este plan del pueblo mexicano que lucha por trabajar, tierra, techo, alimentación, 
salud, educación, independencia, libertad, democracia, justica, y paz. 
 
(EZLN 1st January 1994) 
 
 In this passage, the aims of the Primera Delcaración de la Selva Lacandona 
are very much clarified. The Zapatistas express a desire “to participate with the 
Mexican people in forming a government for our country that is free and 
democratic” (Khasnabish 2010: 113). This represents the Zapatistas’ first attempt at 
strategically connecting with elements of Mexican civil society, something which 
would later go on to form the centrepiece of their strategy. Such a deliberate 
focus on the national explains why there was no direct mention of Indigenous 
people in the declaration (Womack Jr. 1999). It is clear that the EZLN were 
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attempting to avoid the localisation of the revolution by opting instead for a 
language and style that maintained a deliberate focus on national-level issues.  
 Before I conclude this discussion on the Primera Declaración de la Selva 
Lacandona, and its significance as part of the wider textual repertoire of the Zapatista 
movement, it is important to draw attention to the fact that this - and all the other 
declarations discussed later in this chapter - are published in the Spanish language. 
This, I argue, not only reminds us to "take language seriously" as an act of resistance to 
what Singh (2018) describes as "colonial mastery" but should also draw our attention 
to the fact that the many iterations, statements and proposals written and/or vocalised 
by the Zapatistas and other ethnopolitical struggles often remain forcibly "entangled 
with […] masterful thought and practice" (Singh 2018: 67, 94). Here, Singh (2018: 2) 
reflects on the challenge many decolonial struggles face in liberating themselves and 
how, in particular, practices of countermastery remain entangled with masterful ways, 
sometimes even reproducing "new masterful subjects". While her work exclusively 
centres on the writings of anticolonial thinkers such as Frantz Fanon, Singh’s (2018) 
observations have implications for textual analysis everywhere, where she specifically 
concentrates her discussion on the challenges and/or opportunities associated with 
mastery over colonial languages and the implications this has for anticolonial thought 
and action.  
All six of the Zapatista Delcaraciones de la Selva Lacandona are published in the 
Spanish language, where a number of others were selected for further translation into 
English, French, German and Italian. The Zapatista declarations are not publically 
available online through Indigenous languages nor do the Zapatistas vocalize strategy 
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using local vernaculars (Marcos, a mestizo, spoke on behalf of the Zapatistas in 
Spanish). While this may appear like an obvious statement of truth, it does, I argue, 
speak to the more precarious nature of anticolonial resistance and ethnopolitical 
struggle in Mexico. In particular, it showcases how ethnopolitical struggles remain 
permanently trapped between a desire for agency, on one hand, and their fear of 
perpetual obscurity, on the other. 
In her battle to decipher meaning in this debate, Singh (2018: 83) argues how 
colonial languages can and should be weaponised against the conditions of mastery 
and should be used as a "mobilising force [..] wielded by the self regardless of the 
historical stakes that have led to its utterance" in the first place. This metaphor of 
weaponry empowers speaking subjects to rework and regain mastery over language 
that once disempowered their ancestors. The use of the Spanish language in the first 
declaration, in particular, certainly has the effect of making the revolutionaries 
knowable to the Mexican state, uniquely positioning them within the wider social 
body as speaking subjects that can be seen, heard and, above all, understood. For 
Singh (2018: 83), "language itself cannot limit human expression even when it is an 
imposed or inherited tongue". By reengaging the use of Spanish in the declarations, 
the Zapatistas rearticulate this language in ways that not only inscribe new meaning(s) 
but embrace a language that was once used to colonise, thus returning it " through the 
colonised pen with a vengeful, recuperative force aimed toward decolonisation" (Singh 
2018: 83). 
Of course, while empowerment flows from engaging and reworking former 
colonial languages, it does not deny the fact that, in this case, Indigenous 
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communities remain trapped, in what I describe here, as a permanent state of 
untranslatability. This, I add, is marked by an urgent need to embrace other languages, 
usually that of the oppressor, to guarantee their place of visibility within public-
political spaces. It can still be seen as a form of subjugation that not only burdens 
ethnopolitical struggles but reinforces the centrality, once again, of a logic of 
coloniality that condemns the Indigenous Other to a permanent state of obscurity 
(Quijano in Moraña et al. 2008). As a perpetually unfolding debate, we are left with a 
sense that ethnopolitical struggles like the Zapatistas remain forced to navigate an in-
between space that is neither stable nor unstable but filled with a range of tools that 
allow Indigenous people to conquer mastery while also, potentially, forcing them to 
recreate new masterful narratives (Singh 2018).  
Here postcolonial translation theorists such as Bassnett and Trivedi (1999) 
argue that this in-between space need not be considered a place of disempowerment. 
Instead, the luminal spaces generated by acts of translation are full of creative 
potential and embody a process of negotiation which actively eludes the politics of 
polarity (Bassnett and Trivedi 1999). By inhabiting this third space, the Zapatistas 
generate a new language of resistance for the twenty-first century aimed at 
challenging the then relatively new and untested reality of neoliberalism. This 
language of resistance characterizes the declarations and evolves and adapts over time 
as the struggle matures. It creatively borrows from different languages, cultures, 
histories and political traditions to tell the story of Indigenous suffering in Chiapas 
and to actively imagine an alternative futurescape where poverty, suffering and 
inequality are eradicated.  
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In what follows we continue with the Segunda Declaración de la Selva 
Lacandona where the Zapatistas do not just simply question democracy in Mexico but 
pursue a democratic ideal which fundamentally challenges the traditional dynamics 





























The Zapatistas and Civil Society:  
Rethinking Democracy in Mexico 
 
Section three focuses exclusively on the role civil society plays as part of the Zapatistas' 
struggle for social justice in Mexico. Of course, any immediate mention of civil society 
warrants in-depth discussion of the concept itself and how it relates to the Mexican 
context. With this in mind, this section will unfold in two separate stages. First, I will 
provide a detailed definition of civil society to reveal how the concept relates to the 
Mexican context, acknowledging, in particular, the changing interrelation between 
state and society during the country's transition from twentieth century statism to 
twenty-first century neoliberalism. Following on from this broader, more elaborate 
discussion of civil society theory, this section will then return to the Zapatista 
declarations to reveal how the revolutionaries think and do democratisation outside 
the theoretical and conceptual limits of electoral democracy in Mexico. By focusing 
specifically on declarations 2-5, this section will not only reveal how the Zapatistas 
encountered civil society, incorporating this conceptual framework into the 
delcarations as part of their strategy of resistance against the neoliberal Mexican state, 
but how their understanding of civil society transcends all theoretical and conceptual 
limits, where it organizes in more utopian ways that aim to move Mexico beyond the 
dystopian realities of neoliberal logic. Positioning a detailed discussion of civil society 
theory before my analysis of the declarations later in this section will allow me to 
point out more effectively the ways in which the Zapatistas both engage and transcend 
the theoretical limits of civil society scholarship in the declarations.  
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Defining Civil Society in Mexico 
 
While the concept of civil society evades simple or straightforward definitions, it does 
offer us an array of interesting and varied opinions on the relationship between state 
and society in the context of modern democracy (Kastrati 2016; Beasley-Murray 2010). 
Of course, civil society is not a contemporary construct that has just suddenly 
appeared in public debate. On the contrary, it has a rich and layered history, and its 
origins as a political concept date as far back as the early European philosophies of the 
third century (Kastrati 2016; Beasley-Murray 2010; DeWeis 1997). Throughout that 
long history of conceptual development, it has slipped in and out of political 
discourse, experiencing its most recent resurgence in public debate alongside the rise 
of neoliberalism and the New Left across Latin America from the 1980s onwards 
(Cannon and Kirby 2012). At a time when the revolutionary utopias of the twentieth 
century gave way to the liberal values of the twenty-first century, civil society became 
the locus around which this social transformation took place, where it entered a new 
and complex social arrangement with the nation-state. It is precisely at this moment 
of change in the lifecycle of the Mexican nation-state where I take up this discussion.  
  Broadly speaking, civil society is best understood as everything that does not 
constitute the state and/or the economy. For Beasley-Murray (2010), "civil society 
gathers together all those organisations, associations, and movements that mediate, 
formally or informally, between private and public, state and market, particular and 
universal" (69). In this way, civil society constitutes a "multiplicity of diverse groups 
and organisations [that act together] for a variety of purposes, some political, some 
cultural, some economic" (Lummis 1996: 31). As Lummis (1996) adds, civil society 
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provides space for public discourse, for the development of public values and public 
language [and] for the formation of the public self" or citizen. In short, civil society 
may simply be considered a space that is separate from the formal political sphere 
dominated by state power and political parties that aim to control that power" 
(Lummis 1996: 31). 
In Mexico, this "third space" opened up at a time when revolutionary 
nationalism could no longer contain the collective hopes and aspirations of a nation. I 
point here to Gramsci's theory of hegemony as a useful framework which will reveal to 
us with greater clarity the nature of the relationship between state and society 
throughout much of twentieth century Mexico. Following the Mexican Revolution 
(1910-1920), the PRI developed what Gramsci terms the "integral state" (Mentinis 2006: 
32). Central to the formation of this national whole is the total and complete 
coincidence of political society and civil society. In order for the PRI to achieve 
hegemony in Mexico and to secure its place as governing authority, it was necessary to 
dominate all oppositional forces while also seeking to win over the passive and active 
consent of civil society (Mentinis 2006). In other words, as Morton (2003) notes, "this 
expression of hegemony was based on the development of a diffused and capillary 
form of indirect pressure relying on the organic development of a relationship 
between leaders and led, rulers and ruled, where real predominance was concealed 
behind a veil of consent" (635). In this context, the 1917 Mexican Constitution was a 
firm way for the revolutionary class to achieve the goal of hegemony.  
 A proud symbol of revolutionary achievement and the centrepiece of 
nationalist expression, the 1917 Mexican Constitution became an important source of 
legitimacy for PRI hegemony. Following the defeat of several oppositional forces, chief 
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among them Emiliano Zapata in the south and Pancho Villa in the north, the 
constitutionalists drafted this new legal instrument which aimed to secure widespread 
power for the PRI and promote social cohesion (Krauze 1997). To that end, embedded 
within the constitution were a series of reforms that had been made popular by a 
number of revolutionaries in the previous decade, among them Zapata whose chief 
concern was to secure a national agrarian reform policy (Krauze 1997; Barry 1995). A 
treasured addition to the constitution, Article 27 allowed for the federal redistribution 
of national lands to Mexico's rural campesino and Indigenous masses with the 
additional aim of transforming vacant plots of land into economically viable and 
agricultural places of productivity (Barry 1995).  
 By absorbing this revolutionary demand and translating it into state matter, the 
"popular will was deposited in the Constitution and from there passed to the state". As 
Williams (2011: 11-12) adds, this implied "that the will of the state was and is the de-
facto will of the people and vice versa". Of course, land reform, in its most basic legal 
form, was not enough to secure the loyalties of the popular masses. Federal unions, 
such as the Confederación Nacional Campesina (hereafter CNC), formed early on in 
the development of the agricultural sector by president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) in 
1938, shaped the cognitive and affective structures through which citizens perceived 
reality (Mentinis 2006).  In other words, the CNC was an effective device deployed by 
the PRI to build up and strengthen loyalty among campesinos, promoting a strategic 
alliance between state and agricultural workers which the PRI could - and often did - 
mobilise during times of political turmoil and crisis.  
 While the agricultural sector remained loyal to this nationalist ideology, 
experiencing "an impressive record of growth" (Barry 1995: 29) between the years 1940-
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1970, other sectors of society began to question the merits of this statist model. As 
Lomnitz (2001: 54) makes clear, "urbanisation and the generally growing complexity of 
national society began to complicate the management of state representation" leaving 
the PRI open to criticism from urban and middle class sectors that enjoyed their 
economic mobility yet questioned the social conservatism of the nation-state. Between 
the years 1957-1960, railroad workers staged a series of strikes calling on the 
government to increase wages amid a recent devaluation in the Mexican peso over the 
previous years (Sergi 2009). While the government conceded a relatively small hike in 
workers' wages, it vehemently resisted an additional campaign by railroad workers for 
an independent union executive (Sergi 2009). Like the CNC, STFRM, the Mexican 
railroad workers' trade union, was strongly connected to the political leadership of the 
PRI which frequently used both corruption and open repression to guarantee co-
optation (Sergi 2009). Years of strikes and stand-offs by the rail workers eventually 
culminated in military intervention which led to the arrest of 3,000 workers, 500 of 
whom were imprisoned for several years (Sergi 2009).  
 While the state managed to stem the flow of social unrest in the short-term, 
public frustration with the PRI continued to mount. In 1968, the Mexican student 
movement staged a series of demonstrations in Mexico City demanding an end to 
state violence and repression and for a more transparent and democratic political 
society (Kriza 2019; Poniatowska 1971). What originally began as a series of 
concentrated protests by university students from nearby Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México (UNAM) quickly escalated into large-scale street demonstrations 
which consisted of "many different left-wing groups [as well as] Christian and 
conservative groups too" (Kriza 2019: 85). Testimonios gathered by Poniatowska (1971: 
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16), from students who participated in the movement, capture the excitement and 
desire for change that was driving the momentum behind these demonstrations: 
"Nunca se habian visto en México manifestaciones espontáneas tan grandes y tan 
extraordinariamente vivas como las estudiantiles. En realidad, el Movimiento 
Estudiantil sacudió a la sociedad mexicana y por eso el gobierno empezó a tener tanto 
miedo". 
 As the quote suggests, the Mexican state did, in fact, fear further escalation in 
street protests, particularly when the country was set to host the 1968 Olympics. There 
was also strong suspicion too across government that the outlawed communist 
opposition had infiltrated the student mobilisation. The communist party in Mexico 
had been outlawed by the PRI since the 1940s (Krauze 1997). However, following the 
rise of Marxist ideology, which I mentioned earlier, Mexican security forces initiated a 
widespread clamp down on all forms of opposition that were deemed politically 
subversive (Krauze 1997). Amid this politics of confusion and chaos, government 
security forces fired shots into a crowd of student protesters on the evening of 2nd 
October 1968, following the end of a peaceful demonstration in Tlatelolco square. 
Among the ensuing chaos, the Mexican armed forces killed and disappeared hundreds 
of young protesters in a massacre which has remained permanently etched in the 
public consciousness ever since (Poniatowska 1971). The Tlatelolco Massacre, as it 
became known, forced the Echeverría government (1970-1976) to enact a series of 
economic reforms in a populist move designed to quell social unrest and steer 
Mexico's restless urban and middle class sectors back towards the embrace of the PRI 
(Krauze 1997). While many of these reforms did indeed curtail further social unrest, 
aided in large part by the oil boom of the 1970s, it was quite clear that, by the 1980s, 
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the "mechanisms of state bureaucratic representation could not avoid the country's 
bankruptcy in 1982" (Lomnitz 2001: 54; Levy et al. 2001). As Lomnitz (2001: 54) adds, 
not only did this mean that "foreign economic demands had to be attended to", but it 
also signalled the beginning of a new kind of relationship between state and society in 
Mexico.  
The rise of neoliberalism from 1982 onwards in Mexico revealed a newly 
emerging relationship between state and society that was very different to any that 
had been experienced before. After more than fifty years of protectionist polices, the 
Mexican state committed to withdrawing from its traditional role as central economic 
arbiter with the implementation of el Tratado Libre Comercio de América del Norte 
(TLCAN) in 1994 (Browning 2013; Wise et al. 2003; Levy et al. 2001). Preparation for 
this trade deal between Mexico, the United States and Canada involved a process of 
state transformation that was decidedly reformist in nature and which resulted in a 
series of institutional changes within the organisational structure of the nation-state 
(Morton 2003). As Cannon (2016) points out, the 1917 Mexican Constitution, once 
again, became the locus for this latest cycle of change which resulted in a process of 
national deconstruction and neoliberal rebirth. Moreover, many of the revolutionary 
guarantees that were once formally the centrepiece of revolutionary achievement were 
either removed or heavily reformed to facilitate this "one way journey toward 
neoliberalism" (Cannon 2016: 63). Barry (1995: 117) adds that the "hallowed" Article 27, 
the legal basis for land reform in Mexico, suffered a series of amendments which 
equated to the "termination of land reform [...] to make Mexico's farm sector more 
compatible with the international market". This included the right to sell, rent, 
sharecrop or mortgage ejidal lands in a move that then-President Salinas de Gortari 
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(1988-1994) marked as an end to state paternalism (Barry 1995). Unions too, including 
the CNC, lost significance overnight, as the government was no longer interested in 
micromanaging this agricultural sector, relying instead on market forces to govern 
demand and competition between campesinos. It is open to debate whether this 
disarticulation between state and society did indeed liberate civil society as "the 
principle locus of legitimation", (Beckman 1993: 23). However, this separation between 
state and society certainly attracted interest from scholarship. 
With this rise in neoliberalism worldwide, Cohen and Arato (1992) were the 
first to propose a workable theory of civil society. In their view, there simply was not a 
"sufficiently complex theory of civil society available" to adequately explain the opaque 
relation between the "normative model of democracy or project of democratization 
and the structure, institution, and dynamics of civil society" (Cohen and Arato 1992: 
xi). In other words, with the role of the state as national guarantor now fully paired 
back, how do we begin to conceptualise this new arrangement between society and 
state? How do they relate to one another and where do they stand vis-à-vis the other 
going forward? Does one regulate the other or is there an egalitarian interrelation 
between political and social spheres?  
Amid the disintegration and collapse of "old hegemonic paradigms", Cohen and 
Arato (1992) note that there was an urgent need to account for an emerging "discourse 
of civil society" which "focus[ed] precisely on new, generally non-class based forms of 
collective action orientated and linked to the legal, associational, and public 
institutions of society" (1-2). In response to this theoretical gap, Cohen and Arato 
(1992: 19) "locate the genesis of democratic legitimacy [...] within a highly 
differentiated model of civil society". In their view, a tripartite model "distinguishes 
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civil society from both the state and the economy" which, in their view, is the only way 
to "underwrite the dramatic oppositional role of this concept under authoritarian 
regimes and to renew its critical potential under liberal democracies" (Cohen and 
Arato 1992: ix). In other words, it is important to distinguish civil society from "a 
political society of parties, political organisations, and political publics" on one hand 
and "economic society composed of organisations of production and distribution" on 
the other (Cohen and Arato 1992: ix). As Lummis (1996) says, civil society refers to that 
sphere that generally organises itself autonomously as opposed to an alternative space 
that is established and directly controlled by the state.  
For Cohen and Arato (1992: 25), this third way positions civil society at a unique 
crossroads between the state and the economy where it functions as a buffer or 
mediator between the separate worlds of state and economy, facilitating the 
progressive governance of a neoliberal model. Civil society takes over where the state 
leaves off, allowing government to roll back its presence in both society and the 
economy leaving the marketplace free to expand unhindered while society self-
mobilises to address its own social needs. This model is both progressive and utopian 
in that it avoids any return to the oppressive social conditions of state welfarism, on 
one hand, while also maintaining the integrity and credibility of the nation-state on 
the other, a "precondition" they add, "for modernity" (Cohen and Arato 1992: 30).  
However any claims made by Cohen and Arato (1992) to the utopianness of 
their model is quickly dismissed by Beasley-Murray (2010) who takes aim at the self-
limiting and differentiated role civil society plays in this elaborate tripartite theory. 
For Beasley-Murray (2010: 93), this theory "imposes a series of boundaries" that draws 
upon the "force of social movements to legitimate political order" while also 
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"restraining the force at the point at which it might challenge the state". Cohen and 
Arato (1992: 598) are clear that civil society should know its place, that is it should 
respect the boundaries of difference between nation-state and the economy and that it 
is only permitted to engage in forms of civil disobedience that aim “at either the 
defence or assertion of minority rights or the democratization of political society and 
[...] economic institutions". There is no legal justification for exceeding the legal and 
institutional limits of modernity. Of course, this is all based on the rather utopian 
expectation that the nation-state and economic institutions are themselves receptive 
to change and that they would be willing to acknowledge and accept - with enough 
pressure applied by social movements within the legal limits laid down by the nation-
state - the Other in their policy and planning. Yet, as we are all too aware, modernity, 
symbolised here by the nation-state, has a historically poor record of acknowledging 
difference across the many social and racial stratospheres which make up the 
lifeworld. Naturally, this is a point I take up once more in my more detailed discussion 
of Zapatismo and civil society in the following subsection. For now, like Beckman 
(1993), Beasley-Murray (2010: 113) contradicts the idea that somehow the state rolls 
back or shrinks under an emerging neoliberal paradigm. Instead, he contends that it 
"slip[s] its bounds and invest[s] society as a whole [...] legitimising itself through direct 
and total coincidence with the social [therefore] erasing any distinction between state 
and society".  
This "alternative reconfiguration of state power" (Beckman 1993: 30), where 
"everything becomes one" (Beasley-Murray 2010: 113) within a socio-political and 
economic totality is very much akin to Hardt and Negri's (2000: 329) concept of 
Empire. They argue that the "structures and institutions that constitute [civil society] 
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are today progressively withering away". Unlike previous European imperial projects 
between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, which had a dominant geographic 
centre and subordinated geographic periphery, “Empire” is a decentred and 
deterritorialised concept. “Empire” does not coalesce around any particular geographic 
or territorial centre of articulation and production (Hardt and Negri 2000). Instead, 
this contemporary view of empire explores the "globalisation of economic and cultural 
exchanges" across a delimited world space where control over this new universal 
standard does not lie with any one individual or group of individuals (Hardt and Negri 
2000). Alternatively, it is governed by the many intermediations, transactions and 
capital flows which formidably take place between transnational corporations, 
agencies and industries which constitute this global lifeworld (Hardt and Negri 2000). 
Empire operates along the "plane of immanence", a device deployed by Hardt and 
Negri (2000) which explains the radical and total deconstruction of borders, in 
particular those borders which at one time formed a protectionist shield around the 
nation-state. With those removed - certainly at an economic level - there is a 
"smoothing of social space" where, "the geographical divisions among nation-states 
and between central and peripheral, northern and southern clusters of nation-states 
are no longer sufficient to grasp the global divisions and distribution of production, 
accumulation, and social forms" which now define the politics and practices of empire 
today (Hardt and Negri 2000: 334). In the authors’ view, civil society no longer serves 
as an adequate point of mediation between capital and sovereignty and NGOs are the 




Of course, the so-called Rise of the Left or the Pink Tide offers additional 
perspectives on the interrelation between state and society in Latin America. While 
this topic is not necessarily the centrepiece of my analysis in this chapter, nor did it 
directly impact Mexico, any definition of civil society in the Latin American context 
more generally would be incomplete without at least a brief mention here. Beginning 
with Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1998 and continuing throughout many countries in 
Central and South America including Brazil (2003), Ecuador (2007), Argentina (2003), 
Bolivia (2005) among others, the Pink Tide saw a string of left-wing and left-of-centre 
governments unanimously elected across the region on a broad anti-neoliberal 
platform which encompassed a wide mix of concerns from human and environmental 
rights to Indigenous issues and other social justice claims (Cannon and Kirby 2012). 
Such widespread reaction to neoliberal ideology was almost entirely led by domestic 
civil society networks which no longer appeared willing or able to absorb further levels 
of inequality generated as a result of extreme welfare cuts and industry privatization 
(Kirby and Cannon 2012). As the so-called Pink Tide intersected across a variety of 
different national contexts, generating a host of different political outcomes, I will 
avoid further generalities here and will focus instead on the Bolivian context which 
serves as the alternative case study in this thesis.  
Following my discussion in chapter two, Bolivia's Movimiento Al Socialismo-
Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (MAS-IPSP) was elected in 2005 
marking an end to more than 20 years of neoliberal rule in the country. Unlike more 
traditional political parties which articulate policies around a neatly packaged 
ideological framework with the added aim of convincing society to vote for it, the 
MAS-IPSP acted as an umbrella group, absorbing a wide range of demands pertinent 
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to many of the country’s Indigenous and campesino majority including natural 
resource sovereignty (Webber 2011).  
As I discussed, between the years 2000-2005, a series of protests by Indigenous 
and campesino groups in Cochabamaba, the Chapare and El Alto expressed a great 
deal of concern over the widespread privatisation and/or foreign redistribution of 
Bolivian natural resources. Protests in El Alto, the Guerra del Gas (2003), forced the 
resignation of two neoliberal presidents, paving the way forward for MAS-IPSP victory 
in 2005 (Postero 2017; Pearce et al. 2011; Webber 2011). Theoretically speaking, Bolivian 
civil society, which is largely defined by the activities of campesino and Indigenous 
groups, visibly transcended the boundaries of Cohen and Arato’s (1992) self-limitation, 
radically destabising the dynamics of neoliberal state power by replacing the regime 
with a new and inclusive ethnic one (Postero 2017). This radical over-reaching on the 
part of civil society is described here by Álvarez et al. (2017: 3) as the “uncivic society” 
where civil society extends its reach beyond all theoretical norms and distinctions to 
directly challenge the very basis of neoliberal state power. However, despite the 
euphoria that surrounded Morales's election victory and his promise to radically 
decolonise Bolivia by nationalising renewable and non-renewable resources and 
foregrounding Indigenous rights in national policy frameworks, the MAS-IPSP party 
continued to consolidate power around the nation-state in what Harten (2011: 232) 
describes as a “project of institutionalizing social movements tactics and traditional 
Indigenous practices as official mechanisms of Bolivia’s democratic system” (Webber 
2011). This is something which I will return to in chapter four where I explore how 
Morales incorporated ritual practices as part of his wider communicative strategy in 
Bolivia.   
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 In the meantime, having established the theoretical and historical basis of civil 
society in the Mexican and Latin American contexts, attention now turns to examining 
how the Zapatista social justice movement addresses the concept in their own 
discourse. By focusing on declarations 2-5, this next section will analyse how the 
Zapatista revolutionaries develop their struggle for social justice and democracy in 








































Civil Society and the Zapatistas:  
Declaraciones de la Selva Lacandona 2-5 
 
This section will discuss how the Zapatista Declaraciones de la Selva Lacandona offer 
an altogether entirely different utopian perspective on the role that civil society should 
play in a process of democratisation in Mexico, one which radically departs from any 
of the leading approaches outlined above. While the historical and contemporary 
study of civil society has focused to varying degrees on the interdependence between 
civil society and the state and/or market, the Zapatistas no longer identify the state as 
the locus of democratic accountability and legitimacy in Mexico (EZLN 17th July 1998; 
EZLN 10th January 1996; EZLN 1st January 1995; EZLN 10th June 1994). Instead, while 
civil society has been central to the construction and reconstruction of powerful state 
and neoliberal hegemonic projects since the turn of the twentieth century in Mexico, 
declarations 2-5 propose a total and complete deconstruction of state hegemony in 
favour of a democratic transition which elaborates a new form of power founded 
entirely on the democratic and sovereign will of civil society.  
  The Segunda Declaración de la Selva Lacandona is the first declaration to 
introduce the concept of civil society into Zapatista discourse. The Zapatistas 
acknowledged the potentiality of civil society following a series of interventions led by 
civil society in the early stages of the Chiapas conflict (EZLN 10th June 1994). In 
response to the intense battle taking place between the Zapatista army and the 
Mexican military over the first twelve days in January 1994, the Mexican and 
international community staged a series of protests both at home and abroad (Muñoz 
Ramírez 2008; Earle and Simonelli 2004). Overseas, hundreds of protesters had 
gathered outside Mexican embassies and consulates across key European and North 
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American cities expressing solidarity with the revolutionaries. As Muñoz Ramírez 
(2008) notes, vigils were held at key locations in Washington, Canada and Madrid 
while the international human rights organisation Amnesty International observed 
and condemned the actions of the Mexican state from their base in London.19 
  While the international community remained focused on events in Chiapas as 
they unfolded, Mexico City also became the site of a much more important and 
influential demonstration. On 12th January 1994, around 100,000 civilians from across 
Mexico peacefully gathered in Zócalo, the central square in Mexico City (Muñoz 
Ramírez 2008). While the main intention behind this mass demonstration of students, 
workers, Indigenous people and activists was to publically showcase their support for 
the Zapatista revolutionaries, it also aimed to apply pressure on both sides to bring an 
end to the bloodshed and to peacefully reconcile their differences. With the weight of 
public opinion visibly stacked against any further escalation in military action, 
President Salinas de Gortari was left with little choice but to concede to protester 
demands. On 12th January, Salinas declared a ceasefire in Chiapas which came into 
effect less than 24 hours after the protest began (Muñoz Ramírez 2008). 
  While this intervention by a national and international network of individuals, 
social movements and organisations was entirely unexpected, it was also a hopeful and 
                                                          
19 Amnesty International had already been keenly observing political events in Chiapas since the 1980s 
when civil unrest had broken out between various campesino and indigenous unions and the state. In 
their report, Mexico: Human Rights in Rural Areas, published in 1986, the organisation outlines the 
extensive nature of political killings across Oaxaca and Chiapas, "where those responsible for these 
killings have enjoyed effective immunity from prosecution as a result of collusion at the local level 
between law enforcement officials and powerful individuals" (Amnesty International 1986: 22). The 
report provides a full list of victims and notes a worrying trend in acts of torture and disappearing. 
While this civil unrest can be traced along deep colonial lines, it was more immediately the result of 
failed state policies in the region particularly in the area of land reform and the distribution of fair and 




optimistic sign that the Zapatistas were not alone in their struggle against the Mexican 
state. This optimism carried through to the publication of the second declaration. 
According to Khasnabish (2010), the Segunda Declaración de la Selva Lacandona marks 
a decisive change in the nature and style of Zapatista discourse. Unlike the Primera 
Declaración with its "bureaucratic [and] ridged style", the Segunda Declaración -  
including subsequent declarations 3-5 - are decidedly more optimistic and upbeat in 
tone, defined by a strong "literary flair", according to Khasnabish (2010: 115). While 
Khasnabish (2010) delivers a more general overview of the declarations, situating them 
within the context of that time, this chapter develops a more nuanced approach, 
focusing on the declarations as ethnopolitical manifestos designed to challenge and 
destabilise neoliberal power in Mexico (Rabasa 2010). Key to this is an emphasis the 
Zapatistas place on a language of reason, dignity and hope which the rebels weave 
throughout the declarations as a way to frame their new ideas and proposals for the 
future. Emboldened by the abundance of moral support during their earlier 
unsuccessful and, at times, violent encounters with the Mexican state over the 
previous six months, the Zapatistas turn to "los elementos honestos de la sociedad 
civil" in order to establish "un diálogo nacional por la democracia, la libertad y la 
justicia" (EZLN 10th June 1994). They do so in the hope that civil society will respond 
by continuing to organise in the valleys and in the streets just as the revolutionaries 
did in the mountains in early January, "que la esperanza se organise que camine ahora 
en los valles y cuidades como ayer en las montañas" (EZLN 10th June 1994).  
As a strong discursive category embedded within the newly evolving 
revolutionary narrative of Zapatismo, we might link here the concept of hope to that 
elaborated by Dinerstein (2016). For Dinerstein (2016), the concept of hope embodies a 
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"desire for change and the belief in a situation that is better than the existing one". In 
this sense, hope resembles utopia and embodies a strong "utopian function" 
(Dinerstein 2016). According to Stillman (2000), utopias are critical spaces which 
promote thoughtful action. The author acknowledges that in their most stereotypical 
form as literature, utopias are blueprints for the ideal society. However, Stillman 
(2000) goes on to add that the concept of utopia also serves a more meaningful 
purpose as analytical tools which raise and reflect on the possibility of alternatives to 
everyday social reality. In chapter four, I discuss the concept of utopia in relation to la 
utopía andina where Andean histories contain the hope and expectation for 
transformative revolutionary political projects in contemporary Bolivian politics 
(Flores Galindo 2010 [1986]). Thus, it is clear that hope, like utopia, "enables us to 
engage with the not yet conscious and the not yet dimension of reality that inhabits 
the present and that can be anticipated here and now" (Dinerstein 2016). However, 
Dinerstein (2016) adds that, unlike utopia, the concept of hope is not purely 
intellectual but rather is that emotional antithesis which rallies against the anxieties 
induced by the dystopianness of everyday reality. It is clear that hope is not just a 
political project but a personal endeavour which lies at the heart of decolonial struggle 
and remains a central driving force behind the search for new ideas, new social 
relations and alternative horizons which seek to challenge and undo the legacies of 
our (neo)colonial past (Dinerstein 2016). In other words, hope articulates both a 
personal and political quest for new imaginaries that challenge with "urgency the 
hegemonic [and] catastrophic" condition of our realities (Dinerstein 2016). To think, 
articulate, and do a politics of hope opens up new possibilities to forge meaningful, 
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concrete endeavours which aim to create better lifeworlds beyond the current 
limitations of our unimaginative and, at times, dystopian realities (Dinerstein 2016). 
  With this in mind, the Zapatistas deploy the concept of hope across their 
declarations as a way to challenge the dystopian reality of the Mexican condition. In 
their view, Mexico is characterised by "[una] política de extermino y la mentira 
[donde] los poderes de la Unión ignoraron nuestra justa demanda y permitieron la 
masacre" (EZLN 10th June 1994). In particular, the Zapatistas take issue with the 
institutionalised nature of power in Mexico which is exclusively exercised by the one-
party state system. Moreover, in their view, such an approach to power cultivates a 
culture of fraud, violence and criminality which impedes the practice of democracy 
throughout Mexico. To this they add,  
 
todos comprendimos que los días del eterno partido en el poder [...] no puede 
continuar más; que el presidencialismo que lo sustenta impide la libertad y no 
debe ser permitido, que la cultura del fraude es el método con el que se imponen e 
impiden la democracia. 
 
(EZLN 10th June 1994)  
  
The Zapatistas specifically point to the 1994 August elections which, in their 
view, provide clear evidence for the fraudulent and criminal way in which the 
institutional PRI behaves. While the PRI won this election with a solid 50.18% of the 
national vote, it was unclear to opponents how the party had managed to secure such 
a decisive victory in light of recent challenges (Scherlen 1998). Not only had the party 
endured an Indigenous rebellion, a political assassination and internal crises, all of 
which unfolded during the first six months of 1994, but it also had not recovered from 
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the election of 1988, when the party was vehemently accused of rigging the result, 
denying the PRD victory. To this, the Zapatista response is clear,  
 
la multitud de irregularidades, la inequidad, la corrupción, el chantaje, la 
intimidación, el hurto, la falsificación, fueron el marco en el que dieron las 
elecciones más sucias de la historia de México. 
 
(EZLN 1st January 1994)  
  
 During this election cycle which included federal and state elections, the 
Zapatistas accuse the PRI of imposing handpicked governors on states which had 
particularly high levels of voter absenteeism. For the Zapatistas, this is clear evidence 
that the party had committed fraud in an attempt to maintain its authoritarian grip on 
power,  
  
los altos porcentajes de abstencionismo en las elecciones locales en los estados de 
Veracruz, Tlaxcala y Tabasco demuestran que el escepticismo civil volverá a reinar en 
México. Pero, no conforme con esto, el sistema de partido de Estado volvió a repetir el 
fraude de agosto imponiendo gobernadores, presidentes municipales y congresos locales.  
 
(EZLN 1st January 1994)  
  
In Chiapas, there was also controversy over the election of PRI governor Eduardo 
Robledo Rincón (Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Womack Jr. 1999). While Robledo Rincón was 
elected to office with a clear, decisive 50% share of the state-wide vote, local 
opposition, groups including the Partido Revolucionario Democrática (PRD) candidate 
Amado Avendaño Figueroa alongside the Zapatistas contested the result staging 
blockades, seizing radio stations and occupying farms and ranches along the Pacific 
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coast of Chiapas (Womack Jr. 1999). Collectively, they demanded that Avendaño 
Figueroa, who officially received a 35% share of the vote, be recognised as governor-
elect (Womack Jr. 1999). Of course, these accusations of fraud did little to alter the 
mindset of the federal executive or to encourage any reconsideration of the national or 
local vote by the electoral commission. And so, in December 1994, both president 
Zedillo and Governor Robledo Rincón assumed office, securing another six years of 
PRI rule.  
Yet, despite concern over the dystopian nature of electoral politics in Mexico, 
characterised by the fraudulent and criminal activities of the PRI, the Zapatistas make 
clear that they do not have issue with the nature of power itself. Rather, the rebels 
express much greater concern over who exercises power and how that power is 
articulated over and throughout the entire Mexican social body. As the Zapatistas 
clarify, "el problema del poder no será quién es el titular, sino quién lo ejerce" (EZLN 
10th June 1994). This distinction is important to note here because it draws attention to 
the precise ways in which the Zapatistas acknowledge and define power in the 
declarations and, in turn, how that power should be exercised throughout Mexico in 
order to achieve a more democratic and egalitarian society in their view.  
Instead of acknowledging the legitimacy of state power and PRI hegemony, the 
Zapatistas directly challenge it, exclusively turning towards the concept of civil society 
in the declarations in order to instigate a democratic change in Mexico and to begin 
reclaiming national sovereignty from the so called "ladrones de la esperanza" (EZLN 
10th June 1994). For the Zapatistas, it is civil society "en quien reside nuestra soberanía 
[y] es el pueblo quien en todo tiempo altera o modifica nuestra forma de gobierno 
(EZLN 10th June 1994). Here, the Zapatistas explicitly recognise the democratic and 
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sovereign will of civil society while simultaneously rejecting the authority of the state. 
This clear, decisive statement undermines and destabilises the centrality of the nation-
state in the modern political lifeworld by revealing instead the opportunities and 
possibilities that arise in thinking and doing politics outside the physical and 
epistemological limits of electoral politics. 
The Zapatistas share a Foucauldian view regarding the nature of discourse, power 
and power relations by acknowledging that power does not emanate from any one 
"central point" such as the state or any of its agencies and institutions (Powers 2015: 
29). On the contrary, by shifting their focus away from the state and towards the 
democratic potentiality of civil society in declarations 2-5, the Zapatistas acknowledge 
that power exists within a "continually shifting web or grid of individual positions of 
tension between power and resistance", to reiterate the point originally made by 
Powers (2015: 29). In other words, the Zapatistas do not base their politics in a 
“confrontación entre organizaciones políticas” (EZLN 10th June 1994). Rather, they 
define their politics as a “confrontación de sus propuestas políticas con las distintas 
clases sociales" (EZLN 10th June 1994). Power is clearly not conceptualised here as 
property nor does it exist in any kind of objective form (Angel Martínez 2018). Instead, 
power is viewed more as an exercise and something which circulates throughout the 
social body in a series of dynamic and fluid exchanges between those with power and 
those who resist that power (Angel Martínez 2018). This, in turn, leaves the concept of 
power always open to contestation between the various subjects of the lifeworld, 
where it can be lost, reclaimed and lost again in a continuous albeit at times 




To facilitate this democratic transition, the Zapatistas propose an elaborate and 
ambitious initiative known as the Convención Democrática Nacional (hereafter CND) 
in the second declaration (EZLN 10th June 1994). The aim of the CND is to mobilise 
civil society around the common goal of achieving a democratic transition in Mexico. 
In doing so, the CND proposes the formation of a provisional government of transition 
that will draft a new set of laws for Mexico as well as a new national constitution 
which will guarantee the popular will. In the second declaration the CCRI write, 
"Llamamos a la realización de una Convención Democrática, nacional, soberana y 
revolucionaria, de la que resulten las propuestas de un gobierno de transición y una 
nueva ley nacional, una nueva Constitución que garantice el cumplimiento legal de la 
voluntad popular" (EZLN 10th June 1994). The idea, according to Womack Jr. (1999) is 
that the Zapatistas would rally Mexican civil society to organise free and fair elections 
which the PRI would then win given its previous historical record. But when civil 
society takes to the streets to protest this electoral result, it would force a political 
crisis on the PRI that the party itself would not be in a position to resolve, thus paving 
the way forward for the Zapatistas to join civil society in the formation of a transitional 
government that would conduct politics in a free, fair and democratic way (Womack 




[la] Convención Nacional Democrática y Gobierno de Transición deben 
desembocar en una nueva Carta Magna en cuyo marco se convoque a nuevas 
elecciones. El dolor que este proceso significará para el país será siempre menor al 
daño que produzca una guerra civil. La profecía del sureste vale para todo el país, 
podemos aprender ya de lo ocurrido y hacer menos doloroso el parto del nuevo 
México 
 
(EZLN 10th June 1994)  
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What the Zapatistas propose here is an altogether different, more radical view of 
civil society and the role it plays in a process of democratisation in Mexico. With a 
clear emphasis on drafting new legal infrastructure through the CND, civil society 
appears to transcend the limits of modernity to become a self-organised, self-
empowered social whole that exists outside the state "[en] un espacio libre y 
democrático" (EZLN 10th June 1994). The Zapatistas are clear that they do not believe 
in the self-limitation of civil society nor do they confirm that it should operate within 
the legal and institutional parameters laid down by the laws of the nation-state 
(Cohen and Arato 1992). The Zapatistas appear to encourage civil society to slip 
between the boundaries of self-limitation and differentiation to engage in utopian 
forms of organising. As the Zapatistas propose,  
 
[un] proyecto de la transición a la democracia, no una transición pactada con el 
poder que simule un cambio para que todo siga igual, sino la transición a la 
democracia como el proyecto de reconstrucción del país; la defensa de la soberanía 
nacional; la justicia y la esperanza como anhelos; la verdad y el mandar 
obedeciendo como guía de jefatura; la estabilidad y la seguridad que dan la 
democracia y la libertad; el diálogo, la tolerancia y la inclusión como nueva forma 
de hacer política. 
 
(EZLN 1st January 1996)  
 
From this quote it is clear to see, that the Zapatistas do not intend to lead in the 
creation of a new Mexican hegemony nor do they intend to develop a new social order 
that rearticulates familiar forms of institutional power which, as the declarations have 
established thus far, guided Mexico to this point of political crisis in the first place. 
Instead, the Zapatistas reiterate "[que] no estamos proponiendo un mundo nuevo, 
apenas algo muy anterior: la antesala del nuevo México" (EZLN 10th June 1994). This 
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revolution is not about recreating "una nueva clase, fracción de clase o grupo en el 
poder" (EZLN 10th June 1994). Rather, it concerns the hopeful and, therefore, utopian 
possibilities embodied within civil society which, through initiatives like the CND, the 
Zapatistas unleash, encouraging Mexico to organise "[en] una sociedad plural, 
tolerante, incluyente, democrática, justa y libre" (EZLN 10th June 1994).  
As the declarations unfold, it is clear to see that the Zapatistas remain 
committed to Mexican civil society and to the role it plays in further constructing and 
developing spaces of physical and epistemological encounter that will, according to 
the rebels, fulfil their ambition to forge a new and more meaningful democratic 
society in Mexico. Following on from their earlier successes with the CND, both the 
third and fourth declarations propose the development of two additional initiatives 
designed by the Zapatistas themselves which they claim will help motivate and 
facilitate further organising outside the limits of electoral democracy. In the Tercera 
Declaración de la Selva Lacandona, published by the EZLN-CCRI on the 1st January 
1995, the Zapatistas call on,  
 
todos las fuerzas sociales y políticas del país, a todos los mexicanos honestos, a 
todos aquellos que luchan por la democratización de la vida nacional, a la 
formación de un Movimiento Para La Liberación Nacional incluyendo a la 
Convención Nacional Democrática y todas las fuerzas que sin distinción de credo 
religioso, raza o ideología política están en contra del sistema de partido de 
Estado. 
 





As the quote references, the Movimiento para la Liberación Nacional (MLN) is 
an inclusive, national space designed to unite all those forces across Mexican society 
that specifically oppose the neoliberal state. By explicitly calling on individuals, groups 
and organisations of different backgrounds, religious creeds and political persuasions, 
the Zapatistas emphasise their commitment to a national front that challenges the 
centrality and authority of the neoliberal state without reclaiming power either for 
themselves or for any one specific individual or group. In a gesture towards the diverse 
nature of this proposal, the Zapatistas remove specific references to civil society as a 
conceptual framework in this declaration, replacing it instead with a call, 
 
a los obreros de la república, a los trabajadores del campo y de la ciudad, a los 
colonos, a los maestros y estudiantes de México, a las mujeres mexicanas, a los 
jóvenes de todo el país, a los artistas e intelectuales honestos, a los religiosos 
consecuentes, a los militantes de base de las diferentes organizaciones políticas 
que, en su medio y por formas de lucha que consideren posibles y necesarias, 
luchen por el fin del sistema de partido de Estado. 
 
(EZLN 1st January 1995)  
 
While the Zapatistas continue to push for a national solution to the crisis of 
democracy in Mexico, the third declaration also raises and reflects on la cuestión 
indígena, in a move designed to conflate the national and the ethnic in the mind of the 
reader or Mexican public. In contrast to the Primera Declaración de la Selva 
Lacandona, where I suggested that the Zapatistas strategically downplayed references 
to the ethnic characteristics of this revolution, the rebels now appear to fully embrace 
the ethnopolitical nature of this struggle, specifically emphasising how a national 
solution is the only way in which Mexico will bring about an end to this conflict in 
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Chiapas. This strategy is, then, designed to appeal to the wider Mexican public who 
are sympathetic to an Indigenous rights-based agenda and to prevent any further 
localisation of the conflict by the state and security forces. For example, within the 
first twelve months of the revolution, when the third declaration was originally 
published, military troops had established a tightly guarded conflict zone in Chiapas, 
with heavily-manned security checkpoints that controlled the flow of individuals and 
communities in and out of the Zapatista territory in a strategic move designed to both 
intimidate and confine and isolate the rebels within Mexico (Khasnabish 2010; Muñoz 
Ramírez 2008).  
Meanwhile, the third declaration may be viewed as an attempt by the 
Zapatistas themselves to unravel these constraints and breakdown these physical 
divides in an epistemological endeavour designed to contest a basic assumption of the 
modern worldview that indigeneity can and should be confined to the small places 
and spaces of ethnopolitical thought and action. Instead, the declaration reveals how 
the state misses the point and fails to acknowledge that this conflict is not just simply 
about ethnicity and the apparently unreasonable demands put forward by the rebels 
for territorial and political autonomy (Ryan 2011; Khasnabish 2010; Reygadas et al. 
2009; Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Ross 2006). On the contrary, the declaration outlines how 
this is a conflict that affects all Mexicans who identify and suffer the same injustices 
and conditions of poverty that originally led to the revolution in Chiapas in the first 
place. In other words, the Zapatistas attempt to underline, with the greatest of clarity, 
that Indigenous issues are in fact Mexican issues and vice versa and that confining 
ethnicity, whether physically or epistemologically, only perpetuates rather than solves 
the wider crisis of democracy afflicting Mexico. I am reminded here of Bonfil Batalla 
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(2002) who argues that the struggle for México profundo is a struggle against the 
imposition of modern imaginaries that marginalise other, “more profound” ways of 
knowing and being. As Bonfil Batalla (2002: 10) writes, “las relaciones entre el México 
profundo y el México imaginario has sido conflictivas durante los cinco siglos que lleva 
su confrontación. El proyecto occidential del México imaginario has sido excluyente y 
negador de la civilización mesoamericana”. By embracing a national struggle for 
democracy, liberty and justice, the Zapatistas encourage the development of a new 
relationship within and between the wider civilian population that will lead to a more 
fair and inclusive society.  
In a similar vein to previously published declarations, the Zapatistas propose 
the formation of yet another national initiative in the Cuarta Declaración de la Selva 
Lacandona, released to the public on 10th January 1996. While the Frente Zapatista de 
Liberación Nacional (FZLN) continues to showcase the revolutionaries’ commitment 
to their ongoing pursuit of democratic change in Mexico, it also begins to highlight 
the inherent challenges facing this relatively small ethnopolitical movement in their 
efforts to maintain consistency between discourse and practice. In the fourth 
declaration, the Zapatistas, once again, call upon Mexico to participate "en una nueva 
etapa de la lucha por la liberación nacional y la construcción de una patria nueva" 
which they define here as "el Frente Zapatista de Liberación Nacional" (EZLN 10th 
January 1996). The aim, they write, is to form "[un] organización civil y pacífica, 
independiente, democrática, mexicana, nacional, que lucha por la democracia, la 
libertad y la justicia en México" (EZLN 10th January 1996). The FZLN was established 
on the back of a very promising and highly successful EZLN-led initiative in August 
1995 known as the National and International Consultation for Peace and Democracy 
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(Khasnabish 2010; Muñoz Ramírez 2008; Womack Jr. 1999). The intention behind this 
referendum was to forge a dialogue between the Zapatistas and national and 
international civil society networks with a view to assesing the public's opinion on 
several key questions that were pertinent to the rebels at the time. Below I compiled 
together a list of the six questions proposed by the Zapatistas during this consultation 





Questions Support (in favour) 
Does the respondent support the EZLN's eleven 
demands? 
98% 
Should the democratic forces in the country work 
together to achieve these demands? 
92% 
Does the Mexican state require a profound reform 
to achieve democracy? 
95% 
Should the EZLN transform itself into a political 
force? 
57% 
Should the EZLN join with other democratic 
forces to form a new opposition alliance? 
43% 
Should women be integrated on an equal basis 
into the nation's developing democratic culture? 
90% 
(Graph 3.2 provides a full list of the six questions proposed by the Zapatistas during the National and 
International Consultation for Peace and Democracy. See also Khasnabish 2010 and Womack Jr. 1999 for 








Conducted between 23rd and 27th August, 1.2 million ballots were collected 
nationally by 40,000 volunteers who manned 8,000 polling stations located in every 
single state across the country (Khasnabish 2010; Womack Jr. 1999). Moreover, a 
further 100,000 votes were cast online by international supporters across 55 countries 
worldwide (Khasnabish 2010; Womack Jr. 1999). While it is clear from the results that 
there was overwhelming support for both the Zapatistas and their revolutionary cause, 
I take issue with Khasnabish (2010: 129) and others who suggest that "the idea of the 
Zapatistas becoming a more conventional political force was deeply attractive" 
following this consultation. The vote was certainly a clear act of defiance against the 
state which would naturally view any unmandated polling within the Mexican 
jurisdiction as a threat to electoral democracy and an attempt at destabilising and 
undermining the government's legitimacy and authority over this national space. Yet, 
it is quite clear from the results that support among the wider Mexican public 
significantly drops with the suggestion that the Zapatistas should either lead or join 
other democratic forces in the formation of a new opposition front in Mexico. While 
many Mexicans and members of the wider international community continued to 
support the Zapatistas in their difficult negotiations with the state at San Andrés 
Larráinzar, where they aimed to secure rights to land, culture and political autonomy 
in Chiapas, there was a greater reluctance on the part of wider society to support and 
join in the formation of a national democratic alliance in Mexico (Muñoz Ramírez 
2008; Higgins 2001).  
This certainly explains why all three Zapatista initiatives outlined in the 
declarations thus far from the CND, the MLN right through to the FZLN failed to 
sufficiently mobilise lasting democratic change in Mexico outside the institutional 
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frameworks of the nation-state. Despite their efforts to try and nationalise the conflict 
in Chiapas, developing a strong nationalising rhetoric within the declarations, civil 
society continued to view the unfolding situation in Chiapas as a predominantly local 
matter but one which needed strong levels of national sympathy and support.20 
It is within this context that I draw attention to the Quinta Declaración de la 
Selva Lacandona published by the EZLN-CCRI on 17th July 1998. Unlike previous 
declarations published before it, where Zapatista discourse is defined by a sense of 
hopefulness and optimism, the fifth declaration appears to be marked more by a sense 
of urgency on the part of the revolutionaries who have arguably entered one of the 
darkest periods in the Chiapas conflict (Khasnabish 2010; Womack Jr. 1999). In the 
more than two years since the publication of the previous declaration, the Zapatista 
command not only failed to secure their rights to Indigenous autonomy in national 
law but, equally as worrying, witnessed an escalation in violence which resulted in one 
of the worst atrocities to befall Indigenous communities in contemporary Chiapas. 
Rhetorically speaking, the fifth declaration frequently stresses that "es la hora 
de la lucha por los derechos de los pueblos indios, como un paso a la democracia, a la 
libertad, y la justicia para todos" (EZLN 17th July 1998). This specific emphasis on la 
hora invokes a sense of urgency in the collective task to reform Mexico and to secure 
                                                          
20
  Addressing the reasons why the Zapatistas failed to inspire widespread political action for democratic 
change nationally are many and lie beyond the scope of a chapter where the primary aim it is to assess 
the Declaraciónes themselves as tools in the dismantling of capitalist regimes (Rabasa 2010). However, 
Adler Hellman (2000) points to the internet as a possible root source of the problem. While the 
Zapatistas themselves did not directly engage the use of internet technologies to draft or disseminate 
declarations and communiqués (Pitman and Taylor 2007), the flurry of online activity by sympathizers 
of the movement is likely to have transferred a lot of support to the virtual space, where activists set up 
blogs and shared information online about the resistance in solidarity with the revolutionary cause. In 
contrast to Cleaver’s (1998: 622) optimistic assertion that this “electronic fabric” provided the “nerve 
system for increasingly global organisation in opposition to the dominant economic policies of the 
present period”, Adler Hellman (2000: 179) questions the virtue of this claim by suggesting instead that 
internet activism or slacktivism or hashtag activism generates the “illusion of connectedness and 
political effectiveness where little exists”. 
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Indigenous rights in national law (Khasnabish 2010). While the Zapatistas had 
managed to successfully secure a deal with the Mexican state that would, in theory, 
permit the practice of Indigenous autonomy in Chiapas, the government failed to 
elevate the San Andrés Accords to constitutional level thus denying the Zapatistas 
legitimacy and stability in Chiapas. Instead, federal security forces escalated their 
military campaign against the revolutionaries, even funding and supplying arms to a 
number of clandestine paramilitary groups operating within the Selva Lacandona 
(Muñoz Ramírez 2008). Rather than resolve the conflict in Chiapas, the government 
increased tensions between Indigenous people and the state, permitting the military 
to engage in the forced displacement of entire communities in an effort to destabilise 
the region. While this certainly tested the resolve of Zapatista rebels, it positioned 
many more communities, organisations and groups in danger.  
As I mentioned in chapter one, on the 22nd December 1997, 45 Indigenous 
people from the pacifist, Catholic organisation Las Abejas were killed by a paramilitary 
group in the small hamlet of Acteal where they had been seeking refuge from earlier 
displacement (Khasnabish 2010; Rabasa 2010; Hayden 2002; Womack Jr. 1999; Centro 
de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas 1998). Within the context of this 
dystopian image of death, destruction and displacement, as well as the repeated 
failure of Zapatista initiatives to mobilise Mexican society around any meaningful or 
lasting democratic reform of Mexico, the fifth declaration can be seen as a reminder to 
Mexico that the crises it faces cannot be resolved unless Indigenous people in Chiapas 
and across the country are recognised fully in law: "no habrá transición a la 
democracia, ni reforma del Estado, ni solución real a los principales problemas de la 
agenda nacional sin los pueblos indios" (EZLN 17th July 1998).  
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Thus far this chapter has established the ways in which the Zapatista 
Declaraciones de la Selva Lacandona have challenged and destablised traditional power 
dynamics in Mexico. From declaring war against the Mexican state in the Primera 
Declaración de la Selva Lacandona to emphasizing a politics of hope in declarations 2-5 
that encouraged civil society to exceed the limits of modernity and organize outside 
the parameters of electoral democracy in more hopeful, utopian ways, the Zapatista 
revolutionaries use the declarations to think beyond political norms and conventions 
to reimagine democractic spaces and possibilities in Mexico to achieve social justice 
and liberty for Indigenous people and Mexicans more generally. However, analysis of 
the Declaraciones also reveals a growing divide between Zapatista discourse and 
practice, particularly towards the latter years (1998). With political initiatives such as 
the Convención Nacional Democrática (Segunda Declaración), Movimiento de 
Liberación Nacional (Tercera Declaración) and Frente Zapatista de Liberación Nacional 
(Cuarta Declaración) struggling to mobilize Mexican civil society in any meaningful or 
democratic way, the Zapatista revolutionaries radically reconsider their strategy which 
is revealed to us in the Sexta Declaración de la Selva Lacandona and which is analysed 











From Civil Society to a Globalisation of Resistance:  
Sexta Declaración de la Selva Lacandona 
 
The publication of the Sexta Declaración de la Selva Lacandona on the 30th June 2005 
marks a decisive change in the nature and style of Zapatista politics and discourse. 
After nine years of political uncertainty, hostility and alienation perpetuated by state, 
military and paramilitary forces against Zapatista loyalists and sympathisers in 
Chiapas, the Zapatistas prepared to take measures into their own hands by 
implementing the San Andrés Accords. This manoeuvre was a particularly radical one 
because it was carried out by the rebels themselves without the backing or consent of 
the Mexican government. This move followed more than five years of false hope and 
denial, where, despite its commitment to the agreement in 1996, the Mexican 
government, along with Congress, repeatedly refused to implement the Accords which 
would, in theory, permit the practice of Indigenous autonomy in Chiapas (Muñoz 
Ramírez 2008; Manaut et al. 2006; Higgins 2001). Following a two-year "strategy of 
silence", whereby the Zapatistas set about an internal reconfiguration of their 
movement between the years 2001-2003, the rebels reappeared a completely 
transformed social movement (Dinerstein 2016: 241; Muñoz Ramírez 2008).  
This radical transformation brought about renewed interest in Zapatismo once 
more. No longer was this conflict simply about the struggle for Indigenous autonomy. 
Rather, this form of ethnopolitical activism had reached new heights. The Zapatistas 
had now committed themselves to fully translating the idea of Indigenous autonomy, 
something which had been the source of violent conflict between Indigenous people 
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and the state, into a tangible, workable reality. As with any radical transition, this new 
phase in Zapatista development naturally drew the attention of scholars across a 
variety of disciplines curious as to the nature this form of autonomy would now take. 
In particular, some expressed a great deal of interest in the practical and, therefore, 
institutional aspects of Zapatista autonomy (Mora 2017). This included a focus on 
areas like autonomous healthcare (Kozart 2007; Cuevas 2007; Warfield 2015;), 
education (Neils 2008; Zibechi 2013; Warfield 2015;) and justice (Mora 2015) and how, 
in particular, the health and wellbeing of communities improved as a result. 
Meanwhile, others were more concerned with the conceptual underpinnings of this 
radically new form of Indigenous self-government (Dinerstein 2016; Harvey 2016). This 
included, among other things, interest in the Caracoles (see chapter one) which not 
only serve a practical function as the new locus of Zapatista political administration - 
replacing the CCRI as the political and military core of this social movement - but also 
act as metaphorical conch shells "that open to the outside world and through which 
the outside world can know the Zapatistas" (Ross 2005: 39).  
 Yet, despite this body of literature which deals exclusively with the institutional 
and symbolic nature of Zapatista autonomy, I contend that several gaps still remain. In 
particular, how did this radical transition shape Zapatista discourse in the 
declarations? Moreover, how did their approach to the conceptual ideas of democracy, 
civil society and the state, all of which were dominant and interrelated themes across 
the five previous declarations, evolve in response to this transition? Through an 
analysis of the Sexta Declaración de la Selva Lacandona, I will reveal the discursive and 
epistemological nuances which underpin this period of transition, including how ideas 
around democracy, civil society and the state have been shaped by their new 
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transnational view of the world which, in turn, influences their uniquely intersectional 
approach to political resistance.  
As the final declaration published by the CCRI, the Sexta Declaración de la 
Selva Lacandona offers a long-term view of Zapatista political resistance. While La 
Sexta does express certain continuities with previous ethnopolitical strategies, 
particularly in relation to the revolutionaries’ intention to maintain arms despite 
evolving into a much more peaceful social movement, this final declaration does mark 
a rupture with the political past (Hernández Navarro 2013; EZLN 30th June 2005). As 
one of the longest declarations published by the CCRI it is divided into six separate 
subsections which include as follows: 1) De lo que somos; 2) De dónde estamos ahora; 
3) De cómo vemos el mundo; 4) De cómo vemos a nuestro país que es México; 5) De lo 
que queremos hacer; 6) De lo que vamos a hacer.  
 Throughout the course of this evolving narrative, La Sexta offers the reader a 
more profound take on Mexico's current political situation, where the rebels focus 
precisely on the imposition of transnational capitalism across the geopolitical space 
and the consequence this universal reality has for Mexico in particular. Similar to the 
argument put forward by Hardt and Negri (2000) in their book Empire, the Zapatistas 
no longer identify either the nation-state or civil society as useful political categories. 
For example, the term civil society which populated many of the previously published 
declarations no longer features in the Sexta Declaración de la Selva Lacandona and the 
Zapatistas leave behind reference to the nation-state in De lo que somos to focus 
instead on transnational capitalism as the root source of their and Mexico’s 
democratic problems. In particular, the declaration considers how transnational 
capitalism, which they acknowledge here as neoliberalism, intersects across different 
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corporal and geopolitical lines to produce different kinds of personal and political 
struggles which manifest around the world in different ways. La Sexta reads like an 
awakening, where the Zapatistas acknowledge how other groups also appear to be 
affected by neoliberalism and how this generates new possibilities to collaborate and 
learn in a globalisation of resistance. The Zapatistas aim to connect these different 
anti-neoliberal struggles together by developing a new kind of global resistance, one 
which does not have any epistemological or geographic centre but which, instead, 
forges a new alliance from below and to the Left. As the Zapatistas say, they aim "no a 
tratar de resolver desde arriba los problemas de nuestra Nación, sino construir desde 
abajo por abajo una alternativa a la destrucción neoliberal, una alternativa de 
izquierda para México" (EZLN 30th June 2005). This political ideal is not just reflected 
in their decision to disband the EZLN in 2003, thus decentralising the decision-making 
process across this social movement but also in their outward support of political 
causes. In the previous decade alone, the Zapatistas have stood in solidarity with the 
families of the victims of the forty-three students kidnapped and disappeared at 
Ayotzinapa in 2014 – a struggle for justice which has received worldwide attention as a 
result of social media – and backed the presidential campaign of Mexico’s first 
indigenous and first female candiate, María de Jesus Patricio Martínez (Marichuy), in 
the recent 2018 elections.  
 The 2000 election cycle was a momentous occasion for Mexico. After more than 
seventy years of PRI rule, then-president of Mexico Ernesto Zedillo conceded electoral 
defeat for the first time in the history of the PRI. While unexpected, this development 
paved the way for Vicente Fox and the Partido Acción Nacional (hereafter PAN) to 
assume control over the federal executive later that same year (Shirk 2000). This 
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peaceful transfer of power between opposing political parties marked the beginning of 
Mexico's formal transition to a modern, liberal democracy (Levy et al. 2001). While the 
basic elements of multi-party competition had already been in place up to that point, 
the PRI had maintained an exclusive form of authority over the federal executive, 
often resorting to suspect means in order to secure its grip on power (Levy et al. 2001). 
With Vicente Fox and the PAN now prepared to take office for the first time in history, 
it appeared as though Mexico had now finally achieved a new democratic norm.  
 For the Zapatistas, however, this peaceful, democratic transfer of power 
between political parties does not sufficiently get to the root cause of Mexico's 
underlying problems. While many different countries across Latin America began to 
collectively challenge the authority of neoliberalism, including Bolivia where 
Indigenous and campesino groups staged a series of protests between 2000-2005 
against the Sánchez de Lozada government over the privatisation of natural resources, 
the 2000 election cycle  in Mexico revealed the country's ongoing commitment to this 
international economic order. A traditionally conservative party, the PAN was founded 
in 1939 by professionals, intellectuals, entrepreneurs and Catholics who sought an 
alternative to the secular, dominant and, above all, paternalistic PRI  (Shirk 2000; 
Cornelius and Craig 1988).  The PAN was a liberal, democratic party which encouraged 
"individual development by helping citizens to help themselves rather than by offering 
government handouts" (Shirk 2000: 26). Naturally, this policy framework appealed to 
urban middle-class Mexican voters, the PAN's principal constituency, who had been 
showing their frustration with PRI hegemony since the late-1960s (Cornelius and Craig 
1988). While the PRI remained a dominant force in Mexican politics, supported in 
large part by the rural campesino vote, the PAN had been making steady yet 
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significant electoral gains in many gubernatorial and local elections since the 1990s 
(Levy et al. 2001; Shirk 2000; Cornelius and Craig 1988). Within a decade or so, the 
PAN went from governing just one percent of the Mexican population in 1987 to more 
than 27 million citizens by the time it entered government in late-2000 (Shirk 2000). 
Based on this history and trajectory of development, it is no surprise, then, that newly-
elected PAN President, Vicente Fox, favoured free-market reforms with an economic 
agenda that would guarantee continuity rather than complete rupture with the 
international neoliberal order (Shirk 2000).   
 With the Mexican electoral system largely unresponsive to the wider challenges 
afflicting the country, the Zapatistas take it upon themselves to lead the anticapitalist 
narrative in Mexico through the publication of their sixth and final declaration. This 
more profound discourse is largely in line with other leftist Latin American leaders 
including the then newly-appointed president of Bolivia, Evo Morales, who also 
developed a strongly anticapitalist discourse during his ethnopolitical campaign. By 
replacing capitalist ideology with new cosmological epistemologies, Morales garnered 
widespread support among Bolivia's majority Indigenous and campesino population, 
securing victory in 2005 as the country's first Indigenous president. 2005 was the same 
year in which the sixth declaration was published. While the Zapatistas had always 
expressed their strong opposition to neoliberal ideology - it was a key reason why the 
Zapatistas led the 1994 Chiapas insurrection in the first place - previous declarations 
had been more preoccupied with formalising alternative, concrete democratic 
arrangements with civil society and against the nation-state including the CND, MLN 
and the FZLN. However, as La Sexta makes clear, the revolutionaries shift gear almost 
entirely, expressing a more profound concern for the underlying social, cultural, 
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environmental and human impact a modern, capitalist framework is having across 
Mexico (EZLN 30th June 200).  
 The Sexta Declaración de la Selva Lacandona recognises capitalism as a 
dominant form of social architecture, one that goes about organising entire societies 
into those who have and those who have not (EZLN 30th June 2005). The success of 
such a regimented system of social control is predicated on the widely held belief that 
those who accumulate the most wealth, measured by the Zapatistas here in terms of 
financial and capital resources, exercise the most power over society while the 
remainder of the social whole are forced to comply, obey and serve on the margins: 
"en el capitalismo mandan los que tienen el dinero y las cosas y obedecen los que 
nomás tienen su capacidad" (EZLN 30th June 2005). This exploitative network between 
the oppressor and the oppressed, whereby the wealthiest in society "les sacan todo lo 
que puedan", extends beyond human interactions to include the ways in which 
humanity relates to the natural world, to culture and to our own consciousness and 
morality as beings in the lifeworld: "el capitalismo todo lo convierte en mercancías, 
hace mercancías a las personas, a la naturaleza, a la cultura, a la historia, a la 
conciencia" (EZLN 30th June 2005). The Zapatistas are clear that capitalism as a social 
system not only legitimises such actions as robbery and theft but even celebrates the 
plunder of human and other resources "donde los robadores están libres y son 
admirados y puestos como ejemplos" while capitalism "encarcela y mata a los que 
rebelan contra la injusticia" (EZLN 30th June 2005). It is clear, then, that capitalism is 
embedded within the Mexican lifeworld, where the exploitation of everything and 




vemos el café empaquetado, en su bolsita o frasco muy bonitillo, pero no vemos al 
campesino que sufrió para cosechar el café pero no vemos al coyote que le pagó 
muy barato su trabajo, y no vemos a los trabajadores en la gran empresa dale y 
dale para empaquetar el café.  
 
(EZLN 30th June 2005). 
But, the Zapatistas are clear about how capitalism continues to evolve, beyond 
the boundaries of the nation-state, to become an aggressive global model of 
development "[donde] los capitalistas tratan de dominar todo en todo el mundo" 
(EZLN 30th June 2005). For the Zapatistas, the nation-state, formally the centrepiece of 
twentieth century geopolitics, has become absorbed into one large country that is 
defined only by the logic of money or capital: "la globalización neoliberal quiere 
destruir a las Naciones del mundo y que solo queda una sola Nación o país o sea el país 
del dinero, del capital" (EZLN 30th June 2005). In this way, the Zapatistas mirror many 
of the sentiments expressed in Hardt and Negri's (2000: xii) Empire, where the global 
order is no longer defined by nation-states but is instead "united under a single logic of 
rule". As I mentioned earlier, the concept of “Empire” is not based on any of the 
traditional imperial projects that were, at one time, defined by geographic boundaries. 
Instead, the concept of “Empire” eradicates spatial and epistemological divisions to 
create a global whole, where this "smooth world" opens up every possible corner of this 
geopolitical space to the penetrable forces of capital (Hardt and Negri 2000: xiii). In 
this way, neoliberal globalisation, the term used by the Zapatistas here to describe the 
globalised nature of capitalism’s universal expansion, is a war of conquest by corporate 
interests for a delimited territorial and geopolitical space "[donde] los grandes 
capitalistas que viven en los países que son poderosos como Estados Unidos quieren 
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que todo el mundo se hace como una gran impresa donde se producen mercancías y 
como un gran mercado" (EZLN 30th June 2005).   
 Yet, the consequences of this globalised regime are many according to the 
Zapatistas. In the declaration, the Zapatistas reveal how this neoliberal ideological 
framework intersects across economic, social, cultural, gender, sexual, and ethnic 
divides producing a range of victim experiences among subaltern groups that suffer 
beneath the weight of this homogenizing and evasive geopolitical world order. La 
Sexta appears to adopt an intersectional worldview that sheds light on the multiple 
realities of life beneath the global neoliberal paradigm and how this produces many 
different experiences of discrimination, marginalisation, subjugation and invisibility 
that may not necessarily be so obvious at first glance. Crenshaw (1989) was the first to 
propose and develop a theory of intersectionality through her legal work which she 
uses as a method for uncovering the many different ways in which African-American 
women experience racism and discrimination under legal and political institutions 
and agencies that fail to capture and account for the nuances of identity. For 
Crenshaw (1989), laws, policies and other mechanisms of governance will remain 
perpetually blind and ignorant to the experiences of the Other if they do not begin to 
consider the fact that identities are borne at the intersection where gender meets race 
meets sexuality and so on. By neatly constructing the world around dominant 
categories and worldviews that never meet, intersect or overlap, legal, political and 
social institutions recreate and perpetuate the conditions of marginalization and 
discrimination that condemns the Other to a lifetime of obscurity (Crenshaw 1989). 
In this context of intersectionality, it appears as though the sixth declaration is 
an attempt by the Zapatistas to challenge and destabilize conventional categories like 
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civil society and subalternity that are so often bound up in our attempt as scholars to 
collectively account for the experiences of marginalization, discrimination and 
resistance at the hands of global neoliberal forces. The sixth declaration becomes a 
useful tool to cut through the overpowering presence of categories and groupings to 
reveal the many different, often individualized experiences of trauma that lie behind 
the veil of our assumptions. Perhaps the question should not be whether the subaltern 
speaks but rather who exactly says what and when? In other words, the assumption 
that the subaltern speaks with a unified voice, something which instantly assumes that 
trauma is a universal and shared experience that can be captured with one voice, is 
dismantled under La Sexta which exposes multiple traumas resulting from the 
homogenization of neoliberalism. Viewing the sixth declaration through an 
intersectional lens reveals the overlaps where neoliberal theory negatively and, 
sometimes, traumatically intersects across different social barriers.  
Therefore, the sixth declaration is an exercise in thinking beyond categories 
such as ethnicity to expose instead the many other identity forms across the Mexican 
space that are also negatively bound up in the neoliberal experience. For example, the 
Zapatistas point out how small campesino farmers and business peoples are affected 
by transnational corporations, “si alguien se trabajaba en una pequeña o mediana 
empresa pues ya no porque se cerró y la compró una gran transnacional” (EZLN 30th 
June 2005). Moreover, the declaration sheds light on how homosexual and 
transgendered peoples find themselves forced to resist the homogenizing tendencies 
of this global order, “hay homosexuales, lesbianas, transexuales, muchos modos, que 
no se conforman con que los burlan, y los desprecian, y los maltratan, y hasta los 
matan porque tienen otro modo que es diferente” (EZLN 30th June 2005). The 
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revolutionaries also point towards the many Mexican women who resist 
discrimination under the patriarchal forces of capitalism, “hay mujeres que no dejan 
que les traten como adorno o que las humillen y desprecien nomás por ser mujeres” 
(EZLN 30th June 2005) and, the many young students who continue to resist the 
privatization of education services across the country, “hay los estudiantes que no 
dejan que se privatice la educación y luchan porque sea gratuita y popular” (EZLN 30th 
June 2005). While the Zapatistas do not deny that the fight against neoliberalism is a 
collective one, the sixth declaration stands out as a reminder to first acknowledge the 
presence of subjectivity in a world that consistently tries to challenge the basic 
principles of alterity and difference.  
Compared to previous declarations, the Zapatistas reimagine the landscape of 
resistance in Mexico, adopting their worldview to consider all the ways in which global 
capitalism, which they also refer to as neoliberalism in La Sexta, intersects across 
different subjectivites to produce a political space that neither experiences nor resists 
neoliberalism in uniform ways. Unlike previous attempts to mobilize civil society, the 
Zapatistas no longer locate themselves at the heart of this new global resistance. 
Instead, by acknowledging that neoliberalism impacts individuals and groups across 
Mexico in multiple ways, the Zapatista now struggle for a globalization of resistance 
that emphasizes solidarity and respect for difference. They propose an exchange of 
ideas and material supplies with other, different anti-neoliberal struggles taking place 
globally, drawing distinctive and meaningful connections between spaces of 
resistance.  
For example, the Zapatistas support the Cuban resistance against US 
hegemony, offering the Cuban peoples maíz, “que ya lleva muchos años [los cubanos] 
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resistiendo en su camino que no está solo y que no estamos de acuerdo con el bloqueo 
que les hacen y que vamos a ver el modo de mandarles algo aunque sea maíz para su 
Resistencia” (EZLN 30th June 2005). Moreover, looking beyond Cuba, the Zapatistas 
acknowledge anti-neoliberal resistances being led in Ecuador and Bolivia at the time 
(2005), offering them “un poco de maíz no-transgénico” as part of material aid in their 
struggle (EZLN 30th June 2005). “A los hermanos y hermanas de la Europa Social”, the 
Zapatista revolutionaries offer to supply pozol “que da mucha fuerza en la Resistencia” 
(EZLN 30th June 2005). Of course, as a sign of their awareness of difference in a 
globalization of resistance, La Sexta also draws attention to the fact that this 
fermented alcoholic corn drink, which is highly potent, may not necessarily be of any 
advantage to other struggles elsewhere across the world “porque pozol es más bien de 
nuestro modo y qué tal que les prejudice la panza y se debilitan sus luchas y los 
derrotan los neoliberalistas” (EZLN 30th June 2005). Pozol is a symbolic way for the 
Zapatista revolutionaries to acknowledge respect for difference in this global 
resistance against the universal imposition of neoliberal coloniality in Mexico and 
around the world (EZLN 30th June 2005). Through the exchange and transfer of ideas 
and material supplies the Zapatistas open up fresh space “[donde] quepan todos los 
mundos que existen porque quieren destruir los neoliberalistas y porque no se dejan sí 









This chapter has shown, in great detail, the importance of the Zapatista Delcaraciones 
de la Selva Lacandona as destabilising influences in the political dynamics of neoliberal 
Mexico. Not only do the Zapatista Declaraciones raise and reflect on issues of 
democracy and justice in Mexico, but they present alternative ideas and proposals that 
critically evaluate the world, rearticulating a much more hopeful and utopian space 
that lies just outside the limits of electoral democracy with the support of civil society. 
The Declaraciones describe how Zapatista ideas concerning democracy and civil 
society change as they adjust to new political realities in a constantly evolving 
lifeworld where space is continually reshaped and reimagined in ways often beyond 
their control. From a declaration of war against the neoliberal state in the Primera 
Declaración de la Selva Lacandona in 1994 to a globaisation of resistance in the Sexta 
Declaración de la Selva Lacandona in 2005, Zapatista revolutionaries continue to 
operate and evolve a dynamic and adaptable ethnopolitical model that thinks beyond 
the conditions of modernity/coloniality (Mignolo 2011; 2000) towards a more hopeful 
futurescape, permanently committed to the dismantling of negative capitalist regimes 
(Rabasa 2010).21 
The final chapter of this thesis remains focused on the theme of utopia as an 
important analytical device in the study of ethnopolitical struggle in the neoliberal 
                                                          
21
 In the years since the Zapatistas downgraded the role of the EZLN in the mid-2000s, each of the five 
Caracoles have been responsible for developing and articulating their own communication strategy. The 
Zapatistas now publish all communiqués online (http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/) which also serves 
as a digital archive, where one can source every declaration and communiqué that was ever published 
by the EZLN since 1994. However, considering that this chapter is the first of its kind to formally analyse 
the long-standing Zapatista Declaraciones in terms of their content and influence in Mexico, it is clear 
that there is relatively little scholarship which adequately explores the power and potency of Zapatista 
text. With political figures like Subcomandante Marcos and the EZLN no longer speaking for the 
Zapatista grassroots, there is significant scope for research to consider the ways in which outward 
communication is strategised by the Zapatistas and whether any tensions and challenges emerge 
between Caracoles in this post-guerrilla phase of their development.  
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lifeworld. While Zapatista revolutionaries reflect on a future not yet in the 
declarations, chapter four examines how former Bolivian president Evo Morales 
combines the use of performance and discourse to draw attention to Andean histories 
which he then applies to the construction of Andean utopias in contemporary Bolivia. 
While both ethnopolitical social movements engage the use of utopias as critically 
reflective tools to think and do beyond the limits of modernity and neoliberal 



















(De)Constructing Andean Utopia in Evo Morales’s Bolivia: 








From thinking beyond the limits of the neoliberal state in the Zapatista Declaraciones 
de la Selva Lacandona, attention now turns to observing the ways former president Evo 
Morales Ayma reworked and reshaped the parameters of national political space 
around the historic struggle for Indigenous rights and social justice in Bolivia. 
Applying Flores Galindo's (1994 [1986]) la utopía andina as theoretical framework, this 
fourth and final chapter analyses, for the first time, two inaugural speeches delivered 
by Morales in January 2006 in which he strategically combined the use of 
performance, discourse and memory to convey a new sense of the political which 
ruptured with the neoliberal past. By drawing on the memories of anticolonial 
revolutionary figures such as Tupac Katari and Tupac Amaru II together with an 
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elaborate performance of Indigenous ritual at the ancient ceremonial grounds of 
Tiwanaku, Morales situated his presidency as the culmination of a long struggle for 
social justice which defined the previous five hundred years of anticolonial resistance 
in the Andes. The strategic appropriation and reworking of historical narratives and 
pre-colonial myth and memory in the political present constitutes the essence of 
Andean utopias, according to Flores Galindo (1994 [1986]), and has been a 
characteristic feature of anticolonial revolution in the Andes since the colonial 
encounter in 1532. Not only does this indicate that Flores Galindo's (1994 [1986]) 
Andean utopia is a suitable framework for this chapter but that its application in the 
analysis of Morales's two 2006 inaugural speeches constitutes a new dimension in the 
study of presidential discourse in Bolivia unveiling the ways Morales redefined space 
and endowed it with new meaning. However, in addition to the study of presidential 
discourse and performance in Morales's Bolivia, this chapter also draws attention, 
once again, to the 2011 TIPNIS controversy. Here, this chapter argues that the planned 
construction of this highway development both enhanced and destabilised Morales's 
image as Andean decoloniser. On one hand, I argue that this highway symbolised 
Morales's commitment to renegotiate a history of chronic underdevelopment and to 
enhance Bolivia's economic standing across the pan-Andean region. On the other, I 
draw attention to Morales's excessive use of force towards anti-highway demonstrators 
at Chaparina on 25th September 2011 and reveal the continuities with the neoliberal 
past, particularly in relation to the state's tendency to manage and police Indigenous 
protesters. Finally, I establish broad links between the TIPNIS controversy and the 
downfall of the president in 2019 which prompts us to ask what his resignation from 
office might mean for Andean utopias in Bolivia and the Andes going forward. 
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 This chapter is divided into three sections. In section one I spend time defining 
the concept of Andean utopia in relation to the Andes more generally and Bolivia 
specifically. In section two, I apply Flores Galindo's concept to the analysis of 
presidential discourse at La Paz and Tiwanaku, illustrating how Morales uses 
performance, discourse and memory to redefine the national political space. 
Moreover, I also explore the significance of the constituent assembly as a mechanism 
used to bring this utopian vision to life. Finally, section three discusses the 
significance of the TIPNIS controversy in relation to Morales's utopia, arguing how it 
both enhances and destabilises his image as an Indigenous president who respects and 















Defining la utopía andina 
 
La utopía andina is a concept that was originally developed in 1978 by Peruvian scholar 
and historian Alberto Flores Galindo in collaboration with his close friend and 
colleague Manuel Bruga. It emerged through discussions they had on millenarianism 
in the Andes and was developed and refined through a series of collaborate projects 
including one funded by UNESCO in 1982 (Aguirre and Walker 2010). However, 
during this time, both Flores Galindo and Bruga developed differing interpretations of 
la utopía andina which could no longer be reconciled through further collaborative 
research in this area. This divergence in opinion resulted in the publication of two 
separate texts on the subject, one by each author (Manrique 2013; Aguirre and Walker 
2010; de la Cadena 1990). 
Flores Galindo published Buscando una Inca. Identidad y utopía en los Andes in 
1986 (Manrique 2013; Aguirre and Walker 2010). An immediate success, Buscando una 
Inca was noted for its innovative reinterpretation of Andean campesino history. While 
Bruga released his text, Nacimiento de una utopía. Muerte y resurreción en los Andes, 
almost three years later in 1989, Flores Galindo's text had already drawn substantial 
attention, winning the prestigious Casas de las Americas prize in 1986 (Manrique 2013; 
Aguirre and Walker 2010). Flores Galindo wrote Buscando una Inca at a time in 
Andean history when he witnessed the beginning of yet another revolutionary 
encounter take place on the Andean political horizon. In his mind, this ignited fresh 
concern over the historic divides that still existed between Hispanic and Indigenous 
populations in the contemporary Andean lifeworld. In particular, Sendero Luminoso, a 
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Maoist guerrilla insurgency began actively recruiting and mobilising campesino and 
Indigenous populations throughout the Peruvian Andes, eventually manifesting in an 
anticolonial campaign of violence against the neoliberal Peruvian state in 1980. While 
Flores Galindo did not survive to witness the violent escalation of this conflict and the 
devastation it caused across Peru - the author prematurely died in 1990 at age forty of 
a brain tumor - he was most concerned about how this particular revolutionary 
campaign related to ongoing cycles of Indigenous revolutionary activity in the Andes 
throughout the previous five hundred years of (neo)colonial rule (Aguirre and Walker 
2010). A dedicated socialist, Flores Galindo expressed the greatest of concern for 
socialism in the Andes and, the persistent failure of anticolonial revolutions more 
generally to bring about adequate change and to restore social justice for the 
Indigenous and campesino majority. His work is both inspired by and builds upon the 
intellectual endeavours of Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui who developed a rigourous 
critique of Marxist theory (Humberto Flores 2006). Mariátegui disputed the universal 
and abstract application of Marxism across Latin America which he claimed failed to 
account for Indigenous experiences and subjectivities and, as such, was limited in 
terms of its ability to liberate communities from the excesses of capitalism or, as 
Humberto Flores (2006: 76) writes, “las pretensiones universales del capitalismo de su 
tiempo”. In this context, Buscando una Inca must be considered a radical political 
project of the socialist-Left that sheds light on the strategic role Andean histories play 
in shaping revolutionary activities and their struggle for social justice. 
It is important to point out at this stage that, while Flores Galindo writes from 
his perspective as a Peruvian historian and scholar, his work does in fact have 
implications for the wider Andean region. The Andes is a distinctive region in South 
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America which trancends the nation-state borders of Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia to 
reveal a geographic space that shares many cultural and historical traits. In Buscando 
una Inca, Flores Galindo is chiefly concerned with the relationship between Andean 
societies and the western world and how a violent encounter between these worlds 
more than five centuries ago shaped a perpetual conflict in the political present which 
manifests around key issues relating to history, memory, identity and nationhood 
(Aguirre and Walker 2010; Flores Galindo 1994 [1986]). Identifying the recurrent 
tensions at play between Indigenous and Hispanic traditions, Buscando una Inca 
addresses how Andean societies have consistently engaged the use of specific 
memories and histories of the pre-colonial world to negotiate political futures beyond 
the conditions of colonial subjugation and domination in the present (Flores Galindo 
1994 [1986]). Divided into eleven essays, Buscando una Inca provides the reader with 
an extensive account of Andean revolutionary history from the time of the colonial 
encounter in 1532 right through to the political present (Sendero Luminoso), a colonial 
history of revolutionary struggle that is not just exclusively Peruvian but is also shared, 
in large part, by Bolivia in what is a collective Andean historical imaginary. As Aguirre 
and Walker (2010) note, Flores Galindo's essayist style allows him to capture hundreds 
of years worth of Andean history in a single text, to observe not only how memory and 
history have recurrently featured as important devices in the creation of bold new 
revolutionary futures, but, more importantly, how these memories and histories of the 
Andean past have been influenced by interactions, exchanges and mediations within 
the complex social dynamic of the (neo)colonial lifeworld. 
At this point, it is worth noting that the concept of Andean utopia devised by 
Flores Galindo in the late-twentieth century is neither based on nor linked to Thomas 
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More's use of the term utopia in a much earlier publication of the same name in 1516 
(More 2009 [1516]). While arguably both utopias are political projects in their own 
right, they have separate agendas which places them on decidedly different conceptual 
pathways resulting in different outcomes. As original founder of the term, More 
deliberately confused the definition of utopia to simultaneously mean no-place (ou-
topos) that is also a good place (eu-topos) (Vieira and Marder 2012; Claeys 2010; More 
2009 [1516]). In his text, More created the fictional island republic of Utopia which 
exists outside history in an imagined space, a complete intellectual creation on his 
part (More 2009 [1516]; Flores Galindo 1994 [1986]). While More's Utopia served as an 
opportunity to understand and critically evaluate life in Europe, "where wise social 
planning [was] not so easy to find", his publication unwittingly founded a literary 
genre designed to teach and delighted its readership by challenging their perceptions 
of everyday reality through imagined futurescapes (More 2009 [1516]: 6; Vieira and 
Marder 2012; Claeys 2010; Quijano 2003). As Davis notes, literary or transcendent 
utopias were just a collection of futures cut off from the useless burden of the past 
(Vieira and Marder 2012). They isolated time and space, leaving the past behind as a 
closed case while encouraging readers to focus only on the future as the privileged seat 
of all European hope and expectation (Vieira and Marder 2012; Quijano 2003). As 
Flores Galindo (1986: 22) notes, utopia simply represented "una forma de soñar 
despierto […] la imaginación pero controlada y conducida por la crítica".  
On the contrary, la utopía andina is firmly rooted in time and space and is 
concerned with the memories of the Inca past as an alternative to the colonial present. 
According to Flores Galindo (1986: 39), a distinct feature of la utopía andina is the fact 
that notions of the perfect and the ideal do not exist "fuera de la historia o 
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remotamente al inicio de los tiempos". Instead, as Flores Galindo (1986: 39) writes, la 
utopía andina "es un acontecimiento histórico. Ha existido. Tiene un nombre: el 
Tahuantinsuyo. Unos gobernantes: los incas. Una capital: el Cusco". In his view, la 
utopía andina "ha sido cambiado para imaginar un reino sin hambre, sin explotación y 
donde los hombres andinos vuelvan a gobernar" (Flores Galindo 1986: 39). It 
represented "el fin del desorden y la obscuridad. Inca significa idea o principo 
ordenador" (Flores Galindo 1986: 39).  
Central to la utopía andina is what is known and understood across the Andes 
as el mito del Inkarrí (López Baralt 2016; Flores Galindo 1986). Following the arrival of 
the Spanish in the Andes in the year 1532, Pedro Pizarro and his troops occupied the 
Inca city of Tahuantinsuyo (López Baralt 2016; Flores Galindo 1986). To cement their 
authority and control over the region, Pizarro and his troops captured the Inca king 
Atahuallpa in 1532 and sentenced him to death on 25th July 1533 (López Baralt 2016). 
The death of Atahuallpa is central to the history of the Spanish conquest and is a 
profound moment of rupture in the historical consciousness of Andean peoples past 
and present. As Flores Galindo (1986: 29) writes, "no fue una muerte que facilmente 
pudiera ser olvidada [y] fue la más mala hazaña que los españoles han hecho en todo 
este imperio de Indias". While the death of the Inca did indeed symbolise the collapse 
of the pre-colonial world order and the dawn of a new era defined by the foreign 
occupation of the Spaniards "[que] habían conseguido tierra e indios mediante sus 
armas", it did not necessarily bring about an end to the memories of this Andean past 
which continued to circulate and permeate public consciousness and discourse in 
different ways across the Andes (Flores Galindo 1986: 29). During his execution, 
Atahuallpa's head was severed from his body and his corpse then stolen by supporters 
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so as to avoid any further desecration of his remains by Spanish authorities (López 
Baralt 2016). The sparation of the king’s head and body combined with the unknown 
location of his burial fuelled what became known as el mito del Inkarrí, where many 
Andeans believe that "algún día las partes del Inka se reconstituirán, se unirán el 
cuerpo con la cabeza y será el tiempo del retorno a la liberación y a una nueva época 
de oro, se producirá un Pachakuti" (López Baralt 2016: 7). In other words, someday the 
Inca king will return and rescue the Andes from the colonial grip of foreign European 
powers.  
Pachakuti is a key concept in the construction of utopias in the Andes and 
describes a cataclysmic reversal in time and space, where one era is replaced by 
another in the mental universe of Andean subjects (López Baralt 2016; Postero 2007; 
Flores Galindo 1994 [1986]). A unique concept to the Andes, Pachakuti has multiple 
complimentary and divergent meanings, where it can assume positive or negative 
connotations in the minds of Indigenous subjects depending on circumstance (Postero 
2007). While commonly associated with the negative consequences brought about by 
the colonial encounter in 1532, where the Andes became defined by slavery, disease, 
racism and death, Pachakuti was also the name of an Inca king responsible for 
transforming the Inca civilisation into an imperial superpower that aggressively 
controlled vast swathes of the Andean region for several centuries until its downfall in 
1532. According to Cartwright (2016), the title Pachakuti, which the Inca king bestowed 
upon himself, loosely translates to mean "reverser of the world" or "earth shaker" and, 
in this context, was associated with the elevation of the Inca in the Andean world 
order "and the creation of an empire which would eventually be the largest ever seen 
in the Americas". Therefore, like many concepts in the Andean world, Pachakuti 
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assumes dual meaning, referring to moments of catastrophe or renovation and 
renewal in a constant cycle or turning about in the lifecycle of the Andean universe. In 
the context of Pachakuti, it is clear, then, that time and space interrelate and overlap, 
producing a world that is unstable yet full of change, possibility, reform and renewal 
(Cartwright 2016; López Baralt 2016; Postero 2007; Flores Galindo 1994 [1986]). 
As opposed to the strictly linear worldview offered by European utopias, where 
history remains confined to the past as "another country", cyclicality is a useful way in 
which to discern how time and space traditionally intersect throughout the Andean 
lifeworld (Canessa 2008: 355). As the oldest and most fundamental unit of territorial-
spatial organisation in the Andes, the ayllu, which I discussed in chapter two, offers us 
a glimpse into how time and space are traditionally organised vis-à-vis the other. 
The ayllu performs as a cosmic space of interrelationality and duality, where 
communities mediate between the human or earthly world above and the spirit world 
below (Canessa 2012). Birth and death are not opposite ends of a horizontal and linear 
timeline but are key moments bound up in a continuous and repetitive lifecycle, 
where spirits move between these partially connected worlds inhabiting space as 
human and non-human lifeforms in the cosmos (Yampara Huarachi 2017; Alderman 
2016; de la Cadena 2015; Canessa 2012; Huanacuni Mamani 2010; Abercrombie 1998). 
To illustrate this point further, I return to Alderman (2016) who describes how the 
Bolivian-Andean Kallawaya community frequently communicate and engage with 
nearby mountain spirits or mulchulas which they believe contain the spirits of dead 
ancestors who have passed on from the human world and entered a spiritual 
imaginary where they occupy place and space in different, other worldly forms. This 
does not exclude the Kallawaya ancestors from participating in the daily politics of the 
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ayllu, where they remain important social actors who must be regularly consulted on 
issues through rituals and other performances that take place within the community. 
While this reinforces an-other way in which to do politics in the Bolivian-Andes, it also 
speaks to a particular relationship with history, memory and the past as something 
that is close and intimate to Andean societies, always present in the lifeworld but just 
existing in other earthly ways that remain unknown to European epistemologies and 
ways of doing (Yampara Huarachi 2017; Canessa 2012; 2008; Huanacuni Mamani 2010).  
Moreover, through his observations, Canessa (2008) notes how the Bolivian-
Andean community of Pocobaya speak about the ancient, pre-colonial past with a 
keen sense of familiarity, using grammatical constructions in their native Aymara 
which reveal their personal experiences of history and of the ancient past. For 
example, the Aymara word for history (nayra) also means eyes which highlights how 
history is not just something that can be personally experienced but that it also exists 
everywhere in the places and spaces that can be seen and heard. Unlike the more 
ambiguous characteristics of European utopian thought, where the past and future 
remain on permanently separate ends of a linear timeline, both time and space 
coalesce around the ayllu, where history informs the very basis of everything 
Indigenous people see and do in the Andean lifeworld. Furthermore, Canessa (2012) 
observes how the Pocobayeños frequently hear the Incas in the wind. Following the 
colonial encounter more than five hundred years ago, Pocobayeños believe that the 
Incas never disappeared. Instead, similar to the ancestors of the Kallawaya 
community, the Incas escaped into nearby mountains, where they can be frequently 
heard within the ayllu as earthly spirits that continue to exist and be in the world as 
other (in)visible lifeforms. It is clear, then, that an Andean sense of history can only be 
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understood as a living and breathing thing which not only sustains life in some of the 
most obvious ways (agriculture), but is also the source of all hope, expectation and 
anticipation in the Andean universe. As López Baralt (2016: 5) writes, el Inkarrí or the 
return of the Inca,  
 
se relaciona con transformaciones poderosas, es el fin del mundo y el inicio de uno 
nuevo; es cósmico, deben existir alineamientos y ordenamientos de toda 
naturaleza, todo debe coincidir y confluir para el momento del gran cambio, de la 
transformación del Pachakuti. El mundo debe darse la vuelta y ponerse al revés, el 
Inkarrí es la absorción de todas las energías celestes, telúricas y comunarias que en 
el momento preciso brotan y estallan de adentro de la tierra, donde por siglos 
estuvieron acumlándose para iniciar el cataclismo; no es una persona, no es la 
comunidad y no es la naturaleza. Es el todo que adquiere un sentido en un 
momento preciso, ni antes ni después. Pero que una vez que está en marcha debe 
manifestarse en toda su expresión.  
 
 
Such sense of anticipation and expectation for the return of the Inca or 
Pachakuti opened up new spaces where anticolonial revolutionary struggles could 
shape and rework myth, memory and history in the political present to organise and 
unify entire populations of Andean societies around collective action that aimed to 
wrest control of the Andes from Spanish colonial authorities (Flores Galindo 1994 
[1986]). However, it is important to bear in mind that the concept of Andean utopia is 
neither static nor unchanging but has instead evolved across time and space where, 
memories, myths and histories intersect and merge with Eurocentric epistemologies in 
the political present to acquire new meanings in the pursuit of more socially just 
lifeworlds for Indigenous and campesino majorities (Flores Galindo 1994 [1986]). It 
would be a very difficult task for this chapter to fully capture the enormous length and 
breadth of anticolonial revolutionary struggle in the Andes and how they all shaped 
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and reworked myths and memories of the ancient pre-colonial past for their own 
political and social gain in the present. Moreover, it is also worth mentioning that 
Andean utopias were not all necessarily located in precise moments of revolutionary 
change and transformation in Andean colonial society. As Bruga (1989) argues, song, 
dance, theatre and other cultural rituals are also considered to have transmitted 
meaning, nostalgia and a longing for the return of the Inca. In this way, la utopía 
andina is best understood in plural form (Andean utopias), where it has developed in 
two phases (Flores Galindo 1994 [1986]). As I will show, while Andean utopias of the 
sixteenth to eighteenth centuries were broadly infused with elements of Catholicism, 
emphasising the literal return or resurrection of the Inca, contemporary Andean 
utopias are much more about the struggle for socially just worlds and the restoration 
of harmony across the Andean lifeworld which had been interrupted by the colonial 
encounter (Postero 2007; Flores Galindo 1994 [1986]).  
In particular, I focus here on the revolutions led by Tupac Amaru II between the 
years 1780-1782 not because they represent early evidence for the presence of Andean 
utopias in Andean colonial society. On the contrary, cycles of anticolonial revolution 
were well established across the Andes by this stage in history. Instead, the revolutions 
of Amaru II provide ample evidence for all the ways in which Andean utopias evolved 
within and infused with elements of colonial society to reproduce a series of 
revolutionary struggles that engaged the use of myth, memory and history of the pre-
colonial world to negotiate alternative futurescapes beyond negative colonial realities.  
 
(Image one is included here to draw attention
with Christianity in the region. Pictured is a depiction of the Cerro Rico outside Potosí on the Bolivian altiplano. 
image presents Pachamama, the Andean earth goddess as the Virgen Mary who is worshopped by Spanish religious 
and political rulers from both heaven and earth. 
observation reveals the presence of Andean influences, including the image of the sun and the moon either side of the 
mountain. Painted by an unknown artist the Virgen del Cer
Andean colonial society between the 16
Potosí.) 
 to the ways in which Andean cosmologies intersected and overlapped
While Christian iconography dominates the frame, careful 











Tied to the myth of the Inkarrí, Tupac Amaru II, otherwise known as José 
Gabriel Condorcanqui, claimed himself to be a descendent of Inca nobility and a 
legitimate heir to the Inca throne (Postero 2007; Flores Galindo 1994 [1986]). 
Assuming the name of an earlier member of the Inca nobility (Tupac Amaru) who 
battled against the tyranny of Spanish occupation in the sixteenth century, Amaru II 
was a devout Christian who prepared to lead an army that would usher in a Pachakuti, 
where world order would be restored and the Inca would reign supreme over the 
Andes once again (Postero 2007; Flores Galindo 1994 [1986]). As the image above 
suggests, it was clear that in eighteenth century colonial society notions of 
Andeanness had long fused with elements of Christianity, where the return of the Inca 
often consolidated around the elevation of key revolutionary figures who assumed 
messianic proportions similar to the biblical resurrection of Jesus Christ (Flores 
Galindo 1994 [1986]). Writers like Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, the son of an Inca 
noblewoman and a Spanish conqueror, played a key role in this epistemological 
infusion, producing the first chronicle of the Inca civilisation from the perspective of 
an emerging mestizaje which shaped and reworked elements of the ancient past to 
negotiate and legitimate their own identities as biological products of the conquest as 
well as to placate wider European audiences. Fiengo-Varn (2003) writes that de la 
Vega’s Los Comentarios Reales were produced under the pressure of European culture 
and censorship. She adds that they provided an account of Peruvian-Andean history 
which “celebrates European notions of platonic progression […] while obscuring the 
hard realities of colonial practices” (Fiengo-Varn 2003: 119). Inca Garcilasco de la Vega 
“interpreted the Spanish Conquest as a tragic but inevitable event, to be accepted as 
the prelude or gateway to a new synthesis based on the union of Spaniard and Indian, 
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guided by the inner harmony of Christian and Inca laws and wisdom” (Brading 1986: 
7).  
To that, Flores Galindo (1994 [1986]) writes, that many, including Amaru II, 
read and disseminated de la Vega's Los Commentarios Reales which were circulated 
widely throughout the Andes. He adds that, in one instance, this narrative specifically 
presented the Inca Empire not as a diarchy (which it was) but as a monarchy (which it 
was not), which meant that when Andean peoples in the eighteenth century "se espere 
o se busque la vuelta del Inca se pensará en singular: un individuo, un personaje al que 
legítimamente corresponda el imperio y que asuma los rasgos de mesías" (Flores 
Galindo 1994 [1986]: 43; Fiengo-Varn 2003; Brading 1986). In other words, the world of 
the Incas was recreated in the mind of a mestizo whose greatest concern was 
mediating the complex relationship between Indigenous and colonial societies so as to 
avoid his own possible rejection as a member from either one. Narratives like Los 
Commentarios Reales developed an official status among colonial societies, influencing 
the thoughts and practices of both Andean and European populations and how they 
perceived and understood the Inca past. This historical text was accepted reading 
among Spanish and Indigenous nobility, where Andean utopias appeared as elite-led 
projects that emphasized the important role of charismatic leaders and their ability to 
unite entire societies around anticolonial revolutionary struggle. It was clear, then, 
that Los Commentarios Reales inspired Amaru’s idea of the imperial restoration of the 
Inca and justified his central position as Andean savior within this wider utopian 
construction (Aguirre and Walker 2010).  
Even though Amaru's eighteenth century rebellion spread across the Andean 
region, influencing the famous siege of La Paz in 1781 by fellow revolutionaries Tupac 
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Katari and Bartolina Sisa, it was successfully defeated within two years by colonial 
authorities. The revolutionary leaders, including Amaru II, Katari and Sisa, were all 
subsequently sentenced to death by Spanish judges (Postero 2007; Flores Galindo 1994 
[1986]; Ainsworth Means 1919; Valencia Vega n.d). While the Spanish considered this 
defeat a victory, consigning this revolutionary activity to the confines of history, it 
only sought to reconfirm belief in the perpetual cycle of the Inkarrí among wider 
Andean public consciousness, where the Inca would return when the time was right 
(Postero 2007; Flores Galindo 1994 [1986]). This sentiment was duly reinforced by 
Katari's final words before death: "volveré y seré millones" (Valencia Vega n.d). While 
the memory of these revolutionary figures continues to circulate throughout the 
Andean imaginary, it was clear that their deaths signified the end of the literal return 
of the Inca, according to Flores Galindo (1994 [1986]). Instead, Andean utopias of the 
nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries embraced the struggle for social 
justice and the restoration of idylic and harmonious Andean societies (Flores Galindo 
1994 [1986]).  
In Bolivia, the presence of Andean utopias in the twentieth century was 
reflected by the rise of the Katarista movement which reworked historical narratives 
of the pre-colonial past to develop a political project of ethnic recovery in the present. 
The Katarista movement emerged in response to the assimilationist agenda of the 1952 
Revolutionary Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) state which promoted 
mestizaje as the new cultural norm in Bolivian society (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; 
Canessa 2000). Central to Katarismo was Fausto Reinaga's indianismo or Indigenous 
nationalism which vehemently rejected Occidental modernity in favour of an 
Indigenous socialism (Reinaga 2001 [1970]). Similar to Mariátegui in Peru, Reinaga 
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(2001 [1970]) criticised the foreign imposition of socialist-Marxist thought from abroad 
which, in his view, was unable to account for the collective experiences of local 
Indigenous marginalization in Bolivia. Instead, Reinaga (2001 [1986]) rooted his 
socialism in the ancient past "[donde] hace 10,000 años antes de Cristo", he writes, 
"nosotros edificamos una sociedad perfecta; en que el hombre era felíz porque no 
tenía ni hambre, ni temor, ni miedo" (Reinaga 2001 [1970]: 444). Reinaga (2001 [1970]: 
446) defines in his La Revolución India his notion of la República Socialista India as 
follows,  
 
donde no habrá ni explotación del hombre por el hombre ni discriminación racial 
alguna. Una República donde el hombre no será valorado, medido, pesado y 
tasado por el color de su piel, ni por el volumen y brillo de su oro: producto de su 
crimen, sino por su cerebro, el trabajo creador y la santidad de su vida. Una 
República, donde día tras día se harán la condiciones para que el hombre pueda, 
es esta tierra y en esta vida, desarrollar la plenitud total de su personalidad y -




While Reinaga and his Partido Indio de Bolivia (PIB) struggled to motivate any 
significant social change towards that particular socialist horizon he describes above, 
many Indigenous people began to question the merits of a revolutionary state system 
which forced them to reject their ethnic ways in favour of state citizenship that was 
"organised hierarchially on a clientelist basis" (Canessa 2000: 124). Concerned with 
ethnic identity and its survival beneath the cultural weight of state-endorsed 
mestizaje, intellectuals from rural and urban communities gathered at the ancient 
ceremonial site of Tiwanaku in the year 1973 to launch the Tiwanaku manifesto 
(Escárzaga 2012; Canessa 2000). The Tiwanaku manifesto brought the politics of 
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Katarismo to the attention of the state and the wider Bolivian public, where they 
proposed, for the first time in history, the creation of an Aymara state (Escárzaga 2012; 
Canessa 2000).  
As the name suggests, Katarismo combined elements of the past, including an 
emphasis on Tupac Katari and Aymara social organizing and cosmology, with the 
struggle for social justice in the political present, where they demanded ethnic rights 
and greater cultural visibility articulated through a language of nationhood (Postero 
2007; Canessa 2000). Political radicals within Katarismo, including Felipe Quispe, 
spoke a particular language that was reminiscent of Pachakuti, where he celebrated “la 
forma de organización social previa a la llegada de los españoles, una forma de 
organización social superior a la que éstos trajeron, que denomina sistema comunista 
de ayllus, donde hombre y mujer eran felices porque no había hambre y miseria” 
(Escárzaga 2012: 202). Through his discourse, Quispe promoted an inversion of worlds 
where the modern-colonial society, symbolized by the prescence of the Bolivian 
nation-state, would be erased and replaced by “la construcción de un Estado 
independiente de trabajadores Aymaras, Qhiswas y demás nacionalidades” (Escárzaga 
2012: 204). He adds that the total and complete destruction of a modern, capitalist 
Bolivia was necessary in order to pave the way for the return of what Quispe refers to 
as la Comuna Aymara, “[una] sociedad sin clases, ni razas, donde reine el colectivismo 
de Ayllus, como en tiempos del Tiwanakense Aymara” (Escárzaga 2012: 204). 
Collectively, Reinaga, Quispe and Katarismo represented the resurgence of a socialist-
Left in the Bolivian-Andes that reworked memories of the ancient past around 
political projects in the present. Capitalising on the eighteenth century image of 
revolutionary hero Tupac Katari, Quispe and the Kataristas generated clear and 
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decisive Andean utopian imaginaries which aimed to consolidate and unify entire 
Indigenous populations around the struggle for social justice in Bolivia, to “construir el 
Socialismo Horizontal Colectivista de Ayllus y volver al Qullasuyu original”, the name 
given to the south eastern region of the Inca Empire (Escárzaga 2012: 203).  
Yet, while their presence was significant, their material gains were minimal and, 
as a result of internal divisions, disagreements and political differences, Katarismo 
eventually disbanded. It fragmented into a series of smaller urban-based political 
parties which frequently contested elections in cities like El Alto (Aymara stronghold), 
having limited widespread appeal among the general voting public throughout Bolivia 
(Lazar 2008; Canessa 2000). 
Finally, the 2000-2005 anti-neoliberal protest movements, which I have 
documented at length elsewhere in the thesis, reflected the presence of Andean utopia 
in twenty-first century Bolivia by the way in which they combined elements of the past 
with the struggle for social justice in the political present. While these protest 
movements in Cochabamba, the Chapare and El Alto did not collectively unite to form 
a single, national response to the neoliberal crisis in Bolivia, they did all universally 
resist the tendency of the neoliberal state to privatise the country's natural resources 
which transferred public ownership rights into the hands of private transnational 
interests (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014). Authors, including Dunkerley (2007) and Webber 
(2011), unanimously agree that this period of social unrest in contemporary Bolivian 
history can be accurately described as a social revolution because it carved out fresh 
space for radical transformative action and political renewal. However, Gutíerrez 
Aguilar (2014: xviii) has since referred to this five year period of social unrest as the 
“beginning of an era of Pachakuti”, where the centrality of the state and neoliberal 
283 
 
institutional power was displaced by a polyphonic and plural social capacity that 
distorted the heteronymous political order. In her view, these mobilizations 
represented a historic moment of transformation, where Indigenous communities 
“rose up forcefully […] in a proposal to take political power away from the traditional 
state and subject it […] to local decision making” (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014: 187).  
Through a series of bloqueos or roadblocks in 2003 across the Andean city of El 
Alto, Aymara protesters staged an elaborate defence of Bolivian patrimony which 
starved La Paz of all vital supplies in an act akin to earlier anticolonial struggles led by 
Tupac Katari and his wife Bartolina Sisa in the eighteenth century. Building on the 
momentum of earlier struggles in Cochabamba and the Chapare, where Indigenous 
and campesino protesters resisted the privatization of water and the eradication of the 
coca leaf respectively, these mobilizations led to the collapse of the neoliberal state as 
this era of Pachakuti reverberated throughout Bolivia. Gutiérrez Aguilar’s (2014) 
emphasis on the reverberation of Pachakuti speaks to the motion or rhythem of this 
change as it echos throughout the political lifeworld beyond the precise moment at 
which the neoliberal state collapsed and towards the struggle for a new Andean 
horizon led by president Evo Morales Ayma and his Movimiento Al Socialismo – 
Instrumento Político por la Soberanía del Pueblo (MAS-IPSP).  
In what follows, I locate the presence of Andean utopia in Morales’s Bolivia. 
Through careful analysis of his two 2006 inaugural speeches, this chapter observes the 
ways in which Morales capitalized on Andean memories, myths and histories to 
orientate his presidency in the political present. By mediating between the political 
past and the present, Morales redefined the collective struggle for social justice and 
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positioned his presidency as the culmination of a long and difficult history of 





































Discourse, Performance, Memory:  
Constructing Andean Utopia in Morales’s Bolivia 
 
Now that the general idea behind la utopía andina has been developed for this chapter, 
my attention turns to unearthing some of the ways in which the concept of Andean 
utopia was active in Morales’s Bolivia. While work in this area remains limited, 
Postero (2017; 2007) is one of the few scholars to address how utopian visions of 
Andean culture in Bolivia helped to renegotiate spaces and open up new possibilities 
for political and social reform. Writing in the aftermath of Morales's 2006 election, 
Postero (2007: 19) argues how Indigenous myth and memory continued to be 
reworked and reshaped as a "cultural resource for empowerment" in Bolivia. In 
particular, she writes how Morales and his MAS-IPSP government frequently deployed 
the concept of pachakuti, the reversal of time/space in the Andean mental universe, as 
a discursive mechanism "to convince the public that this government is different from 
all others before it" and that it is here to enact political and cultural reforms “[en] un 
profundo proceso de descolonización política, económica, social y cultural” (MAS-
IPSP 2014).  
 While Postero (2017; 2007) adopts a considerably broad overview of Andean 
utopia in Morales’s Bolivia, I propose to offer a more focused analysis here. In 
particular, I propose to locate the presence of Andean utopia in Morales’s political 
discourse and practice. By focusing specifically within the context of his first 
presidential term (2006-2010), this section will combine an analysis of performance 
and discourse in Morales’s Bolivia to reveal how this president transmitted his sense of 
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Andean utopia via modern and non-modern forms in the pursuit of social justice. 
While Morales delivered a more formal speech to Congress on 22nd January 2006, 
where the president laid out a series of important policy proposals that would shape 
the legal and institutional framework for Bolivia, the president also participated in an 
elaborate Indigenous-led ceremony at the ancient site of Tiwanaku. Here, Morales 
delivered a brief speech at Tiwanaku, where he engaged the use of performance to 
transmit a new sense of the political which gently coaxed his Andean utopia into life. 
By combining the use of discourse and performance over this three-day inaugural 
process, Morales unveiled how myth, memory and history were revived in the political 
present, forming an important foundation upon which to build successful 
ethnopolitical futurescapes. To navigate the complexities of this discussion, I have 
opted to analyse performance and discourse under separate subsections before tying 
























Performing Andean Utopia at Tiwanaku 
 
Following Morales’s successful victory at the polls on 18th December 2005, where the 
MAS-IPSP secured a resounding 53.7% of the national vote, the first of two inaugural 
ceremonies took place at the ancient ceremonial site of Tiwanaku (Webber 2011; 
Holton n.d). Tiwanaku was a carefully chosen location for its symbolic appeal among 
ethnic communities and was indicative of a new era in Bolivian politics. A world 
heritage site, Tiwanaku is located along the Bolivian altiplano, a little over an hour by 
road south of La Paz (Friedman 2008). While a popular tourist site today, Tiwanaku 
has been a source of Bolivian pride throughout much of the twentieth century and is 
the symbolic heartland of Aymara identity. Aymara people collectively claim this site 
as their ancestral home (Friedman 2008). While Tiwanaku may be considered a 
symbol of "common identity and shared memory" among Aymara peoples, Holton 
(n.d) points out how they are the latest in a long line of political and cultural groups to 
appropriate this site as a landmark of their ancient past. As Friedman (2008) notes, 
Tiwanaku exemplifies the way Bolivians attach meaning to and organize space and 
place in a country which has a deeply contested history (Tuan 1977). This ancient 
archaeological site has been continually recreated, re-imagined, contested and 















(Image two provides an overview of the ancient ceremonial site of Tiwanaku
photo one can see the Andean alter
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Tiwanaku was founded as an ancient city-settlement in 1200BC near lake 
Titicaca (Friedman 2008). While the origins of this site remain disputed, it is believed 
that the original inhabitants of this settlement were the Uru or 'water people'. 
However, they were a marginalised ethnic group who were denied access to their 
lands and territories first by the Incas and then later by the Spanish conquistadores 
(Friedman 2008; Holton n.d).22 First, the Incas appropriated the ruins of Tiwanaku in 
the fifteenth century, refashioning this site as their own place of birth (Friedman 
2008). Later, the Spanish conquistadores dismantled this ancient settlement as a way 
to erase the myths and memories that were once formally associated with it (Friedman 
2008). In deconstructing Tiwanaku, the Spanish used the materials to rebuild 
churches of their own nearby for Christian worship, thus reinventing this space in 
accordance with their own Eurocentric beliefs and values (Friedman 2008). Since then, 
Tiwanaku has been the subject of historical interest, drawing the attention of 
European, North American and later Bolivian archaeologists to the region (Friedman 
2008; Holton n.d). Over the course of several excavations, the majority of which have 
taken place at various stages throughout twentieth century Bolivian history, Tiwanaku 
has been reconstructed and restored, where numerous stonework and artefacts have 
been appropriated by European and North American museums for preservation 
(Friedman 2008; Holton n.d). Friedman (2008: 4) writes that German researchers had 
                                                          
22
  Today, the Chipaya, a small ethnic minority who live on the remote Bolivian altiplano, are believed to 
be direct descendants of the ancient Tiwanaku settlers (Langenheim and Morgan n.d). After centuries 
of marginalisation, the Chipaya have been forced to relocate to the bleak altiplano where they struggle 
to survive without proper lands and water resources. Despite claiming the oldest ethnic lineage in 
Bolivia today, the Chipaya continue to suffer discrimination in nearby cities like Oruro to where some 
community members are forced to migrate in search of work (Langenheim and Morgan n.d). For the 
Chipaya who remain on the altiplano, they continue to eek out basic lifestyles in adobe huts, hunting 
flamingo for sustenance. Tourism has become an important source of income for the Chipaya in recent 
years. The community received funding from both the Bolivian government and the European Union in 
a joint partnership which allowed for the construction of several small lodges and a large dining hall 
that can house and feed guests who come to visit this remote community.  
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been so distressted by the “looting” and general “state of conservation of the site” that 
they petitioned the Bolivian government to allow them return some of the stonework 
to Berlin for “safekeeping”. This level of interest by European and North American 
researchers and writers changed the physicality of Tiwanaku through repeated 
excavations, (re)interpreting its use and meaning through various historical readings 
(Friedman 2008).  
By the mid-twentieth century, Bolivia developed interest once again in this 
ancient archaeological site, elevating it as an iconic emblem of Bolivian nationhood 
following the tumultuous Revolution of 1952. The revolutionary MNR sought to 
identify national symbols that would form the centrepiece around which a new and 
cohesive Bolivian nationalism could be articulated. While the image of Tiwanaku 
featured on postal stamps, formly situating it within the national imaginary, the site 
itself became an “apogee of Bolivian civilisation and history” (Friedman 2008: 5; 
Holton n.d).  
By the 1970s, Tiwanaku became the platform for a new kind of nationalism. 
This ceremonial site became associated with the anticolonial resistance of the 
Katarista movement, which, as I mentioned, mobilised in the 1960s against the 
assimilationist agenda of the earlier revolutionary period of 1952. Leaders of the 
Katarista movement, which included the radical Aymara intellectual Felipe Quispe as 
well as former vice-president of Bolivia Álvaro Garcia Linera, converged on the 
grounds of Tiwanaku in 1973 to launch their Tiwanaku manifesto. As noted earlier, this 
manifesto called for Bolivia to be re-founded as an Aymara state and for the country to 
be referred to as Qullasuyu (Canessa 2012; 2008; 2000; Abercrombie 1998).  
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 Alongside these historical-political (re)appropriations, it is also worth 
mentioning that Tiwanaku forms an important part of cultural life in Bolivia. For 
example, Tiwanaku cultural iconography has influenced several Bolivian artists down 
through the decades, among them, the country's most famous muralist Miguel Alandia 
Pantoja.23 According to Holton (n.d), Pantoja often turned to the imagery of flowers, 
animals and other Tiwanaku symbols in his murals which thematically depict the 
hardship of campesino and Indigenous life before, during and after the Bolivian 
Revolution of 1952. Furthermore, today, Tiwanaku continues to influence cultural 
practice. As I discussed at length in chapter two, Bolivian-Aymara engineer and 
architect Freddy Mamani Silvestre continues to draw inspiration from Tiwanaku 
culture, inscribing images like the Chakana or Andean cross onto the façades of his 
bold architectural aesthetic which celebrate ethnicity and plurinationalism in 
Morales’s Bolivia (Lerchs 2017; Bertelli 2016; Little 2016; Andreoli 2015). 
 As a result of these multiple appropriations, it is clear that Tiwanaku is a 
multivalent signifier which acquires meaning through the various discursive and non-
discursive practices that shape a collective understanding of place in reality. The 
combination of symbols, gestures, performance and discourse during the Indigenous-
led inaugural ceremony for Evo Morales in January 2006 (re)appropriated this space 
                                                          
23
 Born in Catavi in the Department of Potosí, Miguel Alandia Pantoja had an illustrious career as a 
muralist producing some 43 works. Many of his paintings were inspired by the twentieth century 
muralist tradition in Latin America which was led by Mexican painters including David Alfaro Siqueiros 
whose work is considered to have influenced Pantoja's aesthetic and thematic style. Pantoja's murals 
depict "el activismo político en defensa de los derechos de los indígenas y más tarde de los de la clase 
obrera, en especial los mineros" (Querejazu 2015). As Montoya (2007) notes, Pantoja's work "no solo 
estuvo vinculado a los momentos claves de la historia nacional, sino que llego a constituir una síntesis 
simbólica de la cultura y el instrumento eficaz para transmitir las aspiraciones populares". Like Mexico, 
many of Pantoja's murals adorn key sites across La Paz, including el Banco Central de Bolivia, Hospital 
Obrero and the headquarters of the Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (FSTMB). 
During the military dictatorship of General René Barrientos Ortuño many of Pantoja's murals were 
destroyed which forced the artist into exile in neighbouring Peru where he later died in 1975. 
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once more, transforming Tiwanaku into a platform which Morales and the MAS-IPSP 
used to transmit his new sense of the political in Bolivia. Against the backdrop of an 
impressive election victory, thousands of spectators from across Bolivia as well as a 
series of invited guests including then-Cuban president Fidel Castro and Guatemalan 
activist Rigoberta Menchú arrived at the ancient ceremonial site to witness Evo 
Morales be crowned Apu-Mallku, "the highest power of the Andean world" (Postero 
2007: 1). Over the course of this two-day ceremony, Evo Morales engaged in a series of 
ritual performances designed to ready him for his forthcoming presidency. 
Throughout the ceremony, Morales donned a bright red tunic or an unk'u traditionally 
worn by Aymara priests (Postero 2007). In a ritual and symbolic gesture of 
purification, Morales washed his hands, head and feet before making offerings of 
alcohol and coca leaves to Pachamama or Mother Earth. In a final performance of 
indigeneity, Morales was blessed by a number of female and male shamens before 
being officially anointed as the chosen leader of the 36 Indigenous nations of Bolivia 
whose representatives were present during the ceremony (Postero 2007). 
 
 
(Image three caputures up close the Andean alter used by Morales at Tiwanaku during his three inaugural 
ceremonies, where he, along with spiritual guides
 
 
Before Morales even uttered his first words at Tiwanaku,
performance of Indigenous ritual and purification gently coaxed his Andean utopia 
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in this case, reproduce a new sense of the political in the present. Of course, defining 
the concept of performance 
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and possibilities. In her view, performance "functions as vital acts of transfer 
transmitting social knowledges, memory, and a sense of identity through reiterated or 
[…] twice behaved behaviour" (Taylor 2003: 2-3). "Histories" writes Taylor (2003: 271, 
21), "become visible through performance", where "embodied or performed acts 
generate, record and transmit knowledge" in a constant cycle of "againness" from one 
group/generation to the next. While she admits that performances or "embodiment" 
may change with the passage of time, "the meaning might very well remain the same" 
(Taylor 2003: 20). Therefore, the types of performances, gestures, rituals and symbols 
on display throughout the course of this two-day inaugural ceremony aimed to revive 
memories and transmit meanings, revealing a form of the political that described, or 
better still, embodied an-other way in which to know the world and do politics in 
Bolivia (de la Cadena 2015; Taylor 2003).  
 This form of ethnopolitics, embodied and enacted by Morales himself, 
expanded a Western sense of the political to include the participation of both human 
and other-than-human elements of the lifeworld (de la Cadena 2015; Postero 2007; 
Taylor 2003). For example, shamens and spiritual leaders from across the 36 
Indigenous nations of Bolivia were invited to participate at the two-day ceremony to 
allow ethnic communities to personally bless their new political leader in accordance 
with their own usos y costumbres (Postero 2007). In contrast to Bolivia's long-standing 
colonial history, where ethnic groups were either marginalised or assimilated by the 
political leadership, Morales demonstrated a form of ethnopolitics that was ethnically 
inclusive and which depended upon the spiritual support of the social whole to 
succeed politically. Moreover, president-elect Morales actively engaged with other 
elements of the lifeworld, including the earth goddess, Pachamama. He did so in order 
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to receive the wider blessing of the Andean universe which acknowledged that 
Morales was not just a president for the living-speaking Andean world but that his 
ethnopolitical project also extended beyond the tangible and the visible to include 
unseen cosmological forces which underpin the Andean lifeworld he looked set to 
govern (de la Cadena 2015). It was only through performance and embodied social 
practice did Morales engage with this sense of the ethnopolitical which is deeply 
entwined with the memories and histories of the pre-colonial past (Taylor 2003). 
 Performance - gestures, orality, movement, dance, singing and so on - has 
always been a fact of life for Indigenous people (Taylor 2003). It has been a 
fundamental way in which communities across the Andes traditionally communicate 
within the lifeworld, conduct politics and other social and economic activities, 
mediate the internal relationship with the ethnic self as well as their external 
association with human and non-human others (Alderman 2016; de la Cadena 2015; 
Canessa 2012; Taylor 2003; Abercrombie 1998). The ayllu, the oldest living example of 
social organising in the Bolivian Andes which pre-dates both the colonial encounter 
and the Inca civilisation, collapses the "false dichotomy" between man and nature, a 
familiar logic to western modernity, to reveal instead a universal social whole that can 
only be understood and mediated through embodied actions (Canessa 2012: 162; 
Yampara Huarachi 2017; Alderman 2016; de la Cadena 2015; Abercrombie 1998). As I 
noted earlier, the Andean Kallawaya regularly perform ritual offerings of coca leaves, 
alcohol and llama foetuses to the nearby mulchulas or mountain deities. This 
acknowledges the political agency of these non-human beings in the ayllu, bridging a 
peaceful and harmonious relationship between these partially connected worlds, 
making them knowable and understandable to each other (Alderman 2016; de la 
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Cadena). With ancestral spirits like the mulchulas permanently inhabiting social 
space, the past is always present and is revived and relived through performance. This 
reflects what Yampara Huarachi (2017) suggests when he argues that "landscapes are 
history settled on the earth which provide information both about the memory of 
men's time and the memory of nature". Even within urban environments, Indigenous 
people continue to perform dances and other ceremonies in places like El Alto as a 
way to mediate the relationship with the ethnic self and to maintain close association 
with their history and heritage despite the great distances that now arguably exist 
between themselves and their ancestral lands (Canessa 2012; Lazar 2008).  
 By engaging in a variety of rituals and gestures that are commonly and 
historically associated with ayllu relationality, Morales normalised this form of 
embodied ethnopolitical practice in the modern political lifeworld.24 In so doing, he 
acknowledged how embodied practice transmits certain epistemologies or ways of 
knowing the world and doing politics which are only revealed to us through the 
behaviours or rituals or gestures that are correctly performed in space (Taylor 2003; 
Tuan 1977; Relph 1976). In accordance with Tuan (1977), who argues the importance of 
the human body in spatial organisation, Morales’s body in action organised Bolivian 
political space to conform with and cater to his cosmological view of the world. He 
elevated the idea of performance as a concrete form of political practice which 
transmitted memories, meanings and a new sense of the political reording Bolivia 
around new spatial imaginaries that included human and non-human political actors. 
                                                          
24
 There is a variety of video footage available online which shows Morales attending inaugural 
ceremonies at Tiwanaku. However, it is difficult to both source and verify video footage depicting his 
2006 inaugural ceremony. Instead, I will insert a link to a video clip which showcases some highlights 
from Morales’s third inaugural ceremony at Tiwanaku in 2015 which should provide the reader with an 
idea of how performance was harnessed by this indigenous president.  
The footage can be found here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NslbPQOJPhE  
297 
 
 However, his performances at Tiwanaku were accompanied by a series of 
speeches delivered both at Tiwanaku and later in La Paz which developed further his 
vision for a more socially just Bolivia. Similar to the EZLN in Mexico, who relied on the 
lettered word to challenge the neoliberal state and organise civil society, Morales, too, 
turned to conventional forms of discourse to further translate his new political agenda 
throughout Bolivia. While Taylor (2003) is clear that there has always been this uneasy 
relationship between the repertoire and the archive, between performance and 
discourse, across Latin American history, where performances have been devalued as 
forms of epistemology or ways of knowing, it is clear that Morales incorporated both 











                                                          
25
 While I acknowledge the importance of performance to indigeneity, it is neither the intention of this 
chapter nor this thesis to consider the performative aspects of ethnopolitics in contemporary Mexico 
and Bolivia. Extensive and thorough research has already taken place in this area (see Graham and 
Penny 2014; Gilbert and Gleghorn 2014) and reveals how Indigenous people harness the power of 
performance to shape their identity. Instead, the aim of this chapter (and thesis) is to focus on 
indigenous text and to analyse the content of Morales’s 2006 inaugural speeches. The aim is not to 
downplay or deny the importance of performance in ethnopolitics but to strongly consider the 
alternative ways (speeches, declarations) in which Indigenous people express themselves, produce 
knowledge and define their political resistance in contemporary Latin America.  
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Discourse and Memory in Morales’s Bolivia 
 
Having engaged in a series of ritual performances at the ancient site of Tiwanaku, 
where Morales embodied a new sense of the political through an elaborate display of 
rituals and gestures that reveal another way in which to know the world and do 
politics in Bolivia, Morales turned to the more conventional sphere of discourse to 
further articulate and elaborate his Andean utopian vision. His political speeches at 
Tiwanaku and La Paz combined rhetorical flair and stylistic flourishes that generated a 
sense of anticipation about the cultural, social and political changes set to come. 
Moreover, unlike performance and embodied practice, Morales's speeches provided 
him with the opportunity to develop policy detail and to put in place a new 
architectural framework that supported this ambitious transformation of Bolivia. In 
particular, his inaugural address to Congress in La Paz on 22nd January 2006 revealed, 
with great clarity, the important pillars of his presidency including the Constituent 
Assembly, tasked with redrafting the constitution. Moreover, Morales's political 
discourse framed these new policies using a particular language and vision rooted in 
the Andean cosmological philosophy of vivir bien which emphasises harmony and 
kinship ties between the human and non-human elements of the lifeworld, something 
which Morales previously expressed through performance and embodied ritual 
practice at Tiwanaku (Postero 2017; 2007; Alderman 2016; de la Cadena 2015; 1990; 
Canessa 2012; 2007; Bendezu 2011; Flores Galindo 2010; 1983; Abercrombie 1998; Stern 
1989). Through this analysis, I will demonstrate how memory and history intersected 




 Following the ceremony at the ancient site of Tiwanaku, Morales returned to La 
Paz, the political and administrative capital of Bolivia, to deliver his formal address to 
the nation. Following his official swearing-in as Bolivia's new president, where he 
became the first Indigenous man to don the presidential sash and be presented with 
the presidential medal, Morales proceeded to deliver this speech which began in a 
rather unusual and uncharacteristic way. As Morales says, 
 
Para recordar a nuestros antepasados por su intermedio señor presidente del 
Congreso Nacional, pido un minuto de silencio para Manco Inca, Tupaj Katari, 
Bartolina Sisa, Zárate Villca, Atihuaiqui Tumpa, Andrés Ibañez, Che Guevara, 
Marcelo Quioga Santa Cruz, Luis Espinal, a muchos de mis hermanos caídos, 
cocaleros de la zona del trópico Cochabamba, por los hermanos caídos en la 
defensa de la dignidad de pueblo alteño, de los mineros, de miles, de millones de 
seres humanos que han caído en toda América y por ellos presidente pido un 




 This request for a minute silence was quite a profound gesture and a unique 
way in which to begin an inaugural address. With an opportunity to speak for the first 
time as Bolivia's first Indigenous president - a momentous occasion for many - 
Morales opted instead to offer up a minute silence to honour, in the presidents words, 
"mis hermanos caídos" (Morales 2006b). By enacting this deliberate form of silence, 
Morales immediately promoted remembering and generated a unique kind of space 
wherein Andean histories, memories and myths converged in the political present to 
find voice and meaning through Morales. From the passage it is clear that Morales did 
not identify nor did he isolate any one particular figure or moment in history. Instead, 
much like the Zapatistas in their Primera Declaración de la Selva Lacandona, Morales 
positioned his presidency as the product of a long and difficult history of Andean 
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revolution which began with Manco Inca in the fifteenth century and which has since 
continued right through to the political present, where miners and the cocalero 
movement fought against the neoliberal state which proposed the privatisation of 
Bolivian industry and the eradication of coca farming in the Chapare (Postero 2017; 
Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014; Crabtree and Chaplin 2013; Harten 2011; Webber 2011; Corr 
2006). Morales actively sought to situate his presidency at the intersection between 
the revolutionary past and present, where he drew attention to the continuity of 
historical struggle in the Andes and how this long and complex history of anticolonial 
revolution shaped the very foundations of his political presidency. Morales says, 
 
Esa lucha democrática cultural, esta revolución cultural democrática, es parte de la 
lucha de nuestros antepasados, es la continuidad de la lucha de Tupac Katari; esa 
lucha y estos resultados son la continuidad de Che Guevara. Estamos ahí hermanas 
y hermanos de Bolivia y de Latinoamérica vamos a continuar hasta conseguir esa 




 From this passage, it is clear to see that Morales captured the very idea of la 
utopía andina. His political speech engaged the historic struggle for social justice, a 
mainstay of Andean history, and a cause that had been taken up by many of the 
region's most prolific revolutionary figures. Not only did this historic struggle 
permeate the political present but it also bore down on Morales who carried the 
weight of responsibility for this historic legacy and who needed to ensure that the 
hopes, dreams and revolutionary ambitions of his ancestral counterparts would be 






Estamos acá para decir basta a la resistencia. De la resistencia de 500 años a la 
toma del poder para 500 años, indígenas, obreros, todos los sectores para acabar 
con esa injusticia, para acabar con esa desigualdad, para acabar sobre todo la 





By embracing this ongoing struggle for Indigenous justice, Morales was 
determined to bring about an end to centuries of Indigenous oppression and 
discrimination, something which characterised the previous five centuries of 
Indigenous life in Bolivia. In many ways, Morales's political discourse performed the 
Andean concept of pachakuti, where he pointed to a major turning about in the social 
order of things in Bolivia. As I discussed earlier, pachakuti is deeply associated with 
the negative and traumatic events surrounding the colonial encounter, where the 
Incas were replaced by the Spanish as rulers of the Andean world (Mesa Gisbert et al. 
2016; de la Cadena 2015; Canessa 2012; Abercrombie 1998). However, objectively 
speaking, pachakuti is neither an inherently positive nor negative mental experience in 
the Andean universe. Rather, as outlined earlier, it describes a turning about in the 
social order of things, where one era is replaced by another in a cataclysmic reversal of 
time and space (Postero 2017; Flores Galindo 2010; 1983; Stern 1989; Bruga; 1988). 
While pachakuti is frequently used to refer to the Andean world and its decent into 
colonial disorder and chaos, it also equally suggests that therein lies the possibility 
that world orders might one day reverse. There has always been this shared 
anticipation and hope, which has transcended generations of Andean peoples, that 
one day the colonial world order might collapse in the same cataclysmic way in which 
it once formally began all those many centuries ago (Flores Galindo 2010; 1983; Stern 
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1989). Through his political discourse, Morales captured this sense of anticipation and 
expectation by situating his presidency on the verge of pachakuti or, as he described in 




Hoy día empieza un nuevo año para los pueblos originarios del mundo, una nueva 
vida en que buscamos igualdad y justicia, una nueva era, un nuevo milenio para 
todos los pueblos del mundo, desde acá Tiahuanacu, desde acá La Paz, Bolivia. 






 This passage, which is part of a short inaugural address delivered by Morales 
during the 2006 Indigenous-led ceremony at Tiwanaku on 21st January 2006, provides 
important insight into how Morales framed his Andean utopian vision for a 
contemporary Bolivia. Unlike a number of his ancestral counterparts, including Amaru 
II, Katari and Sisa, who led a series of anticolonial revolutions throughout the pan-
Andean region between 1780-1782, Morales did not presume himself to be the 'return 
of the Inca' nor did he seek to self-impose any particular kind of personalised view of 
how this Andean futurescape should be (Serulnikov 2016; Flores Galindo 2010; 1983; 
Stern 1989). Instead, Morales was very keen to downplay the personal nature of his 
recent presidential victory, emphasising instead how Indigenous people will now play 






Quiero decirles, con mucho respeto a nuestras autoridades originarias, a nuestras 
organizaciones, a nuestros amautas, a controlarme, si no puedo avanzar, 
empújenme ustedes, hermanas y hermanos. A corregirme permanentemente, es 
posible que pueda equivocarme, puedo equivocarme, podemos equivocarnos, pero 
jamás traicionar la lucha del pueblo boliviano y la lucha de la liberación de los 
pueblos de Latinoamérica. El triunfo del 18 diciembre 2005 no es el triunfo de Evo 
Morales, es el triunfo de todos los bolivianos, es el triunfo de la democracia, es el 
triunfo, como una execpción, de una revolución democrática y cultural en Bolivia. 




In this passage, Morales acknowledged the inclusive and, therefore, collective 
nature of this contemporary Andean utopia. Like the Zapatistas, Morales emphasised 
how the Indigenous principles of community organising and governance such as 
mandar obedeciendo will reduce errors and failures on his part as president by 
ensuring that both he and his MAS-IPSP administration will be held to account by the 
popular will. Similar to the Zapatistas in their Declaraciones de la Selva Lacandona, 
Morales ruptured with the neo-colonial past by decentering the role of the self and the 
executive in the Bolivian political lifeworld, rearticulating a new form of power located 
among the Bolivian pueblo. Morales positioned Indigenous people right at the heart of 
this new ethnopolitical campaign, where Indigenous episteme now functioned as an 
important moral authority over his presidency, guiding the development of this new 
MAS-IPSP administration going forward. While Morales identified indigeneity as a 
leading dimension for his new MAS-IPSP administration, he also cautiously avoided 
overstating the ethnocentric nature of his presidential victory, highlighting that this 
was not just a triumphant moment for Indigenous people specifically but that it was a 
cause for celebration by Bolivians everywhere more generally (Morales 2006a; 2006b). 
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In particular, Morales noted how the Bolivian middle-classes were also welcome 
within the ranks of the MAS-IPSP and that his new administration would not seek to 
alienate those who did not exclusively identify as Indigenous. As Morales says, "quiero 
decirles, muchos hermanos profesionales, intelectuales, clase media, se incorporaron 
al instrumento político de liberación, hoy instrumento político del pueblo" (Morales 
2006a). While it is clear that Morales expressed great pride in being Aymara and that 
this presidency would centre on Indigenous issues, he was also adamant about the 
need to achieve a sense of national unity among the various different social sectors of 
Bolivian society by highlighting how respect for difference should be a matter of 
priority for all Bolivians going forward. As Morales stated during his speech at 
Tiwanku, "buscar una unidad de todos los sectores, respetando la diversidad, 
respetando lo diferente que somos, todos tenemos derecho a la vida" (Morales 2006a). 
 This emphasis on the Bolivian pueblo emerged as a relatively recent feature of 
MAS-IPSP discourse and was something which guided their electoral development in 
the years before their first victory in 2005. The historic roots of the MAS-IPSP lie in the 
coca-growing region of the Chapare, in the department of Cochabamba, where a 
strong population of cocaleros (coca leaf farmers) began mobilising against the heavily 
militarised neoliberal state which advanced an aggressive counter-narcotics policy that 
intended to completely eradicate coca production in the country (Webber 2011). While 
the coca leaf is a sacred, ancestral symbol of Bolivia's Indigenous heritage, often used 
to feed the deities in ritual performances to Andean gods such as Pachamama, it was 
also deeply implicated in the international narcotics trade as a central ingredient in 
the manufacture of cocaine (Alderman 2016; Dunkerley 2007). Many cocaleros were 
former miners who had been forced to return to the agricultural sector following the 
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collapse of the tin industry in the wake of Bolivia's neoliberal-turn in 1982 (Dunkerley 
2007). This increased population in the Chapare encouraged even greater levels of 
production of coca product which, in turn, led to the neoliberal state aggressively 
pursuing an anti-coca campaign that was politically and materially motivated by US 
interests (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; Webber 2011; Harten 2011). In his autobiography, 
Morales detailed how the "DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency] no solo cometían abusos 
contra los pobladores del trópico de Cochabamba, sino también bombardeaban y 
destruían los caminos y playas vecinales, empleando incluso explosivos de alto poder" 
(Morales Ayma 2014: 204). These intrusive and violent actions by the DEA "nos ha 
permitido crear mayor conciencia ideologica, cultural, repasar un poco la historia, por 
eso nuestras marchas también eran por la soberanía y dignidad" (Morales Ayma 2014: 
205). While hunger strikes, road blockades, grand protests and historic marches 
remained all highly popular forms of struggle and resistance among cocaleros and 
other peasant unions across the altiplano at that time, collective moves were also 
being made by campesino leaders in the 1990s to formally establish un instrumento 
político that would channel these marginalised voices into the political mainstream 
and electorally challenge the logic of established parties including the long-standing 
MNR (Arbona et al. 2016; Garcia Yapur et al. 2015; Webber 2011; Harten 2011).  
 In 1996, Alejo Véliz was elected to serve as leader of the newly established 
Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (ASP) (Webber 2011; Harten 2011). However, 
following a series of disagreements among key peasant leaders, including Alejo Véliz, 
Felipe Quispe and Evo Morales, the ASP was quickly disbanded and two new political 
parties emerged in its place (Webber 2011). While Quispe went on to lead the 
Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (MIP), an indianista party that specialises in a radical 
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form of Aymara nationalism which had limited widespread appeal, Morales and the 
cocaleros formed the Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (IPSP) which 
successfully catered to a much "broader, inter-ethnic and cross-regional social base" 
(Webber 2011: 60; Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; Harten 2011; Morales Ayma 2014). Like the 
ASP, the IPSP experienced difficulties in registering as a formal political party, and was 
forced to inhabit the empty shell of the now defunct Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). 
While the MAS-IPSP continued to define a strategy of resistance against the neoliberal 
state, leading street protests and demonstrations, Webber (2011) notes how the party 
underwent a significant shift in approach following the 2002 election cycle, where it 
came in second place to the MNR (22%) winning a 20.9% share of the total national 
vote (Webber 2011; Morales Ayma 2014). Encouraged by this result, the MAS-IPSP 
began to actively transition away from a politics based exclusively around protest to a 
more formal parliamentary strategy that aimed to capitalise on this growing electoral 
appeal (Webber 2011; Harten 2011). For example, the MAS-IPSP courted middle-class 
urban voters by appointing Álvaro Garcia Linera, a mestizo intellectual, as the vice-
presidential candidate for the party. Furthermore, the MAS-IPSP abstained from any 
direct participation in violent confrontations between citizens and the state during the 
2003 Guerra del Gas (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014; Webber 2011). While this decision to 
abstain from violence was welcomed by a more moderate votership, the MAS-IPSP 
also translated the popular demands of the anti-neoliberal protesters into a tangible 
policy platform which not only included calls for resource sovereignty which I 
discussed in chapter two but also the formation of a constituent assembly. 
 While it is clear that Morales exclusively relied upon Bolivia's long history of 
Andean revolution, memory and myth as important contextual markers which helped 
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to orientate his presidency in the political present, he did not explicitly seek to 
recreate or restore the precolonial world order. Rather, as I have established thus far, 
through a combination of performance and discourse Morales focused almost 
exclusively on establising a new era of social justice for Indigenous people, mediating 
between the past and the political present to recreate a new Bolivian national 
imaginary, that both foregrounds indigeneity without alienating other sectors of 
Bolivian society. For the remainder of this section, I focus specifically on how policies 
such as the constituent assembly mediated this challenge, igniting this new sense of 
the political and bringing this Andean utopia to life. 
 The 2009 Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional was the centrepiece of 
Morales's ethnopolitical model of nation-state governance. While Bolivia is no 
stranger to constitutional reform, having amended a total of sixteen different 
constitutional documents in the two hundred years since independence in 1825, this 
was the first time in the country's history that a constitution had been approved by 
national popular vote (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; Eisenstadt et al. 2013; Pearce et al. 
2011). In a similar fashion to the Zapatistas, it is clear that both ethnopolitical case 
studies emphasised constitutional reform as an important hallmark of their bold new 
utopian ambitions. Like Bolivia, the Zapatista social justice movement emphasised the 
merits of a fresh new constitutional framework as a way to transcend the negative and 
dystopian limits of the neoliberal Mexican state in a collective process of national 
renewal that invited the participation of Mexican civil society to lead the change 
(EZLN 10th June 1994). Of course, unlike the Zapatistas, Morales and the MAS-IPSP did 
indeed manage to preside over the development of a new constitutional document in 
Bolivia, one which foregrounds the rights of the country's Indigenous and campesino 
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majority. However, this move to explicitly re-found Bolivia was not without its 
challenges (Eisenstadt et al. 2013).  
 In his two 2006 inaugural addresses, Morales announced the formation of una 
asamblea constituyente that would be tasked with responsibility for redrafting Bolivia's 
new constitution (Morales 2006a; 2006b). To reconfirm his commitment to this 
process of national renewal and social change, Morales proposed to hold elections for 
the constituent assembly within six months of entering political office on 2nd July 2006 
(Eisenstadt et al. 2013; Morales 2006a; 2006b). The decision to entrust this delicate 
process of constitutional change and transformation to the Bolivian pueblo was a 
strategic move on the part of Morales and the MAS-IPSP and one which reinforced 
their democratic credentials as an unconventional political party of the Left that 
remained committed to grassroots democratic participation.  
Capitalising on previous electoral successes, Morales and the MAS-IPSP 
managed to safely retain their majority during assembly elections in 2006, securing 137 
seats out of a grand total of 255 (Eisenstadt et al. 2013; Pearce et al. 2011). While other 
key political parties contested the elections on July 2nd, including the right-wing 
Podemos and the MNR, which won 60 and 20 seats on the assembly respectively, no 
other political party came as close to winning the 54% majority share that successfully 
positioned the MAS-IPSP as leaders of this new constitutional process (Eisenstadt et 
al. 2013).  
 It is clear, then, that the constituent assembly carefully mediated between the 
political past and present, serving as an important hallmark of social justice for 
Bolivia's Indigenous majority which saw them secure a leading role in a new national 
conversation over the country's legal and political future. In his speech at La Paz, 
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Morales was keen to demonstrate to the nation how the formation of the constituent 
assembly was not simply an exercise in constitutional reform but served as an 
important opportunity that would help to move Bolivia beyond the legacies of the 
country's neocolonial past towards a more ethnically inclusive futurescape.  
In view of this, the decision to host the constituent assembly in the historic city 
of Sucre was a move in that direction. In 1825, the quaint, whitewashed city of Sucre 
hosted the most important moment in Bolivian political history. Colonial leaders 
gathered in the Casa de la Libertad to collectively agree and sign the act of 
Independence which presided over the breakup of Alta Peru thus securing Bolivia's 
independent future as a republican state (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016). Relocating the 
2006 constituent assembly to the historic heartlands of the Bolivian republic does not 
just drew attention to the enormity of the political task at hand but, perhaps, more 
importantly, revealed Morales's intention to secure a clean break from this long 
republican history, an opportunity to start-over akin to notions of pachakuti I 
mentioned earlier.  
As Eisenstadt et al. (2013) recall, while Bolivia has a long history of 
constitutional reform, Indigenous people have only played a marginal role at best in 
shaping Bolivian state matter. In 1945, Indigenous people were invited to participate in 
the Primer Congreso Indigenal under the presidency of Gualberto Villarroel (1908-
1946) (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016). While the Congreso allowed Indigenous people to 
channel their demands into the political mainstream, petitioning the government to 
remove pongueaje (compulsory regime of free and obligatory labour imposed by 
wealthy landowners on the Indigenous population) from all future legal texts, 
Eisenstadt et al. (2013) makes clear that the Congreso simply reinforced the marginal 
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role played by Indigenous people in the process of state building in this republican-
era. It confined them to the role of lobbiests unable to lead in the creation of new laws 
for their own personal and political benefit. Meanwhile, in the historic surrounds of 
Sucre, it was clear that the 2006 constituent assembly offered Bolivia an opportunity 
to rethink the past, 'start over' and develop a more socially just and inclusive society 
together.  
 Yet, the constituent assembly encountered a series of internal challenges right 
from the very beginning which appeared to destabilise the very foundations of 
Morales's political ambitions. While the Zapatistas struggled to even arrive at this 
particular point of constitutional change in Mexico, the Bolivian case reveals to us the 
many challenges that confront Indigenous political actors in mobilising a new national 
constitutional framework around key ethnopolitical issues. While numerous complex 
demands emerged among delegates inside the constituent assembly, the contours of 
political division and disagreement can be broadly traced along more conventional 
left-right political divides in Bolivia (Eisenstadt et al. 2013). Even though the political 
Right - Podemos and the MNR - did not necessarily hold the balance of power in the 
assembly, they collectively controlled enough seats in order to be able to influence a 
credible opposition to MAS-IPSP delegates and their proposals. Eisenstadt et al. (2013) 
provides a comprehensive list of all the internal disagreements which plagued the 
operation of the constitution assembly from day one. Not only did delegates disagree 
on whether the assembly should modify the existing constitution or redraft it 
altogether, disputes over voting procedures and political autonomy also delayed 
progress. However, a proposal by MAS-IPSP delegates to relocate the capital of Bolivia 
from Sucre to La Paz resulted in near civil war across the country, forcing the Morales 
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government to suspend the constituent assembly altogether, eventually relocating it to 
the city of Oruro (Eisenstadt et al. 2013; Pearce et al. 2011). It is clear that to downgrad 
the status of Sucre as Bolivia's capital was more a symbolic gesture than a practical one 
on the part of the MAS-IPSP. While it could be seen as a move designed to consolidate 
political, administrative and judicial resources around one geographic location (La 
Paz), it more closely reflected a desire on the part of MAS-IPSP delegates to shift focus 
away from that republican history which Sucre so clearly represented.  
For Morales and the MAS-IPSP the capitalía debate symbolised an opportunity 
to start over, to re-found Bolivia on different terms, from a city of their choosing 
which did not necessarily carry the historic weight of Sucre. As I mentioned earlier, 
while La Paz also has deep roots in the colonial Andes, it has also been the site of 
important anticolonial struggles, some of which posed a serious threat to the very 
foundations of the Spanish occupation of the Andes in the eighteenth century 
(Serulikov 2016; Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; Ainsworth Means 1919). As Serulikov (2016) 
notes, between March and October of 1781, Aymara communities led by eighteenth 
century revolutionary leader Túpac Katari - mentioned earlier in inaugural speeches 
delivered by president Morales -  laid siege to the city of La Paz, blocking off 
communication and starving the city of key supplies for up to 109 days. Just like 
Morales’s discourse and performance, the constituent assembly very clearly attempted 
to draw a distinctive line between the past and present, developing strategic 
associations that emphasised continuity with a revolutionary history of social justice 
while rupturing with the neo-colonial past. As the MAS-IPSP later wrote about the 





Fue una estrategia profundamente democrática de los pueblos indígenas 
originarios campesinos y movimientos populares, para generar un marco de 
consenso dentro de un nuevo Estado, pero también fue la forma de concretizar la 
aspiración de las mayorías históricamente marginadas del país. La Asamblea fue el 
resultado del Poder Constituyente que sintetizaba los proyectos, las propuestas, la 
resistancia y la lucha de siglos de pueblo boliviano. 
 
(MAS-IPSP 2014: 14) 
 
It is clear, then, that the constituent assembly performed as a legal instrument 
designed to secure social justice for Bolivia’s Indigenous and campesino majority. By 
embodying “[las] aspiracion[es] de las mayorías históricamente marginadas del país”, 
as the passage clearly states, the constituent assembly struggled for social justice in 
order to “transformer, desde los cimientos, el Estado colonial republicano” (MAS-IPSP 
2014: 14). 
Amid the chaos, turmoil and ongoing public debate, Bolivia's new plurinational 
constitution was eventually passed by MAS-IPSP delegates in Oruro without the 
participation of Podemos or the MNR. As Eisenstadt et al. (2013: 100) note, in a 
“marathon session lasting fourteen hours, 411 constitutional articles were rapidly read 
aloud, briefly debated and […] approved by two-thirds majority”. However, before the 
legal document was put to the people in a national referendum, the Morales 
government intercepted the text in order to renegotiate portions of it with some 
rather disenfranchised elements of Bolivia’s political Right (Pearce et al. 2011). The 
constitution that was passed into law on the 25th January 2009 was a decidedly 
different document to the one originally approved by assembly delegates in Oruro 
between 8th-9th December 2007. It was clear that while the 2009 Constitución Política 
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del Estado Plurinacional was a reminder of the difficulties faced by an Indigenous 
president forced to compromise on his ethnopolitical agenda, it was a proud symbol of 
ethnopolitical progress in a global neoliberal lifeworld that had confined Indigenous 
people to the political margins. From a series of inaugural ceremonies and speeches in 
early 2006, designed to discursively and performatively embody and enact his vision 
for a more inclusive and socially just Bolivia, Morales and the MAS-IPSP eventually 
signed into law a constitutional text that, in their view, underpinned “la transición de 
un Estado capitalista colonial hacia un Estado Plurinacional, socialista, communitario 
y con autonomías para el Vivir Bien” (MAS-IPSP 2014: 14).  
In what follows, I return to the 2011 TIPNIS controversy which I use to 
demonstrate the complex nature of this Andean utopian vision in action. While the 
highway construction symbolises a process of economic and infrastructural 
development designed to elevate and integrate Bolivia into a pan-Andean futurescape, 
it also represents the deconstruction of other, more locally-based spatial imaginaries. 
In his pursuit of this highway development, Morales denies TIPNIS communities 
agency and their legal right to decide on the nature of development on their lands, 
thus negating the importance of Indigenous constitutional autonomies in favour of 









(De)Constructing Andean Utopia in Morales’s Bolivia:  
Analysis of the 2011 TIPNIS Controversy 
 
Thus far, this chapter has not only established the presence of Andean utopias in 
Bolivia but has successfully mapped that struggle for social justice onto the former 
presidency of Evo Morales. Through careful and detailed analysis of his two 2006 
inaugural speeches, this chapter revealed how Morales combined the use of 
performance and discourse at Tiwanaku and La Paz to engage memories of the distant 
past which, in turn, ignite a new sense of the political in the present, one which 
acknowledged the presence of both human and non-human lifeforms in the Andean 
lifeworld. As I showed, the constituent assembly served as an important hallmark in 
the struggle for social justice in Bolivia, encouraging Indigenous people to lead in the 
creation of a new Bolivian state structure.  
 In this third and final section, however, our attention returns to the 2011 TIPNIS 
controversy which I previously explored in chapter two. As one of two primary case 
studies in this thesis, additional analysis of the TIPNIS controversy discusses the 
development of this disputed highway from an original Andean utopian perspective. 
Unfolding over two stages, this section will first address how the TIPNIS highway 
helped Morales to renegotiate a Bolivian history characterized by chronic 
underdevelopment and limited or fragemented national economic growth. As I will 
show, by relentlessly pursuing this highway development in the TIPNIS reserve for 
several years, it symbolized a wider move on the part of Morales and the MAS-IPSP to 
reinvent Bolivia’s role in the Andean region and to position the country at the 
economic crossroads between east and west.  
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 However, the highway also intersected with local Indigenous imaginaries 
within the TIPNIS reserve itself, thus destablising the image of Morales and the MAS-
IPSP as an inclusive ethnopolitical state model. Building on earlier discussions from 
chapter two, this chapter will focus specifically on events such as the Chaparina 
Massacre and the Indigenous consultation to reveal how the TIPNIS highway reasserts 
the traditional dynamics of the (neo)colonial state which Morales and the MAS-IPSP 
had hoped to confine to the past.  
At this point it worth mentioning that there will be several overlaps from my 
earlier analysis of the TIPNIS controversy in chapter two. Not only will this provide an 
opportunity to recap on some key dates and events, but it will also be necessary in 




























Renegotiating the Past, Developing for the Future 
 
There are a number ways in which to consider how the TIPNIS highway development 
renegotiates the past in order to overcome a history of limited, fragmented economic 
growth. To begin with, when Morales first announced plans to proceed with this 
highway, it was confirmed that Brazil would play a leading role in its development. 
Brazilian authorities originally put forward up to $415 million to finance the project 
while Bolivian officials contracted Brazilian engineering and construction firm, OAS, 
to deliver on the highway by the year 2014 (El Deber 1st August 2011). This highway 
intended to link the departments of Cochabamba and Beni together, a distance 
covering around three hundred kilometers (El Deber 1st August 2011). For those who 
objected, Morales simply claimed that he did not quite understand “cómo es possible 
que estos sectores estén en contra del progreso, de la integración y del desarollo 
economico del país” (El Deber 3rd August 2011). To understand further the president’s 
insistence on progress and integration here, it is important to acknowledge Bolivia’s 
history with regards to processes of development and how construction of the TIPNIS 
highway symbolises an effort to overcome this past. Let us recap this history briefly.    
As I have discussed elsewhere, Bolivia has not only been been a traditionally 
very poor and deeply unequal nation-state but it has been regionally isolated and 
geographically fragmented (Webber 2011). Reflecting on the national question in his 
controversial Pueblo Enfermo, early 20th century Bolivian writer and intellectual 
Alcides Arguedas argued that the disarticulated nature of Bolivian geography and a 
lack of modern transport infrastructure to retify this inherent national condition 
contributed to his pessimistic assessment of Bolivia as “un pueblo enfermo” (Paz-
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Soldán 1999). Bolivia's highlands and lowlands have long been historically 
disconnected from one another, with towns, villages and settlements in the 
Amazonian north in particular being most isolated. Since formal colonial rule, the 
majority of investment and development within Bolivia has focused primarily on 
important and strategic sites along the Bolivian altiplano, where minerals and other 
lucrative resources have been primarily sourced (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016). For 
example, as I discussed in chapter two, during formal Spanish occupation of the 
Andean region in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the city of Potosí developed 
into a mega-metropolis on the back of silver that was being relentlessly extracted from 
the nearby Cerro Rico mountain (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016). And, when silver extraction 
declined following Bolivian independence in 1825, cities like Oruro further along the 
Bolivian altiplano eventually replaced Potosí as important and strategic economic 
centres (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016). The highland city of Oruro developed in strength 
and character during the ninteenth and twentieth centuries as a result of the lucrative 
tin mining trade which was fuelled domestically by foreign demand from overseas in 
Europe. Therefore, broadly speaking, development in Bolivia over the last few 
centuries has been largely concentrated on the altiplano, where there has been greater 
demand for infrastructural investment to facilitate the exploitation of natural 
resources.   
However, the twentieth century Revolutionary government set out to 
reconfigure this imbalance between northern and southern Bolivia. The rise of the 
national revolutionary party, the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), led to a 
period of accelerated growth in transport and other infrastructural projects. The 
intention behind this infrastructural development strategy was to modernise Bolivia 
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and to better integrate disparate regional geographies together. For example, 
Capobianco R (1996) describes how the 1952 Revolutionary MNR facilitated the 
construction of a new asphalt roadway between Cochabamba, in the Cordillera valley, 
and Santa Cruz de la Sierra, in the Oriente. Not only was this roadway designed to 
integrate these once formally disconnected geographies together but it also aimed to 
promote a national, state-endorsed process of internal colonisation, where highland 
campesinos would migrate to the underpopulated Amazonian lowlands as agricultural 
workers to help support emerging agribusinesses in the Oriente. As an advertisement 
in the newspaper La Nación attests, “la moderna carretera que unirá Cochabamba y 
Santa Cruz constituye un motivo de justificado orgullo para el Supremo Gobierno de 
Bolivia (La Nación 9th April 1953). 
The MNR’s plan to infrastructurally modernise Bolivia expanded beyond just 
simply roadways. The revolutionary government extended the Bolivian rail network 
further south towards the national borders of neighbouring Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile. In the same national periodical I mentioned above, an edition of the newspaper 
that celebrates the first anniversary of the 1952 Revolution, the government promoted 
a new rail link between Antofagasta in Chile and Bolivia with additional rail services 
running to Buenas Aires, Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosí, Uyuni and Atocha among 
others (La Nación 9th April 1953).  
Moreover, that same year, the MNR government also inaugurated the 
construction of El Aeropuerto Nacional de El Alto in April 1953 (Mesa Gisbert et al. 
2016; La Nación 9th April 1953). The development of this new airport infrastructure 
coincided with the first anniversary of the launch of a new national airline known as El 
Lloyd Aero Boliviano which began operations one year earlier connecting Bolivians 
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“desde el cielo a la patria”, as the advertisement states (La Nación 9th April 1953). In 
turning the sod at this new airport development, revolutionary intellectual and then-
president of Bolivia, Dr Víctor Paz Estenssoro, declared that this new airport would 
form “parte integrante de un verdadero plan de carácter nacional" (La Nación 9th April 
1953). However, as we know from previous discussions of revolutionary nationalism in 
earlier chapters, successive twentieth-century Bolivian governments were limited both 
in terms of their political stability and financial scope to continue this radical 
redevelopment of the country into a modern and well-integrated nation-state. Instead, 
burdened by national debt, Bolivia suddenly shifted focus away from state-centred 
development projects towards a neoliberal political process that focused on 
decentralisation, free market capitalism and the privatization of industry and services 
(Goodale and Postero 2013; Webber 2011; Harvey 2005).  
  In 2000, new opportunities emerged that would help shape the development of 
Bolivian infrastructure and support Morales's Andean utopian vision which included 
strengthening his country's standing in the continental region. Between the 4th-5th 
December 2000, a dozen or so transport ministers from across several South American 
nation-states descended upon the city of Montevideo to formally agree and sign the 
Iniciativa para la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana (hereafter IIRSA) (Centro 
Cuarto Intermedio 2011). The IIRSA was a long-term infrastructural development plan 
specifically for the South American region and involved the finance and construction 
of road, rail, air, maritime and telecommunications infrastructure at strategic 
locations throughout South America (Centro Cuarto Intermedio 2011). Broadly 
speaking, the intention behind this development plan was to modernise and integrate 
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South American countries together, to better facilitate trade and economic growth 
through infrastructure (Centro Cuarto Intermedio 2011).  
It was clear that a region-wide plan of this nature was drafted to rival 
development taking place in North and Central America. As I discussed in chapter 
one, el Plan Puebla Panamá (PPP) was first implemented in the year 2001 and was 
designed to enhance infrastructural ties between Mexico and its Central American 
neighbours. The intention behind this was to extend the benefits of North American 
free trade and economic growth further south along the continent. To rival North and 
Central American economic growth, Brazil favoured a process of South American 
integration to ensure “que no están al margen del desarrollo económico del capital, 
situación que oblige a la interconexión vial de países que facorezca a bajar costos de 
exportación y de esta manera se incremente la competitividad comercial” (Centro 
Cuarto Intermedio 2011: 35-36).  
It is clear, then, that as an important and strategic player in the region, Brazil 
was a leading participant behind the formation and development of IIRSA. Brazil was 
keen to find ways in which to forge fresh trade routes with Peru. In particular, Brazil 
had it sights set on the lucrative East Asian market to which Peruvian coastal ports 
had direct access. To exploit the benefits of trade with China, Brazil first had to 
establish the necessary infrastructure to connect the east and west coasts of the 
Andean region together (García Torres 2011). Among other initiatives, IIRSA proposed 
the development of el Interoceánico Central, a series of strategic infrastructural 
developments that would take place across the Andean region over an extended 
period of time, eventually forging a cross-continental network of roadways, bridges 
and tunnels linking Brazil with Peru and, therefore, Brazilian industry with the Asian-
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Pacific marketplace. In a similar vein to the Mexican PPP, which was renamed the 
MesoAmerica Project (MP) in 2008, IIRSA was also rebranded, absorbed under a new 
cross-continental development organisation referred to as COSIPLAN (Consejo 
Suramericano de Infraestructura y Planeamiento). However, despite these 
organizational changes, el Interoceánico Central remained a priority for this regional 
development committee, placing Morales’s Bolivia right at the strategic crossroads of a 
new and emerging pan-Andean economic zone.  
Under proposals for el Interoceánico Central, eight out of a total of nine 
Bolivian departments were identified as locations where infrastructural development 
would take place to facilitate construction of this strategic corridor. Considering 
Bolivia’s history, the Morales government was all too eager to exploit the benefits of 
this expansive infrastructural operation across large swathes of Bolivian territory. Even 
through it was Brazilian commercial interests driving this infrastructural development 
plan, it was clear that Bolivia would also benefit greatly from fresh access to coastal 
ports in Peru.  
Access to the coast has been a particularly contentious issue for Bolivians over 
the previous two centuries. Anyone familiar with the geography of Latin America will 
know that Bolivia has long been a landlocked country, losing its coastline to 
neighbouring Chile in La Guerra del Pacífico which unfolded between the years 1879-
1883 (DIREMAR 2014; Querejazu Calvo 1983). At the heart of this conflict lay a dispute 
over the lucrative, resource-rich region known as the Litoral which, in the period 
before the war, formed part of Bolivian territory (Mesa Gisbert et al. 2016; DIREMAR 
2014; Querejazu Calvo 1983). However, on the 14th February 1879, “Chile invadió 
militarmente el puerto boliviano de Antofagasta […] sin previa declaratoria de Guerra” 
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(DIREMAR 2014: 20). Since then, tensions between Bolivia and Chile have been quite 
frayed with both governments laying equal claim to the Litoral. Over the years, there 
have been several attempts by both sides to resolve this territorial dispute through 
diplomatic channels. The most significant of these came on 18th May 1895 when Bolivia 
and Chile signed three treaties including el Tratado de Paz y Amistad, el Tratado de 
Transferencia de Territorio and el Tratado del Comercio (DIREMAR 2014). While under 
these agreements Chile remained sovereign owner-occupier of the Litoral, these 
treaties granted Bolivia access to maritime ports in the region. But given the nature of 
the conflict itself, and that fact that Chile simply took the Litoral away from Bolivia, 
these agreements did not entirely satisfy Bolivia which has continued to push for more 
adequate and appropriate solutions to this conflict.  
On 17th February 2011, Morales and his government escalated tensions even 
further between the two countries when he and the MAS-IPSP took Chile to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague to legally challenge their claim to the 
Litoral (DIREMAR 2014). While Bolivia's latest legal effort to reclaim sovereign access 
to the coast failed, this whole process completely underscored the strategic 
importance of domestic, regional and international infrastructure networks like el 
Interoceánico Central which continue to provide Bolivia with (in)direct access to 
coastal ports. In all that Morales and his government have tried to achieve, he aimed 
to capitalize and enhance Bolivia’s strategic location at the heart of a pan-Andean 
economic frontier. Such infrastructural programmes, according to van Dijck (2013), 
not only aimed to support regional and national intergration within Bolivia but also 
intended to strengthen the country’s influence internationally.  
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The TIPNIS highway was a symbol of that commitment to foster greater 
economic integration across the pan-Andean region. While the 2008 TIPNIS highway 
did not form part of original IIRSA proposals, its recent addition to the Bolivian 
infrastructural landscape showcased Morales's intention to commit to an ongoing 
process of economic development and integration across the Andes with the financial 
and material support of neighbouring Brazil. By connecting together the departments 
of Cochabamba and Beni, the TIPNIS highway drew together two important 
departments which had already been isolated for development under previous IIRSA 
proposals. While García Torres (2011) acknowledges that the TIPNIS highway was not 
officially included in IIRSA projects, she states that “su relación parece bastante 
probable en la medida en que se constituye como una ruta auxiliar que permitirá la 
conexión entre los Ejes principales del IIRSA en el país” including, she adds, el Eje 
Interoceánico Central. It is clear, then, that development of the TIPNIS highway served 
as an opportunity for Bolivia to reinvent the Andean space and to enhance its 
economic producitivty. By accepting rather than rejecting development opportunities 
proposed by neighbouring Brazilian authorities, Bolivia could renegotiate the past, 
overcome the limitations of history and advance its standing on the economic 
international stage with the support of Brazil. The TIPNIS highway represented new 
opportunities for Morales’s Bolivia to strategically position itself at the heart of a new 
and emerging Andean futurescape. As García Torres (2011) adds, “Bolivia resulta clave 
como país de transito para que Brazil pueda dar salida a sus mercancias por el 
Pacífico”. Moreover, Morales and the MAS-IPSP had already distributed concessions to 
a number of multinational corporations, permitting the likes of Brazil and other 
transnational players to begin exploratory drilling in the TIPNIS reserve once the three 
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phases of this roadway development were completed (McNeish 2013; García Torres 
2011). While the highway itself was relatively small in scale considering the vastness of 
the Andean region overall, it symbolised Morales's commitment to Bolivia's economic 
integration within the wider pan-Andean region.  
For the remainder of the chapter I will focus on the ways in which the TIPNIS 
highway has also been perceived as dystopian by lowland Indigenous communities 
from within the TIPNIS reserve who seek to preserve and protect the integrity of their 
ethnoterritorial rights against large-scale infrastructural development. This 
controversy also drew attention to the way in which Morales’s Andean utopian vision 

















The 2011 TIPNIS Controversy and Continuities with the Neoliberal Past 
 
The aim of this final section is to argue that, while the TIPNIS highway development 
may appear to represent new economic opportunities for Bolivia on a pan-Andean 
scale, it also symbolises a certain degree of continuity with the past for lowland 
Indigenous communities (Yuracaré, Moxeños, Chimané) who were forced to confront 
the hegemonic tendencies of the Morales state. Through my earlier analysis of locally 
sourced print media in chapter two, I argued that the TIPNIS reserve developed into a 
discursive battleground, where lowland Indigenous people found themselves 
marginalised by the discursive impulses of Bolivia’s former Indigenous president. In 
this final section, I complement the findings of that earlier analysis by showcasing 
here how Morales's use of force against lowland Indigenous protesters further 
alienated TIPNIS communities from the plurinational state. In particular, I focus on 
events surrounding the Chaparina Massacre, a key moment in the early stages of 
TIPNIS conflict which, I argue, resembled events during Bolivia's neoliberal past where 
former president Sanchez de Lózada used military aggression against protesters 
during the 2003 Guerra del Gas (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014). I conclude that the TIPNIS 
controversy, in particular the Chaparina Massacre, played a small role in the wider 
destabilisation of Morales's image as Andean decoloniser and that this contributed, in 
a very broad sense, to a decline in his support which, in turn, led to the eventual 
collapse of his regime in 2019.  In the context of this chapter, the recent collapse of 
Morales's presidency encourages us to reflect more profoundly on the nature of 
Andean utopias in Bolivia, particularly in relation to Pachakuti and the ongoing cycle 
of struggle for justice by Indigenous people in the Andes.  
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 In response to government plans to construct a highway directly through the 
heart of the TIPNIS reserve and Indigenous territory, lowland Indigenous 
communities organised for an elaborate protest march to take place between the town 
of Trinidad, in the Bolivian Amazonia and La Paz (Delgado 2017; Laing 2015; McNeish 
2013). The march was coordinated by the lowland Indigenous organisation, 
Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB), which was formed in 1989 to 
defend the collective interests of lowland Indigenous communities from the threat of 
logging and other agroindustrial activities taking place on or near their protected 
territories including the TIPNIS reserve. On the 15th August 2011, several hundred 
lowland Indigenous people gathered in Trinidad to begin this march which covered a 
distance of six hundred kilometres (La Prensa 12th August 2011; Los Tiempos 15th August 
2011). The march was entitled La octava marcha indígena por la dignidad y la tierra y el 
territorio (Los Tiempos 15th August 2011). The title of the protest itself provides us with 
our first clue to suggest that this conflict symbolised a degree of continuity with the 
past from the perspective of lowland Indigenous people (Página Siete 15th August 2011). 
As I discussed elsewhere, lowland Indigenous people had been conducting protests 
marches from the Bolivian lowlands to La Paz since 1990, when members of CIDOB 
first co-ordinated the Marcha por el territorio y la dignidad. As stated in chapter two, 
central to this first march was a greater demand for the legal protections of their 
lowland territories (Página Siete 15th August 2011). During a series of multicultural 
reforms in the mid-1990s, the government implemented Ley INRA (Ley del Servicio 
Nacional de Reforma Agraria) which designated several territories including the 
TIPNIS reserve as a Tierras Comunitarias de Origen (TCO). However, the continuity of 
these marches under the administration of Indigenous president Evo Morales drew 
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attention to the limitations of the plurinational state in relation to the land question 
in the Bolivian lowlands and for its inability to secure dignity for Indigenous people in 
the region. The fact that this march was the eighth in a long succession of marches 
that transcended the political change from neoliberalism to plurinationalism under 
Morales reflected, for lowland Indigenous communities at least, the view that Morales 
government did not represent the restoration of dignity.  
 The 2011 march for dignity between Trinidad and La Paz lasted a total of three 
months beginning 15th August 2011 and concluding the 19th October that same year. 
Despite the peaceful nature of the demonstration, the Morales state still approached 
the protesters with aggressive force. In the wake of increasing tensions between 
lowland Indigenous marchers and cocaleros, who staged several bloqueos along the 
route of the march in support of the highway development, the Morales government 
sent in state negotiators and up to four hundred police officers as a way to somehow 
mediate hostilities between groups. Amid the standoff between pro- and anti-highway 
demonstrators, Bolivian police raided a makeshift encampment that been established 
overnight on the 24th-25th September by lowland Indigenous protesters. In this 
surprise move, police armed with batons and tear gas attacked and arrested many of 
the protesters in an event which has been widely remembered as the Chaparina 
Massacre (McNeish 2013). While some protesters managed to escape the ambush, 
hiding themselves and their children in nearby overgrowth, many more men, women 
and children were beaten, arrested and hauled away in a fleet of waiting hired buses 
(McNeish 2013; Gil 2012).  
 Video footage of the incident quickly surfaced across national media and 
sparked outrage among the Bolivian public who then took to the streets in solidarity 
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with TIPNIS marchers. Events at Chaparina badly damaged the reputation of Morales 
and his administration which, as I had emphasised earlier, centred on the Indigenous 
struggle for justice against colonial violence and prejudices. In an effort to quieten 
national discontent, Morales repeatedly attempted to distance himself from the event 
claiming that not only had a number of police officers stepped out of line, but that he 
did not order nor was he aware of any such plan to carry out this attack in the first 
place (McNeish 2013). As Morales was later quoted saying in a national periodical: 
"ninguna acción de intervención o represión fue dispuesta el 25 de septiembre de 2011 
por mi autoridad" (Página Siete 16th October 2013). He repeatedly denied knowledge of 
or involvement in the Chaparina Massacre and attempted to legitimise this response 
by reciting his own personal experience of oppression at the hands of US and Bolivian 
military intervention in the Chapare during the height of the coca eradication 
campaign in the 1990s (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014; Actenberg 2013; Dunkerley 2007). Yet, 
despite his claims to ignorance, both he and his MAS-IPSP administration could not 
shake off the image of bloodied protesters which circulated widely throughout Bolivia. 
It was not that long ago when security forces were deployed by the state to quell 
protests in the Andean city of El Alto during the 2003 Guerra del Gas (Gutiérrez 
Aguilar 2014). At the height of this anti-neoliberal protest, where Aymara activists 
resisted government efforts to privatise Bolivian gas reserves and redistribute this 
resource abroad, 45 Indigenous protesters were killed (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014). The 
Chaparina Massacre drew fresh attention to the continuities between the past and the 
present and the tendency of the Bolivian state to police the demands of Indigenous 
people who appeared to slip outside the limits of multicultural containment (Hale 
2005). Despite firing several leading members of his cabinet and the defence forces in 
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addition to conceding protesters’ demands and halting construction of the highway, 
events at Chaparina left a lasting legacy which continued to permeate the public 
consciousness. Several years later and Fernando Vargas, former leader of the TIPNIS 
Subcentral committee claims that lowland Indigenous people still seek justice for 
events that happened that day. As Vargas is quoted saying, "es una situación tan crítica 
que a siete años no tenemos a ningún responsable" (El Deber 2019). Moreover, Vargas 
reported in the same interview that Indigenous communities from the TIPNIS reserve 
commemorated the seven year anniversary (2019) of the Chaparina Massacre with an 
event organised by el Comité Cívico pro Santa Cruz, a right-wing organisation that has 
always stood in opposition to Morales, leading the separatist agenda in Santa Cruz de 
la Sierra (El Deber 2019). It is controversies like Chaparina that slowly eroded Morales's 
once formidable political majority, which gradually contributed to the eventual 
demise of his presidency after fourteen years.  
His downfall, however, does raise some interesting questions in relation to 
Andean utopias in Bolivia and the cycle of anti-colonial revolution which has long 
characterised this history. Has that moment or cycle of Pachakuti, which Morales 
famously alluded to in his two 2006 inaugural speeches, now come to an end?  How 
will Indigenous people frame the downfall of the country's first Indigenous president 
in years to come? Does another Pachakuti await? These questions are impossible to 
answer at this stage. Yet, they serve an important basis for future discussion. As 
Indigenous people prepare for the long-term consequences of Morales's forced 
resignation from power, the question of socialism, indigeneity and the struggle for 





This final chapter has been dedicated to observing the ways former Bolivian president 
Evo Morales Ayma redefined the national character, reworking political space around 
the historic struggle for Indigenous rights and justice in the twenty-first century. 
Through an Andean utopian framework, this chapter analysed Morales's two 2006 
inaugural speeches concluding that his combined use of performance and discourse 
enacted a new sense of the political, transmitting memories and myths about the pre-
colonial and anti-colonial revolutionary past which helped to orientate his presidency 
in the political present. By drawing attention to Bolivia's long history of anti-colonial 
revolutionary heroes in the Andes, Morales positioned his presidency as the 
culmination of this long historic struggle for Indigenous justice, strategically situating 
his 2006 election victory as a new era of change, akin to a moment of Pachakuti in the 
lifecycle of the Andean cosmological universe. My discussion of the constituent 
assembly reinforced that point, drawing attention to the ways Morales applied modern 
policies and frameworks to consolidate this new sense of the political in the 
contemporary Andean lifeworld. However, my discussion of the TIPNIS controversy 
provided impetus to rethink the fragile nature of utopias in the Andes. While I argued 
the case that the TIPNIS highway enhanced Morales's image, signifying his 
commitment to redeveloping Bolivia out of its enfermedad to borrow Arguedas historic 
view of it, the TIPNIS conflict most notably left behind a lasting legacy that continues 
to reverberate throughout lowland Indigenous communities who seek justice for the 
Chaparina Massacre. It was moments like this, where the Morales state used excessive 
force against peaceful anti-highway Indigenous demonstrators that contributed 
towards a gradual decline in his support which, broadly speaking, contributed towards 
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the eventual demise of his regime altogether. With yet another anti-colonial 
revolutionary cycle brought to an abrupt end, where does this leave indigeneity, 
socialism and Andean utopia in Bolivia? 
 It is clear, then, that the two theoretical utopian frameworks applied across the 
latter half of this thesis helped to illuminate the similar ways in which former 
president Morales and the Zapatista social justice movement utilized discourse to 
endow spatial imaginaries with new meanings in their common pursuit of justice for 
Indigenous people. While the Zapatistas think outside the democratic and electoral 
limits of the nation-state, towards a more hopeful space, Morales shaped and 
reworked the internal dynamics of Bolivia, relying on Andean histories and memories 
to orientate his presidency in the political present. However, the contested nature of 
state power revealed the fragile limits of this Andean utopia and Morales’s decline in 
support strongly contrasted with the slow and steady development of the Zapatistas 
and their globalisation of resistance. In what follows, I develop these points further in 
the conclusion, elaborating on some of the key findings to emerge from this 



















This study set out to consider the implications of ethnopolitical research conducted 
from a "hemispheric frame of reference" (Castellanos et al. 2012). This study focused 
on two primary case studies drawn from Mexico and Bolivia which offered excellent 
insight into the elaborate and influential ways in which Indigenous people have, and 
continue to, resist the politics of the international neoliberal order. From an analysis 
of the Zapatista social justice movement, which operates outside the limits of the 
Mexican state, this study also considered the implications of an ethnopolitical state 
framework in Morales's Bolivia through discussion of the controversial 2011 TIPNIS 
dispute. As the first study of its kind to examine Mexico and Bolivia from a 
comparative ethnopolitical perspective, this thesis was guided by two key questions: 
what happens to our understanding of ethnopolitics when framed within a 
comparative setting? Does a comparative methodology facilitate a more critical 
rereading of contemporary ethnopolitical struggles in Latin America? As will be 
shown, this comparative methodology developed greater critical awareness of the 
similarities and differences in ethnopolitical activity between Mexico and Bolivia, 
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which, in turn, generated fresh insight into the contemporary struggle for land and 
Indigenous rights in Latin America. It is hoped that the findings generated from this 
study will encourage scholars of Latin American indigeneities to consider the merits of 
comparative methodologies in future ethnopolitical research.  
 The focus on place and space adopted in this thesis provided an effective 
framework for this study. It isolated two key components of the wider ethnopolitical 
struggle in Latin America and positioned them as organising tropes. Chapters one and 
two comparatively analysed the struggle for land and place in Mexico and Bolivia and 
identified several key similarities and differences in the way Indigenous people 
challenge the logic of the neoliberal lifeworld in order to “make place” in Latin 
America. Moreover, chapters three and four examined the politics of space and 
established key findings in relation to Indigenous representation in Mexico and Bolivia 
and how Indigenous people engage space and endow it with meaning and value 
through discourse, performance and other acts. Central to the success of this 
comparative study was the choice of methodology and how this multidisciplinary 
framework combined local and international Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
scholarship and print media with several key primary texts published by Indigenous 
people themselves. This multidisciplinary methodological approach honoured 
Indigenous agency and provided first-hand insight into how Indigenous people 
attempt to influence and affect change over and throughout the lifeworld. 
Additionally, my interest in Mexico and Bolivia stemmed from the radically different 
ways in which ethnopolitics is conducted in each country which led me to pose the 
following question in the introduction: how does the Zapatista model of ethnopolitical 
autonomy compare to former Indigenous president of Bolivia Evo Morales Ayma and 
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his ethnopolitical model of nation-state governance particularly in relation to the 
struggle for place and space?  
 In terms of land and place, several key findings emerge as a result of this 
comparative methodological framework. From the outset this comparative 
ethnopolitical study reinforced the widely held view that state-endorsed development 
agendas, whether led by Indigenous or non-Indigenous presidents, continue to 
generate considerable ongoing challenges for Indigenous communities and their 
ability to “make place” right across Latin America. In Mexico, I described how the 
Zapatista social justice movement resisted the ethnoterritorial and ethnocultural 
appropriations of the Maya region by president Andrés Manuel López Obrador and his 
Tren Maya development. Even though development of this rail network has yet to 
commence, it has already divided opinion between Indigenous groups who have 
endorsed the economic merits of the project and those, namely the Zapatistas, who 
have not. The already contested nature of this railway development in Chiapas 
resembles, in part, the long-standing resistance led by lowland Indigenous 
communities in Bolivia against the construction of a roadway development through 
the heart of the TIPNIS reserve. However, considering the ethnic status of former 
Bolivian president Evo Morales Ayma, the 2011 TIPNIS controversy evolved into a 
discursive battleground, where, I argued, race and gender were weaponised by the 
Morales state to marginalise and exclude lowland Indigenous people from the nation, 
representing them as elements acting outside the collective interests of the 
plurinational state. Yet, despite this nuance, this comparative study acknowledged the 
universal threat posed by development projects on or near Indigenous territories that 
are endorsed by governments which promote/d anti-neoliberal agendas. 
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 Alongside universal opposition to state-endorsed development, this 
comparative study drew attention to other key findings in relation to the ways in 
which Indigenous people in Bolivia and Mexico “make place”. Tracing the contours of 
ethnoterritoriality along rural-urban lines, chapter two argued that la nueva 
arquitectura andina redefines the act of place-making in contemporary Bolivia, where 
wealthy Aymara peoples seek out new ways to renegotiate the ethnic self. By 
transforming the urban landscape of El Alto, la nueva arquitectura andina combines 
the use of vivid Andean colours and ancient Andean iconography to recreate bold 
architectural aesthetics which reassert new forms of ethnic pride in this 
predominantly Indigenous city. As I argued, these buildings function as social spaces, 
where communities gather to mediate social ties through fiestas exercising a sense of 
communal belonging which mimics traditional practices performed within the 
Andean ayllu. Meanwhile, as this comparative framework pointed out, the Zapatista 
Caracoles developed decidedly different conceptual features which radically 
distinguish them from Neo-Andean architecture in Bolivia. In chapter one I argued 
that, in a similar way to snail shells which spiral in an inward-outward motion, the 
Zapatista Caracoles differentiate between inside and outside spaces, allowing 
Indigenous communities to construct the familiar internal world of Zapatista 
autonomy away from the evasive threat posed by the neoliberal order outside.  
 Yet, despite the fact that these acts of place-making are aesthetically distinct 
from each other, highlighting the non-uniform ways in which Indigenous people 
choose to “make place” in different parts of Latin America, this comparative study 
revealed that Indigenous place-making operates along similar epistemological lines. In 
the same way that la nueva arquitectura andina reworks the logic of capitalism around 
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the creation of these modern Indigenous aesthetics in El Alto, where wealthy alteños 
invest considerable money to commission these ethnic designs, the Zapatista 
Caracoles compel the world of neoliberal development aid to conform to the internal 
standards established by Zapatista communities, thus allowing Indigenous people to 
decide on the flow and exchange of financial aid and other external assistance between 
Zapatistas and the neoliberal world. Even though Indigenous people “make place” in 
decidedly distinctive ways which often appear to bear little resemblance to each other, 
this comparative methodology has determined that acts of place-making are defined 
by a universal need to empower communities against the excesses of neoliberal 
orthodoxy, reworking and conforming the logic of capital around internal ethnic 
subjectivities which guarantee their agency and visibility in the lifeworld and, above 
all, secure their place in Latin America.  
 In addition to land and place, this thesis developed a comparative analysis in 
relation to the politics of space, revealing the opportunities and challenges which lie at 
the heart of the wider ethnopolitical struggle for social justice in contemporary Latin 
America. Applying the use of two separate theoretical utopian frameworks, this 
comparative study analysed primary texts which illuminated several key similarities 
and differences in the way Indigenous people in Mexico and Bolivia engaged space and 
endowed it with meaning through discourse and other embodied acts. This 
comparative methodology isolated key texts such as the Zapatista Declaraciones de la 
Selva Lacandona and former president Morales's two 2006 inaugural speeches, which 
were common devices used by both Indigenous groups in Mexico and Bolivia to 
negotiate the public space and communicate meaning within and throughout the 
wider social body.  
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 As results from this comparative study show, the politics of space and the 
ethnopolitical struggle to enact meaning over and throughout the lifeworld is largely 
influenced by the nation-state and, in particular, whether Indigenous people choose to 
embrace it as a vehicle for change or reject it altogether. As argued in chapter three, 
the Zapatista Declaraciones de la Selva Lacandona challenged and destabilised the 
dynamics of the neoliberal Mexican state by first declaring war against the federal 
executive before then articulating new ideas and proposals regarding the struggle for 
democracy, liberty and justice in Mexico. By deploying the concept of hope across the 
declarations, the Zapatistas actively encouraged civil society to transcend the limits of 
modernity and to organise in more hopeful and utopian ways outside the boundaries 
of electoral democracy in Mexico. Evolving and adapting their resistance, the 
Zapatistas gradually developed a transnational view of the world, where they 
challenged the hegemony of global capitalism by proposing to build a globalisation of 
resistance from below and to the Left.  
 In contrast to the pursuit of justice by the Zapatistas outside and in opposition 
to the neoliberal state, former president Morales embraced the nation-state as a 
platform and vehicle to enact change throughout the Bolivian lifeworld. Through an 
Andean utopian framework, chapter four analysed Morales's 2006 inaugural speeches, 
revealing the way the former president of Bolivia reshaped the internal dynamics of 
national space around the struggle for Indigenous rights and justice. By combining 
discourse and performance Morales strategically reworked Andean histories, 
memories and myths to legitimise his presidency in the political present, positioning 
his 2006 victory as the culmination of a long anti-colonial revolutionary history. Yet, 
despite these key differences, this comparative study also pointed to the limitations of 
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textual space and, in particular, the struggle to enact meaningful, long-term 
ethnopolitical change in Latin America. 
  In Bolivia, the 2011 TIPNIS controversy not only revealed how Morales sought 
to consolidate his victory and enhance his image as Indigenous president by endorsing 
infrastructural projects like the highway which aimed to improve Bolivia's strategic 
influence in the Andes, it also pointed to the deeply contested nature of state-driven 
policies, where Morales violently policed lowland Indigenous communities who 
exercised their right to reject the president’s proposal for development. The decline in 
support for Morales accelerated as a result of events such as the Chaparina Massacre 
which destabilised his image as Indigenous president and revealed the fragile limits of 
his Andean utopian vision. While recapturing the nation-state offered Morales 
extensive opportunity to enact radical ethnopolitical change over and throughout the 
Bolivian lifeworld, translating discourse into action and transforming the country into 
a leading model of Indigenous state governance, the TIPNIS controversy revealed the 
contested nature of national imaginaries and the difficulty faced by a single 
Indigenous president compelled to lead a diverse, dynamic and at times contested 
plurinational state. Meanwhile, in an alternative space outside the confines of the 
nation-state, the Zapatista social justice movement continue to gradually build a 
global resistance against capitalism which is an enormous challenge for a relatively 
small and local Indigenous population that relies on solidarity with other anti-
neoliberal forces inside and outside Mexico in order to effect change within this 
expansive global universe. Collectively, these limitations point to the vulnerability of 
ethnopolitical actors in Latin America today, who struggle to translate discourse and 
other embodied practices into long-term transformative change. This ongoing struggle 
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to enact meaning in space reinforces the value of place which will never be truly 
guaranteed until Indigenous people see the world as theirs to inhabit too.  
All studies are necessarily limited in scope due to time and other constraints. 
However, it is hoped that the necessary limitations of this study indicate pathways 
towards further opportunities for comparative research in Latin American 
indigeneties. This comparative study established a series of findings in relation to the 
politics of place and space across two primary ethnopolitical case studies drawn from 
Mexico and Bolivia. I contend that findings from this study would be further enriched 
through additional comparative research between other leading ethnopolitical case 
studies in Latin America. For example, Indigenous groups in Chile and Ecuador are 
heavily involved in a series of anti-neoliberal protests, where the struggle for place and 
space is very much to the fore of their contemporary ethnopolitical agendas. 
Moreover, there is also scope to expand a comparative indigeneities methodology 
beyond politics to include many of the ethnocultural dimensions of Indigenous 
resistance, where art, literature, textiles, and other cultural practices are applied in 
different ways across the continent with a view to promoting ethnic visibility amid the 
homogenous culture of the neoliberal world. The digital space also provides scope for 
comparative research as Indigenous people across Latin America use the internet to 
not only to promote activism and awareness of their political struggles but to revive 
ethnic languages through hip-hop culture in places like El Alto and Yucatán. The 
scope for comparative research in Latin American indigeneities truly is immense and 
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